Ethics - The Way We Live

Fundamentals

The goal of human life is not virtue or piety but a life of happiness in which pleasure predominates over pain.

As if Epicurus had not sufficiently shocked conventional sensibilities by dismissing the existence of supernatural gods, and rejecting the pursuit of virtue as an end in itself, Epicurus tripled down on his philosophic revolution by holding that “Pleasure” is not something disreputable, but is indeed the Guide of life. Pointing out that in a universe in which there are no supernatural gods or absolute standards of virtue, it is still necessary to determine how we should live. Epicurus of course looked to Nature, and saw that Nature gives living beings only Pleasure and Pain by which to determine what to choose and what to avoid

Flagrantly disregarding the wrath of the orthodox, Epicurus proclaimed Nature quite literally gave humanity “nothing” but Pleasure and Pain as guides. While there are many shades of feeling, all of them resolve down to being categorized pleasurable or painful, and there are no in-between, mixed, or third alternatives. As Epicurus’ biographer summarized, “The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“ (Diogenes Laertius 10:34)

Epicurus did not consider this to be wordplay or wishful thinking, but the foundation on which to erect the highest and best way of life. Epicurean philosophy always looks to Nature rather than to wishful thinking, and so the Epicureans taught: “Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that Nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain? (Torquatus in Cicero’s On Ends 1:30)

Citations:
1. As to the definition of Pleasure, see the following citations and the related answer in the FAQ List:
  1. Pleasure is one of the feelings, of which there are only two - pleasure and pain:
    1. Diogenes Laertius 10:34 : ”/The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“/
    2. On Ends 1:30 : ”/Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?/
  2. Given that there are only two feelings, you are feeling one or the other at all times if you are feeling anything at all:
    1. On Ends 1:38: Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“
  3. As to pleasure and pain being separate and unmixed in any particular feeling:
    1. PD03 : ”/The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once/ .“
  4. All of those taken together show that Epicurus did not limit pleasure to what we generally think of as sensory stimulation, but included within pleasure all states of awareness of life that are not felt to be painful. You can see an explicit example of that here in regard to discussion of one’s hand in its normal state of affairs, whenever it is not in some affirmative pain:
    1. On Ends 1:39 : For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.
  5. This position is asserted by comparing the conditions of two people who are not in pain, but who are seemingly in very different conditions: A host at a party who is pouring wine to a guest who is drinking it. Here is the example:
    1. On Ends 2:16 : “This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one’s senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?” [Torquatus objects to the question as quibbling but the implicit answer is “yes” based on the condition of “not being thirsty” and “the thirsty man who drinks” both being conditions of pleasure.”]
  6. This means that Epicurus was defining all conditions of awareness where pain is not present to be pleasure. It’s significant to remember “conditions of awareness” because he is not saying that a rock, which is not feeling pain, to be feeling pleasure. Only the living can feel pleasure or pain, but when you and aware of your condition all of your feelings can be categorized as either painful or pleasurable. You can see this sweeping categorization stated specifically here:
    1. On Ends 2:9 : Cicero: ”…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that ‘freedom from pain’ does not mean the same thing as ‘pleasure.’” Torquatus: “Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be.”
    2. On Ends 2:11: Cicero: Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” Torquatus: “Absolutely the same, indeed the negation of pain is a very intense pleasure, the most intense pleasure possible.”
  7. This is how Epicurus can say that the wise man is continuously feeling pleasure, and how he defines the absence of pain as the highest pleasure. He is not talking about the most intense stimulation, he is talking philosophically about the most pure and complete condition of pleasure where pleasure is defined as a condition where absolutely all pain is gone. The wise man is about to consider this condition to be the most complete pleasure even though it is not the most intense stimulation:
    1. On Ends 1:56 : By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain. [57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory. Fools however are tormented by the recollection of misfortunes; wise men rejoice in keeping fresh the thankful recollection of their past blessings. Now it is in the power of our wills to bury our adversity in almost unbroken forgetfulness, and to agreeably and sweetly remind ourselves of our prosperity. But when we look with penetration and concentration of thought upon things that are past, then, if those things are bad, grief usually ensues, if good, joy.
    2. On Ends 1:62 : But these doctrines may be stated in a certain manner so as not merely to disarm our criticism, but actually to secure our sanction. For this is the way in which Epicurus represents the wise man as continually happy; he keeps his passions within bounds; about death he is indifferent; he holds true views concerning the eternal gods apart from all dread; he has no hesitation in crossing the boundary of life, if that be the better course. Furnished with these advantages he is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains. For he remembers the past with thankfulness, and the present is so much his own that he is aware of its importance and its agreeableness, nor is he in dependence on the future, but awaits it while enjoying the present; he is also very far removed from those defects of character which I quoted a little time ago, and when he compares the fool’s life with his own, he feels great pleasure. And pains, if any befall him, have never power enough to prevent the wise man from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation.
As to Pleasure being the guide of life:
1. Lucretius Book Two [167]:
  1. Munro: “But some in opposition to this, ignorant of matter, believe that nature cannot without the providence of the gods, in such nice conformity to the ways of men, vary the seasons of the year and bring forth crops, aye and all the other things, which divine pleasure, the guide of life, prompts men to approach, escorting them in person and enticing them by her fondlings to continue their races through the arts of Venus, that mankind may not come to an end.”
  2. Rouse: “But some in opposition to this, knowing nothing of matter, believe that without the gods’ power nature cannot with so exact conformity to the plans of mankind change the seasons of the year, and produce crops, and in a word all else which divine pleasure, the guide of life, persuades men to approach, herself leading them and coaxing them, through the ways of Venus, to beget their generations, that the human race may not come to an end.”
  3. Humphries: “Some people do not know how matter works. They think that nature needs the will of the gods to fit the seasons of the year so nicely to human needs, to bring to birth the crops And other blessings, which our guide to life, the radiance of pleasure, makes us crave through Venus’ agency.”
2. Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus [129]:
  1. Bailey: [129] And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good.
Notes: There is no higher good than pleasure, no greater evil than pain.

2. The Term “Pleasure” Does Not Include Only Physical And Mental Stimulation, But All Types Of Normal, Healthy, and Non-Painful Experience.

It is proper to divide all experience between those that are pleasurable and those that are painful. Life itself is desirable, and therefore all experiences which are not painful are rightly considered to be pleasurable.

One might think that stirring philosophers, priests, and politicians to exasperation on the topics of “Gods,” and “Virtue” would be enough of a revolution for any one philosopher. But Epicurus’s commitment to the truth led him to drive forward to correct the erroneous view of “Pleasure” as well. While virtually everyone before him had properly understood “pleasure” as including sensory stimulation, Epicurus saw this definition as perversely narrow. Epicurus therefore turned to clarifying how the term “pleasure” properly applies to more than sensory stimulation, just as the term “gods” properly applies only to non-supernatural beings.

Epicurus realized that since Nature has given us only two feelings, if we are alive and feeling anything at all we then are feeling one or the other of the two. That means if we are not feeling pain, what we are feeling is in fact pleasure. This means that “Pleasure” involves much more than the sensory stimulation, which we have been trained by priests and virtue-based philosophers to consider the only meaning of the term. Once we understand that all experiences in life that are not painful are rightly considered to be pleasurable, Epicurus taught us that we can then use the term “Absence of Pain” as conveying exactly the same meaning as “Pleasure.” The benefit of this perspective is that Pleasure be comes something that is widely available through a myriad of ways of life that do not require great pain to experience. Pleasure becomes a workable term to describe the goal of life, and a life of continuous pleasure in which pleasures predominate over pain becomes possible for all but the very few who face extreme circumstances (and even they need not face more pain than pleasure indefinitely.)

Just as we should understand “gods” to refer to living beings who are blessed and imperishable, and “virtue” to refer to actions which lead to happiness, we should understand “pleasure” to refer to all experiences of life that are not painful. Torquatus preserves for us this explanation: “Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“ (On Ends 1:38)

Find out more in our page dedicated to The Epicurean View of Pleasure, our Ethics Forum, our Wiki, and our Discussion Guide. Listen to our Special Lucretius Today Podcast Episode 269 devoted to this topic.

Citations:
1. Diogenes Laertius X-34 : ”The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“
2. On Ends Book One, 30 : ”Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?
3. On Ends Book One, 38 : Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“
4. On Ends Book One, 39 : For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.
5. On Ends Book Two, 9 : Cicero: ”…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that ‘freedom from pain’ does not mean the same thing as ‘pleasure.’” Torquatus: “Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be.”
6. On Ends, Book Two, 11: Cicero: Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” Torquatus: “Absolutely the same, indeed the greatest, beyond which none greater can possibly be.” [Plane idem, inquit, et maxima quidem, qua fieri nulla maior potest. (Cic. Fin. 2.11)]
7. On Ends Book Two, 16 : “This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one’s senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?”

