Cicero - On Divination

This text comes from Lacus Curtius, which reproduces a Book of the De Divinatione by Cicero published in the Loeb Classical Library, 1923 Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, vol. XX, 1923; Latin texts with facing English translations by W[illiam] A[rmistead] Falconer.

This site’s primary translation below is C. D. Yonge’s (from The Treatises of M. T. Cicero, Bohn’s Classical Library, 1853), covering both Book One and Book Two complete. An earlier partial transcription of Book One only, from Falconer’s Loeb translation (Harvard University Press, 1923, from Lacus Curtius), is preserved below in the reference excerpts.

References to Epicurus and Democritus:

3 5 Now my opinion is that, in sanctioning such usages, the ancients were influenced more by actual results than convinced by reason.9 However certain very subtle arguments to prove the trustworthiness of divination have been gathered by philosophers. Of these — to mention the most ancient — Xenophanes of Colophon, while asserting p229 the existence of gods, was the only one who repudiated divination in its entirety; but all the others, with the exception of Epicurus, who babbled about the nature of the gods, approved of divination, though not in the same degree. For example, Socrates and all of the Socratic School, and Zeno and his followers, continued in the faith of the ancient philosophers and in agreement with the Old Academy and with the Peripatetics. Their predecessor, Pythagoras, who even wished to be considered an augur himself, gave the weight of his great name to the same practice; and that eminent author, Democritus, in many passages, strongly affirmed his belief in a presentiment of things to come. Moreover, Dicaearchus, the Peripatetic, though he accepted divination by dreams and frenzy, cast away all other kinds; and my intimate friend, Cratippus, whom I consider the peer of the greatest of the Peripatetics, also gave credence to the same kinds of divination but rejected the rest.
30 62 “Then shall we listen to Epicurus rather than to Plato? As for Carneades, in his ardour for controversy he asserts this and now that. ‘But,’ you retort, ‘Epicurus says what he thinks.’ But he thinks nothing that is ever well reasoned, or worthy of a philosopher.73 Will you, then, put this man before Plato or Socrates, who though they gave no reason, would yet prevail over these petty philosophers by the mere weight of their name? Now Plato’s advice to us is to set out for the land of dreams with bodies so prepared that no error or confusion may assail the soul. For this reason, it is thought, the Pythagoreans were forbidden to indulge in beans;74 for that food produces great flatulence and induces a condition at war p295 with a soul in search for truth. 63 When, therefore, the soul has been withdrawn by sleep from contact with sensual ties, then does it recall the past, comprehend the present, and foresee the future. For though the sleeping body then lies as if it were dead, yet the soul is alive and strong, and will be much more so after death when it is wholly free of the body. Hence its power to divine is much enhanced by the approach of death. For example, those in the grasp of a serious and fatal sickness realize the fact that death impends; and so, visions of dead men generally appear to them and then their desire for fame is strongest; while those who have lived otherwise than as they should, feel, at such a time, the keenest sorrow for their sins.
86 “You ask why everything happens. You have a perfect right to ask, but that is not the point at issue now. The question is, Does it happen, or does it not? For example, if I were to say that the magnet attracted iron and drew it to itself, and I could not p319 tell you why, then I suppose you would utterly deny that the magnet had any such power. At least that is the course you pursue in regard to the existence of the power of divination, although it is established by our reading and by the traditions of our forefathers. Why, even before the dawn of philosophy, which is a recent discovery, the average man had no doubt about divination, and, since its development, no philosopher of any sort of reputation has had any different view. 87 I have already cited Pythagoras, Democritus, and Socrates and, of the ancients, I have excluded no one except Xenophanes. To them I have added the Old Academy, the Peripatetics, and the Stoics. The only dissenter is Epicurus. But why wonder at that? for is his opinion of divination any more discreditable than his view that there is no such thing as a disinterested virtue?
49 109 “But let us bring the discussion back to the point from which it wandered. Assume that I can give no reason for any of the instances of divination which I have mentioned and that I can do no more than show that they did occur, is that not a sufficient answer to Epicurus and to Carneades? And what does it matter if, as between artificial and natural divination, the explanation of the former is easy and of the latter is somewhat hard? For the results of those artificial means of divination, by means of entrails, lightnings, portents, and astrology, have been the subject of observation for a long period of time. But in every field of inquiry great length of time employed in continued observation begets an extraordinary fund of knowledge, which may be acquired even without the intervention or inspiration of the gods, since repeated observation p343 makes it clear what effect follows any given cause, and what sign precedes any given event.
37 “And poetic inspiration also proves that there is a divine power within the human soul. Democritus says that no one can be a great poet without being in a state of frenzy, and Plato says the same thing. Let Plato call it ‘frenzy’ if he will, provided he praises it as it was praised in his Phaedrus.95 And what about your own speeches in law suits. Can the delivery of you lawyers be impassioned, weighty, and fluent unless your soul is deeply stirred? Upon my word, many a time have I seen in you such passion of look and gesture that I thought some power was rendering you unconscious of what you did; and, if I may cite a less striking example, I have seen the same in your friend Aesopus.
131 “Again, Democritus expresses the opinion that the ancients acted wisely in providing for the p367 inspection of the entrails of sacrifices; because, as he thinks, the colour and general condition of the entrails are prophetic sometimes of health and sometimes of sickness and sometimes also of whether the fields will be barren or productive. Now, if it is known by observation and experience that these means of divination have their source in nature, it must be that the observations made and records kept for a long period of time have added much to our knowledge of this subject. Hence, that natural philosopher introduced by Pacuvius into his play of Chryses, seems to show very scanty apprehension of the laws of nature when he speaks as follows:

