Episode 016 - The Atoms Are Imperishable And Provide Continuity To All Nature
Date: 04/27/20
Link: https://www.epicureanfriends.com/thread/1536-episode-sixteen-the-atoms-are-un-destroyable-and-provide-continuity-to-all-natur/
Summary
Section titled “Summary”Martin reads the Daniel Brown translation of several Book One passages: the argument that if matter were infinitely divisible everything would long since have dissolved; the proof that primary particles must be solid rather than soft; the continuity argument showing each species reproduces its own kind because atomic properties are fixed; the claim that atoms have a minimum “least part” that cannot be separated from the whole; and the final reduction-to-absurdity showing infinite divisibility would eliminate any distinction between the smallest and largest bodies. Elaine opens a discussion about whether Lucretius anticipates the concept of entropy, which Martin clarifies at length — the proper physical definition is probabilistic (measuring the likelihood of a given state), not simply a measure of disorder as popular usage implies. Cassius then offers a practical reconciliation of Lucretius’s eternal-universe claim with modern physics: the span between any cosmic beginning and any eventual heat death is so vast relative to human history that it is functionally infinite, meaning atoms continuously reassemble throughout the entire period of human civilization. Martin confirms this is the correct reading and attributes the formulation to their Finnish forum member Ilka.
The panelists then discuss the swerve, paradox, and duality before arriving at a close comparison of how four translators render the phrase “true reason” near the end of the passage. Daniel Brown (1743) says “true reason exclaims against it,” Munro says “true reason protests and denies,” Bailey says “true reasoning cries out against this,” and Stallings and Martin Ferguson Smith both render it as “sound reasoning.” Cassius notes that the emphatic, almost indignant verb in each version suggests something more than cold logic — that correct reasoning carries feeling with it, that confidence itself is a form of feeling. This leads to a discussion of Lucian’s Alexander the Oracle-Monger: it is not necessary to know the precise mechanism of a fraud in order to be confident it is one, and that confidence is Epicurean.
The longest digression concerns Star Trek. Martin describes the Organian episode (“Errand of Mercy,” Season 1, Episode 26 of the original series) — in which a superrace living in complete bliss and without territorial ambition intervenes to prevent a Klingon-Federation war — as an approximation of Epicurean gods. He then raises the famous scene from Star Trek V where Captain Kirk declares “I need my pain,” which Martin calls “fully Epicurean” and contrasts sharply with the Stoic alternative of training oneself to withstand pain through indifference. Spock’s arc — his severe emotional suppression training ultimately failing because feeling is what makes decisions possible — is similarly identified as an implicit critique of pure rationalism. Star Wars, by contrast, is held up as a heavily Stoic popular narrative. The episode closes with Martin clarifying that even without Epicurus’s hard solid particles, modern quantum mechanics still defeats Zeno’s paradoxes: probability-distribution particles can still form compounds, and you can still walk across a room.
Transcript
Section titled “Transcript”Cassius: Welcome to Episode 16 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who lived in the age of Julius Caesar and wrote On the Nature of Things, the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. I’m your host, Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com Forum, we’ll walk you through the six books of Lucretius’ poem and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book Epicurus and His Philosophy by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt. Before we start with today’s episode, let me remind you of our three ground rules. First, our aim is to go back to the original text to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it — not simply repeat for you what modern commentators teach about it today. Second, we won’t be talking about modern political issues in this podcast. Epicurean philosophy is very different from Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, and Marxism. It must be understood on its own, not in terms of any conventional modern morality. Third, the physics presented by Lucretius is the essential base of Epicurean philosophy. When you study this, you’ll see that Epicurus taught neither luxury nor minimalism, but that feeling, pleasure, and pain are the guides that nature gave us to live by — not supernatural gods, not idealism, and not virtue ethics. More than anything else, Epicurus taught us that there is nothing supernatural whatsoever, and that means there is no life after death, and any happiness we will ever have must come in this life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion. Remember that our home page is LucretiusToday.com, where you can find a free copy of the versions of the poem that we’re reading. In this Episode 16, we’ll discuss how the atoms are never destroyed, how the atoms provide continuity to all of nature, and that there’s a strict limit on the divisibility of all things. Now, let’s join the discussion with Martin reading today’s text.
Martin: But still, if nature had prefixed no bounds in breaking things to pieces, the parts of matter broken by every passing age had been reduced so small that nothing could of them be formed that would in any time become mature. For things we see much sooner are dissolved than are again restored, and therefore what an infinite tract of ages past has broken and separated and dissolved in future time can never be repaired. So that certain bounds of breaking and dividing must be set, because we see each being is repaired, and stated times are fixed to everything in which it feeds the flower of its age.
