Episode 323 - The Pre-Epicurean View: Three Divisions of Philosophy And Three Divisions of Goods
Welcome to Episode 323 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote “On The Nature of Things,” the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
This week we start are continuing our series reviewing Cicero’s “Academic Questions” from an Epicurean perspective. We are focusing first on what is referred to as Book One, which provides an overview of the issues that split Plato’s Academy and gives us an overview of the philosophical issues being dealt with at the time of Epicurus. This week will will continue in Section 5
Our text will come from
Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge We’ll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we’ll also refer to the Rackam translation here:
-V.
I entreat you however, said Atticus, I entreat you to go on, Varro. For I am greatly attached to my own countrymen and to their works; and those subjects delight me beyond measure when they are treated in Latin, and in such a manner as you treat them. And what, said I, do you think that I must feel, who have already engaged to display philosophy to our nation? Let us then, said he, continue the subject, since it is agreeable to you.
A threefold system of philosophising, then, was already received from Plato. One, on the subject of life and morals. A second, on nature and abstruse matters. The third, on discussion, and on what is true or false; what is right or wrong in a discourse; what is consistent or inconsistent in forming a decision.
And that first division of the subject, that namely of living well, they sought in nature herself, and said that it was necessary to obey her; and that that chief good to which everything was referred was not to be sought in anything whatever except in nature. And they laid it down that the crowning point of all desirable things, and the chief good, was to have received from nature everything which is requisite for the mind, or the body, or for life. But of the goods of the body, they placed some in the whole, and others in the parts. Health, strength, and beauty in the whole. In the parts, soundness of the senses, and a certain excellence of the individual parts. As in the feet, swiftness; in the hands, strength; in the voice, clearness; in the tongue, a distinct articulation of words. The excellences of the mind they considered those which were suitable to the comprehension of virtue by the disposition. And those they divided under the separate heads of nature and morals. Quickness in learning and memory they attributed to nature; each of which was described as a property of the mind and genius. Under the head of “morals” they classed our studies, and, I may say, our habits, which they formed, partly by a continuity of practice, partly by reason. And in these two things was contained philosophy itself, in which that which is begun and not brought to its completion, is called a sort of advance towards virtue; but that which is brought to completion is virtue, being a sort of perfection of nature and of all things which they place in the mind; the one most excellent thing. These things then are qualities of the mind.
The third division was that of life. And they said that those things which had influence in facilitating the practice of virtue were connected with this division. For virtue is discerned in some good qualities of the mind and body, which are added not so much to nature as to a happy life. They thought that a man was as it were a certain part of the state, and of the whole human race, and that he was connected with other men by a sort of human society. And this is the way in which they deal with the chief and natural good. But they think that everything else is connected with it, either in the way of increasing or of maintaining it; as riches, power, glory, and influence. And thus a threefold division of goods is inferred by them.
Transcript (Unedited)
Section titled “Transcript (Unedited)”Cassius:
Welcome to episode 323 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius who wrote on the Nature of Things, the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the epicurean text and we discuss how epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of epicurus@epicureanfriends.com where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes. This week we’re continuing in book one of Cicero’s academic questions from an epicurean perspective, the purpose that Cicero had in writing this book was to discuss the background of the development of the academy with one of the major points of contention being what it was that caused Aristotle to break off from the academy and how those issues fed into the development of stoicism, all of which were topics of great concern at the time that Epicurus formed his school last week.
We got up through section four of book one, and this is where Varo had stated that there was no real difference between the Peripatetics and the old academy. Aristotle was superior in a certain luxurious of genius according to Varo, but both schools had the same source and adopted the same division of things to be desired and avoided, and this is where Vero used the illusion of not wanting to be like a pig teaching Minerva because he’s thinking that all of these issues are so well known to Cicero and the other people that he’s speaking with that it might not need to be discussed. But it was important to understand that Socrates in bringing philosophy down from the heavens, had taken the position that he was not going to give positive positions about major issues in philosophy. He was going to talk about ethics and virtue in lieu of trying to understand the nature of the universe, which had been the goal of most of the philosophers up to that point.