(This excerpt list was drawn from Falconer’s Loeb translation of Book One, before this page was rebuilt around Yonge’s complete translation of both books below — the citation numbers here are Falconer’s own continuous section numbers, not Yonge’s chapter numerals.)

Outline Of The Argument

Editor’s note: The numbers below (1, 2, 3…) are this outline’s own topical numbering and are Arabic on purpose, precisely so they are never confused with the Roman-numeral chapter headings (I, II, III…) used by Yonge’s own translation immediately below. Each entry links to the Yonge chapter where that stretch of argument actually begins. Book One and Book Two each restart their own Roman-numeral chapter count from “I,” so a citation like “Book Two, Chapter VII” is not the same location as “Book One, Chapter VII” — follow the link, not just the numeral, to be sure which one you are looking at.

Book One is Quintus’s uninterrupted case FOR the reality of divination, argued on Stoic principles. Book Two is Cicero’s own point-by-point reply AGAINST it, from an Academic-skeptic standpoint — so entries in the two books frequently address the very same examples from opposite sides. Book One also ends abruptly (“the rest of this Book is lost”) — a genuine gap in the surviving manuscript tradition, not an error in this transcription. Book Two, by contrast, survives complete.

Outline - Book One

1. Quintus Introduces Divination as Universally Believed, Named for the Gods (1:I)

Begins at 1:I

Cicero frames divination — foreknowledge of future events — as an ancient belief confirmed by the unanimous consent of the Roman people and of all nations, distinguishing the Roman derivation of the word (from the gods, divis) from the Greek (from madness, mania, per Plato).
Cicero surveys the Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Egyptians as long-standing practitioners of astrological prediction, and the Cilicians, Pisidians, and Pamphylians as relying on bird-omens, noting no Greek colony was ever founded without first consulting an oracle.

2. Rome’s Own Long History of Augury and Sanctioned Frenzy (1:II)

Begins at 1:II

Cicero traces Roman divination from Romulus (himself a noted augur) through the kings and the haruspices imported wholesale from Etruria, arguing no form of divination was ever left untried.
Cicero notes the two natural modes — frenzy (chiefly the Sibylline verses, interpreted by ten appointed citizens) and dreams — citing the Senate’s vote to build a temple to Juno Sospita on the strength of a dream reported by Caecilia.

3. Which Philosophers Endorsed Divination — and Epicurus’s Lone, Childish Dissent (1:III)

Begins at 1:III

Cicero surveys the philosophers on divination: Xenophanes admitted the gods but denied divination outright, while Epicurus is singled out as the one philosopher who “talks so childishly about the nature of the gods” that he rejected divination along with them.
Cicero notes that Socrates, Zeno, the Old Academy, the Peripatetics, and even the atomist Democritus all sanctioned some belief in foreknowledge, though Dicaearchus and Cratippus restricted it to dreams and frenzy alone.
Cicero traces the Stoic pedigree of the doctrine from Zeno through Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Diogenes, Antipater, and Posidonius, noting only Panaetius wavered into doubt.

4. Cicero States His Method: Weighing Both Sides as in the Nature of the Gods (1:IV)

Begins at 1:IV

Cicero explains he is examining divination the same way Carneades attacked the Stoics — weighing arguments on both sides rather than asserting rashly — since the stakes are either impious neglect of religion or old-womanish superstition.

5. Quintus Proposes the Topic: If Divination Is Real, the Gods Exist (1:V)

Begins at 1:V

Quintus, prompted by having just reread Cicero’s third book On the Nature of the Gods, asks to take up the subject left aside there — divination — and states his thesis that the reality of divination and the existence of the gods mutually imply one another.

