Episode 028 - The Number of Shapes of Atoms Is Not Infinite, But Innumerable
Date: 07/20/20
Link: https://www.epicureanfriends.com/thread/1628-episode-twenty-eight-the-number-of-shapes-of-atoms-is-not-infinite-but-innumerab/
Summary
Section titled “Summary”Episode 028 covers Book Two’s argument that while the variety of atomic shapes is finite (not infinite), the number of atoms of each shape is itself infinite — because the universe’s total matter is infinite, as was proved in Book One. Martin reads Daniel Brown’s translation of the passage, which argues through several steps: rare animals appear scarce locally but are abundant elsewhere (and even if only one specimen of a kind existed in all the world, infinite atoms would still be needed to produce it); the analogy of shipwreck debris scattered over every shore illustrates what finite seeds in infinite void would produce — scattered, never-uniting particles; therefore the first seeds of every shape and kind must be infinite in number. The passage concludes with a vivid image of perpetual war between creative and destructive forces, with the cries of newborns mingling with the groans of the dying at every hour of every day.
The discussion focuses on two main areas. First, whether Lucretius’s claim that the forces of production ultimately prevail in the universe is correct: Cassius invokes DeWitt’s observation that even though individual bodies are destroyed, the universe as a whole never disappears; Martin gently corrects this, noting that the heat death hypothesis means that in the far future matter will no longer come together to form new things — though the timescales are so vast as to have no practical significance. Second, the episode develops into an extended exploration of epistemology, the role of science in Epicurean life, and what “truth” means from an Epicurean perspective. The Letter to Herodotus is quoted directly: Epicurus makes a pointed distinction between saying atomic shapes are “infinite” and saying they are “incomprehensible in number” (Bailey’s translation) — a distinction the panel explores at length, with Martin explaining the mathematical levels of infinity (countable vs. uncountable) and Elaine arguing that what matters practically is that if there were truly infinite types of elementary particles there would be no predictability whatsoever in nature.
The episode also discusses isonomia (equal distribution) as a concept relevant to the rare-animals passage; Charles identifies a connection to the five Platonic solids from the Timaeus (fire/tetrahedron, water/icosahedron, earth/cube, air/octahedron, dodecahedron/cosmos) as likely the target of Epicurus’s argument; and the Pontius Pilate “What is truth?” question is used to explore the Epicurean position that truth is known through senses, feelings, and prolepsis — not through abstract definition. Cassius cites Polyaenus the geometrician (from Frances Wright’s A Few Days in Athens, page 108) as an example of Epicurus’s view that science is not an end in itself but is integral to the pursuit of pleasure. Elaine offers the episode’s most memorable closing line: she invites listeners to spend a few minutes each day examining the process they used to arrive at their own decisions — how they knew what was true and what was not.
Transcript
Section titled “Transcript”Cassius: Welcome to Episode 28 of Lucretius Today. I’m your host, Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we’ll walk you through the six books of Lucretius’ poem and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book Epicurus and His Philosophy by Norman DeWitt. Before we start, here are our three ground rules. First, our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it, which may or may not agree with what you hear about Epicurus at other places today. Second, we aren’t talking about Lucretius with the goal of promoting any modern political perspective. Epicurus must be understood on his own, and not in terms of competing schools which may seem similar to Epicurus but are fundamentally different and incompatible, such as Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, or Marxism. Third, the essential base of Epicurean philosophy is a fundamental view of the nature of the universe. When you read the words of Lucretius, you will find that Epicurus did not teach the pursuit of virtue, or of luxury, or of simple living, or of science as ends in themselves, but rather the pursuit of pleasure. From this perspective, it is feeling which is the guide of life, and not supernatural gods, idealism, or virtue ethics. And as important as anything else, Epicurus taught that there is no life after death, and that any happiness we’ll ever have must come in this life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion. Now let’s join the discussion with Martin reading today’s text.