And Varo had stated that Socrates had he continued to be alive, would not have approved of what Plato and Aristotle and the other schools began to do, which was to develop a systematic arrangement of positive positions, which of course Socrates had moved away from doing in his own teaching. What we’ll do today is proceed into section five, which begins with an interlude in which Atticus, the Epicurean tells Varo that he’s very much interested in Varo explaining all of these issues and especially that Varo explained them in Latin, which was the native tongue of course, of the speakers. In this dialogue with the implication that the really important thing in being able to understand philosophy and being able to understand what’s being discussed is to be able to express these terms in words that you yourself understand. And the place where Vero is about to start is that he is going to explain the basic three divisions that most all of the schools shared in epicurean terms. We talk about physics, ethics, and canons, but the basic approach is to say whatever it is you’re going to say about the nature of the universe, whatever you’re going to say about the nature of how to live and whatever you’re going to say about knowledge, whether it’s possible and how to obtain it, and that threefold vision, it’s what’s going to be discussed in section five. And so we’ll move right into that. When Joshua is ready.
Joshua:
I intrigue you, however said Atticus, I entreat you to go on Varo where I am greatly attached to my own countrymen and to their works, and these subjects delight me beyond measure when they’re treated in Latin and in such a manner as you treat them. And what said Cicero, do you think that I must feel who have already engaged to display philosophy to our nation? Let us then say, Varo, continue the subject since it is agreeable to you, and then this is Varo speaking the rest of this section. A threefold system of philosophizing then was already received from Plato. One on the subject of life and morals, a second on nature and Abru matters. The third on discussion and on what is true or false, what is right or wrong in a discourse, what is consistent or inconsistent in forming a decision? And that sentence, I’m going to also read and rack them.
There already existed then a threefold scheme of philosophy inherited from Plato. One division dealt with conduct and morals the second with the secrets of nature, the third with dialectic and with judgment of truth and falsehood, correctness and incorrectness, consistency and inconsistency in rhetorical discourse. Now I’m back to the young translation and that first division of the subject, the division of living. Well, they sought in nature herself and said that it was necessary to obey her and that chief good to which everything was referred was not to be sought in anything, whatever except in nature. And they laid it down that the crowning point of all desirable things and the chief good was to have received from nature everything which is requisite for the mind or the body or for life, but if the goods of the body, they play some in the whole and others in the parts health, strength and beauty, in the parts soundness of the senses and a certain excellence of the individual parts as in the feet, swiftness in the hand, strength in the voice, clearness in the tongue, a distinct articulation of words, the excellences of the mind.
They considered those which were suitable to the comprehension of virtue by the disposition and those they divided under the separate heads of nature and morals, quickness in learning and memory. They attributed to nature, each of which was described as a property of the mind and genius under the head morals. They classed our studies and I may say our habits, which they formed partly by a continuity of practice and partly by reason. And in these two things was contained philosophy itself in which that which has begun and not brought to its completion is called a sort of advance towards virtue, but that which is brought to completion is virtue being a sort of perfection of nature and of all things which they place in the mind, the one most excellent thing is virtue. Those things then are the qualities of the mind. The third division was that of life, and they said that those things which had influence in facilitating the practice of virtue were connected to this division for virtue is discerned in some good qualities of the mind and body which are added not so much to nature as to a happy life. They thought that a man was, as it were a certain part of the state and of the whole human race, and that he was connected with other men by a sort of human society, and this is the way in which they deal with the chief and natural good, but they think that everything else is connected with it either in the way of increasing or of maintaining it as riches, power, glory and influence. And thus a threefold division of goods is inferred by them.