And yet, though the first seeds of things are solid, all beings that are compounded, such as air and water, earth and fire, may be soft, however made or by what power formed, and from them be produced because there is a void still mixed with things. And on the contrary, if these first seeds were soft, what reason can there be to say when hardened flints and iron could be formed, for nature would want the proper principles to work upon, and therefore these first seeds must simple solids be, by whose union, close and compact, all things are bound up firm, and so display their strengths and hardy forms.
Again, because each being in its kind has certain bounds, prefixed to its increase, and to the preservation of its life, and since by nature’s laws it is ordained to each how far their powers to act or not extend, since nothing changes and everything goes on as it began, each kind of birds must steady in their course, show the same colors painted on their wings. The principles of matter when they spring must be fixed and unchangeable; if the seeds of things could change by any means, it would be unknown what could be formed, what not, by what means every being is limited, and stops short within the bounds it cannot break. Nor could the cause of time in every age, the nature, motion, diet, and manners of the old sire impress upon the young.
Besides, because the utmost point or the extreme of every body, something that the eye cannot discern, it is not made of parts, but it is in nature what we call the least, which never exists of itself, divided from body, nor ever can, because it is the very first and last of something else. For this, by heaping up such parts as these, one by another, completes the being of every body. Since then they can’t subsist apart and separate, they must need stick close, nor be divided by the utmost force. These seeds therefore are in their nature solid and of simple form of smallest parts bound close, not tied together by united seeds of various kinds, but in themselves entire eternally unmixed and pure, from which nature will suffer nothing to be forced or lessened, reserving them as first seeds to form and to repair those things that die.
Again, suppose there was no least, the smallest bodies must be composed of parts boundless and infinite, the half of every being must then contain another half, so there would be no end of still dividing. And where could be the difference between the smallest and the largest bodies? None in the least, for though the whole be entirely infinite, yet bodies that are smallest would contain infinite parts alike, which since true reason exclaims against, nor will allow the mind to give assent, you must confess, profess, that there are bodies which are void of parts, and are by nature at least, since such there are, you must admit them solid and eternal.
Cassius: There’s a lot of important principles in this section. Well, in general, it’s more argument for these indivisible particles that he called atoms, but now we call them elementary particles, and so he’s continuing on in that.
Elaine: His first paragraph, Martin — it sounds to me like he’s thinking about entropy in a way, where he says “for things we see much sooner are dissolved than are again restored.” So is he anticipating the tendency towards entropy there in that little sentence? That’s really amazing.
Martin: I don’t think so. He uses it in a different way than it looks at first. I think he uses this message to make the proof by refuting the opposite. And here it’s actually the opposite of what he means. It’s the indirect proof that he finds here. So where he says things are — it’s easier to put things apart than to put them together — “things we see much sooner are dissolved than are again restored” — how could that not be entropy?
Elaine: How could that not be entropy?
Martin: No, because it’s the end. He said “because we see each being is repaired and stated times are fixed to everything in which it feeds the flower of its age.” And this is the refutation of what he said before. So that means if it appears to be that things fall apart easily, then he makes the counter-statement, but we actually see that…
Cassius: Okay. So he just didn’t take it all the way. So.
Elaine: Yeah. He didn’t take it all the way. So.
Cassius: Yeah. Okay. So he’s basically taking this to show that the view that everything falls apart quickly is in contradiction with observation. Okay. All right. Well. I’m not sure — I’m kind of more with Elaine on that at the moment. Martin, let’s be clear about how we’re defining entropy. What does that mean?
Martin: The definition is through the probability. So it’s given by: the entropy of a certain state is a measure of the probability that the state exists. So the system could be in another state, and the entropy measures how probable the state is in which it is currently. Now.
Cassius: Okay. Now, see, I understood that word differently. I thought it was a measure of organization versus disorganization.
Martin: No, this is not a definition — this is an interpretation, which by pattern recognition seems to work. But for me, it was an obstacle that delayed my understanding of entropy until the third year of study, when we learned this properly in statistical physics. So this is so misleading. I think two years ago I had a discussion with Alex where I put this out already, so that it’s not a measure of order or disorder. It’s just by coincidence that quite often the state which is more probable appears to us to be of lesser order. We may have a situation then where the scientific definition — which I’m sure you’re probably correct about — is so different from the way it’s generally understood that we’ve got to clarify what we’re talking about.