The authorities appear to confine the reference to “smooth motion” to the Cyreniacs, and to interpret the Diogenes Laertius reference to kinetic and katastematic pleasures as rejecting this relationship. Is that necessarily so, however? Need to verify these two alleged citations as they come from Chatgpt:

Diogenes Laertius 2.86–87 (Cyrenaics): “They laid down that there are two states, pleasure and pain, the former a smooth motion, the latter a rough motion….”
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.215 (on Cyrenaics): “Cyrenaic doctrine… says that the End is pleasure and the smooth motion of the flesh.”

Lucretius references to roughness:

De Rerum Natura 2.434–441: when atoms with “hooked” shapes entangle, they produce aspera tactu (“rough to the touch”), which he associates with bitterness and pain in taste and bodily sensation.
DRN 2.447–452: smooth, round atoms yield gentle, pleasant sensations, while rough, barbed atoms yield harsh and painful ones.
DRN 4.637–640: in discussing sensations of touch, “aspera tactu” again denotes what produces pain, as opposed to smoothness producing delight.

3. The Wise Man is Always Happy Because He Is Always Able To Find More Reason For Joy Than For Vexation.

Everyone experiences pain in life, but the wise man who understands the true nature of pleasure is able to find more pleasure than pain and therefore finds life to be desirable.

4. Life Is Desirable, But Unlimited Time Contains No Greater Pleasure Than Limited Time.

Continuation of life is desirable because it brings additional pleasures, but the reasoning mind understands that additional pleasure can never be greater in kind than the pleasure which we experience when pain is totally absent. The elimination of pain from our experience does not require unlimited time, so the wise man recognizes that the additional pleasures in a life of unlimited time are not greater in kind than those which we experience in limited time.

As we close this list of some of Epicurus’s most important doctrines, by now it should be no surprise that Epicurus held that life is very desirable. How could he reason otherwise, given that life is a necessity for the experience of pleasure, and pleasure is what Nature has given us as the goal to pursue? But Epicurus knew that humanity is not only fearful of death, but that we covet so strongly the possibility of living forever that we are constantly tempted by mystical claims offering us false promises of eternal life. Epicurus saw that he needed to answer that challenge, and deal with the concern that the inevitable death of our friends and ourselves constitutes a stain on life which forever spoils our happiness. Such a negative view of life was unacceptable to Epicurus, and he pointed out that death in fact does not deprive us of nearly so much as we think it does.

The observation that pleasure cannot be made more complete than complete (than when we experience nothing but pleasure without any adulteration of pain) leads us to realize that Infinite Time Contains No Greater Pleasure Than A Limited Time. This is because while it is certainly true that pleasure is greater in duration when we live longer, pleasure cannot be made more complete than complete, and duration is not the only factor involved in measuring pleasure. Epicurus wrote to Menoeceus that the wise man at a banquet choose not the most food, but the best, and held that our desire should not be for the longest life, but the most pleasant. The determination of what is “most pleasant” is not an objective measurement, but instead must take into account all circumstances of life, including not only duration but also the intensity and part of the body affected by pleasure and pain. If we take Epicurus’ advice to heart, we see that nothing can be made more complete than that which is complete, and that “variation” - or the continuous adding-on of new pleasurable experiences, cannot make our lives more complete any more than continuously adding water to a jar can make the jar hold more water.

Epicurus explains to us that his philosophy allows us to see that no matter how long we live, unlimited time can contain no “greater” pleasure than limited time. This is because time (duration) is only one aspect of pleasure. It makes no more sense for us to seek the longest time of life as the greatest pleasure as it would for us to measure the largest quantity of food at a banquet as being the best way to eat. While time is a relevant dimension, time is not at all the complete picture of pleasure, because pleasure involves not just time but intensity, and the part of the our experience that is affected; and in the end the “best” pleasure is a subjective assessment. Epicurus tells us we can see this by considering the person at a banquet, as already mentioned. Epicurus wrote to Menoeceus that the wise man at a banquet will choose not the most food, but the best food, and held that our desire should not be for the longest life, but the most pleasant life.

When you remember the Epicurean worldview that there is no supernatural god, no absolute virtue or right and wrong to which we must conform, we can see that the decision as to what is the best life - the most complete life for us - is a matter for us to decide, and that time is neither the most important factor nor the determiner of our decision. Epicurus teaches us to compare our lives to a banquet, or to a jar that we are filling with water. What we should want to do is not to eat the most food, or continue pouring water into the jar after it is full, but to see that the “fullness of pleasure” and the completeness of life is something that we can retain despite our limited lifespans. No jar can be filled more full than full, and no life can be made more complete than complete: once we see that our target is a “complete” life, then “variation” - or the continuous adding-on of new pleasurable experiences — does not make the experience any more pleasant. And since it is pleasure that Nature gives us as our goal, Epicurean philosophy gives us a fighting chance - if we work to understand it and apply it properly - to consider our lives to be complete and in no need of unlimited time.

Citations:

PD19. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure.
Letter to Menoeceus 126: “And he who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man to make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life, but also because it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die well.”
PD18. The pleasure in the flesh is not increased when once the pain due to want is removed, but is only varied: and the limit as regards pleasure in the mind is begotten by the reasoned understanding of these very pleasures, and of the emotions akin to them, which used to cause the greatest fear to the mind.
PD20. The flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited, and unlimited time is required to supply it. But the mind, having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits, and having dissipated the fears concerning the time to come, supplies us with the complete life, and we have no further need of infinite time; but neither does the mind shun pleasure, nor, when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short, in any way, of the best life.
PD21. He who has learned the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain due to want, and makes the whole of life complete, is easy to obtain, so that there is no need of actions which involve competition.
Notes:

5. The Virtues Are The Tools For Finding Happiness Through Pleasure; The Virtues Are Not Absolute Or Ends In Themselves.

Only pleasure is desirable in and of itself. The virtues are tools for obtaining pleasure and a life of happiness, and the virtues are valuable only for the pleasure that they bring, not as goals in themselves.

Skepticism and Determinism do not exhaust the list of lies and errors plaguing humanity. Epicurus saw that false priests and philosophers have erected a false ideal - “virtue” - as the goal of life. Epicurean philosophy has shocked the sensibilities of conventional thinkers for two thousand years by committing itself boldly to the conclusion that “virtue” is not absolute or an end in itself, and that Nature alone provides us the proper guide of life.

As with “gods,” Epicurus held that “virtue” is a useful concept, but one that has been drastically misunderstood. True “virtue” is not something given by divine revelation, or through logical analysis of ideal forms, but is instead simply a set of tools for living the best life possible. Epicurus held that virtue is not the same for all people, or the same at all times and places, but that instead what is virtuous varies with circumstance, according to whether the action is instrumental for achieving happiness. Good and evil are not absolutes, but instead consist in sensation, as Epicurus explained to Menoeceus: ” “Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation. And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality.” (124)

Likewise, even something as highly regarded as justice is not absolute, but observable only in practical effects: “In its general aspect, justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all.” (PD36)

Citations:
1. Letter to Menoeceus [124]
  1. Bailey: “Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation. And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality.”
  2. Hicks: “Accustom thyself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply sentience, and death is the privation of all sentience; therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life an illimitable time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality.”
  3. Inwood-Gerson: “Get used to believing that death is nothing to us. For all good and bad consists in sense-experience, and death is the privation of sense-experience. Hence, a correct knowledge of the fact that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life a matter for contentment, not by adding a limitless time [to life] but by removing the longing for immortality.”
  4. Epicurus Wiki (Epicurism.info): ” Accustom yourself to thinking that death is no concern to us. All things good and bad are experienced through sensation, but sensation ceases at death. So death is nothing to us, and to know the truth of this makes a mortal life happy — not by adding infinite time, but by removing the desire for immortality.”
  5. Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 33
    1. Bailey: “Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time, it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed.
  6. Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 36
    1. Bailey: “In its general aspect, justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all.”
  7. Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 37
    1. Bailey: “Among actions which are sanctioned as just by law, that which is proved, on examination, to be of advantage, in the requirements of men’s dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not. But if a man makes a law, and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men’s dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice. And even if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is nonetheless just for that period, in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds, but look to the actual facts.”
  8. Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 38:
    1. Bailey: “Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just have been shown not to accord with the general concept, in actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, they were just at the time, when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another, but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer of advantage.”
Citations:
1. Letter to Menoeceus [124]
  1. Bailey: “Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation. And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality.”
  2. Hicks: “Accustom thyself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply sentience, and death is the privation of all sentience; therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life an illimitable time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality.”
  3. Inwood-Gerson: “Get used to believing that death is nothing to us. For all good and bad consists in sense-experience, and death is the privation of sense-experience. Hence, a correct knowledge of the fact that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life a matter for contentment, not by adding a limitless time [to life] but by removing the longing for immortality.”
  4. Epicurus Wiki (Epicurism.info): ” Accustom yourself to thinking that death is no concern to us. All things good and bad are experienced through sensation, but sensation ceases at death. So death is nothing to us, and to know the truth of this makes a mortal life happy — not by adding infinite time, but by removing the desire for immortality.”
  5. Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 33
    1. Bailey: “Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time, it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed.
  6. Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 36
    1. Bailey: “In its general aspect, justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all.”
  7. Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 37
    1. Bailey: “Among actions which are sanctioned as just by law, that which is proved, on examination, to be of advantage, in the requirements of men’s dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not. But if a man makes a law, and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men’s dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice. And even if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is nonetheless just for that period, in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds, but look to the actual facts.”
  8. Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 38:
    1. Bailey: “Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just have been shown not to accord with the general concept, in actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, they were just at the time, when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another, but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer of advantage.”