6. Cicero Questions the Circularity of Quintus’s Two Claims (1:VI)

Begins at 1:VI

Cicero challenges Quintus’s reciprocal claim, noting nature could give signs without any god’s involvement, and gods could exist without having granted mankind any art of divination; Quintus then offers to lay out his case, distinguishing divination by art (entrails, portents, augury, astrology, lots) from divination by nature (dreams, frenzy).

7. Judge by Results, Not Causes: The Analogy From Medicine (1:VII)

Begins at 1:VII

Quintus argues divination should be judged by its track record of results rather than by demanding an explanation of its causes, comparing it to medicinal herbs whose efficacy is known though their mechanism is not, and opens a run of quoted verse (from Cicero’s own translation of Aratus) on weather-signs from the sea.

8. More Natural Weather-Signs, and the Limits of Boëthus’s Explanations (1:VIII)

Begins at 1:VIII

Quintus continues citing natural weather-omens (gulls, the woodlark) as proof that reliable signs need not have a known cause, noting even the Stoic Boëthus could only explain the mechanism of sea- and sky-signs, never why they hold true at all.

9. Frogs, Oxen, and the Mastic Tree: Signs Without Explained Causes (1:IX)

Begins at 1:IX

Quintus continues the catalogue of natural signs (frogs, cattle sensing moisture, the thrice-fruiting mastic tree signaling plowing season), arguing throughout that not knowing why a sign works is no objection so long as it reliably does work.

10. From Medicinal Herbs to Entrails and Lightning: The Same Principle (1:X)

Begins at 1:X

Quintus extends the same “we know the effect though not the cause” principle to entrail-reading and lightning-omens, closing with the story of the clay statue of Summanus, decapitated by lightning, whose missing head the haruspices correctly predicted would be found in the Tiber.

11. Cicero’s Own Consular Poem Quoted as a Witness for Astral Omens (1:XI)

Begins at 1:XI

Quintus turns to Cicero’s own youthful poem on his consulship, quoting at length its account of Jove’s fire ordering the stars and of the comets and portents Cicero himself observed and reported during the Catiline conspiracy.

12. The Poem Continues: Lightning-Struck Statues and Etruscan Prophecy (1:XII)

Begins at 1:XII

The quoted poem continues, describing the eclipse and portents surrounding the Latin festival, the Etruscan seer’s dire warnings, and lightning striking the Capitol — toppling the statue of Natta, shattering the law-tablets, and displacing the She-Wolf statue — all interpreted by the Gauls as omens later fulfilled.

13. The Poem’s Close, and Cicero’s Challenge: These Things Happened (1:XIII)

Begins at 1:XIII

The poem closes praising the ancestors’ piety and Cicero’s own philosophical constancy; Quintus then challenges Carneades directly — he need not explain why such signs work, only that Cicero himself witnessed them, arguing that chance alone (unlike a genuine cause) could never produce results with the coherence of reality, much as scattered paint could never by accident portray a Venus.

Begins at 1:XIV

Quintus concedes that predictions sometimes fail, but argues this no more disproves divination than shipwrecks disprove navigation or Pompey’s and Cato’s errors disprove statesmanship — since divination by conjecture, like these other arts, is usually but not infallibly right, refined by an eternity’s worth of observed precedent.

15. King Deiotarus’s Devotion to Auspices, Vindicated Even in Defeat (1:XV)

Begins at 1:XV

Quintus praises the Cilician, Pamphylian, Pisidian, and Lycian augural traditions, and tells at length of King Deiotarus, who turned back from a fated journey on an eagle’s warning and, even after losing his kingdom to Caesar, never regretted having obeyed the auspices that had counseled loyalty to Pompey and the Senate.

16. Roman Losses From Ignoring the Auspices: Claudius, Junius, Crassus (1:XVI)

Begins at 1:XVI

Quintus catalogues Roman disasters that followed defiance of unfavorable auspices — the lost fleet of Claudius and Junius, Agamemnon’s fleet in myth, and Crassus’s fatal Parthian campaign — and defends the augur Ateius against the charge of having caused Crassus’s death merely by reporting the bad omen.

17. Omens Warn, They Do Not Cause: The Staff of Romulus and Attius Navius (1:XVII)

Begins at 1:XVII

Quintus argues that unfavorable signs merely warn of what will happen absent precaution, not cause the disaster themselves, then tells the legend of Romulus’s augural staff surviving a fire unhurt, and of the augur Attius Navius, the swineherd-turned-augur consulted by King Tarquinius Priscus.

18. Attius Navius Cuts a Whetstone With a Razor; the Gracchus Auspice Story (1:XVIII)

Begins at 1:XVIII

Quintus completes the Attius Navius story — his augury proven when a whetstone is cut through with a razor before king and people — and adds the case of Tiberius Gracchus, who, having taken the auspices irregularly, confessed his fault and thereby confirmed rather than undermined the authority of the haruspices.