Cassius: Right. So I thought, Martin — I may be wrong — but I thought entropy was thermodynamic, and it was the degree of unavailability of heat energy for conversion into work. But you’re saying that’s not the definition anymore?
Martin: It could be. I mean, I cannot recall now how this derives from the other. The primary definition is from statistics. It’s part of thermodynamics, that’s right, but the fundamental definition goes over probability. And then based on this one, you can derive some corollaries to characterize entropy, and then something like what you say may be the result.
Cassius: You know, guys, we started on this because Elaine asked: “Is this not a precursor of the study of entropy?” Maybe the sentence needs to be modified: that this is a precursor of something else, but not entropy. I don’t know.
Elaine: Well, I think it touches on it.
Cassius: Okay. So here I’m going to have to get a Wikipedia — I don’t know if they’re even right, but it looks like maybe there was more than one definition.
Martin: No, no. There’s one primary definition from statistics, and that’s the one which is valid. All others have usually limitations.
Cassius: Well, it says here there are two equivalent definitions of entropy: the thermodynamic definition and the statistical mechanics definition. But classical thermodynamics came first, right? What is — because I don’t recall the thermodynamic one — can you state it now?
Martin: Okay. So for a closed thermodynamic system, it is the quantitative measure of the amount of thermal energy not available to do work. And the statistical definition was developed later.
Cassius: That’s real interesting. This may be over my head. Maybe the more important issue is we’re trying to make sure we’re understandable by people of general learning. What do you take from this discussion so far about what Lucretius was trying to say? Because I’ll go ahead and say again — although my understanding of entropy was obviously less sophisticated — I was thinking that where Elaine was going originally was correct, that Lucretius is saying both that we observe that things are more easily dissolved than they are put together again. Now, whether you call that entropy or something else, I think that’s what he’s saying. But then he’s also saying at the end that there’s a limit to that, and in the end it does not go any further than down to the ultimate particle state. And that’s why the universe still exists. If it did not stop at the particular state, then the universe would no longer exist after an infinite time.
Elaine: Yeah, because it would eventually dissolve.
Cassius: Yeah. Plus, the things reconstitute, and this can only happen with seeds. And that means this is another proof for him that we don’t see it completely fall apart — that these smallest particles exist.
Elaine: Right. So, Martin — this would not be compatible with the heat death of the universe.
Martin: Yes. True. Okay. Epicurus doesn’t know about that. He doesn’t anticipate it. So that doesn’t match to it, and that’s why I also don’t want to over-interpret anything of it. But Epicurus writes as if in anticipation of entropy.
Elaine: Okay. It’s like he kind of almost got there, though. He noticed some stuff.
Martin: Yeah. Yeah. Entropy is a word which exists basically only by the physical definition. A lot of words — like “work” and “energy” — they have their prior popular meaning, and in physics it’s sharpened. So we often have a conflict between what a word means in popular knowledge and what it means specifically in physics. But with entropy it’s the other way around — this is a thing defined in physics, and then it has been taken and popularized under the banner of popular science.
Cassius: Right. So that means in this case it’s easy to refer back to the physical definition, and that clarifies it, despite the fact that some of these popularized things — like the order/disorder interpretation — can lead to contradictions.
Martin: Right. So, listeners — don’t worry if you don’t understand all the statistics and the physics. I think there’s already a good enough case made here that at least within the boundaries of our experience — we’re obviously not going to be around for the heat death of the universe — there’s evidence that the breaking down doesn’t continue indefinitely. And that’s my perspective on the significance of this: he’s talking to people who are of average education and intelligence, and the person of average education and intelligence can certainly see in their own experience that it is easier to destroy something — to smash a glass — than it is to put the glass back together again. It’s easier to smash an egg than it is to put the egg back together again. So it’s common experience that it’s easier to dissolve things than to assemble them. And so if the universe has existed for an infinite amount of time — which perhaps is a point that he’s going to be making later, or maybe he’s already made to some extent — but if the universe has existed for an infinite amount of time, and it’s easier for things to dissolve than to come together, then why hasn’t everything just dissolved into nothing? And the reason is that the elements themselves cannot be dissolved. And so we can still use that kind of reasoning even for a universe that will end in heat death, and that that time is so long that during our entire human history it might as well be as if it were infinite and not going to have an end.
Elaine: Exactly. Okay, good. Yay! I got it — exactly what Martin said. I need to take a moment and appreciate that. That is the most straightforward way to reconcile the eternity in Epicurus with what we know today. Yes. Thank you, Martin. I feel really good. I’m excited. I’ve got my physics down.