Wisdom {#wisdom}

Temperance (Self-Control) {#temperance—self-control}

Courage {#courage}

Justice {#justice}

Honesty {#honesty}

Faith (Confidence) {#faith—confidence}

Friendship {#friendship}

Suavity {#suavity}

Consideration {#consideration}

Hope {#hope}

Gratitude {#gratitude}

The Question of “Katastematic vs Kinetic Pleasure” {#the-question-of-katastematic-vs-kinetic-pleasure}

See “Epicurus On Pleasure,” by Boris Nikolsy, for an explanation of this issue and a proposed resolution based on the work of Gosling & Taylor in “The Greeks On Pleasure.”

Key Takeaways:

Nature gives us nothing other than pleasure and pain as guides to determine what to choose and avoid, and so we conclude that all “good” and “evil” comes to us through sensation.
If we are alive and experience anything at all, that experience can be considered to be either pleasure or pain. There is no neutral or in-between feeling, because the experience of living without pain is pleasurable. While we can feel both pleasure and pain at the same time in different aspects of our experience, when we feel pleasure in that aspect of experience, we feel no pain in that aspect, and the reverse is true also. This means that the normal experiences of life where pain is not present are pleasurable, and thus that pleasure is the normal state of life and in most cases easy to obtain.
The most desirable life is that in which we are experiencing only pleasures without any accompaniment of pains. While pain is difficult to avoid, and must sometimes be chosen, pain is by nature generally either manageable, if of long duration, or brief, if of high intensity, and thus unmanageable and intense pain is not to be feared.
In a general sense we use the word “Pleasure” to describe what nature tells us to pursue and “Pain” to describe what nature tells us to avoid, but in the service of Pleasure we sometimes choose an immediate pain and avoid an immediate pleasure when the outcome of our choice will lead to greater pleasure as a result.
In the selection of pleasures we also do not necessarily select those which are longest lasting, but instead we select those that are the most pleasant.
No pleasure is intrinsically “bad” or “evil,” but the desire for some pleasures produces more pain than pleasure, and such desires should be avoided.
While all pleasure is desirable and all pain is undesirable prudence in choosing and avoiding involves primarily asking the question: “What will happen to me if I pursue this course of action?”
It is also useful to ask whether the desire involves matters which are natural or necessary, with the principle of the distinction being that those things that are necessary are satisfied without much trouble or effort, since nature herself makes such wealth as will satisfy her both easy of access and moderate in amount, but as to those things that are neither necessary nor natural it is not possible to discover any boundary or limit.
In human life, pain is generally either manageable, if of long duration, or brief, if of high intensity, and thus unmanageable and intense pain is not to be feared.
Virtue is not an end in itself. Nature provides pleasure and pain as guides for choice and avoidance, but Nature does not provide absolute standards of goodness, virtue, piety, reason, or justice that apply to all people at all times and all places. Those things we think of as virtuous are good are choiceworthy only insofar as they contribute to bringing pleasure or avoiding pain.
There is no heaven or hell after death in which to experience reward or punishment. Life is short, and we should not put postpone pursuing pleasure while we can.
Because atoms can swerve, humans and other intelligent beings are not subject to complete determinism, and their lives are affected by their choices and avoidances. It would be better to commit the error of believing in a false religion than to commit the error of considering oneself to be a slave to hard determinism.
And so while we live, let neither the young be slow to seek wisdom, nor the old weary in the search of it. For no age is too early or too late for the health of the soul. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]
And to say that the season for studying philosophy has not yet come, or that it is past and gone, is like saying that the season for happiness has not yet come, or that it is now no more. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]
But some men argue that happiness is not the goal of life, and that there is some particular final and ultimate good, an End to which all other things are means, while not itself a means to anything else. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
But we that it is Pleasure which is our first and kindred good, the alpha and omega of a blessed life, and that all Pleasure is good. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]
And so the “greatest good” is that which brings about unsurpassable joy, such as the bare escape from some dreadful calamity. [(Plutarch - Epicurean Fragment)]
And this is the nature of ‘the good,’ if one apprehends it rightly, and stands by his finding, and does not go on walking round and round, harping uselessly on the meaning of ‘good.’ [(Plutarch - Epicurean Fragment)]
And by this we mean that pleasurable living is the ultimate end prescribed by Nature. If you do not on every occasion refer each of your actions to this end, but instead of this you turn to some other end, your actions will not be consistent with your goal. [(Epicurus - Principal Doctrine 25)]
For we see that every animal, as soon as it is born, seeks for pleasure, and delights in pleasure, while it recoils from pain, and so far as possible avoids it. This every young animal does as long as it remains unperverted, at the prompting of Nature’s own unbiased and honest verdict. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
It is pleasure that fills the sea with ships and the lands with corn, and by pleasure is every kind of living thing conceived, rising up to behold the light of the sun. [(Lucretius Book 1)]
And in the pleasure of spring the birds take flight, the wild herds bound over green pastures and swim the rapid rivers, each in turn following the charms of pleasure with desire leading them on to continue their races. [(Lucretius Book 1)]
The proof that pleasure is our guide of life is more luminous than daylight itself. Our evidence is derived entirely from Nature’s sources, and rests firmly for confirmation on the unbiased and unimpeachable evidence of the senses. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
Lisping babies, even dumb animals, prompted by Nature’s teaching, can almost find the voice to proclaim to us that there is no welfare but pleasure, no hardship but pain, and their judgment in these matters is neither sophistic nor biased. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
Thus there is no necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain is to be avoided. These facts are perceived by the senses, in the same way that we perceive that fire is hot, snow is white, and honey is sweet. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
If we were to strip a man of all sensation, nothing would remain of his life. It therefore follows that Nature herself, through these faculties of sensation, is the judge of that which is in accord with or contrary to nature. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
And what faculty does Nature grant for perception and judgment of that which is to be desired and avoided besides pleasure and pain? [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
None of this needs to be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to it. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
For there is a difference between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder. Syllogistic reasoning is appropriate for abstract and hidden matters, but mere observation is all that is necessary to establish facts which are obvious and evident. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
Nevertheless, some men use syllogistic reasoning to argue that pleasurable living is not the goal of life. They argue that “the good” is something with a certain limit beyond which nothing is higher, but that pleasure cannot be the good because it has no limit. [( Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book 10)]
To these men we say that pleasure does have a limit, for a man’s life is like a vessel, and a man’s limit of pleasure is reached when his vessel is filled with pleasure, and all pain which accompanies that pleasure is removed. [(Epicurus - Principal Doctrine 3, 18, 19, 20; Lucretius Book 6)]
For when the pain of want is removed, bodily pleasure does not increase, and only varies. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 18)]
Mental pleasure also has a limit, and this limit is reached when we reflect on the limits of the bodily pleasures, and the limits on the fears that cause the mind the greatest alarms. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 18)]
For although the body itself knows no limits to the time required to fulfill its pleasures, the mind, intellectually grasping the goal and the limits of the flesh is capable of banishing all terror of the future, and of procuring a life that is complete in the knowledge that we have no need of unlimited time. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 20)]
This is because the mind can grasp that if we measure the limits of pleasure through reason, unlimited time can afford no purer pleasure than limited time. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 3. 18, 19, 20)]
But it is impossible for someone to dispel the pain of fear about the most important matters in life if he does not understand the nature of the universe, and if he gives credence to myths.[(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 49)]
So for those who do not study nature, there can be no enjoyment of pure pleasure. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 49)]
Other men argue that pleasure cannot be “the good” because the pleasant life is more desirable when Virtue is added. [(Aristotle - Nichomachean Ethics, Book 10)]
These men say that if the addition of Virtue is better, then pleasure is not the good; for the good cannot become more desirable by the addition of anything to it. [(Aristotle - Nichomachean Ethics, Book 10)]
But those who place the Good in Virtue are beguiled by the glamour of a name, and do not understand the true demands of Nature. If they will simply listen to Epicurus, they will be delivered from the grossest error. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
These men speak grandly about the transcendent beauty of the virtues; but were they not productive of pleasure, who would deem them either praiseworthy or desirable? [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
We esteem the art of medicine not for its interest as a science, but for its conduciveness to health; the art of navigation is commended for its practical and not its scientific value, because it conveys the rules for sailing a ship with success. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
So also Wisdom, which must be considered as the art of living, if it effected no result would not be desired. But as it is, wisdom is desired, because it is the artificer that procures and produces pleasure. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
We must therefore act to pursue those things which bring happiness, since, if that be present, we have everything, and, if that be absent, all our actions are directed towards attaining it. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]
If the point at issue here involved only the means of obtaining happiness, and our enemies wanted to say “the virtues” - which would actually be true - we would simply agree without more ado. [(Diogenes of Oinoanda)]
But the issue is not “what is the means of happiness,” but “what is happiness itself and what is the ultimate goal of our nature.” [(Diogenes of Oinoanda)]
To this we say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that Pleasure is the end of the best way of life, while the virtues, which are messed about by our enemies and transferred from the place of the means to that of the end, are in no way the end in themselves, but the means to the end. [(Diogenes of Oinoanda)]
But a great error has arisen among men in the mistaken idea of condemning pleasure and praising pain. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
For no one rejects, dislikes or avoids pleasure itself, because it is pleasure, but because those who do not know how to pursue pleasure rationally encounter consequences that are extremely painful. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
Nor again is there anyone who loves or pursues or desires pain itself, because it is pain, but because they see that circumstances occur in which toil and pain can procure some great pleasure. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
For example, who among us ever undertakes laborious physical exercise except to obtain some advantage? [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
But who has any right to find fault with a man who chooses to enjoy pleasures that have no annoying consequences, or one who avoids a pain that produces no resulting pleasure? [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
On the other hand, we denounce with righteous indignation men who are so beguiled and demoralized by the charms of the pleasure of the moment that they cannot foresee the pain and trouble that are bound to follow. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
Equal blame belongs to those who fail in their undertakings through weakness of will, which is the same as saying that they shrink from toil and pain. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
But in a free hour, when our power of choice is unlimited, and nothing prevents our being able to do what we like best, every pleasure is to be welcomed and every pain avoided. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