19. Two Kinds of Divination Restated; Oracles, Frenzy, and Sanctioned Lots (1:XIX)

Begins at 1:XIX

Quintus restates the division between divination by art and by pure inspiration (frenzied prophets like Bacis, Epimenides, and the Sibyl, plus sanctioned oracular lots), then closes with two Roman prodigy-and-serpent stories, including Tiberius Gracchus’s fatal choice to release the female snake in place of his wife.

20. Delphi’s Long Record of True Oracles, and Early Dream-Prophecies (1:XX)

Begins at 1:XX

Quintus defends the Babylonian star-record and, at length, the oracle at Delphi — arguing its historic fame proves centuries of accurate prophecy even if its power has since faded — then turns to dreams, opening with the prophetic dream of Dionysius the tyrant’s mother.

21. Poetic and Legendary Dreams: Ilia, Hecuba, and Aeneas (1:XXI)

Begins at 1:XXI

Quintus offers dream-narratives from Ennius (Ilia’s anguished dream) and from legend (Hecuba’s dream of bearing a firebrand, correctly interpreted by Apollo’s oracle as foretelling Paris and the fall of Troy) and from Fabius Pictor’s account of Aeneas.

22. Tarquin the Proud’s Dream of the Rams and the Reversed Sun (1:XXII)

Begins at 1:XXII

Quintus quotes Accius’s tragedy on Tarquin the Proud’s dream of two rams, one of which overpowers him, and the diviners’ verse interpretation warning him of the “stupid” man (Brutus) who would in fact overthrow his rule.

23. Persian and Indian Dream-Prophecies: Cyrus, Calanus, Alexander (1:XXIII)

Begins at 1:XXIII

Quintus recounts Phalaris’s mother’s blood-filled dream, the Magi’s correct thirty-year-reign interpretation of Cyrus’s sun-dream, and the Indian sage Calanus’s prophecy to Alexander of their reunion in death, fulfilled within days.

24. Hannibal’s Warning Dreams From Juno and Jupiter (1:XXIV)

Begins at 1:XXIV

Quintus tells of Hannibal’s dream-warning from Juno against melting down her golden column, and his dream of a divine guide leading him to invade Italy behind a destructive serpent-wreathed monster, plus Hamilcar’s dream of supping in Syracuse, fulfilled by his capture there, and the death-foretelling dream of Publius Decius.

25. Philosophers’ Own Dreams: Socrates, Xenophon, Aristotle, Sophocles (1:XXV)

Begins at 1:XXV

Quintus turns to philosophers’ own testimony: Socrates’s dream in prison correctly predicting his death in three days, Xenophon’s fulfilled dreams during the march of the Ten Thousand, Aristotle’s account of Eudemus’s dream, and Sophocles’s dream identifying a temple thief.

26. Roman Dream-Prodigies: the Beaten Slave and the Two Gracchi (1:XXVI)

Begins at 1:XXVI

Quintus recounts the dream of the rustic repeatedly warned to report a religious offense to the Senate until his own illness forced him to comply, and Gaius Gracchus’s dream in which his dead brother Tiberius foretold that Gaius too was fated to die the same violent death.

27. Two Famous Stoic Dream-Stories: Simonides and the Murdered Traveller (1:XXVII)

Begins at 1:XXVII

Quintus tells the two dream-stories favored by the Stoics: Simonides warned in a dream by the man he had buried not to sail (the ship was later lost), and the Arcadian traveller whose murdered companion appeared in a dream to reveal the innkeeper’s crime and the location of his body.

28. Cicero and Quintus’s Own Dreams: the River-Crossing and Marius at Atina (1:XXVIII)

Begins at 1:XXVIII

Quintus turns to Cicero’s and Quintus’s own experience: Cicero’s dream in Asia of Quintus nearly drowning then safely crossing a river, and Quintus’s dream at Atina of Caius Marius promising deliverance — both later fulfilled, the latter when the Senate’s recall decree for Cicero was passed at Marius’s own monument.

29. Answering the Objection From False Dreams, via Plato’s Republic (1:XXIX)

Begins at 1:XXIX

Quintus answers the objection that dreams are often false by quoting Plato’s Republic at length: base, disordered dreams arise from a mind clouded by excess and appetite, while the temperate soul’s dreams, freed from bodily disturbance, are calm and true.

30. The Soul’s Power Grows Nearest Death; Posidonius’s Dying Rhodian (1:XXX)

Begins at 1:XXX

Quintus argues the soul divines best when least entangled with the body, especially near death, citing Posidonius’s story of a dying Rhodian who correctly named the order in which six companions would die, and Homer’s dying Hector foretelling Achilles’s death.
Quintus closes this stretch by asking whether Epicurus’s doctrine should really be preferred to Plato’s on this point, dismissing Carneades’s inconsistency as no serious rival to the authority of Plato and Socrates.