Cassius: Well, that’s such a profound statement from Martin there. Martin, do you want to restate it again in your own words? What is the best way to reconcile modern physics to that position?
Martin: Yeah — by whatever the length of time has passed before, by whatever beginning there has been, plus the end of it through something like heat death or through the extended acceleration of the universe — I thought that this is so far before and after the birth of the first human and the death of the last human, that we are not worried about it. And it’s not from me — I saw this stated before I stated it — from our Finnish friend, Ilka.
Elaine: Yeah, Ilka stated this one.
Cassius: Yeah, good. Okay, before we move on — Charles, anything on this?
Charles: Not on this paragraph, no.
Cassius: Okay, very good. Okay, what about the next passage — that hard body thing? We kind of covered that two sessions ago, where he argues that the elemental particles are hard.
Elaine: Yeah, so back then that made sense. I don’t really think we have to belabor that.
Cassius: Yeah. And I believe also two sessions ago, we also talked about the terminology of seeds in early Epicurean lists.
Elaine: Yeah. Right.
Cassius: Okay, what about the next passage about how everything goes on — each kind of birds and the seeds of things? And that’s similar to the beginning of this book where he talked about how we’re not just doing random things, so the same line of reasoning that he used to eliminate the possibility of the supernatural — now he is saying this also shows you that there are these fundamental particles.
Cassius: Somebody might ask, in looking at that, where he says “if the seeds of things could change by any means, it would be unknown what could be formed and what could not be formed” — and probably at this point we ought to comment on how that relates to or limits the impact of the swerve. The seeds themselves not changing, but on the other hand the seeds themselves being able to swerve — that’s implying that there’s a disconnect between the swerve and the actual properties of the seeds.
Charles: Right — so a limited number of things that the seeds can do, but that doesn’t affect the range of probabilities that are available. I always saw the swerve as a byproduct of the seeds or the atoms.
Cassius: Well, when you say “byproduct,” what do you mean by the word “byproduct”? Because again — the general point here being that the seeds are how nature continues itself along the same path, basically, in the way that birds have colors on their wings and the other examples that he’s giving there.
Charles: Yeah, I mean the swerve is a part of the action of the seeds — it’s not possible for the swerve to break down the seeds — so I think those are two different things.
Martin: I think the swerve is not touched on here, because we can construct a universe with hard bodies which behave like this which don’t have a swerve, and those which do have a swerve. The whole reason for the introduction of the swerve is to save free will — or however we want to call it — from the determinism which a materialist universe without the swerve would have.
Cassius: Martin, whenever we get back into this argument — doesn’t it have two illustrations in Lucretius? And of course I think he does that in Book Two instead of here. But number one is free will — but doesn’t he also say that’s why the universe came together in the first place? Because the atoms, yeah, right — because otherwise they’re going in a straight line.
Martin: Yeah, but that one is because of the initial start conditions, which people chose. You can choose different start conditions which would assure this without a swerve.
Charles: I’d have to touch up on that part about the byproduct later, but it will be touched upon in Book Two — it’s kind of about the movement of atoms as a whole.
Cassius: Well, the general point that I kind of keep in my mind — and somebody could correct me if they disagree or have another spin on it, to have a pun there — the issue that I continue to think is important is that you have both fixed and unchangeable seeds in the form of the atoms, and at the same time you also do have some amount of indeterminacy in the way the atoms come together, and the things that they can do. There is room for some change at the same time that there are also things that are not changing.
Cassius: Right — but not changed in just breaking them down indefinitely. So I think those are two different things, and they shouldn’t be seen as paradoxical.
Charles: Yeah, it’s easy — I was talking to somebody about this day to day — how easy it is to create paradoxes because of language. But you know, reality doesn’t actually have a paradox in it.
Cassius: Right. I mean, our modeling still has paradoxes.
Martin: Well, so by that it’s because there are things that we don’t completely understand. I don’t think we would say that reality itself is contradictory.
Cassius: Yeah, that is our expectation. Right. Right. So it’s our thinking and our language and so on that leads to that — but that’s not the nature of reality, so far as we know.
Martin: The problem is in the model and not in reality. Yes — we cannot tell yet. We still hope that in the end reality is consistent and doesn’t have these paradoxes. So far you see it only as a deficiency in our models.