In certain emergencies, or owing to the claims of ordinary life, it will frequently occur that pleasures have to be postponed and annoyances accepted. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
The wise man always holds in these matters to this principle of selection: he rejects some pleasures to secure other and greater pleasures, and he endures some pain to avoid other and worse pains. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
And so question each of your desires, and ask: “What will happen to me if that which this desire seeks is achieved, and what if it is not?” [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 71)]
All pleasure is good, because it is naturally pleasing to us, but not all pleasure should be chosen. And in the same way all pain is evil, and yet not all pain is to be shunned. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
It is by measuring one against another, and by looking at the conveniences and inconveniences, that all these matters must be judged. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal, who indulges in an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts, revelry, sexual lust, and the delicacies of a luxurious table, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or willful misrepresentation. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]
Instead, we say that a pleasant life is produced by those thoughts and actions which we choose and avoid after we reason soberly, and after we banish those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]
And we also say that mental pleasures and pains can be much more intense than those of the body; since the body can feel only what is present to it at the moment, whereas the mind is also aware of the past and of the future. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
Thus intense mental pleasure or distress contributes more to our happiness or misery than a bodily pleasure or pain of equal duration. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
This being the theory of Pleasure that we hold, why need we be afraid of not being able to reconcile it with the glorious exploits of our ancestors? We confidently assert that if they had a motive for the dangers that they braved in battle, that motive was not a love of virtue in and for itself. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
For when our ancestors braved great dangers before the eyes of their armies, they earned for themselves both the safety of their fellow citizens as well as honor and esteem, the strongest guarantees of security in life. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
And so we must act for ourselves to determine what to choose and avoid, and therefore the wise man scorns Fate, which some introduce as sovereign over all things. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]
The wise man affirms that some things happen by necessity, others happen by chance, and others happen through our own agency. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]
For the wise man sees that necessity destroys responsibility, and that chance is inconstant, but our own actions are autonomous, and it is to our own actions that praise and blame naturally attach. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]
It would be better to accept the legends of the gods than to bow beneath the yoke of destiny which determinist philosophers have imposed. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]
The legends of the gods at least hold out some faint hope that we may escape punishment, if we honor them, but the necessity of the determinist philosophers is deaf to all entreaties. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]
Necessity is an evil; but there is no necessity for continuing to live with necessity, and if life is unendurable, we may serenely quit life’s theater when the play has ceased to please us. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 9, Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
On the other hand, the man who has many good reasons for ending his own life is of very small account. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 38)]
And this is because life is desirable, and those who say that it would be better never to have been born are the most foolish. For such men could easily depart from life if they truly believed what they were saying. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]
As for us, we say that even as men choose of food not merely and simply the larger portion, but the more pleasant, so the wise seek to enjoy the time which is most pleasant, and not merely that which is longest. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]
And we also say that the wise man does not hold Fortune to be a god, as the world in general does, for in the action of a god there is no disorder. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]
The misfortune of the wise is better than the prosperity of the fool, and it is better that what we judge to be good action not owe its success to the aid of chance. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]
And that is why we regard independence of outward things to be a great good, not so that we in all cases will have little, but so that we will be content with little if we do not have much. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
This is because we are honestly persuaded that we have the sweetest enjoyment of luxury when we are least in need of it.[(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
To habituate oneself to a simple and inexpensive diet supplies all that is needed for health, and enables a man to meet the necessary requirements of life without shrinking. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
This places us in a better condition to enjoy those times when we approach luxury, and renders us fearless of fortune. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
But there is also a limit in simple living, and he who fails to understand this falls into an error as great as that of the man who gives way to extravagance. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 63)]
And likewise, to those men who say that emotion is to be avoided or repressed as a danger to the good life, we say that the wise man feels his emotions more deeply than do other men, and this is no hindrance to his wisdom. [(Diogenes Laertius - Book 10)]
As we decide what it is we should choose and avoid, we must avoid the error of those men who spend their whole lives furnishing for themselves the things they think are proper to life, without realizing that each man at birth was poured a mortal brew to drink. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 30)]
For every man passes out of life as if he had just been born, and the same span of time is both the beginning and the end of his greatest good. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 60, 42)]
So remember that you have been born once and cannot be born a second time, and for all eternity you shall no longer exist. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 44)]
You are not in control of tomorrow, so do not postpone your happiness, and waste your life by delaying, for each one of us dies without enjoying excess time. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 14)]
But we should be grateful to Nature, because she has made the necessities of life easy to acquire, and she has made those things that are difficult to acquire unnecessary. [(Epicurus - Usener Fragment 469)]
When misfortune comes, we should find solace in the happy memory of what has been, and in the knowledge that what has been cannot be undone. For the man who forgets his past blessings on that day becomes old. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 19, 55)]
Remember also that of all the means which wisdom acquires to ensure happiness throughout the whole of life, by far the most important is friendship. [(Epicurus - Principal Doctrine 27)]
For friendship dances around the world, bidding us all to awaken to the recognition of happiness. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 52)]
So at one and the same time we must philosophize, laugh, and manage our household and other business, while never ceasing to proclaim the words of true philosophy. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 41)]
And as we proclaim this true philosophy, it is preferable to seem to speak in oracles that are of advantage to all men, even though no men understand us, rather than conform to popular opinion and thereby gain the constant praise that comes from the many. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 29)]
So we must free ourselves from the prison of public education and politics, and hoist our sail and flee that which passes as culture. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 58; Epicurus - Usener Fragment to Pythocles1)]
For the soul neither rids itself of disturbance, nor gains a worthwhile joy, through possession of great wealth, nor by the honor and admiration bestowed by the crowd, nor through any of the other things sought by unlimited desire. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 81)]
The study of nature does not create men who are fond of boasting and chattering, or who show off the culture that impresses the many, but rather men who are strong and self-sufficient, and who take pride in their own personal qualities, not in those that depend on external circumstances. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 45)]
And the greatest fruit of this self-sufficiency is freedom. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 77)]
But in contrast to freedom, some men say that there is a single true law which applies universally to all men, and is unchanging and everlasting, and that this single law summons all to duty by its commands and averts all from wrong-doing by its prohibitions. [(Cicero - The Republic)]
These men say that it is a sin to try to alter or repeal this law, and there should not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law for all nations and all times. [(Cicero - The Republic)]
To these men of a single law, we say that there never was such a thing as absolute justice, but only agreements made in mutual dealings among particular men, at various times and places, to provide against infliction or suffering of harm. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 33)]
And while we also say that justice is the same for all, as it is something found mutually beneficial in the dealings of men, justice differs in how it applies to particular places and circumstances, and the same thing is not necessarily just for everyone. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 36)]
Whether a law is just depends on whether it is mutually advantageous, and this varies according to circumstances. A law ceases to be just when it is no longer advantageous for the mutual dealings of the citizens involved. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 37)]
Thus the man who best knows how to meet external threats makes into one family all the creatures he can; and those he can not, he at any rate does not treat as aliens. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 39)]
Where he finds even this impossible, he avoids all dealings, and, so far as is advantageous, excludes them from his life. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 39)]
Yet some men indulge, without limit, their avarice, ambition, and love of power, to the extent that they must be restrained, rather than reformed. Therefore any means of obtaining protection from other men is a natural good. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 6)]
Those who possess the power to defend themselves against threats by their neighbors, being thus in possession of the surest guarantee of security, live the most pleasant life with one another. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 40)]
And so let us remember that the most excellent and desirable life consists of living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures, of both body and mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain.[(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
To achieve this, we must possess a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain. We must know that death means complete unconsciousness. And we must know that pain is generally light, if long, and short, if strong. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
And we must have no dread of any supernatural power; nor must we ever allow the pleasures of the past to fade away, but we must constantly renew their enjoyment in our recollection. [(Torquatus - Cicero’s On Ends)]
Keep in mind all these things you have been taught, and you will escape far away from myth. Devote yourself to the study of first principles of Nature, and of infinity, and of the standards of choice and avoidance, and of the feelings of pleasure and pain, and of the highest goal for which we choose between them. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]
For if you exercise yourself in these precepts, day and night, both by yourself, and with one who is like-minded, then never will you be disturbed. You will live as a god among men, for men lose all semblance of mortality when they live in the midst of immortal blessings. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]
And then, when we do reach the end of our lives, we will say that we have anticipated you, Fortune, and entrenched ourselves against all your secret attacks.[(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 47)]
And we will not give ourselves up as captives, to you or to any other circumstance, but when it is time for us to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who vainly cling to it, we will leave life - crying aloud in a glorious song of triumph - that we have lived well. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 47)]