31. Frenzy as Divine Presentiment: Cassandra’s Prophetic Fury (1:XXXI)

Begins at 1:XXXI

Quintus derives “presage” from an old word for keen perception, arguing frenzy is presentiment intensified to the point of divine possession, illustrated at length by quoted verses of Cassandra prophesying Troy’s doom in her ecstatic fury.

32. A Sailor’s Fulfilled Prophecy at Dyrrhachium; Cratippus’s Summary Argument (1:XXXII)

Begins at 1:XXXII

Quintus tells of a Rhodian sailor’s prophecy of Pompey’s disaster at Pharsalia and the burning of the fleet, fulfilled in every detail, then closes the dream-and-frenzy section by quoting Cratippus’s summary logic: a single indisputably fulfilled presentiment is enough to establish that divination is real.

33. Conjectural Divination: Calchas’s Sparrows, Sulla’s Serpent, Dionysius’s Horse (1:XXXIII)

Begins at 1:XXXIII

Quintus turns to artificial, conjectural divination (haruspices, augurs, interpreters), giving Homer’s Calchas counting sparrows to predict Troy’s ten-year siege, the serpent-omen that prompted Sulla’s victorious attack at Nola, and the swarm of bees on Dionysius’s recovered horse foretelling his rise to tyranny.

34. Portents Before Leuctra: Sweating Statues and the Spilled Lots at Dodona (1:XXXIV)

Begins at 1:XXXIV

Quintus catalogues the omens that preceded Sparta’s disaster at Leuctra — rattling arms and a sweating statue of Hercules, doors bursting open at Thebes, incessant crowing at Lebadia, a garland appearing on Lysander’s statue, the fallen golden stars of Castor and Pollux, and an ape scattering the Spartans’ consultation-lots at Dodona.

35. Flaminius’s Fatal Contempt for the Chickens Before Lake Trasimene (1:XXXV)

Begins at 1:XXXV

Quintus tells at length how the consul Flaminius mocked and ignored a series of unfavorable omens — his horse’s fall before Jupiter’s statue, the sacred chickens’ refusal to feed, a standard stuck fast in the ground — before his catastrophic defeat and death at Lake Trasimene, alongside reports of a great simultaneous earthquake.

36. Infant Omens of Greatness: Midas, Plato, and Roscius (1:XXXVI)

Begins at 1:XXXVI

Quintus gives infancy-omens foretelling future greatness — ants feeding the infant Midas grains of wheat, bees settling on the infant Plato’s lips, and a serpent found coiled around the actor Roscius in his cradle — and argues divine influence is diffused through certain places and states of mind, including Bacchic ecstasy.

37. Poetic and Prophetic Frenzy as Evidence of Divine Inspiration in the Soul (1:XXXVII)

Begins at 1:XXXVII

Quintus argues that poetic inspiration itself (per Democritus and Plato) and the fire of great oratory both testify to a divine energy stirring the soul, adds the apparition of armed virgins that routed Brennus’s Gauls at Delphi, and notes Aristotle’s view that melancholic, ecstatic natures possess a gift of presentiment.

38. The Stoic Syllogism for Divination, From the Gods’ Benevolence (1:XXXVIII)

Begins at 1:XXXVIII

Quintus sets out the Stoics’ formal argument: since the gods exist, love mankind, and are not ignorant of the future, and since foreknowledge would benefit us and is not beneath their dignity, they must give us signs of the future — therefore divination exists.

Begins at 1:XXXIX

Quintus argues that not knowing a sign’s underlying cause is no objection to trusting it, invoking the magnet as a parallel case, and closes by noting that of all philosophers and nations only Xenophanes and, later, Epicurus alone dissented from a near-universal endorsement of divination — calling Epicurus, who also denied disinterested virtue, “shameless.”

40. Legendary and Royal Augurs: Calchas, Amphiaraus, Tiresias, Priam’s Children (1:XL)

Begins at 1:XL

Quintus surveys legendary and royal augurs — Calchas guiding the Greek fleet to Troy, the deified seer Amphiaraus, Tiresias, and Priam’s prophetic children Helenus and Cassandra — noting that among the ancients, wisdom, kingship, and the gift of augury were regularly bound together.

41. Divination Among Foreign Peoples: Druids, Magi, and Whole Prophetic Nations (1:XLI)

Begins at 1:XLI

Quintus extends the survey to non-Roman peoples — the Gallic Druid Divitiacus, the Persian Magi who alone may crown a king, and whole cities and families (Telmessus, the Iamidae and Clutidae of Elis) renowned for divination — and describes Rome’s practice of sending noble youths to study Etruscan augury so it would not be corrupted by mercenary practitioners.