Cassius: Yes. Right. Right. I’d bring that up because there are, I guess, sort of New Age kinds of thinking that put a lot of significance on paradox. And I felt like you were almost going there a little bit — that keeping these two things in mind that are not reconcilable — those two things I think are just different aspects of the situation and are not in conflict with each other. But it’s real important when we look at this to not get into that kind of New Age thing where “the truth is in the paradox.” Or “you’ve got to keep conflicting ideas in mind.” Really, if you’ve got conflicting stuff going on, it means you just don’t know — you’re missing some of the information.
Charles: Reminds me of a friend of mine who’s obsessed with duality.
Charles: Yes. Oh my gosh. So I had a conversation with somebody about that this week — they wanted to transcend the duality of pleasure and pain, and I was like, well, there must be some kind of pleasure that’s making you want to transcend it, otherwise why do you want it? We just went around in circles. I never could get anywhere. A little frustrating.
Elaine: No, I think there are a lot of different types of duality, and for most people it’s usually about substance. Right. You’re right. And so this is a materialist philosophy — so we’re not, in that sense, dual, because we’re not in like matter and spirit. I don’t know where I was going with that. I just — I guess my original point was just that we have to be careful that we don’t suggest that there’s something special about maintaining cognitive dissonance, because that’s not the goal.
Charles: Yeah. Just to kind of add on to that — Epicurean philosophy is monistic in the materialist sense. However, if you really wanted to pull that angle, you could say there is a duality of pain and pleasure. But I wouldn’t go that route. And even then, the only thing binding it is just the choice of language.
Cassius: Yeah. Well, no — I think from experience there are clearly two different categories of feeling — pain and pleasure — and I don’t think we have to get fancy with that and try to break that down. They’re both feelings, sure, but there are ones that you want and ones that you don’t want.
Martin: So I’m very eager to get into Book Four — this is my favorite one, and it’s one I’m more well-versed on.
Cassius: All right. Let’s see — so we’ve gotta finish Book One first. But right before the last paragraph — this is almost going back towards Zeno’s paradoxes. These last two passages are, it seems to me, going back to the need to refute Zeno’s paradoxes by talking about the possibility of infinite divisibility. The first part here talks about parts of the atom — right? Is there a least part?
Elaine: Yeah, I don’t see anything here that I can really add. I think it speaks for itself.
Cassius: Yeah, Elaine — I guess what I think you’re probably going towards is: I do think there’s a lot of discussion in some of the different texts that I’ve read, which try to get a lot of information out of this about whether the atom has parts or not, and you can get really into the physics of that. But it’s probably not significant to us at this point. Martin, again — since physics is your area — does an ultimate particle have a part? Does it have an edge? Does it have a corner?
Martin: No, no. This is the thing — if Epicurus had essentially hard bodies as he modeled reality with hard-body elementary particles, we don’t have that anymore, because of the uncertainty principle. So if you take the swerve more seriously and also apply it to the size of the body, then we see that the body — the outline of the body — is only defined by probability lines. So there are no hard bodies at the elementary level according to our current physics models. Yes, right. And anything which would not have this continuous smearing out of the elementary particles would be in contradiction with quantum mechanics. And that one is a bit — so we may expect eventually some modifications to this, but not so fundamental that we get back to simplistic models with hard bodies. We may use them in simple cases, but we know very well it’s not applicable when we go deeper. Or — like I mentioned already — there is a discussion of a new particle which is of enormous size. So instead of having an extremely small elementary particle which you can observe with some kind of microscope in a laboratory, it’s the other way around: when we detect this particle, the whole laboratory is inside that particle, or appears to be, according to the model.
Martin: Yeah, yes. The way we describe this particle is that it’s supersized — but this is speculative, so we have not yet found this particle. And this is a criticism of some modern physics: that the models can get so far ahead of the evidence sometimes that it might as well be science fiction.
Cassius: Yeah. At this point.
Martin: So — that’s why I don’t like to talk about the multiverse assumptions, because it’s very speculative. But it’s not — well, the problem is that eventually we’ll have some physics beyond the standard model, and this supersized particle is something within our reach — with ever-higher energies in our accelerators, if it exists, we will eventually see it. So that means this one is something that awaits experimental confirmation or not, sooner rather than later. And with the multiverse, there’s not even a single chance that we’ll ever get any experimental verification on that. So it’s purely speculative.
Cassius: Right. That takes me back just to Elaine’s point earlier — that it’s important not to allow ourselves to be mesmerized by paradox, and just left floating in the air with “well, we don’t understand this, and maybe the truth is there is no understanding.” Now, I do think there is a legitimate possibility that our human brains are not going to be capable of putting all the pieces of the physics model together in a totally consistent way. Would you say that, Martin? I mean, there’s been some speculation that our cognitive capacity is possibly just not sufficient to do that. We don’t really have an empirical basis for that.
