The Tranquillists: Table of Sources
This page collects every writer documented in "Tranquillism: A Century of Scholars Looking For Epicurus' Supreme Good Anywhere But Pleasure", in two tables. The first covers writers who hold that Epicurus's true good is not pleasure plain and simple, but "absence of pain" renamed as ataraxia, tranquility, katastematic pleasure, or static pleasure. The second, further down the page, covers the smaller number of scholars who have argued directly against that reading. Each row in both tables is one distinct published statement, with its writer, date, exact quotation, and full citation, sorted newest to oldest. Two continuously-updated reference works with no fixed edition date (an encyclopedia entry and Wikipedia) are listed first in the top table, since they cannot be dated the way a single book or article printing can.
| Writer | Date | Full Quotation | Full Citation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tim O'Keefe | n.d. | "He taught that the point of all one's actions was to attain pleasure (conceived of as tranquility) for oneself, and that this could be done by limiting one's desires and by banishing the fear of the gods and of death." | Tim O'Keefe, "Epicurus," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (n.d.) |
| Wikipedia | n.d. | "The ultimate goal then of Epicurean ethics was to reach a state of aponia and ataraxia." | "Epicureanism," Wikipedia (English-language article, collaboratively edited; consulted 2026-07-19). Footnoted directly to O'Keefe, Epicureanism (2010), p. 120. |
| David Konstan | 2005 | "...a view of the goal of human life (happiness, resulting from absence of physical pain and mental disturbance)." / "...the absence of such fear is ataraxy, lack of perturbation, and ataraxy, together with freedom from physical pain, is one way of specifying the goal of life for Epicurus." | David Konstan, "Epicurus," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (first published 2005; substantive revisions since) |
| Tim O'Keefe | 2025 | "Given this pair of distinctions, the Epicureans maintain that the main constituent of the pleasant life, and hence, of the happy life, is the static mental pleasure of ataraxia, or tranquility -- the state of being free from mental disturbance. So while it is accurate to call the Epicureans hedonists, it might be less misleading to say that they are 'tranquillists.'" | Tim O'Keefe, "Achieving Tranquility: Epicurus on Living without Fear," in The Oxford Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Jacob Klein and Nathan Powers (Oxford University Press, 2025), 184-202 |
| Alex Voorhoeve | 2022 | "I have offered an Epicurean account of the pleasures of tranquillity and their supreme value." | Alex Voorhoeve, "The Pleasures of Tranquillity," Homo Oeconomicus 39, no. 2-4 (2022): 185-197, p. 197 |
| Ken Binmore | 2020 | "In his old age at least, Epicurus thought that avoiding pain -- including painful thoughts and regrets -- was much more important than seeking pleasure: that the tranquility to be so derived is a prize beyond measure." | Ken Binmore, Crooked Thinking or Straight Talk? Modernizing Epicurean Scientific Philosophy (Springer, 2020), pp. 8-9 |
| Neel Burton | 2020 | "Epicurus... rather than pleasure, emphasized the avoidance of pain, the elimination of desire, and ataraxia." | Neel Burton, "What Is Ataraxia?" Psychology Today (UK edition, originally published June 2020, updated October 23, 2024) |
| Maria Karvouni | 2018 | "...ataraxia is the goal of life." / "Epicurus characterized the state of ataraxia as the absence of pain and freedom from all worry." | Maria Karvouni, "The Ultimate Tranquilizer," Philosophy Now, Issue 127 (August/September 2018) |
| Yosef Z. Liebersohn | 2015 | "...the removal of pain is a necessary condition for the Epicurean goal of ataraxia and aponia..." | Yosef Z. Liebersohn, "Epicurus' 'Kinetic' and 'Katastematic' Pleasures: A Reappraisal," Elenchos 36, no. 2 (2015): 271-297, p. 271 |
| Neel Burton | 2013 | "Given the prime importance that he attaches to the avoidance of pain, the elimination of desire, and peace of mind, Epicurus is far more of a 'tranquillist' than a hedonist." | Neel Burton, "The Philosophy of Epicurus," Psychology Today (October 2013, updated June 22, 2024) |