42. Divination Shaped by Local Geography: Plains, Climate, and Herding Life (1:XLII)

Begins at 1:XLII

Quintus argues each people’s characteristic form of divination arises from its terrain and way of life — flat-plain dwellers like the Egyptians and Babylonians favor astrology, the ritually devoted Etruscans favor entrail-reading amid frequent prodigies, and pastoral peoples favor bird-omens.

43. State-Sanctioned Divination Among the Greeks, and Rome’s Sibylline Books (1:XLIII)

Begins at 1:XLIII

Quintus surveys state-level reliance on divination — Athenian assembly-diviners, Spartan augur-assessors and dream-incubation, Lycurgus’s Delphi-sanctioned constitution — then turns to Rome’s own Sibylline books, consulted after portents like double suns, sunken land, and sweating or bleeding statues.

44. Rome’s Recorded Prodigies: Caecilia’s Dream and the Draining of the Alban Lake (1:XLIV)

Begins at 1:XLIV

Quintus adds further Roman prodigy-history: Caecilia’s dream prompting the restoration of Juno’s temple (which a skeptic dismissed as “some Epicurean” influence, though he never disputed the prodigies themselves), sweating statues and bleeding streams before the Marsic War, and the oracle of the overflowing Alban lake whose draining, and the Gauls’ sack of Rome, were both fulfilled as foretold.

45. Disembodied Warning Voices, and the Power Believed to Reside in Words (1:XLV)

Begins at 1:XLV

Quintus tells of the unheeded prophetic voice from Vesta’s grove warning of Rome’s capture (commemorated by the altar to Aius the Speaker) and a voice from Juno’s temple demanding sacrifice, then describes Roman customs built on the presumed power of words and names — auspicious formulas, ritual silence, and choosing soldiers or colonists with lucky names.

46. Chance Utterances as Omens: Paulus’s Daughter and Caecilia’s Seat (1:XLVI)

Begins at 1:XLVI

Quintus gives two omens drawn from unintentional remarks: Lucius Paulus’s daughter’s sad announcement that “Perses” (her dog) had died, taken by her father as an omen of his coming command against King Perses, and Caecilia’s offer of her seat to her niece, later fulfilled when the niece married Caecilia’s own widower.

47. Auguries Belong to Quintus’s Own Office; the Eagle-Omen in Cicero’s Marius (1:XLVII)

Begins at 1:XLVII

Quintus turns the defense of augury specifically to Quintus, recalling Publius Claudius’s augury of civil war, and quotes Cicero’s own poem on Marius describing an eagle’s battle with a serpent as a divine omen of Marius’s future glory, confirmed by thunder on the left.

48. Romulus and Remus Contend for Rome by Augury (1:XLVIII)

Begins at 1:XLVIII

Quintus argues Rome’s augural system began as a serious, skilled pastoral practice, not priestly fraud, and quotes Ennius’s account of Romulus and Remus each watching for bird-omens from separate hills to settle by augury who would found and name the city.

49. Returning to the Argument: Long Observation Explains Artificial Signs (1:XLIX)

Begins at 1:XLIX

Quintus returns to his main thread, arguing that even without knowing the underlying cause, centuries of careful observation of entrails, lightning, and prodigies can yield reliable knowledge — enough, he says, to answer both Epicurus and Carneades on the facts alone.

50. Natural Divination and Its Limits: Thales, Anaximander, Pherecydes (1:L)

Begins at 1:L

Quintus distinguishes true natural divination (arising when the mind is freed from the body, as in ecstasy or sleep) from mere shrewd foresight, giving Thales’s olive-market coup and eclipse prediction, and Anaximander’s and Pherecydes’s earthquake predictions, as admirable but not truly divinatory.

51. Ecstatic Prophets and Poetic-Style Predictions (1:LI)

Begins at 1:LI

Quintus describes the ecstatic mode of natural divination — minds detached from the body and stirred by music, solitude, or natural sounds — citing verse examples of doom foretold in oracular style, and the prophetic diviners Marcius and Publicius.

52. The Theory of Dream-Divination, and Antipho’s Art of Interpretation (1:LII)

Begins at 1:LII

Quintus explains dream-divination as the soul’s unobstructed vision during sleep, credits Antipho’s systematic method of interpreting dreams and oracles (comparing it to grammarians interpreting poets), and ties the whole theory of divine signs back to the providence argument from Cicero’s own Nature of the Gods.

53. How the Gods Shape the Signs: Caesar’s Heartless Victim (1:LIII)

Begins at 1:LIII

Quintus argues the same divine energy that governs the world can alter a victim’s entrails or a bird’s flight at the moment of the sign, citing the famous omen of Caesar’s sacrificial ox found without a heart shortly before his assassination, which Spurinna read as a warning.