Cassius:
Joshua, this is a pretty subtle section, but for our purposes, I think what we want to be sure to stay on are the key differences between whatever is being said here and Epicurus approach in general. Much of what is said here is something that overlays very well onto Epic u’s own division, but some of it does not. And the first thing that I would point out in which care has to be taken is where Varo says that the third division is on discussion and on what is true and false, what is right or wrong in a discourse, what is consistent or inconsistent in forming a decision? Certainly Epicurean Canons does not focus mostly on discourse or dialectic. Epicurus focuses on what is consistent or inconsistent with nature as revealed to us through the senses, anticipations and feelings. And while we certainly are going to want to be consistent and not inconsistent in the decisions that we make, dialectic is not the basis of this for Epicurus. The basis for Epicurus is nature as the ultimate authority, and Epicurus does not put nature’s ultimate authority in dialectic, but in the census, anticipations and feelings, the faculties that nature herself has given.
Joshua:
Yeah, that’s an excellent point, and this is jumping around a little bit, but we started in section five today and this threefold division is going to be the dominant subject well through section eight, and let me read from section eight, even though we’re going to get to it eventually. Anyway, section eight clarifies what the third division is. He says the third part of philosophy, which is next in order being conversant about reason and discussion was thus handled by both schools. They said that although it originated in the senses still, the power of judging of the truth was not in the senses. They insisted upon it that intellect was the judge of things. They thought that intellect the only thing deserving of belief because it alone discerned that which is always simple and uniform and which perceived its real character. This they call idea having already received this name from Plato, and we properly entitle it species.
And so we’re talking there about the forms. In other words, we put the intellect in the seat of judgment because it is the intellect and only the intellect. It is able to discern what is simple and uniform. In other words, what is unchanging? And it’s these forms that Plato called ideas in which in Latin they’re calling species, but he goes on to say, he says, but they thought that all the senses were dull and slow and that they did not by any means perceive those things which appeared subjected to the senses which were either so small is to be unable to come under the notice of the senses or so movable and so rapid that none of them was ever one consistent thing and never the same thing because everything was in a continual state of transition and disappearance. And that’s the key point because everything is in motion because of change and because some things fall away and give rise to other things, the argument is the senses are fundamentally unreliable. And so this whole academic tradition is going to look at the senses and discard that as at best, an incomplete view of nature and of reality, and at worse, a deception or an outright lie, a view of nature that leads us astray from the true path that leads onto virtue and wisdom and excellence and all the rest.
Cassius:
Joshua, that’s an excellent way of explaining where we are, and we are going to, as you said, come back to section eight and go through it in detail because this is a point that needs to be hammered over and over again in section five. We are still in this introductory section, but what you’ve just described is the direction that we’re going in as they’ve set up the foundation of the division, they’re planting the seed already in the opening discussion of the division to emphasize that if you cannot reduce your conclusion down into an idea that’s consistent with the forms, then you haven’t reached the possibility of truth in listening to what you just read. You immediately can see the echo of what Dogen of lander is addressing in his fragments four and five of his inscription where he’s saying that the socratics and the aristotelians had held that the flux was so fast that we could not apprehend it.
This is central to the epicurean view of how things are divided, is that we do have the ability through the census to understand that which is truly real. Of course, even to Epicurus, the census as the ultimate authority do not act alone. The mind does process the information that the census provide. The anticipations prolapses are clearly involved in this process as are the feelings of pleasure and pain. But to epicurus the process is not one of looking to ideal forms and fitting your observations into the ideal form. The process is always making sure that your observations are the basis for whatever words you use, whatever descriptions you give to form your conclusions. The essential difference is what you are considering to be your authority, and whether you believe that your senses, feelings and anticipations must be brought into conformity with some ideal form which is knowable to you only through dialectic or whether you’re going to make your descriptions, your words, and your terminology conform to your observations.