| Tim O'Keefe | 2010 | "And this combination of aponia and ataraxia -- with ataraxia being by far the more important of the two -- is the pinnacle of happiness. Epicurus is properly called a hedonist, since he avows that pleasure is the sole intrinsic good. But given his idiosyncratic understanding of pleasure, with ataraxia being the primary constituent of the happy life, it may be less misleading to call him a 'tranquillist'." | Tim O'Keefe, Epicureanism (Acumen / University of California Press, 2010), p. 120 |
| Tim O'Keefe | 2010 | "And because tranquillity is the main constituent of the happy life for Epicurus, having to live in fear of punishment is reason enough never to break the law..." | Tim O'Keefe, Epicureanism (Acumen / University of California Press, 2010), p. 144 |
| Ali Haydar Kutan | 2010 | "...a tranquil life, (i.e., ataraxia), a state which is free from all kind of bodily and mental disturbances is itself the ultimate goal of life." | Ali Haydar Kutan, "Epicurus and Kant: A Comparison of Their Ethical Systems" (M.Sc. thesis, Middle East Technical University, September 2010), p. 124 |
| Voula Tsouna | 2007 | "Another controversy within the Epicurean school concerns the ways in which it is possible to secure the most important aspect of the supreme good: i.e., tranquillity." | Voula Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 18 |
| James Warren | 2004 | "What matters, therefore, in assessing the goodness of a life is clearly not at all how long that life is but rather whether the person in question has attained the natural goal of life, the absence of pain." | James Warren, Facing Death: Epicurus and His Critics (Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 147 |
| James Warren | 2002 | "...the Epicureans and the Sextan Pyrrhonists, despite their other differences, promote something which they call ataraxia as the goal of life." | James Warren, Epicurus and Democritean Ethics: An Archaeology of Ataraxia (Cambridge Classical Studies, Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 5 |
| Clay Splawn | 2002 | "The limit of someone's katastematic pleasure, the greatest pleasure possible for a person, would occur when the person takes pleasure in the fact that he is completely free from pain." | Clay Splawn, "Updating Epicurus's Concept of Katastematic Pleasure," Journal of Value Inquiry 36, no. 4 (2002): 473-482, p. 481 |
| Martha C. Nussbaum | 1994 | "Ataraxia (freedom from disturbance and anxiety) in the soul and freedom from pain in the body: these are the uncorrupted creature's goals." | Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton University Press, 1994), ch. 4, p. 109 |
| Peter Preuss | 1994 | "Some philosophers, having seen the inadequacy of pursuing kinetic pleasure as the good, abandoned pleasure altogether and recommended something else instead, virtue for example. But Epicurus rather makes katastematic pleasure the good of his ethics because it is continuous in its nature." | Peter Preuss, Epicurean Ethics: Katastematic Hedonism, Studies in the History of Philosophy, vol. 35 (Lewiston / Queenston / Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1994), p. 166 |
| Jeffrey Purinton | 1993 | "It follows, then, that, when Epicurus says that pleasure is the telos, what he means is that the telos is specifically what he calls 'katastematic pleasure': painlessness (the katastematic pleasure of the body) and undisturbedness (the katastematic pleasure of the soul)." | Jeffrey Purinton, "Epicurus on the Telos," Phronesis 38, no. 3 (1993): 281-320, p. 281 |
| Stephen E. Rosenbaum | 1990 | "The highest good, for Epicurus, is static pleasure, and it is further the absence of pain -- aponia/ataraxia." | Stephen E. Rosenbaum, "Epicurus on Pleasure and the Complete Life," The Monist 73, no. 1 (January 1990): 21-41 |