Martin: Well, so it’s possible — but I’m not saying that it’s certain. We don’t have that certainty. We may eventually have limits. Possibly, for example, if there is an alien race somewhere out there which has the capability to think more deeply — and I don’t expect that you will ever encounter them because they’re too far away — but if they exist and have this deeper knowledge, they may be able to train us to understand to that next level. For example, although if they understand it all, then they’re as happy as the Epicurean gods. Maybe they want to stay away from us. I mean, they would possibly have curiosity like us. So yeah — that might make them go on space travel. Could be.
Cassius: I can always laugh at the interpretation of some very new newcomers to Epicurean philosophy that the Epicurean gods are alien gods. Yeah — I mean, you would not think that’s what Epicurus meant. Actually, this is how we interpret what Epicurus meant — I mean, we’re not talking about like the movie E.T. — but they were material beings that were not on the Earth. So “extraterrestrials” is easy. It’s easy for people to automatically go to that conclusion, with all the sci-fi connotations. That we’re kind of literally like the E.T. movie character. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Somebody needs to make a movie with the Epicurean extraterrestrials to show what they would really be doing.
Martin: Yeah, but the problem is that the part in which the wise men can sense them is refuted by our physics. So that makes it a bit difficult to make that consistently. So as of now, those Epicurean gods as Epicurus described them are even more far apart from us than they were at that time.
Cassius: I wonder if there are any popular, well-known science fiction scenarios that even come close to just, you know, having a very happy group of extraterrestrials.
Charles: I’ve suggested before that the Star Child from 2001: A Space Odyssey sort of gets the gist of it. But I haven’t read the books, I don’t know all the lore, and it’s been over ten years since I’ve seen it. So I mean, what you would have would be a group of very long-lived beings that were enjoying themselves together and had learned to live.
Martin: There was one on Star Trek — one of the series — one which came close to it. I don’t even remember the type, but I can briefly give the summary. So what happened is: I think it was the Klingons and the Federation were both approaching a planet where the people appeared to be in medieval age. And I think the Federation wanted to stick to the rule of not interfering with a civilization which is not yet advanced enough. But the Klingons somehow wanted to exploit that planet or something. And over this, they started — or were about to start — a war. And suddenly they couldn’t continue. And then this super race revealed itself and said they had set up this medieval civilization only as a deception, so as to keep people away. They themselves lived in bliss and were not concerned about expanding into the universe. And the result was then that the Klingons backed down, and of course the Federation as well, because there was no point — because those beings had superior capability.
Cassius: Yeah. So you know, I wonder if the people who wrote that had read Epicurus.
Martin: I guess so. Meanwhile, I wish we could find that out. That would be interesting.
Cassius: There was — we found it out recently, we stated it recently — that Captain Kirk has expressed Epicurean ideas. And I’m pretty sure this is so close that whoever wrote this has read Epicurus.
Martin: Yeah! My episode you’re discussing is called “Errand of Mercy,” Episode 26 from Season One.
Charles: Oh, okay. Well, I’m starting Season One — I’m kind of on episode ten or something. So I’ll get to that scene. That’s a good analogy, Martin. I did not follow your comment where you said that Kirk had some specific Epicurean inspiration — do you have any recollections?
Martin: When we had the discussion about pain — because then there was — and this was one of the more recent movies — where they had this guru who led them to a false god on a place where no civilization had ever been before, and that was something like a godlike creature. And that creature trapped the people with painlessness. And then Captain Kirk was quoted as saying “I need my pain” as a guidance. And this is fully Epicurean.
Cassius: Yes! I remember us discussing that — I guess on maybe the Facebook page. There’s a clip on YouTube where Kirk is saying “I need my pain” or something. Elaine commented on that if I remember correctly.
Martin: Exactly. And this is not Stoic. If it were, he would just say “you need the pain to train yourself to withstand pain.” But there it’s clearly shown: the pain is the guidance, it’s used as a guide. And I don’t think we have said anything else in this ancient philosophy than that this is the Epicurean world.
Cassius: Interesting. Well, I’m going to keep my eyes out for that. I have seen a lot of Spock-y and stoic-y stuff so far, and in some of the episodes. But yeah, so I’m going to watch out for when we can see Spock sometimes implementing some sort of Stoic counterposition.