Martin: This being proved, I shall here join another observation which justly derives its credit from what is explained before: this is that the seeds of things that are alike and perfectly of the same figure are in number infinite. For though the variety of the figures be only finite, yet the seeds themselves that are alike in nature must indeed be infinite, otherwise the whole of matter must be finite — which I fully proved is not. Thus having cleared the way, I shall now show in short but sweetest numbers that the seeds of matter infinite hold together the whole of things, where constant force of blows on every side. For though you observe some species of animals are less common and nature seems less fruitful in their production, yet in other countries, in other places, and in lands more remote, you meet with many creatures of that kind, and more in number. For though you observe the elephant, chief of beasts, wielding his snake-like proboscis — how many thousands of them in their breeds which fortify with a wall of ivory impenetrable, not to be forced! Yet we see but few are brought to us. But grant, if you please, there was only one single creature of a particular kind in nature, whose like was not to be found throughout the world. Yet unless the seeds of which it was formed were in number infinite, it could never come into being, or, when once made, could increase or be supported. For fancy, you see, the finite seeds of any body tossed about through the infinite space: whence, where, by what force, by what design, could they meet and unite in that wide ocean of matter, that strange confusion? They have no reason, I suppose, to direct them to this union. But as in dreadful wrecks, when many ships are lost, the troubled sea scatters abroad the planks, the sterns, the sailyards, the prows, the masts, the floating oars, the flags swimming about all the shores — that they may be seen and forewarn poor mortals to fly, and at no time to trust their treachery, the power and the deceit of that unfaithful element, even when the perfidious flattery of a smooth face smiles upon them. So, if you allow the first seeds of things to be finite, the various agitation of matter must forever toss them about, gathered as they are, so that they could never be forced to unite. Or if they could, could they preserve that union, or admit of any increase? And yet the nature of things evidently proves that beings are produced and, when produced, increase; and therefore the principle of things in every kind displays an infinite, and by them all beings are formed and supported.
Nor do those motions that are fatal and destructive to beings always prevail and cause a dissolution never to be recovered; nor, on the contrary, do those motions by which beings are formed and increased always preserve things when they are produced. But a perpetual war has been forever carried on with equal success between the principles of things — now the vital seeds prevail, and now again they are routed and beaten out of the field. The cries of infant beings which they send out as soon as they see the light are mingled with the funeral rites of others that are departed. Nor is there a night that follows the day nor a morning that succeeds the night that does not hear the groans and sad sounds of the obsequies mingled with the tender lamentations of newborn babes rising into being.
Cassius: Okay, thank you, Martin. And to sort of summarize what this section talks about — on the EpicureanFriends.com webpage we have the Munro summary, and Munro says that this discussion is about, quote: “The number of shapes being finite, the number of atoms of each shape is infinite, since it was proved in the first book that the sum of matter was infinite. If you say that some animals are more scarce than would be the case if the atoms of which they were made were infinite, I answer: these animals may be very numerous in remote regions. But even if one thing of its kind existed in the whole world, this would imply an infinite sum of atoms — else how could these have met and united in the boundless ocean of matter? The first beginnings therefore of every shape and kind are infinite in number.” And then the last paragraph he says that means that production and destruction alternately prevail, their elements ever waging equal war — no day passes without some dying and some being born.
Cassius: So as we get started today let’s try to stay with the high-level conclusions and see if anybody has any issues with these high-level conclusions. And then for the rest of our time today let’s try to go back and discuss some of the more basic issues involved in Lucretius’s analysis. But actually I want to comment on the second section first, because it has always stayed in my mind how DeWitt made the observation that the forces of creation or maintenance in the universe as a whole actually in the end prevail over the forces of destruction. Because even though any individual body within the universe will ultimately be destroyed — everything that comes together eventually goes apart — the universe as a whole never goes away. So the forces of continuance in the end are things that stay there.
Cassius: I’d like to hear what Martin says about that before I comment, because I think that’s only right in the near term, in the temporary — but Martin, what would you say? Give us your astronomical physics analysis. Is the universe eventually going to go away for good?
Martin: Yes, that is the question. I mean, it will not disappear into nothing, but it will somehow change in a way that life forms can no more be supported.
Cassius: Right. So if the expanding-universe observations are right and it continues, there will be this heat death, so the particles won’t be coming together anymore to form new things. So this is not exactly true — am I saying that right, Martin?
Martin: Yes. But we also need to see that from a practical perspective it doesn’t matter, because it’s billions of years away. And us on Earth — our offspring will no longer exist; eventually all offspring from Earth will have died out before that. So the logic here is incorrect, but the processes that make it incorrect are happening so slowly that it doesn’t have any practical significance for us. But it is, unfortunately, another example where using reason does not lead to the same quality of conclusions as using direct observation.
Cassius: I forget which episode we talked about this, but this exact point was made almost word for word.
Martin: Yeah, well, you know.
Cassius: Well, it’s on the same subject. From our perspective of time — and how much will progress in our lifetimes in comparison to the heat death of the universe — it may as well be infinite.
Elaine: Yeah. I just think it’s still important to take this opportunity to remind people of the unreliability of logic when it comes to deciding on fact, because there will be plenty of times when you’ll hear people ask you to make political decisions, life decisions based on logic. And you always want to go back to evidence. So it didn’t turn out to matter to us that this logical conclusion is inaccurate, but it could have. So be a “show me” person — stick with the evidence.