| Phillip Mitsis | 1988 | "He further claims that someone who satisfies these desires will be in a state of aponia and ataraxia. In identifying these states with eudaimonia, Epicurus relies on the assertion that a necessary condition for happiness is the satisfaction of our natural and necessary desires." | Phillip Mitsis, Epicurus' Ethical Theory: The Pleasures of Invulnerability, Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, vol. 48 (Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 51 |
| A.A. Long & David Sedley | 1987 | "If complete absence of bodily and mental pain constitutes the greatest pleasure, then it is only reasonable to avoid any pleasures which will imperil this objective... As long as pain is absent we have static pleasure, but kinetic pleasure will last only as long as the activity giving rise to it." | A.A. Long and David Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge University Press, 1987), vol. 1, pp. 122-123 |
| Stephen E. Rosenbaum | 1986 | "His general philosophical aim seems to have been much the same as that of Lucretius, his disciple, to know the truth and thereby achieve ataraxia." / "Epicurus did have a serious purpose, to establish the truth and thereby gain mental tranquillity and show the way to mental tranquillity." | Stephen E. Rosenbaum, "How to Be Dead and Not Care: A Defense of Epicurus," American Philosophical Quarterly 23, no. 2 (April 1986): 217-225, pp. 220-221 |
| J.M. Rist | 1972 | "It is certain that for Epicurus the greatest pleasure is a complete absence of pain, both from the body and from the mind... He will be like a calm sea with no disturbing breezes. But what is the position of all actual human beings, none of whom regularly enjoys such absolute tranquillity?" | J.M. Rist, Epicurus: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 109 |
| Carlo Diano | 1967 | "Quand on peut le dire! Mais pour pouvoir le dire, pour entrer dans cette espèce de nirvana vécu les yeux grands ouverts, et se mettre hors du temps et vaincre la mort, il faut que l'âme soit libre de toute agitation et de tout désir... Ainsi, même pour Epicure, on ne peut atteindre le souverain bien qu'à travers la pureté de sa vie et l'ascèse." ["...to enter into this kind of nirvana lived with wide-open eyes, and to place oneself outside time and conquer death, the soul must be free of all agitation and all desire... Thus, even for Epicurus, one can attain the sovereign good only through purity of life and asceticism."] | Carlo Diano, "Épicure: la philosophie du plaisir et la société des amis," Les Études philosophiques, n.s., 22, no. 2 (April-June 1967): 173-186, p. 182 |
| Philip Merlan | 1960 | "The philosophy of Epicurus is not a philosophy of pleasure; it is a philosophy of joy." | Philip Merlan, Studies in Epicurus and Aristotle, Klassisch-Philologische Studien 22 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1960), p. 15 |
| Carlo Diano | 1946 | "Right after the second world war C. Diano in his influential work on Epicurus proposed an interpretation, based on Lucr. 4.627-9, of katastematic pleasure as the condition of the organism free from natural and necessary wants, and of kinetic pleasure as presupposing katastematic pleasure and consisting merely in the variation of it." (secondhand -- Diano's own book has not been directly obtained; this is Peter Preuss's account of its argument) | Carlo Diano, Epicuri Ethica (Florence: G.C. Sansoni, 1946), as described in Peter Preuss, Epicurean Ethics: Katastematic Hedonism (Edwin Mellen Press, 1994), p. 149 |
Every quotation above is verified directly against the cited primary source, following the same standard applied in the source article. The one exception is explicitly marked: the 1946 Diano entry is secondhand (via Preuss), since Diano's original book has not yet been directly obtained.
The Pushback: Scholars Who Argue Pleasure Remains the Goal
Section titled “The Pushback: Scholars Who Argue Pleasure Remains the Goal”The following table collects the smaller number of scholars documented in Part Three of the source article who have argued directly against treating ataraxia, tranquility, or katastematic pleasure as a separate, superior good standing above pleasure — holding instead that these are simply pleasure itself, correctly understood, and not a rival or replacement good.