54. Socrates’s Divine Sign (Daemon), and His Serene Acceptance of Death (1:LIV)

Begins at 1:LIV

Quintus recounts Socrates’s guiding “daemon” — which only ever restrained, never compelled him — through several anecdotes (advising Xenophon to consult Delphi, warning Crito, diverting Socrates from a fatal ambush after Delium), closing with Socrates’s calm acceptance of his own death sentence, untroubled by any warning from his sign.

55. Divination’s Basis in Fate, Properly Understood as the Chain of Causes (1:LV)

Begins at 1:LV

Quintus concedes diviners can be mistaken through ambiguous signs or concealed facts, but insists even one perfectly fulfilled prediction proves divination real, and grounds its power in Fate — defined not as superstition but as the eternal, necessary chain of causes linking all events.

56. Only the Deity Fully Grasps the Chain of Causes; Humans Glimpse It Through Signs (1:LVI)

Begins at 1:LVI

Quintus explains that only a god could foresee everything by tracing every cause, while human diviners can only recognize recurring patterns of signs (as astronomers predict eclipses from observed cycles) without necessarily grasping the causes themselves.

57. Closing Appeal to Nature and the Soul’s Power in Sleep — The Book Breaks Off (1:LVII)

Begins at 1:LVII

Quintus closes with a final argument from nature — the soul, freed in sleep or ecstasy, perceives what the embodied mind cannot — adding Posidonius’s account of the Ceans reading the Dog Star’s rising for signs of plague or health, and Ennius’s mixed verdict on false prophets versus a provident God; the text breaks off here mid-response from Cicero, with the remainder of Book One lost to history.

Outline - Book Two

58. Cicero Reviews His Own Philosophical Works Before Turning to Divination (2:I)

Begins at 2:I

Cicero catalogues his own philosophical writings to date — Hortensius, the Academic Questions, On Ends, the Tusculan Disputations, On the Nature of the Gods — framing On Divination as the next installment, to be followed by a planned work On Fate.

59. Cicero’s Motive: Serving Rome Through Philosophy After Losing Political Power (2:II)

Begins at 2:II

Cicero explains that he turned to philosophy as the only way left to serve Rome after the civil wars stripped him of his usual public role, and sets the scene: he and Quintus, having finished Quintus’s defense of divination, sit down together in the library to continue the discussion.

60. Cicero Opens His Reply: Praise for Quintus’s Case, but Not Assent (2:III)

Begins at 2:III

Cicero compliments Quintus’s Stoic-grounded case but insists he will examine it impartially rather than assert anything as certain, and raises Carneades’s opening question: divination applies to none of the things directly perceived by the senses.

61. Divination Belongs to No Recognized Field of Knowledge (2:IV)

Begins at 2:IV

Cicero argues divination has no proper subject matter at all — not ethics, not natural philosophy, not logic, not politics — and concludes that since it fits none of the recognized fields of expertise, divination as a genuine art does not exist.

62. Quintus’s Own Definition Turns Out to Be Circular (2:V)

Begins at 2:V

Cicero presses Quintus’s own definition of divination as foreknowledge of “fortuitous” events, arguing a pilot, physician, or general already foresees fortuitous outcomes in their own domain just as well as any diviner, leaving divination nothing distinctive to claim.

63. If Chance Is Real, It Cannot Be Foreknown; If Fate Is Real, Divination Is Useless (2:VI)

Begins at 2:VI

Cicero argues that truly chance events cannot rationally be foreseen at all (unlike eclipses, which follow fixed causes), so genuine “fortuitous” divination is a contradiction in terms.

64. No Rational Rule Can Explain the Discovery of Treasure by Divination (2:VII)

Begins at 2:VII

Cicero argues that if events like finding treasure happen by necessity there is no room for chance at all, and if fate governs everything absolutely, then divination’s warnings serve no purpose since nothing fated can be averted.

65. King Deiotarus’s Averted Death Shows the Stoic Dilemma About Fate (2:VIII)

Begins at 2:VIII

Cicero uses King Deiotarus’s escape from a collapsed house (Book One’s example) against the Stoics: either his death was fated, in which case no augury could have saved him, or it was not fated, in which case divination did nothing — either way divination is useless, and the same logic applies to the fleets lost in the Punic Wars and Flaminius’s defeat at Trasimene.

66. Foreknowledge of Disaster Would Only Have Ruined Great Men’s Lives in Advance (2:IX)

Begins at 2:IX

Cicero argues it is actually better not to know the future, since foreknowledge of Crassus’s, Pompey’s, and Caesar’s violent ends would only have poisoned their earlier years with dread, without changing outcomes the Stoics themselves admit were unavoidable.