Which of the two takes precedence? Epicurus considers that if you’re going to look to nature as your ultimate standard, which apparently everybody agrees with that nature should be, you find nature’s standard through the senses, anticipations and feelings. You do not find nature’s standard in dialectic and ideal forms. And of course, as we then move into the division that is described here as morals, what is being said here is that Varo is seeing the most important thing as virtue a perfection of nature, and of all things which they place in the mind, the one most excellent thing. These things then are qualities of mind. And when they discuss the third division being that of life, they see a man as being, as it were, a part of the state and of the human race and connected with other men by sort of human society. And while that terminology is reconcilable with the way Epicurus looks at things, it’s clear, especially in Lucius’s description of the development of society, that society develops naturally and not as a result of the action of any kind of supernatural force or ideal forms of virtue that constitutes the chief force in bringing it about human society to epicurus is a function of nature, and we develop our morality through practical interaction with other human beings and not through a dialectical discussion of any kind of supernatural or overarching virtue to which we need to conform.
And with that, we come to the end of section five, and Vero continues on in section six explaining how this threefold division of philosophy and threefold division of goods is pursued further.
Joshua:
Section six starts this way, and these are those three kinds which most people believe the peripatetics speak of, and so far they are not wrong, but this division is the work of that school. But they are mistaken if they think that the academicians, those at least who bore this name at that time are different from the paras. The principle and the chief good asserted by both appeared to be the same, namely to attain those things which were in the first class by nature and which were intrinsically desirable, the whole of them if possible or at all events, the most important of them. But those are the most important, which exist in the mind itself and are conversant about virtue itself. Therefore, all that ancient philosophy perceived that a happy life was placed in virtue alone. Okay, we’re dealing with the threefold division of philosophy as well as the threefold division of goods.
And to kind of get a handle on this, let’s reexamine this more closely. So in the second little paragraph in section five here, Varo says, A threefold system of philosophizing then was already received from Plato. One on the subject of life and morals, a second on nature and abru matters. The third on discussion and on what is true or false, what is right or wrong in a discourse? What is consistent or inconsistent in forming a decision? So we have those three divisions in philosophy. We have ethics, a second division on nature, so we can call that physics, dealing with what is the underlying foundation of nature. Then you’ve got the third division, which is on dialectic, on the true in the falls, on what is right or wrong in a discourse. We’re talking about things related to rhetoric. So those are the three divisions, ethics, nature, and logic.
And then he’s going to over the next several sections explain each division, and he starts with the first division, which is the division of ethics, the division of living Well, and he says that they sought for their understanding of that first division. They sought in nature herself and said that it was necessary to obey her, and that the chief good to which everything was referred was not to be sought in anything, whatever accepted in nature. And they laid it down that the crowning point of all desirable things, and the chief good was to have received from nature everything which is requisite for the mind or the body or for life. Those are the three divisions of goods under the heading of ethics, this is why this is confusing. We’ve got three divisions of philosophy and three divisions of goods. The three divisions of goods are mind, body, and life, or you could think of it as your lot in life, particularly things that are outside of your control.
And so the whole rest of section five here is talking about these three divisions of goods. So those are your three divisions of goods, the goods of the body. They place some in the hole, in others, in parts of the body and the swiftness of the feet, the strength of the hands, of the clearness of the voice, the distinct articulation of words of the tongue. Those are the parts. And then in the goods of the mind, the excellences of the mind, they considered those which were suitable to the comprehension of virtue. And those they subdivided under the separate heads of nature and morals, quickness in learning and memory. They attributed to nature, each of which was described as a property of the mind and genius. And then under morals, they classed our studies, and I may say our habits, which they form partly by a continuity of practice, partly by reason.