Cassius: Okay. Well, maybe that is a good introduction into the fact that we’ve got a lot of sections coming up in the remainder of Book Two and Three — the remainder of the whole poem — where we’re going to basically get into a routine where we see him say something and think that modern theories do not bear it out. And if we simply say “modern theories don’t bear it out” every time, it’s going to get awfully monotonous in our review of the poem. So I think the best way to try to address that is to make sure we tie the direction he’s going into some high-level conclusions that are practical to us.
Cassius: Whether the heat death of the universe theory is correct or not — and I personally have no ability to say it’s incorrect or correct — it is something that conflicts with the conclusion Lucretius was drawing here, at least in some respects. I remember Martin saying something earlier on about the universe evolving into a state where life would be impossible. I’m not really sure that Lucretius is saying life is what he’s talking about. It could be that he’s just simply saying the universe exists in some form throughout time. But I think he’s basically wanting to defend a general conception of the universe as being formed out of atoms, and he’s trying to extrapolate his theory as far as he can — possibly further than he should have. Unless he felt that it was needed to address some religious argument about God being eternal but the universe not being — something like that could be going on. But there’s just a lot of things being discussed here that go back into issues of basically epistemology and knowledge and what it means to hold something to be true, and whether we should be confident in something or not, and how that applies to ethics and physics. If we stay at the very detailed level I think we’re going to miss the implications of the big picture.
Cassius: Because even though Elaine is making very clear statements about disagreeing with Lucretius’s detailed analysis, at least as I listen to Elaine’s perspective, I don’t hear it differing tremendously from what I read Epicurus to have said. And that’s another point I wanted to bring out today: as we go through the poem, each of the major points is generally reflected at a very high level in the Letter to Herodotus. For example, today the issue of the numbers and sizes of the atoms — somebody who’s reading along in the poem can also find the parallel section in the Letter to Herodotus. One of the easier places to find it on the internet is Bailey’s Extant Remains, which is available at archive.org. On page 23 of the Extant Remains, in the Letter to Herodotus, there’s a paragraph where Epicurus says this: “Moreover, the universe is boundless; for that which is bounded has an extreme point, and the extreme point is seen against something else. So that as it has no extreme point it has no limit, and as it has no limit it must be boundless and not bounded. Furthermore, the infinite is boundless both in the number of the bodies and in the extent of the void. For if on the one hand the void were boundless and the bodies were limited in number, the bodies would not stay anywhere but would be carried about and scattered through the infinite void, not having other bodies to support them and keep them in place by means of collisions. But if on the other hand the void were limited, the infinite bodies would not have room wherein to take their place. Besides this, the indivisible and solid bodies out of which too the compounds are created and into which they dissolve have an incomprehensible number of varieties in shape; for it is not possible that such great varieties of things should arise from the same atomic shapes if they are limited in number. And so in each shape the atoms are quite infinite in number, but their differences in shape are not quite infinite, but only incomprehensible in number.”
Cassius: Okay, so there’s another distinction that we haven’t talked about anywhere. What’s the difference between “infinite” and “incomprehensible in number,” or “innumerable”? I think Epicurus is probably making distinctions like that that are not familiar to us to think about, and so those are higher-level issues that we probably ought to be talking about as we go through some of the details.
Martin: Yeah, regarding “not infinite but innumerable” — so this is the thing: we just don’t know what that number is. So it can be any number. There is no principled limit on it, so it can be finite, it might not be finite, but we just have no way to know this, at least with the physics of 2,500 years ago.
Cassius: I don’t want to go too far into this maybe, but what does “infinite” mean? So “innumerable” means: not capable of being counted, enumerated, or numbered — hence indefinitely numerous, of a great number. While “infinite” is: indefinitely large, countlessly great or immense. So really, “indefinite” is the key. We don’t know — it might be infinite.
Cassius: You know, this is where I think I’m sensing an issue. Is there a difference between saying “we don’t know, but it’s clearly a real lot” versus infinity being some kind of pseudo-mystical concept — almost like “God” — I mean, nobody really knows what they mean when they talk about God, and infinity has that same quality, I think, at least in common discussion. It’s almost a mystical concept that says that no matter how far out you go, new things are going to appear as if from nothing. But “innumerable” to me means there is definitely only a certain number of things — it’s just that as a human we can’t count it. How much of what we’re talking about with infinity boils down to “as humans we don’t have the ability to count it”?
Elaine: Yeah, I mean, I think that’s reasonable, although if you can’t count it for sure you can’t rule out that it’s infinite.
Martin: Yes. And there’s another complication here — unfortunately, mathematics has used a definition of “numerable” which is one subset of “infinite,” and then there’s even a level of “hyper-innumerable” infinity. So there are two different measures of infinity in mathematics. The one is: it’s innumerable, but you can make a bijection between the natural numbers and what you’re looking at — it’s still infinite, but in some way you can count it; you just don’t reach a limit; it’s limitless. And then there are things like the real numbers, which are more than that, meaning that even if you could live long enough you could not eventually count them.