Martin: And then we can sometimes see Spock change to the Epicurean side — right — where his feeling side is what makes it work exactly.
Cassius: Yeah, yeah. Oh, great point. And to that point — he goes into some severe training where he becomes as unemotional as possible. Yeah. He ends up laughing in the end. Yeah. Yeah. Right. Now I’ve watched a lot of these when I was a kid. I don’t know if I got every episode, but I’m going back after decades to rewatch the original series. So I’m still where they’re in the process of building that up. But that was the major theme with Spock — that logic is not going to actually help you without feeling. The feeling is critical. So — oh, that is pretty darn cool, Martin.
Martin: Yeah, and it’s often the case that Spock’s logic helps them out of trouble, because he can extremely quickly make an estimate of what is the most logical way to go. So — hats off to him for that. Logic has its place.
Cassius: Well, and it’s also not just his logic — it’s his knowledge. Right. Because sometimes what they’re calling logic is just — I think it’s mislabeled — it’s information which we have. And so when it comes to making a decision about that information, that is where he has to have his feeling, or he can’t function. Okay. So Martin nominates the Organians — that’s the planet where “Errand of Mercy” takes place — as an example, or a potential example, of something beginning to approximate Epicurean gods.
Charles: Yeah. Well, I think we should make a list of where we see bits of Epicurean philosophy in popular culture. I have a feeling that there are more of us out there — or even people who don’t know they’re Epicurean — but they’ve kind of figured out the basics for themselves.
Martin: And I think this is important, because quite often the stories try to interpret these popular culture elements in a Stoic sense — especially with science fiction.
Cassius: Yeah, yeah. Good point. There was a thread where we had some significant discussion, Martin — that somebody was suggesting that one of the Star Wars episodes was predominantly Stoic.
Martin: Yeah. Star Wars is an example in popular culture which is really heavily Stoic. The uprising there — it’s never successful, it’s completely useless, and many of them just die in heroic fashion without it leading to real happiness. I mean — but what is not Stoic about it? A Stoic would just not do a revolution. So that is a non-Stoic part of it. But they clearly use Stoic methods to basically get through — and fail.
Cassius: Yeah. Right. Right. Well, I’m definitely glad I started rewatching it, and I will be on the watch out.
Cassius: Well, we have one more passage left. What about the last passage here — about if there were no smallest bodies, then half of a being must contain another half, so there’d be no end of division? Right — and that there would be no difference between the smallest and the largest body, because the smallest body would itself contain an infinite number of parts?
Elaine: Right. I think you’re right — that’s a Zeno’s arrow kind of refutation.
Cassius: You know, it’s probably worth commenting on, in the midst of this passage, that he states that the idea of infinite parts within even the smallest body is something that “true reason exclaims against” nor will allow the mind to give assent — stated a couple of different ways here. Yeah. It’s just unbelievable. And I think we had a conversation with Elaine where she was talking about practical reason, and what she means is reason that is connected completely to observation. So it’s just something that our observations of reality would say — nope, that’s not possible — rather than things like the multiverse, and getting your logical processes way outside of what you can observe.
Cassius: We could probably take this another hour to discuss this particular point, but I don’t know whether this is the first — this is going to be an example in Lucretius where he talks about “true reason.” Both Bailey and I think Munro say it that way.
Elaine: Munro — would it just be like common sense? Well, you know, I think this is just ridiculous to think. Yes, yes.
Cassius: But I think the terminology is what I wanted to comment on there. Because he’s referring to this as “true reason,” which implies that there is a false reason. So the whole terminology of reasoning — the word “reason” itself, used alone — is not apparently sufficient to say whether it’s true reason or false reason, or good reasoning or bad reasoning, or common sense like you said. But I think there’s something significant here in the use of “true reason,” as opposed to — why not use the word “folly”? Or use a word like “imagination”? There’s a contrast to be made between true reason versus how you use reason. Like you just said — Elaine was talking about practical reason — that’s based on connections with reality. Martin Ferguson Smith says “sound judgment.” Dialectics is an example of false reasoning.
Cassius: And those who are the proponents of dialectics see this as a way of reasoning. So they’re actually promoting a method that Epicurus would say is not true reasoning. Dialectic is not true reason because it’s not connected to evidence. It’s not supported by evidence.
Elaine: Oh, it’s so interesting. So — Stallings also says “sound reasoning.” “Solid, sound judgment, sound reasoning” — it wouldn’t be sound if it’s not backed up by evidence.