Major Concepts

title: Ethics

Epicurean ethics centers on the pursuit of a pleasurable life. The foundation of this ethical system is built on the belief that pleasure is the highest good (telos), and the natural end of human existence. A key aspect of this system is that “pleasure” is not held to involve sensory stimulation alone, but includes all activities and conditions of life which are not painful.

1. Life Is Desirable And Death Is Undesirable

Epicurus wrote in his Letter to Menoeceus at [126] that [H]e who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man to make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life, but also because it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die well. Yet much worse still is the man who says it is good not to be born but ‘once born make haste to pass the gates of Death’.

2. The Feelings Of Pleasure And Pain

Epicurus identified pleasure as the primary motivator of human action. From birth, humans seek pleasure and avoid pain, indicating that pleasure is a fundamental component of life. As a general rule, pleasure is desirable and pain is undesirable, but circumstances may at times require that some pleasures must be avoided and some pains must be chosen.

What Epicurus meant by “pleasure” has been disputed for two thousand years. That controversy continues today, with some - often influenced by Stoicism or Buddhism or other viewpoints - interpreting Epicurus as advising a life of asceticism, total withdrawal from society, and the pursuit of “tranquility” above all else.

In contrast, those who knew the Epicureans best were clear: they understood Epicurus as teaching that “Pleasure,” and not “Tranquility” or any other particular pleasure, should be considered to be the ultimate goal of life. Rather than limiting pleasure to tranquility alone, Epicurus taught that “pleasure” should be considered to include every experience in life that is not painful. Epicurus held this perspective to be correct because Nature gives us only “pleasure” and “pain” by which to determine what to choose and what to avoid. From Epicurus’ point of view, if we are alive and feeling anything at all, we are feeling either pleasure or pain, with no middle ground or third alternative. From this perspective, every agreeable experience of life, whether of the body, of the mind, or of the “spirit,” comes within the meaning of “pleasure.”

Quote from Diogenes Laertius 10:34

”The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“

Quote from Torquatus, Speaking for Epicurus in Cicero’s On Ends 1:30

”Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain

2.1. There Are Only Two Feelings: If You Are Alive, And Not Feeling Pain, You Are Feeling Pleasure

If you are not feeling pain you are feeling pleasure, and so to Epicurus the word “pleasure” includes not only agreeable sensory stimulation of mind and body but also all normal and healthy experiences of mind and body. Both are not painful, and both are therefore pleasurable. Pleasure therefore includes every non-painful moment of life of mind or body, whether “in motion” or “at rest,” and not just moments of stimulation:

Quote from Torquatus, Speaking for Epicurus in Cicero’s On Ends 1:38

Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“

Quote

Quote from Torquatus, Speaking For Epicurus in Cicero’s On Ends 1:39

For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.

This position can also be seen in the Epicurean comparison of two people who are not in pain, but who are seemingly in very different conditions: A host at a party who is pouring wine to a guest who is drinking it. Here is the example:

Quote from Torquatus, Speaking for Epicurus in Cicero’s On Ends 2:16

On Ends 2:16 : “This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one’s senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?” [Torquatus objects to the question as quibbling but the implicit answer is “yes” based on the condition of “not being thirsty” and “the thirsty man who drinks” both being conditions of pleasure.”]

An application of this perspective can be seen in Principal Doctrine 09: “If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted, and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” By referring to the different aspects of the experience of pleasure in intensity, in duration, and in location of the body that they effect, Epicurus is presuming that regardless of these differences in manner of experience, all are properly considered to be within the wider meaning of the word “pleasure.”

Seen in this way, Epicurean philosophy is neither “hedonistic” nor “ascetic,” as those terms are generally viewed today. Instead, Epicurus assures us that all types of healthy non-painful function of both body and mind are pleasurable and therefore desirable, and in this way a life full of pleasure is attainable.

2.2. There Is No Neutral State Or Third Alternative

That Pleasure and Pain are separate and unmixed in any particular feeling was important enough to be listed among the top doctrines of Epicurus:

Quote from Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 3

PD03: ”The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once .“

To illustrate how it is possible to grasp the view that there is no neutral state or third alternative, a parallel may be drawn with Epicurean physics. In Epicurean physics, every specific location in the universe is occupied either by one of two things, matter or void, with no mixture or third alternative.

We can view human life in a similar way. Epicurean ethics holds that everything in life as either agreeable or disagreeable, in other words pleasure or pain. When we remind ourselves of the vast nothingness that passed before our birth and will pass after our death, we see that every moment of life when we are not in pain is worthy of being considered agreeable and pleasurable, and can in fact be so if we approach life with the proper attitude. Even in those moments when we face pain in some part of our experience, we can look to the other parts of our mental and physical experience to find pleasure, and thus more reason for joy than for vexation.

Some will ask: “Are not bodies mixtures of atoms and void, and human lives mixtures of pleasure and pain, and are not these mixtures a third alternative?” The Epicurean response is that mixtures are not third alternatives that destroy the integrity of component parts. In Physics, “Bodies” are properly viewed as existing as combinations of matter and void, but within bodies, matter and void are properly viewed as retaining their individual identities. Likewise, a human life as a whole is properly viewed as existing as a combination of pleasures and pains, but within a life, pleasures and pains are properly viewed as retaining their individual identities. Despite the difference in their levels of observation, both perspectives are valid. As a distinguished expert on Epicurus has written:

Quote from Professor David Sedley, In “Epicurus’ Rejection of Determinism”

“Almost uniquely among Greek philosophers [Epicurus] arrived at what is nowadays the unreflective assumption of almost anyone with a smattering of science, that there are truths at the microscopic level of elementary particles, and further very different truths at the phenomenal level; that the former must be capable of explaining the latter; but that neither level of description has a monopoly of truth.”

2.3. The Term “Absence of Pain” Means Exactly the Same Thing As “Pleasure”

The insight that makes sense of the entire discussion is that for the reasons stated above, Epicurus was defining all conditions of awareness where pain is not present to be pleasure. It is significant to specify “conditions of awareness” because he is not saying that a rock, which is not feeling pain, to be feeling pleasure. Only the living can feel pleasure or pain, but when you and aware of your condition all of your feelings can be categorized as either painful or pleasurable. You can see this sweeping categorization stated specifically here:

Quote from Torquatus, Speaking for Epicurus in Cicero’s On Ends 2:9

“…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that ‘freedom from pain’ does not mean the same thing as ‘pleasure.’” Torquatus: “Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be.”

Quote from Torquatus, Speaking for Epicurus in Cicero’s On Ends 2:11

“Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” Torquatus: “Clearly the same, he says, and indeed the greatest, beyond which none greater can possibly be..”