Cassius: And that’s my concern — that there’s some kind of a mathematical definition of “infinite” that essentially takes it out of the realm of reality. Now — because Epicurus talks about the universe being infinite, and that’s not out of the realm of reality, it’s just… how does somebody come to terms with that? And I’m not necessarily disagreeing with you, Elaine. How does somebody who’s not a professional philosopher get their mind around whether there’s a difference between “we just can’t count it” and “there’s literally no end to it”?
Cassius: I think that’s what he’s saying, at least in this part of the Letter to Herodotus — he’s saying that the number of shapes of atoms is not infinite, but it is innumerable. So that’s why I was saying I don’t think I would use modern translations of “innumerable” because as Martin says, even the infinite can have different orders within it.
Cassius: Okay, so what is Epicurus saying? What point is he trying to make?
Elaine: I think he’s just saying we don’t know how many there are — there’s a lot.
Cassius: Well, Bailey translates it as “incomprehensible.” To me it means: there’s just a whole lot, we don’t know how many, but it’s not endless. We just don’t know where it stops. But it’s not infinite — yet he definitely talks about infinity elsewhere, so we can’t just say “infinite everywhere.” He definitely has finite versus infinite as a distinction. Yeah. But then he’s also got this category here of “incomprehensibility” as opposed to “infinite.” And every time he raises something, I implicitly want to ask: he must have thought this was an important point, or he would not have included it in his Letter to Herodotus. What is the important distinction he’s trying to make here? Maybe Elaine or someone with Greek could help in that regard.
Martin: Possibly it’s just that he wants to make his theory, his hypothesis on the atoms, complete, so that it’s not an open issue which people might attack.
Elaine: So no — I think it’s getting back to what we talked about in earlier sections. If you had infinite numbers of types of elementary particles — well, we actually don’t think we have innumerable numbers of types of elementary particles; that turned out to be totally not right. But if you had infinite types of elementary particles, there would be no real predictability to what was going to pop into existence. It would throw the whole regularity of observations into confusion.
Cassius: I think that’s the direction, Elaine — that Epicurus is constantly keeping a really big picture in mind: that in order to live happily and successfully, you’ve got to be able to grasp the limits of things and grasp the difference between reality and unreality. This whole idea of god and the supernatural realm and life after death and so forth — these are things that have no evidence to support them. And they become — I think in a lot of people’s minds — something that’s fantasy. The words “fantasy” and “unreal” and “hypothetical” kind of blend together at some point, I think, for a lot of people. And I’m thinking that Epicurus is wanting to emphasize that it’s essential in life to be able to draw a line and say: I’m going to go this far and no further in terms of possibilities or hypotheticals or speculation.
Elaine: So I think all he needed to support that conclusion would be to say: we can observe that the things that would happen if there were infinite types of elementary particles are not happening. So we know that this particular logical conclusion — that types are innumerable rather than infinite — is one worth making. But he got part of it really well.
Cassius: I’d have to reread some of the dialogues in Plato’s Timaeus — the one where he talks about the five shapes — I’m thinking just quickly rereading the Letter to Herodotus that this may have been more of an anti-Platonic sentiment. The second sentence about shapes being “incomprehensible” is the Bailey translation, and so “in each shape the atoms are quite infinite in number but their differences of shape are not quite infinite but only incomprehensible in number.” So that second phrase was probably the wrong one — and it was because reason was used beyond what it could support in evidence. But the first part — I think there’s sufficient observational evidence to base that on, so that part worked.
Cassius: While you’re thinking, Charles — I don’t want today’s show to go by without mentioning the word “isonomia.” I gather for somebody who’s reading into some of the other deeper aspects of the theories, commentators use this section as an example of the word “isonomia” when he’s talking about animals being less common in one area but more common in another. And that’s also something that’s referenced in the Velleius section of Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods. But I don’t know that it has any major implication for us today to continue on that, and I didn’t want to not mention it.
Cassius: But maybe this is the point to get really general again and go back to the issue of Epicurean theory of knowledge and logic and how that applies here. This discussion today gets us back into the general issues that some people have about the role of science and the role of inquiry and the limits of how far we need to go in studying science in order to live a happy life. There are some people who think that Epicurus or Lucretius would lead us into accepting answers for things that are incomplete and just not pursuing science the way some of us would think it needs to be pursued. And so there’s a general question that a lot of people debate: what really is Epicurus and Lucretius’s attitude towards science? Is it simply of interest just because we want to not worry about life after death and supernatural control and fate? If so, why do we need to even worry about science after what was developed in this poem? We could just read the poem and never worry about science again, have our fears about gods and death put to rest, and then just go on in life without ever pursuing any more scientific inquiry at all. Do we think that is what Epicurus and Lucretius were suggesting?