Charles: Whereby, depending on who uses dialectical reasoning, they may incorporate some observation as well. So it’s not necessarily always something purely speculative. But it’s more of a cherry-picking — make your point — which you see a lot. Not just for that, but even in various dietary schemes and so on: you can make your imagination go first, and then you can find stuff to support your point.
Cassius: Well, whereas if you start from the evidence before you’ve made your decision about what’s going on, you’re going to be more likely to be accurate.
Cassius: I wonder also if there is any significance to — as I’m comparing these translations — I see the 1743 says “true reason exclaims against it, nor will allow the mind to give assent,” and then Munro says “true reason protests and denies the mind can believe it,” and then Bailey says “true reasoning cries out against this and denies the mind can believe it.” I’m wondering if there’s a sense of emphaticness.
Elaine: Oh yeah, yeah — or almost: “this is just ridiculous, who would say such a stupid thing?” Yeah, yeah.
Cassius: I’m not articulating it very well, but I’m wondering if there’s a sense of feeling here — that you’re not just saying “one plus one equals three” is wrong, as if it’s insignificant. There’s almost a sense of urgency, or feeling that you care about it.
Elaine: Yes, yes. Yeah — like that. I think that’s right. Great point. I’m not sure what the point is exactly, but I do think there’s something there — it’s not just dry. So there’s feeling involved in making your conclusions about reality.
Elaine: When you run into somebody who says the earth is flat — I have some feeling involved in my frustration. “Why are you believing this thing that’s clearly incorrect?” It naturally arouses some passion in people.
Cassius: Well, and something else that comes to mind — what does the word “confidence” mean? Is confidence a feeling? A feeling of confidence? Yeah. Is that not the way you measure logic — in the sense that you have a feeling that you’re confident that it’s correct? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. I like this direction. It’s true.
Elaine: Well, this goes along with this idea that we’re not ever really neutral creatures — our feelings are simultaneously present with our perceptions. Yeah, that’s where I’m going. That’s right. Yeah, we’re not just computers processing information without any caring about what that information is. We’re feeling beings — yes, we’re feeling at the core.
Cassius: Well, we probably ought to begin to wrap up unless somebody has more thoughts. Yeah. Just to make clear again for this last one — so we can reach the conclusion about infinite divisibility without the elementary particles having to be solid. Yeah right. Martin — just to make sure I understand exactly what you just said — you’re saying that you can reach the conclusion that infinite divisibility is logically impossible without particles being solid?
Martin: Yes. So this is possible without being solid, because we see them now, based on quantum mechanics, as just probability distributions. Where each particle gets assigned a probability distribution of where you can find it, and it’s still one particle. So there is for it — it’s partially filled, basically, at any of its points in space — and we still have elementary particles like this. So, not solid — they can overlap, and in this way form compounds.
Cassius: And so you’re saying that even though elementary particles may not be solid in the sense that Epicurus thought about them, it is in fact still possible to walk across a room?
Martin: Oh yes. Zeno’s paradoxes about motion and arrows are not valid.
Cassius: And sound reason exclaims against that being impossible, because I’ve seen it done. That’s exactly right. I think that’s where we’re going with some of that emphasis in the last passage — that you don’t just hold in abeyance in your mind possibilities that are floating out there. You not only bring them down to a conclusion, but you feel the urgency of bringing them to a conclusion. You realize that life itself is requiring you to take action and to be confident in your conclusion. Right. And “confident” — that calls to mind a passage out of Lucian’s Alexander the Oracle-Monger — and I can’t quote it exactly — but when he’s talking about Alexander the Oracle-Monger and saying that this person was a fraud, what was needed was an Epicurus — or someone of like mind — who would have confidence that even though he might not know the precise way in which the fraud was being conducted, that it was a fraud. It’s not necessary in the end always to know the precise way in which things are done in order to be confident in your assessment of it.
Elaine: Yeah, yeah. Right. That’s relevant to this. Well, anything else for today? I don’t think so. I never know what direction these conversations are going to take off, and so they swerve in these great ways. I really enjoyed this today.
Cassius: There’s no doubt that discussion of science fiction is one of the most popular things we could possibly do. So when we post this episode, I’ll make a comment that we’re talking about Star Trek, and that will probably prompt more discussion. Yeah. All right.
Cassius: Martin, anything else today?
Martin: No, I’m fine.
Cassius: Okay. And I think we’ve temporarily lost Charles, so we will just say goodbye to Charles and close the episode for this week. We’ll be back next week. All right. Yeah. Thanks a lot. Bye-bye.