2.4. The Term “Highest Pleasure” Does Not Refer To A Particular Or Unique Type of Pleasure, But To Any Experience Of Pleasure Unaccompanied By Pain

The realization that “absence of pain” is simply another term for pleasure dissolves any mystery about Epicurus’ view of the role of pleasure. “Absence of pain” does not constitute some special or “fancy” kind of pleasure, but simply the observation that the most complete pleasure is that which is unadulterated with any mixture of pain. Torquatus weaves together both positions in dramatically clear fashion in the statement just cited (On Ends 2:11). This linkage is stated just as clearly in Principle Doctrine 3, third in importance in Epicurean doctrine only to the observations that there are no supernatural gods and no life after death:

Quote from Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 3

PD03: ”The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once .“

When we choose to consider any particular experience of life we find pleasurable, that experience constitutes by definition an experience in which pain is absent. When we choose to consider any combination of experiences in life, either all of those we are experiencing at this moment, or over any length of time, the limit in magnitude of the pleasure portion of that combination of experiences is reached when each element of the combination is pleasurable, and no part of that combination is composed of any pain. This difference in perspective is as different in kind from Stoicism or Buddhism as a glass that is full of water is different from an empty glass of water which is full of air. Both glasses are “full” of something, but the difference in content could not be more different. Epicurus sees complete pleasure as a glass completely full of drops of water, representing all the types of pleasure available to us in life. Those who interpret “absence of pain” as nothingness do not appreciate that what has drained the glass of air (pain) is not “nothingness,” but water (pleasure.)

2.5. Continuous Happiness Is Achievable Through Seeing That Pleasure Overshadows Pain

By rejecting standard attitudes toward pleasure, Epicurus recognized that a_bsence of pain is pleasure, just as absence of pleasure is pain. Any feeling which is not a pleasure is a pain, and any feeling which is not a pain is a pleasure._ Once the error of seeing this formulation in Buddhist/Stoic eyes as nothingness or unity with divine fire is stripped away, the full value of this perspective can be seen: this perspective lays the groundwork for actually achieving a life in which pleasure overshadows pain and in which continuous happiness is possible:

Quote from Torquatus, Speaking for Epicurus in Cicero’s On Ends 1:62

For this is the way in which Epicurus represents the wise man as continually happy; he keeps his passions within bounds; about death he is indifferent; he holds true views concerning the eternal gods apart from all dread; he has no hesitation in crossing the boundary of life, if that be the better course. Furnished with these advantages he is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains. For he remembers the past with thankfulness, and the present is so much his own that he is aware of its importance and its agreeableness, nor is he in dependence on the future, but awaits it while enjoying the present; he is also very far removed from those defects of character which I quoted a little time ago, and when he compares the fool’s life with his own, he feels great pleasure. And pains, if any befall him, have never power enough to prevent the wise man from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation.

This is how Epicurus can say that the wise man is continuously feeling pleasure, and how he defines the absence of pain as the highest pleasure. Epicurus is not talking specifically about the most intense stimulation, which we may or may not just to be worthwhile when we consider the scope of our entire life. Epicurus is talking philosophically that the most “complete” condition of pleasure is defined as any condition where absolutely all pain is gone. The wise man will realize that this is the most “complete” pleasure even though it is not the most intense stimulation:

Quote from Torquatus, Speaking for Epicurus in Cicero’s On Ends 1:56

“By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain. [57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory. Fools however are tormented by the recollection of misfortunes; wise men rejoice in keeping fresh the thankful recollection of their past blessings. Now it is in the power of our wills to bury our adversity in almost unbroken forgetfulness, and to agreeably and sweetly remind ourselves of our prosperity. But when we look with penetration and concentration of thought upon things that are past, then, if those things are bad, grief usually ensues, if good, joy.”

This sweeping redefinition of the life of pleasure - rather than the gluttony or asceticism which his detractors assert - is the hallmark of the Epicurean approach to living. As one biographer of Epicurus observed:

Quote from Norman DeWitt, “Epicurus And His Philosophy” page 240

The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing.

2.6. Pleasure, Not Virtue Or Piety, Is The Supreme Good

In this revolutionary approach to the best life, to the dismay of other philosophers, “Pleasure” is identified as the Supreme Good, rather than Virtue or Piety or Tranquility or Rationality or any other conventional ideal. The Epicureans stated this boldly and emphatically:

Quote from Torquatus, Speaking For Epicurus In Cicero’s On Ends 1:29

We are inquiring, then, into what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else. This Epicurus finds in Pleasure; Pleasure he holds to be the Chief Good, and Pain the Chief Evil.

Quote from Torquatus, Speaking For Epicurus In Cicero’s On Ends 1:40

“Again, the truth that pleasure is the supreme good can be most easily apprehended from the following consideration. Let us imagine an individual in the enjoyment of pleasures great, numerous and constant, both mental and bodily, with no pain to thwart or threaten them; I ask what circumstances can we describe as more excellent than these or more desirable? A man whose circumstances are such must needs possess, as well as other things, a robust mind subject to no fear of death or pain, because death is apart from sensation, and pain when lasting is usually slight, when oppressive is of short duration, so that its temporariness reconciles us to its intensity, and its slightness to its continuance. When in addition we suppose that such a man is in no awe of the influence of the gods, and does not allow his past pleasures to slip away, but takes delight in constantly recalling them, what circumstance is it possible to add to these, to make his condition better?” (On Ends [40] XII)

2.7. Better To Speak Frankly What Is Of Benefit To All, Even If None Agree, Rather Than Compromise

Epicurus’ rejection of commonplace assumptions was by no means limited to the prevailing definition of “pleasure.” Epicurean philosophy leads to a re-examination of many other common misconceptions, including those regarding “gods,” “virtue,” “good and evil,” and even the status of “logic.”

In Epicurean terms, “gods” do exist, and it is important to act “virtuously,” but “gods” are not supernatural or omniscient beings which create universes or control human affairs, and “virtue” is not desirable as an end it itself, but as a means of obtaining pleasure. “Good” and “evil” are not abstract absolutes, but are ultimately evaluations based on sensations of pleasure and pain felt by real living beings. “Dialectical logic” is rejected as misleading, while at the same time “Practical Reason” is embraced as essential for living happily. All of these are important topics to explore and clarify, and that’s what we do here at EpicureanFriends.

Quote from Vatican Saying 29

For I would certainly prefer, as I study Nature, to announce frankly what is beneficial to all people, even if none agrees with me, rather than to compromise with common opinions, and thus reap the frequent praise of the many.

2.8. We Are Born One And Cannot Be Born Twice

As the Epicureans held, “We are born once and cannot be born twice, but for all time must be no more. But you, who are not master of tomorrow, postpone your happiness. Life is wasted in procrastination, and each one of us dies while occupied.”

If you too wish to avoid postponing your happiness, we invite you to join with us in studying and applying Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it.

2.9. Why Do I Read All Over The Internet That Epicurus Prioritized Katastematic Over Kinetic Pleasure?

The answer to this question can be very simple. For example, a first answer, embraced by writers such as Norman DeWitt and Gosling & Taylor, and perhaps best explained by Boris Nikolsky, is that it is clear that Pleasure is a term that embraces all kinds of pleasure. Epicurean texts are clear that it is “Pleasure,” and not pleasures of motion (kinetic), or pleasures of rest (katastematic), or pleasures of any particular type, that constitute a “best” or “highest” form of pleasure.

On the other hand, the answer can be very complex, as there is much dispute over how to interpret Epicurus’ references to “absence of pain.” An alternative answer, embraced by the majority of modern Academics, is that katastematic pleasure equals absence of pain, and since absence of pain can be considered to be “the greatest pleasure,” then katastematic pleasure is the true goal of Epicurean philosophy.

We have much discussion of this question in the forums here.

As a summary of the position taken by Cassius Amicus at EpicureanFriends, we would start with what Diogenes Laertius recorded at line 136 (Bailey):

Epicurus differs from the Cyrenaics about pleasure. For they do not admit static pleasure, but only that which consists in motion. But Epicurus admits both kinds both in the soul and in the body, as he says in the work on Choice and Avoidance and in the book on The Ends of Life and in the first book On Lives and in the letter to his friends in Mytilene. Similarly, Diogenes in the 17th book of Miscellanies and Metrodorus in the Timocrates speak thus: ‘Pleasure can be thought of both as consisting in motion and as static.’ And Epicurus in the work on Choice speaks as follows: ‘Freedom from trouble in the mind and from pain in the body are static pleasures, but Joy and exultation are considered as active pleasures involving motion. ’

Note first that to the extent that Epicurus was observing that pleasures may be thought of in terms of “motion,” this is a clear statement that Epicurus considered to be pleasure both experiences which do and do not involve motion.

Then, note that Epicurus states in the letter to Menoeceus is that in his philosophy, the term pleasure” denominates the very same thing as absence of pain: “By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul.” The term pleasure does not refer only to absence of pain, but to all types of pleasure, including joy, delight, and all pleasures that are clearly pleasures of “motion,” just as much as the term refers to any other kind of pleasure.