Martin: No, I don’t think that’s what they were suggesting.
Cassius: So you need to make enough observations to be sure that you haven’t seen anything supernatural — is how I would put it.
Cassius: Well, Elaine, your goal wouldn’t be — wouldn’t it be fair to say that your goal is not necessarily to validate your conclusion that there’s nothing supernatural? Your goal would be: you want to know what reality is first, right?
Elaine: Let me say that, yeah. So yes, you want to know what you’re basing your decisions about pleasure and pain on. So the canon always comes first, and that’s where physics comes from — from conclusions based on the canon. Why does the canon come first? Because that is the entire bedrock of the philosophy: you have made a commitment to saying that there is a reality, that we observe it through our senses, that we have feelings in response to reality, and that we have these prolepses — what I think of as pattern recognitions that are innate to our species. But the observations and feelings — I don’t think anybody can be confused about how you have to make a decision. If you’re going to have a philosophy, how you’re going to make your decisions about what’s true — are you going to say that we can’t ever know anything about reality and be a skeptic? Are you going to say that you know reality by thinking about it and by logic and abstract reasoning? That’s how you figure out what’s real? Or are you going to say there’s no such thing as reality? These are all positions you can have. And that is the Epicurean position: we know what’s true and what’s real through our senses, through feelings, and through the prolepsis. And we don’t have the other positions, which are incompatible with that. If you don’t start from there, you can’t be an Epicurean.
Cassius: Charles wants to say something. What do you want to add?
Charles: I guess to finish my earlier thought about the shapes. I’m not going to reread sections of Plato in the middle of this, but it seems that it’s more about the elementary particles having not infinite, but I suppose we’re going to fall into the same trap of “incomprehensible” or “innumerable” numbers of combinations to produce different things. I was a bit hung up on the word “shapes,” because it seemed like there were some more contemporary-to-Epicurus issues regarding shapes — specifically the five Platonic solids in Plato’s Timaeus, where he argues about the four classical elements corresponding to different shapes: fire to the tetrahedron, water to the icosahedron, earth to the cube, air to the octahedron, and then the dodecahedron gets tied into theology and creation. And for my second thought — something I wanted to bring up earlier when we were talking about how the universe may as well be infinite according to our perception of time — what Elaine just said, and Cassius about epistemology, is something we all agree with: the Epicurean canon, the epistemology, is the foundation, and the ethics of pleasure and pain depend on it. Because you can’t have the solid conclusion that justifies why you believe pleasure is good and pain is bad without that foundation. Without it you open up pain and pleasure to a lot of subjective or varying explanations or apologetics.
Cassius: Okay, well, let’s stay with what Elaine was saying a minute ago. We have the Epicurean canon that Epicurus has asserted as the way we should think: based on the senses, the feelings, and the anticipations. But where I think Elaine was going to go next is: even if you accept that and just say “okay, I’m going to follow you guys for right now and I’ll accept your premise” — where does that premise about the way to think and the standard of truth, where does that lead you in terms of science and your attitude towards science?
Elaine: I think it makes you commit to being sure that your conclusions are evidentiary — and to understanding the difference between a theory and a hypothesis.
Cassius: Well, let me go back in a different direction — maybe even more basically. The canon that we discussed through Epicurus is more generally known as the Canon of Truth. Let’s go ahead and wrestle with the basic issue. What is truth? What would Pontius Pilate’s question mean? What is truth?
Elaine: Truth is what we accept as real. I mean, I think this gets to — I’m going to go Epicurus on you. It’s like: if you don’t know what I’m saying when I say sugar is sweet, we can’t talk. That’s truth.
Cassius: Well, are you saying that about truth?
Elaine: Yes — everybody knows what we mean when we say that word. It’s not confusing.
Cassius: Well, I’m not sure I really agree that conclusions about what might be true can’t differ — but they can hold an idea of what truth is, or how something lines up with conviction that it’s a part of reality. You can make it into an abstract concept if you try hard enough. But when people talk about it, what reality — what truth is — everybody really knows what they mean, and I think Epicurus would argue strenuously against trying to make this a definition more than it needs to be. I would even go so far as to say that what almost everybody except perhaps professional philosophers means when they say “reality” could be thought of as a prolepsis — you’re using a word that means “yes, this is real,” and it’s not a confusing thing. But isn’t it the case that in common discussion at least, there are a lot of debates about “your truth” versus “my truth” versus whether there’s absolute truth versus contextual truth? Aren’t there a lot of questions there that have to be sorted out?