| Writer | Date | Full Quotation | Full Citation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Emily Austin | 2022 | "[A]dopting a view roughly in line with Gosling and Taylor (1982) and Arenson (2019)." (a footnote declining to relitigate the dispute in her main text, but siding explicitly with the "unified good" camp) | Emily Austin, Living for Pleasure: An Epicurean Guide to Life (Oxford University Press, 2022), ch. 4, n. 8 |
| Kelly Arenson | 2019 | "I share their position that what counts as properly kinetic according to Epicureans is the pleasure linked to the perceived process of restoring painless organic functioning, whereas what counts as katastematic is the awareness of the organism's painless functioning." | Kelly Arenson, Health and Hedonism in Plato and Epicurus (Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), Introduction p. 4 and p. 140 |
| Catherine Wilson | 2019 | "In fact, Epicurus did consider pleasure, including pleasure in food and drink, to be not only the main motive of our actions but also the supreme good." | Catherine Wilson, How to Be an Epicurean (Basic Books, 2019; published in the UK as The Pleasure Principle: Epicureanism and the Good Life), p. 10 |
| Pascal Massie | 2018 | "...ataraxia is not a degree zero since... it is already pleasure and Epicurus' insistence on the idea that ataraxia is a form of pleasure rules out a common objection according to which one who follows such an ethics would live a life of indifference." | Pascal Massie, "Ataraxia: Tranquility at the End," in Sean D. Kirkland and Eric Sanday, eds., A Companion to Ancient Philosophy (Northwestern University Press, 2018), p. 389 |
| David Sedley | 2017 | "Only a tranquil life additionally textured by a variety of kinetic pleasures can be enjoyed as a whole from any chosen temporal viewpoint... Here we are very close to the heart of the Epicurean eudaimonistic enterprise." | David Sedley, "Epicurean versus Cyrenaic Happiness," ch. 5 of Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill, ed. Matthew Wright, Richard Seaford, and John M. Wilkins (Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 103 |
| Mathew Wenham | 2009 | "This framework refuses any conception of pleasure that locates it extrinsically to its experiential object -- yet this is just how the standard interpretation casts katastematic pleasures." | Mathew Wenham, "On Cicero's Interpretation of 'Katastematic' Pleasure in Epicurus," in Greek Research in Australia: Proceedings of the Biennial International Conference of Greek Studies, Flinders University, June 2007, eds. E. Close et al. (Adelaide: Flinders University Department of Languages -- Modern Greek, 2009), 109-118 |
| Boris Nikolsky | 2001 | No single pull-quote is given in the source article for this entry. Nikolsky argues that the entire "kinetic versus katastematic" framework is a scholastic artifact of the Hellenistic Academy's divisio Carneadea -- a classification scheme for cataloging rival schools' positions on the highest good -- transmitted into both Cicero and Diogenes Laertius from a single common source, rather than an independent corroboration of a real Epicurean doctrine. | Boris Nikolsky, "Epicurus on Pleasure," Phronesis 46, no. 4 (2001): 440-465 |
| R.W. Sharples | 1996 | "For Epicurus the goal of life is pleasure, and the happy life is that with most pleasure and least pain." | R.W. Sharples, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy (Routledge, 1996), p. 84 |
| David Sedley | 1996 | Epicurus's own silence on which kind of pleasure infants pursue was "methodologically correct" -- Sedley argues this was precisely because specifying a hierarchy of kinds would have undermined the "absolute generality" of Epicurus's account, i.e. a deliberate avoidance of any kind-based hierarchy, not a covertly-held one. | David Sedley, "The Inferential Foundations of Epicurean Ethics," in Epicureismo greco e romano, ed. Gabriele Giannantoni and Marcello Gigante (Bibliopolis, 1996), p. 323 |
| Gisela Striker | 1993 | "It was this terminological move that allowed Epicurus to identify the greatest pleasure with the good life... I would suggest that he introduced the notion of katastematic pleasure in order to show that happiness can be the same as pleasure after all." | Gisela Striker, "Epicurean Hedonism," ch. 10 of Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1996; originally in J. Brunschwig and M. Nussbaum, eds., Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 3-17), p. 207 of the reprint |
| Gisela Striker | 1990 | "I will argue that tranquillity was in fact not a serious contender for the position of ultimate good in ancient times. Greek theories of happiness from Plato to Epicurus were attempts to spell out what sort of a life one would have to lead in order to have good reasons for feeling tranquil or contented; they were not recipes for reaching a certain state of mind." | Gisela Striker, "Ataraxia: Happiness as Tranquillity," originally The Monist 73, no. 1 (1990): 97-110; reprinted as ch. 9 of Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 183 of the reprint |
| Julia Annas | 1987 | "...ataraxia is not an alternative end but a specification of the kind of pleasure that can be our final end..." | Julia Annas, "Epicurus on Pleasure and Happiness," Philosophical Topics 15, no. 2 (Fall 1987): 5-21, p. 8 |
| J.C.B. Gosling & C.C.W. Taylor | 1982 | "The value of ataraxia is parasitic upon that of aponia, since the only ataraxia worth having on Epicurus' view is that which comes from pleasant memories and confident expectations of sensory pleasures of a painless kind." | J.C.B. Gosling and C.C.W. Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure (Oxford University Press, 1982), ch. 19, 19.2.2, p. 372 |
Every quotation above is verified directly against the cited primary source, following the same standard applied in the source article, with one exception explicitly marked: the Nikolsky entry has no single pull-quote in the source article, only a paraphrase of his argument, and is presented honestly as such rather than with an invented quotation.