This equivalence is driven home by the Epicurean spokesman in Cicero’s On Ends:

Diogenes Laertius X-34 : ”The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“
On Ends Book One, 30 : ”_Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?
On Ends Book One, 38 : _“Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“
On Ends Book One, 39: For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.
On Ends Book One, 56 : By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain. [57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory. Fools however are tormented by the recollection of misfortunes; wise men rejoice in keeping fresh the thankful recollection of their past blessings. Now it is in the power of our wills to bury our adversity in almost unbroken forgetfulness, and to agreeably and sweetly remind ourselves of our prosperity. But when we look with penetration and concentration of thought upon things that are past, then, if those things are bad, grief usually ensues, if good, joy.
On Ends Book One, 62 _: But these doctrines may be stated in a certain manner so as not merely to disarm our criticism, but actually to secure our sanction. For this is the way in which Epicurus represents the wise man as continually happy; he keeps his passions within bounds; about death he is indifferent; he holds true views concerning the eternal gods apart from all dread; he has no hesitation in crossing the boundary of life, if that be the better course. Furnished with these advantages he is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains. For he remembers the past with thankfulness, and the present is so much his own that he is aware of its importance and its agreeableness, nor is he in dependence on the future, but awaits it while enjoying the present; he is also very far removed from those defects of character which I quoted a little time ago, and when he compares the fool’s life with his own, he feels great pleasure. _And pains, if any befall him, have never power enough to prevent the wise man from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation.
On Ends Book Two, 9 : Cicero: “…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that ‘freedom from pain’ does not mean the same thing as ‘pleasure.’” Torquatus: “Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be.”
On Ends, Book Two, 11: Cicero: Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” Torquatus: “Clearly the same, he says, and indeed the greatest, beyond which none greater can possibly be.” (Plane idem, inquit, et maxima quidem, qua fieri nulla maior potest. Cic. Fin. 2.11)
On Ends Book Two, 16 : “This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one’s senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?”
Epicurus to Idomeneus, Diogenes Laertius: On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could increase them; but I set above them all the gladness of mind at the memory of our past conversations. But I would have you, as becomes your lifelong attitude to me and to philosophy, watch over the children of Metrodorus.
Lucretius Book 3 line 98: _“_Thus often the body, which is clear to see, is sick, when, all the same we feel pleasure in some other hidden part; and contrariwise it happens that the reverse often comes to be in turn, when one wretched in mind feels pleasure in all his body; in no other wise than if, when a sick man’s foot is painful, all the while, may be, his head is in no pain. Moreover, when the limbs are given up to soft sleep, and the heavy body lies slack and senseless, yet there is something else in us, which at that very time is stirred in many ways, and admits within itself all the motions of joy and baseless cares of heart.”
Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights : Gellius shows us a list of examples where highly reputable Greek writers were using the negation of a term as the extreme point of its opposite, a_nd he includes within the list Epicurus’ use of “absence of pain.ckgedit_QUOT_ - 9 But concerning inlaudatus it seems possible to give two answers. One is of this kind: There is absolutely no one who is of so perverted a character as not sometimes to do or say something that can be commended (laudari). And therefore this very ancient line has become a familiar proverb: Oft-times even a fool expresses himself to the purpose. 10 But one who, on the contrary, in his every act and at all times, deserves no praise (laude) at all is inlaudatus, and such a man is the very worst and most despicable of all mortals, just as freedom from all reproach makes one inculpatus (blameless). Now inculpatus is the synonym for perfect goodness; therefore conversely inlaudatus represents the limit of extreme wickedness. 11 It is for that reason that Homer usually bestows high praise, not by enumerating virtues, but by denying faults; for example: “And not unwillingly they charged,” and again:15 “Not then would you divine Atrides see Confused, inactive, nor yet loath to fight.” 12 Epicurus too in a similar way defined the greatest pleasure as the removal and absence of all pain, in these words:16 “The utmost height of pleasure is the removal of all that pains.” 13 Again Virgil on the same principle called the Stygian pool “unlovely.”14 For just as he expressed abhorrence of the “unpraised” man by the denial of praise, 15 so he abhorred the “unlovable” by the denial of love. 16 Another defence of inlaudatus is this: laudare in early Latin means “to name” and “cite.” Thus in civil actions they use laudare of an authority, when he is cited. 17 Conversely, the inlaudatus is the same as p141 the inlaudabilis, namely, one who is worthy neither of mention nor remembrance, and is never to be named; 18 as, for example, in days gone by the common council of Asia decreed that no one should ever mention the name of the man who had burned the temple of Diana at Ephesus.18

3. Free Will Frees Us From Determinism And Fate

From Norman Dewitt’s “Epicurus and His Philosophy” Chapter 10 - “The New Freedom”

Since Epicurus was the first to view the rational pursuit of happiness as a practical problem, it was naturally he who first came to grips with the problem of freedom and determinism. Having once assumed that happiness is the goal of life and that the rational pursuit of it presumes both the freedom of the individual and the possibility of planning the whole life, he was bound to single out all those external compulsions to which antecedent and contemporary thought had yielded belief and one by one to demonstrate them to be nonexistent, escapable, or conquerable. In this he was a natural pragmatist, assuming both the need and feasibility of controlling experience.

To begin, as usual, with the synoptic view, this is adequately set forth in a scholium. It should be noted that the problem of freedom arises as part of the problem of causation and that three causes are here presumed, necessity, chance, and human volition: “And he says in other books that some things happen of necessity, some from chance and others through our own choice.” To this statement are added supporting reasons, which apply to the three causes respectively: “because necessity is subject to no correction and chance is a fickle thing but the part that is left to us is free of control, to which, incidentally, blame and the opposite naturally attach themselves.” Thus in outline the limits of freedom and of moral responsibility are clearly recognized.

The content of the scholium admits of expansion through particulars that are available. Various kinds of necessity were recognized. One of these was observed in the movements of the heavenly bodies; mechanistic causes were assigned to these and no significance for human conduct was recognized.2 Another sort of necessity was that of infinite physical causation, sponsored by Democritus, from which escape was discovered through postulating the swerve of the atoms, that is, a degree of free play sufficient to permit of free will in the individual. Still another sort of necessity was that arising from the interference of the gods in the affairs of men. This was eliminated by declaring the gods to be exclusively concerned with their own happiness. A fourth kind of necessity was dialectical. This was simply ignored. For example, when the disjunctive proposition, “Tomorrow Hermarchus will either be alive or dead,” was put up to Epicurus, he declined to give an answer. He was too wary a dialectician himself to swallow a dialectical bait.

4. Desire - Choice And Avoidance

Epicurus categorized desires into three types: natural and necessary, natural but not necessary, and neither natural nor necessary. Natural and necessary desires, such as the need for food and shelter, must be satisfied to maintain a healthy and happy life. Natural but not necessary desires, like the craving for luxury foods, can enhance life but are not essential. Desires that are neither natural nor necessary, such as the pursuit of wealth and fame, are more difficult to obtain, and frequently lead to anxiety and dissatisfaction. As a general approach, evaluating desires to identify which of these categories they constitute will be of assistance in predicting the amount of pleasure and pain likely to be encountered as a result of their pursuit. In the end, however, the goal sought is that of “greatest” pleasure, which must be determined according to individual context and preference, and which is not subject to objective classification.

There Is No Necessity To Live Under The Control of Necessity - Rejection of Determinism
There Is No Fate Or Fortune
Desire Is Not Inherently Painful Or Pleasurable
Selecting Among Desires Using To The “Natural,” “Necessary,” And “Empty” Categories
Weighing Pleasures And Pains
Activity, Rest, And Procrastination

Epicurus introduced a practical approach to ethics known as the calculus of advantage, which involves evaluating the consequences of our actions in terms of pleasure and pain. This rational method helps individuals make choices that maximize pleasure and minimize pain. By carefully assessing the potential outcomes of actions, one can achieve a pleasureable life, and always have more reason for joy than for vexation. This approach emphasizes the importance of wisdom in guiding ethical decisions and achieving long-term happiness, but does not make wisdom a goal in itself.

5. Friendship And Engagement With Society

Friendship holds a major place in Epicurean ethics due to its productiveness in contributing to pleasure and happiness. Epicurus held that friendship is the a primary tool for obtaining security and comfort, helping individuals face life’s challenges. Friendship should be based on mutual benefit and trust, enhancing the quality of life. Epicurus considered the cultivation of friendships as one of the highest pleasures and a vital component of a happy life.