Elaine: That’s how you make things confusing — if you’re a professional philosopher. But aren’t all those truths, in every single one of those categories, holding a sort of common ground with each other? One that everybody could instantly recognize? People are saying: “this is real, this happened, this is the situation” — or if it’s contextual truth: “under these circumstances, this pattern will repeat itself and make itself known, we can verify it.” When we say “contextual,” we’re also including their feelings, which are part of the canon of truth. Their feelings are real phenomena; they’re part of reality. So I don’t see any conflict there at all between what ordinary people mean.
Cassius: Okay. I want to ask Martin to weigh in on this, but maybe the question then simply is: as an Epicurean, or if Epicurus were here to talk to us, what would he tell us the word “truth” means?
Martin: Not really… I basically agree with Elaine that this is a prolepsis. We can talk a bit around it to somehow make it clear, but it’s just basically… tickling your associations on this one. To examine it — there’s a thought pattern we have when we think about truth.
Cassius: Okay. So Elaine, just to summarize — if Epicurus were here and he were listening to us or anybody out in the world discuss the meaning of truth, and if he were to have somebody walk up to him — I can’t cite the exact verse, but Pontius Pilate asks Jesus, “What is truth?” What would Epicurus say if Pontius Pilate asked him, “What is truth?”
Elaine: I think he would do one of those pithy things — like kick a rock or something. I mean, he’d be like: what’s the quote about people who can go around blathering all day about this and that? Just get real. I just think he would roll his eyes. I think that’s a ridiculous question.
Cassius: All right. Now let’s separate that out — you’re saying that’s what Epicurus would say. What would Elaine say?
Elaine: Saying okay — everybody knows, unless they’re trying to be abstractionists, that if somebody comes up to you and says “this is what I believe about reality” or “this is how I experience reality” or “this is true,” people know what each other mean with that word. It’s not confusing.
Cassius: Charles, same two questions — if Pontius Pilate goes to Epicurus and asks “What is truth?” — what would Epicurus say? Or if you prefer, first: what would Charles say?
Charles: I think in my little spiel earlier about consistent behavior making itself known, and what is observable — that’s probably Charles.
Cassius: All right. Just trying to channel what you’ve read through your reading in Epicurus — do you remember anything specific that would lead you to think about what Epicurus would say in response to the question “What is truth”?
Charles: There’s actually a section in — if I remember correctly — the Letter to Herodotus about “true versus real” at some point. I’d have to find it, but I’ll try to put it in the show notes later on. Maybe it’s related to the discussion of what “opinion” means. We could say that Epicurus would say that truth is the end goal of the canon, or the purpose of the canon — how you arrive there. But that seems like a lot of speculation about extant writings we don’t have.
Cassius: Well, let me come back to you in a second. Martin, what do you think Epicurus would say if Pontius Pilate asked him, “What is truth”?
Martin: He would refer to this — that when we hear a word like this, we just know it. And it would be potentially misleading to try to nail it down, because we possibly won’t agree on the definition. So you’re saying that truth is something that people just know. It’s one of these words where we recognize what it is without needing a definition. You can turn it into something you don’t know if you fiddle about with it, but it’s just like: you taste sugar, you know that everybody uses the word “sweet” for that, you know what you’re experiencing. People have agreed to use the word “truth” for this prolepsis — this recognition. It’s kind of like a sensation almost, of truth. And that’s what they mean.
Cassius: Okay, I think we got on this direction because we were talking about the role of science and the role of speculation about theories of atoms and so forth. So how do we relate our viewpoint of truth to our attitude towards science? Is science judged by whether it is true or not? And how do we take our definition of what “true” means and say that this is what applies to science? I’m trying to say what you would tell a child — maybe even a high school student — who is asking you about these questions in a sincere way. Because you could sincerely be confused about questions like this, especially if you come from a religious background or just not a very scientifically trained background. You’re not used to dealing with issues like this. And so you could have a child come to you and say, “I read my Bible today — Pontius Pilate asked Jesus, ‘What is truth?’ and Jesus didn’t give him an answer.” And I also just want to note: we’d want to take into account that Epicurus would have known the intentions of Pontius Pilate — that he wasn’t a benign questioner; he wasn’t sincere. So that messes with the analogy a little bit.
Elaine: All right. So I think the important thing to explain to the child is that science is not the conclusions, right? Science is a process; science is an approach. And it’s consistent with the canon of truth. So it’s not even the data, and it’s not the conclusions you draw from the data — it is an agreement about how to examine reality, how to describe it to each other. Of course there’s some common language that science uses to talk to each other, but science is not the information itself. And that is poorly, poorly taught — or not taught at all — to students today.