And this leads on to virtue that which has begun and not brought about to its completion is called an advance towards virtue, but that which is brought to completion is virtue. These things then are the qualities of the mind. So the goods of the mind were covered there, and then we get to the goods of life or the goods of externals, things beyond our control. And they said that those things which had influence in facilitating the practice of virtue were connected with this division for virtue is discerned in some good qualities of the mind and body, which are added not so much to nature as to a happy life. They thought that a man was, as it were, a certain part of the state and of the whole human race, and that he was connected with other men by his sort of human society. And this is the way in which they deal with the chief and natural good, but they think that everything else is connected with it either in the way of increasing or maintaining it as of richest power, glory and influence.
So that’s the threefold division of goods. And so next week when we come to section six, we are going to finish up the extended view of the first division of philosophy. This is kind of like what dewitt talks about with the synoptic view. Sometimes you need the general view, sometimes you need the detailed view. So at the beginning we got the general view of the three divisions. Now we’re going through each one particularly next week in section six, we’re going to come to the end of the ethical division, and that’s going to take us into the division of philosophy that deals with nature, and we’re going to deal with that until we get to section eight. Section eight is going to give us the division of philosophy that deals with logic, the third division. And so when we start at six next week, we are still in ethics, we’re still talking about ethics. So those three kinds, which most people believe the para speak of, we’re still talking about the ethical division of the goods. And as you pointed out, Cassius, the whole purpose of this exposition is to explain not the divergence of Perpe from Platonism or from the academy, but how they are in fact similar to each other and how they are connected, how there’s still essentially two halves of one system of thought of which stoicism is an offshoot.
Cassius:
Yes, Joshua Cicero is interested in these issues to a large degree because he knows that there’s not only a division between the old and new academy, but more importantly, there is a division with the stoics because the offshoot and extension that the stoics come up with is to focus on virtue itself being the only good, I think we’ve talked about this in a number of episodes, but the stoics get disgusted with the idea that there is anything good in life besides virtue. They do not like the idea of seeing anything particularly pleasure that is not virtue hell to be good or an important part of life because they want everything under their control and under the divine leadership of what they see as virtue or this ultimate divine fire, which they consider to be good. So the big picture to keep in mind as we proceed is what you just said, the threefold division of philosophy goes hand in hand with this question of how you decide to consider the good.
We’ve said many times that in epicurean philosophy, there is nothing good but pleasure. We immediately, when we say something like that, hit upon the rocks of thinking, oh my God, are you saying there’s nothing good in life, but ice cream cake and sex and rock and roll? No, that is not what is being said. The big picture question that is being discussed by Varo, Cicero, Plato, Socrates, epicure, the stoics in everybody is a much higher level look at what are the logical divisions? How do you characterize these things in a single word or a single concept? And it’s just impossible to do that without keeping in mind that when you state a concept, you have to also have some understanding of what you’re saying, what the details are that go into those concepts. Is the good a single thing such as virtue or pleasure? Yes.
Are there many things that fall within those categories? The answer to that is also, yes, sex, ice cream, rock and roll are good, but they are not all that is good in life. And what these guys are looking for, it seems to me, is a way to explain this in understandable terms. Just as all of philosophy divides down into physics, ethics, and the science of knowledge, we’re also going to come to an understanding of what we consider the good to be, what we consider happiness to be. Most everyone is going to use the word happiness as the word to encapsulate their ultimate goal, but what does it mean when we say the word happiness? We have to have an understanding of the implications of that word. When Epicurus talks about pleasure, we have to have an understanding that pleasure is not limited to sensory stimulation.
We have to have the overall picture at the same time that we have an understanding of how the details fit into the overall picture. So next week when we come back in section six, Vero is going to give us the explanation that you’ve discussed, Joshua, about what this threefold division of goods really is all about, and how from Vera’s point of view, that threefold division of goods is nothing different than what Plato and Socrates had said before. And from that, we’ll understand better what Epicurus was saying as well. In looking at this very same question, we’ll come back and get into all of these details further next week. In the meantime, please drop by the forum. Let us know if you have any questions or comments about this episode or any of our other discussions of Epicurus. Thanks for your time today. We’ll be back soon. See you then. Bye.