For an in-depth treatment of this issue with many quotations, see “Not All Politicians Are Sisyphus - What Roman Epicureans Were Taught About Politics” by Jeffrey Fish. Fish states: “Epicurus and his followers did not discourage the possession of power per se, only the ambitious pursuit of it. Their position was much more nuanced than Cicero and Plutarch or their modern counterparts would have us believe.” Further:

“I maintain … that On the Good King itself constitutes a positive case for a form of Epicurean statesmanship. Although Philodemus’ analysis of Homeric kings makes use of several stock elements from kingship literature,he concentrates on one theme especially compatible with Epicureanism,and one, I think, especially articulated within the school. KD 7 identiﬁes glory as a risky pleasure, but adds that there would be no reason not to enjoy it were it risk-free. A ruler’s virtuous exercise of power leads to, or at least tends to promote, his safety. I suggest that, with the help of Philodemus and others like him, Roman statesmen were able to connect two strands of Epicurean thought in order to justify their political life: one, that a person’s virtues are productive of the good will and love of others, actual pleasures in themselves; the other, that power can in fact lead to safety.Combining the two could result in the claim that the virtuous exercise of political power can sometimes provide safety as well as pleasure to a ruler. Epicurean statesmen in previous generations likely held a similar point of view.”
…
”Instructions on the subject of political prominence, like those regarding education, must have been situational rather than dogmatic.“ That is to say, they were not maxims at all. Their basic message was that individuals born into obscurity should he grateful for that fact and should not strive for fame or attract unnecessary attention to themselves. The kind of person at whom this message was directed would have been quite opposite to someone who, to borrow a phrase from Cicero, had been ‘consul-designate from birth.’ The Epicureans had advice for both kinds of people, and a method for evaluating options that promised to maximize happiness Whatever the relevant circumstances. There is no suggestion in any surviving source that a person born to the kind of station referred to by Cicero would be expected to go through the tumultuous process of trying to dismantle all of his inherited privileges and responsibilities.”

…

“Lucretius acknowledges both the nobility by birth of the poem’s addressee (Memmi clara propago), and the need for him to attend to politics more than philosophy in the trying times Rome currently faces (patriai tempore iniquo) (1.41–3). Ex hypothesi, the purpose of the poem cannot have been to withdraw Memmius from politics.”

From the Principal Doctrines:

PD07 - Some men wished to become famous and conspicuous, thinking that they would thus win for themselves safety from other men. Wherefore if the life of such men is safe, they have obtained the good which nature craves; but if it is not safe, they do not possess that for which they strove at first by the instinct of nature.

PD39 - The man who best knows how to meet external threats makes into one family all the creatures he can; and those he can not, he at any rate does not treat as aliens; and where he finds even this impossible, he avoids all dealings, and, so far as is advantageous, excludes them from his life.40. Those who possess the power to defend themselves against threats by their neighbors, being thus in possession of the surest guarantee of security, live the most pleasant life with one another; and their enjoyment of the fullest intimacy is such that if one of them dies prematurely, the others do not lament his death as though it called for pity.

Philodemus On Flattery: ”… the argument demonstrates that they endure to pay such a great price in evils on account of … ; so therefore, good repute was pursued according to nature for the sake of security (from men), good repute which is open to non-philosophical men and philosophers alike; not for the sake of any vice, among which [sc. vices] flattery plays the first role, and recklessly puts upon one greater disrepute whenever it is supposed to accomplish good repute …”

Philodemus On The Good King: “Departing therefore from such topics, let us again recommend that which is good for a king, to be averse to a harsh, austere and bitter character, and to practise gentleness, goodness and a king’s mildness and leniency as much as possible, since these lead to a sound monarchy and not arbitrary rule based on fear of a despot. (Col. 24,6–18 Dorandi, with minor changes)”

Metrodorus Fragment (see Fish article): ‘It is necessary to tell how a person will best uphold the purpose of his nature and how, as far as it depends on his own will, he is not to present himself for public office in the first place’.

Plutarch (see Fish article): ” Not even Epicurus thought men who were in love with fame and honour should lead a quiet life, but they should indulge their nature by taking part in politics and public life, on the grounds that they are constitutionally more likely to be disturbed and corrupted by inactivity, if they do not obtain what they want. But he is a fool to encourage to participate in public affairs, not those who are most able, but those who cannot live a quiet life.”

From Cicero’s De Finibus:

“Holding as I do this theory, what reason should I have for fearing that I may not be able to bring our Torquati into accord with it? … I shall maintain this, that if they performed those actions, which are beyond question noble, from some motive, their motive was not virtue apart from all else. He stripped the foe of his necklet. Yes, and he donned it himself to save his own life. But he faced a grave danger. Yes, with the whole army looking on. What did he gain by it? Applause and affection, which are the strongest guarantees for passing life in freedom from fear.

…

“There remains a topic that is pre-eminently germane to this discussion, I mean the subject of Friendship. Your school maintains that if pleasure be the Chief Good, friendship will cease to exist. Now Epicurus’ pronouncement about friendship is that of all the means to happiness that wisdom has devised, none is greater, none more fruitful, none more delightful than this. Nor did he only commend this doctrine by his eloquence, but far more by the example of his life and conduct. How great a thing such friendship is, is shown by the mythical stories of antiquity. Review the legends from the remotest ages, and, copious and varied as they are, you will barely find in them three pairs of friends, beginning with Theseus and ending with Orestes. Yet Epicurus in a single house and that a small one maintained a whole company of friends, united by the closest sympathy and affection; and this still goes on in the Epicurean school.”

Vatican Saying 66. We show our feeling for our friends’ suffering, not with laments, but with thoughtful concern.

Vatican Saying 78. The noble man is chiefly concerned with wisdom and friendship; of these, the former is a mortal good, the latter an immortal one.

Discussion of this question is here.

6. The Relationship Of Happiness To Pleasure

In his letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus makes many relevant statements, but he himself does not provide a precise definition of “happiness,” and the choice not to provide a precise definition of the term should itself be considered significant. Later Epicureans, however, provided direct statements that are found in other primary sources, such as Diogenes of Oinoanda’s Inscription and Epicurean sections of Cicero’s On Ends. Here is a direct statement from the Epicurean Diogenes of Oinoanda in response to the question “What is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?” -

If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into “what is the means of happiness?” and they wanted to say “the virtues” (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not “what is the means of happiness?” but “what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?”, I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end. Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point.

Also, from Cicero’s On Ends, the Epicurean Torquatus says:
Pleasure and pain moreover supply the motives of desire and of avoidance, and the springs of conduct generally. This being so, it clearly follows that actions are right and praiseworthy only as being a means to the attainment of a life of pleasure. But that which is not itself a means to anything else, but to which all else is a means, is what the Greeks term the Telos, the highest, ultimate or final Good. It must therefore be admitted that the Chief Good is to live agreeably.

…

If then even the glory of the Virtues, on which all the other philosophers love to expatiate so eloquently, has in the last resort no meaning unless it be based on pleasure, whereas pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically attractive and alluring, it cannot be doubted that pleasure is the one supreme and final Good and that a life of happiness is nothing else than a life of pleasure.

To the extent that happiness is identifiable with the best life, Torquatus also provides this description of a life which admits of no further improvement:

The truth of the position that pleasure is the ultimate good will most readily appear from the following illustration. Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity. Let such a man moreover have no dread of any supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection, and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement.

For an article on this issue check here, and to discuss this FAQ response go here.

7. Death - How Long Should We Seek To Postpone It?

Under this topic we discuss the nature of the best life, and the question of How Long Should We Seek To Live?

Death is Nothing To Us And There Is No Reward Or Punishment After Death

See discussion here: How Long Should We Seek To Live?

8. Good And Evil

All Good And Evil Consists In Sensation
There Is No Good But Pleasure
There is No Evil But Pain

9. Virtue

9.1. The Nature of Virtue

Virtue Is Not Absolute Or An End in Itself. Virtue Is Not The Same For All People, Times, And Places, And Virtue Is Instrumental To Pleasure Rather Than An End In Itself

9.2. Piety - The Proper Attitude Toward The Gods

9.3. Prudence

9.4. Friendship

9.5. Courage

9.6. Justice

Epicurus held that justice does not exist in the absolute, and that the application of the term “just” or “unjust” to something is dependant upon time, place, and other circumstances. As a result, justice become primarily a social agreement in which the individuals involve agree not to harm each other. Epicurus held that relationships of justice arise naturally due to the pursuit of pleasurable living, and are not defined or handed down by gods or by ideal concepts. Actions which are considered unjust, on the other hand, when they produce concern over retribution and resulting disturbance of peace of mind.

9.7. Honesty

9.8. Confidence

9.9. Benevolence

9.10. Temperance

9.11. Considerateness

9.12. Hope

9.13. Independence And Self Sufficiency

Epicurus advocated that as a practical matter material wealth, fame, and political power, often do not lead to happiness. He therefore advocated for the pursuit of a lifestyle involving self-sufficiency and independence, emphasizing that these provide freedom from the fickleness and dependence on the crowds. Epicurus pointed out that since all aspects of human life which are not painful are pleasurable, pleasure is generally relatively easy to attain and sustain without material wealth, fame, and political power, and that pain is generally relatively easy to avoid or endure.