Cassius: Elaine, let’s go back for a second. Let me double down on the question and let’s talk about what has been taught for 2,000 years to the West. John 18:37: “You are a king, then?” said Pilate. Jesus answered: “You say that I am a king. In fact, the reason I was born and came into the world is to testify to the truth. Everyone on the side of truth listens to me.” And then Pilate says: “What is truth?” So everybody at least in the West until recent years has been taught that Jesus came into the world to testify to the truth, and that all who loved the truth recognize what he says is true. So truth comes from God — truth has to be passed on by some supernatural being. Or is there a truth that isn’t supernatural? And if we have a truth to ourselves — if there is a human truth — what is the basis of human truth?
Elaine: I understand that we’ve previously been saying in this episode that truth is a prolepsis — something that, like “sugar is sweet,” you recognize it whether that’s sufficient or not. Whatever the explanation is, which we’re not going to get to the bottom of today, what is truth to an Epicurean? I don’t have anything to add to what I’ve already said. I think it’s one of those things where it’s obvious — but is it fair to say that what you’ve been saying is that truth is what we understand through the senses, the anticipations, and the feelings?
Cassius: Yes, yeah. But it’s also itself a feeling of truth. If there’s a feeling of truth, it’s like — you know what I’m talking about — if you make a statement: “I know this is true,” there’s a sensation, an internal sensation, you get along with that. And we use the word “truth” just to communicate that to each other.
Cassius: Okay, we’re probably going to be out of time for me to pursue that any further — which is probably a good thing. But before we close today, I definitely want to go back to a discussion we’re having in a related thread on the EpicureanFriends.com forum about the role of science in our perspective. Is our attitude towards science that Epicurus and Lucretius are teaching us to look for a plausible explanation — find any plausible explanation that seems to make sense — and then forget science and put it to the side?
Elaine: No. Because using our senses as part of science, making observations — that is part of the process of science. So you would never stop observing what’s happening. How much time does the normal person need to devote to studying atoms?
Cassius: How does the normal person need to think about atoms, Elaine?
Elaine: Probably not very much. But you always constantly need to be observing what’s going on around you in the world in order to be able to make decisions about what to do. And science has developed particular methods of helping you test your observations — still using your senses, extensions of your senses — but to keep you from getting accidentally caught up in fallacious heuristics. To help you really stick to your observations and make your conclusions. So informally, we’re using science all the time if we’re making wise decisions, because we’re making observations about reality, about what we observe, and then deciding what to do to get pleasure.
Cassius: Charles, what has reading Epicurus and Lucretius done for your general attitude and the way you employ science in your life?
Charles: Well, my best class in high school regarding science was chemistry. I’ve been all in tune with my senses and just generally more trusting of them. But I’d have to agree with Elaine here that informally we are always within that mindset of using science.
Cassius: You’re within the mindset that you acknowledge and hold science and scientists in high regard as something that ultimately improves your life, improves your pleasure, and is something that someone pursuing pleasure in life is going to be friendly to and employ in making his life more pleasurable and less painful. Is that fair to say?
Charles: Generally speaking, yeah. I could probably see some examples that would be contrived, but those would be about different definitions of what constitutes pleasure. I would say generally speaking, having met other people who describe themselves as hedonists but who are not Epicurean, even they acknowledge the role of science, even if just for the purpose of defeating theology.
Cassius: Okay. And Martin — Elaine is a physician. You are an engineer of a type. What does your Epicurean reading do for your attitude towards scientific inquiry? Does it promote it? Suppress it? Is it irrelevant?
Martin: Our science — the way we do science — is compatible with Epicurean philosophy. And so both mutually support each other. I mean, we can do science without being Epicureans. And as an Epicurean, we do not have to bother that much about pursuing science by ourselves. But both are fully compatible.
Cassius: So, Martin, let me ask — would you agree with this? I think there’s a risk in using too narrow a definition of science. Science is really, to me, the process of using the canon. So we do it if we’re going to live wisely and make good choices for pleasure. We’re doing it all the time because we’re relying on our observations about reality to predict what will happen if we make different decisions. And doing that accurately — that’s not separable from science. So you don’t have to be a physicist to approach life with that kind of evidentiary view. So I think Epicurean philosophy says: use science to make your observations, not mythology.
Martin: Yeah. You used the word “compatible,” and I would have expected a stronger word — like they reinforce each other. They’re almost identical in a way.
Cassius: Yes, integral. It is. That’s necessary to the canon. You can’t understand any of the rest of the philosophy unless you’re going to have a scientific attitude about it. Yes, it encourages science. And what Elaine just said — in order to use the canon, you have to understand how it operates, how the senses operate and when they’re going to be clear and when they’re distorted.
Elaine: So — I’m sorry to interrupt you — that’s not the process of science. That is data and conclusions. And those are fine, but science is actually the way you go about it. And that’s what the philosophy says: go about this by making observations. Notice your feelings, which are your experiences that you’re having, and be aware of your prolepsis. If you don’t do that, you’re not an Epicurean. So it’s fundamental. That’s science. Science is not the information that you obtain through the process of science. Does that make sense? Science is not the information that you obtain — it’s the process.
Cassius: I probably thought it was both.
Elaine: No. Not really. And that’s what I feel is one of the fundamental failures of our education system — making people think that science is the information in the textbook. It’s not. It’s how you got that information and how you’re going to get more.
Cassius: Okay. In the interest of time, I want to ask for closing comments. But before I do that, this reminds me — I was already going to refer back to what Frances Wright says in a couple of places in A Few Days in Athens. The classic example that some people who object to the Epicurean view of science are going to use is the example of Polyaenus. He was apparently a geometrician well known for his abilities in geometry, who became an Epicurean. And on page 108 of A Few Days in Athens, there’s a discussion from Frances Wright defending that episode in Epicurean history. What she defends is that Epicurus’s advice to Polyaenus, who was a geometrician, was not to give up geometry — not to throw it away — but to realize that there are other things in life besides geometry, and to realize that geometry and everything you do in life should be organized within your overall framework towards life. Which, when you get to the bottom line, again, it’s a matter of pleasure and pain. So geometry is not a goal in itself, an end in itself, any more than any other virtue or any other procedure would be. And that would be where we are today, right, Elaine? Science is not an end in itself. Would you agree with that as an Epicurean reader?
Elaine: Oh yeah, sure.
Cassius: And of course you say “yes, sure,” but that’s something some people are really going to get their backs up about. Anybody who’s not really into the Epicurean theory is going to have some particular virtue or some particular thing in life they like, and they’re going to see it as an end in itself. And an Epicurean will say —
Elaine: But we all tell them that they’re just enjoying it, and that’s fine.
Cassius: Right, right. So yes, there’s also a section where Frances Wright elaborates on what you said just a moment ago, Elaine, about science being a process rather than a particular conclusion. I have page 108 of A Few Days in Athens for the Polyaenus discussion. Okay, closing comments for today’s Episode 28. Who wants to go first? Who goes first? The first closing comment comes from Martin.
Martin: I have no closing comments for today.
Cassius: Well, I have a feeling we’ll be revisiting some of these issues in future episodes, and so we can let Martin elaborate in the future. Charles, what about your closing thoughts for today?
Charles: I would have to say that if you’re going to value pleasure, you have to understand — or at least come up with — a comprehensive view of nature and the universe, specifically within the context of wanting to be Epicurean. And that’s what we’re doing by reading Lucretius, and what Lucretius was doing by studying the nature of the universe and advising people that in order to avoid being like children who are afraid of things in the dark that are absolutely not going to harm them, the way to avoid floundering around in the dark is to have a systematic study of nature. That’s why these first two books of Lucretius are so heavily focused on the physics compared to sections of Book Three and then Book Four and parts of Book Five.
Cassius: Yes, right. It’s interesting to me how Lucretius does not go in the same order that Epicurus does in the Letter to Herodotus. And Lucretius also scatters his discussions of epistemology — the issues that would be related to the Canon of Truth — throughout the poem, mentioning them here and there, but not systematically presenting them at the beginning of the book. Neither does Diogenes Laertius — he starts off with the Letter to Herodotus, saving the letter on ethics, the Letter to Menoeceus, for last. Now, I wouldn’t hold Diogenes Laertius as an example of somebody who’s definitely an Epicurean presenting it in the way Epicurus would, but Lucretius pretty much is. And it’s interesting that Lucretius has not gone in the same order as the Letter to Herodotus. We don’t know whether that tells us anything about the order of Epicurus’s own work On Nature. Maybe On Nature is in the same order that Lucretius had. But whatever it is, there was apparently a separate scroll titled the Canon of Truth, and so they didn’t just put a section at the beginning of the physics that would have explained some of these epistemological issues.
Cassius: Okay, Elaine, your closing thoughts for today?
Elaine: I don’t have too much to say about the section that we read today. But I guess as a summary for our other conversation — actually, I’ll just say to the listeners: it might be interesting, if you’ve never done this before, to once a day think about some of the decisions that you’ve made for your life — just small ones like how you’re going to spend your day, or larger ones — and think about the process that you used to decide that, and how you knew what was true and what wasn’t.
Cassius: I think that’s very good advice. Very good advice. And we will elaborate on that as many times as we can in future episodes. Okay, so with that I think we’re ready to say goodbye.
All: All right, y’all have a good week. And we’ll do it again soon. Thank you. Bye. Thanks, bye.