67. Religious Ceremony Cannot Soften a Fate Already Fixed (2:X)

Begins at 2:X

Cicero argues that if all things happen by fate, no amount of religious observance can lighten the blow, citing Homer’s Jupiter unable to save his own son Sarpedon, and closes his opening “skirmish” before turning to Quintus’s more serious, detailed arguments.

68. Quintus’s Two Kinds of Divination Rest on Unverified, Cherry-Picked Examples (2:XI)

Begins at 2:XI

Cicero restates Quintus’s artificial/natural division of divination and objects that Quintus has supported it only with a flood of anecdotal examples rather than explaining, by reason, why each sign should mean what it is claimed to mean.

69. Attacking Entrail-Reading: No Two Schools of Haruspices Agree (2:XII)

Begins at 2:XII

Cicero turns to haruspicy directly, arguing there is no plausible mechanism by which observation over time could have taught which part of an entrail signifies what, and noting Etruscan, Elean, Egyptian, and Carthaginian diviners never coordinated their interpretations with one another.

70. Democritus’s Theory That Entrails Reveal Weather and Harvests (2:XIII)

Begins at 2:XIII

Cicero cites Democritus’s claim that an animal’s entrails reflect the condition of its pasture and thus the weather and harvest, setting up his rebuttal in the following chapter.

71. Refuting Democritus: Entrails Vary Even Among Animals Fed Alike (2:XIV)

Begins at 2:XIV

Cicero rejects Democritus’s theory since animals from the same pasture show healthy and diseased entrails alike, and dismisses haruspices’ claims about entrails predicting inheritances or gains as having nothing to do with weather or soil at all.

72. No Cosmic “Sympathy” Could Link a Liver’s Cleft to Personal Gain (2:XV)

Begins at 2:XV

Cicero grants for argument’s sake that natural sympathies exist (citing Stoic examples like mice livers and tide-linked shellfish) but denies any conceivable connection between a cleft in a liver and a person’s private financial gain, and mocks the claim that the gods engineer, at the very instant of sacrifice, which victim’s entrails will be favorable.

73. Caesar’s Heartless Sacrificial Bull: A Case Study in Absurdity (2:XVI)

Begins at 2:XVI

Cicero dismantles the famous omen of Caesar’s ox found without a heart, arguing it is more likely the heart was diseased and shrunken than that it “vanished” at the instant of sacrifice by divine action — a claim that, he says, abandons natural philosophy entirely.

74. Rival Gods, Rival Entrails: The Incoherence of Multi-God Sacrifice, and Epicurus Named (2:XVII)

Begins at 2:XVII

Cicero presses the absurdity further: how can the same sacrifice please one god and offend another, and how could chance ever deliver the “correct” victim to a messenger sent to fetch one — adding that this is exactly the kind of Stoic claim that lets Epicureans mock them, and quoting Epicurus’s own theory of remote, uninvolved gods living between the worlds, disengaged from any business of the universe — a position Cicero says is at least internally consistent, unlike the Stoics’, who want both an active providence and no real divination mechanism.

75. If Entrails Fail, Lightning-Reading Fails Too: The Etruscan Sixteen Regions (2:XVIII)

Begins at 2:XVIII

Cicero extends his skepticism to lightning-divination, noting the Etruscans’ elaborate division of the sky into sixteen regions explains only where lightning seems to originate, not what it could possibly mean.

76. Lightning Is a Natural, Mechanical Process, Not a Message (2:XIX)

Begins at 2:XIX

Cicero gives the Stoics’ own physical account of thunder and lightning as the product of colliding clouds and compressed heat, arguing that a process this indiscriminate (striking seas, mountains, and deserts alike) cannot plausibly be a targeted divine signal.

77. Cicero’s Own Poetic Prophecy About the Capitol Turned Against Him (2:XX)

Begins at 2:XX

Quintus cites Cicero’s own consular poem describing lightning striking the Capitol and the statues of Natta and the wolf-and-twins as apparently fulfilled prophecy; Cicero declines to argue for the sake of arguing and instead presses Quintus to explain the actual causal principle behind such signs.

78. Even Boethus and Posidonius Could Not Explain the Cause, Only Note the Coincidence (2:XXI)

Begins at 2:XXI

Cicero argues that even the Stoics’ own investigators of lightning-omens (Boethus, Posidonius) never explained why the Natta statue or the wolf-statue being struck should mean anything, and turns Quintus’s “dice and Venus-throws” chance-probability argument back on him using the analogy of a sculpted Pan-head found in stone by pure chance.

79. Beginning the Attack on Portents and Prodigies (2:XXII)

Begins at 2:XXII

Cicero turns to prodigies proper, arguing that a mule giving birth is startling only because it is rare, not because it is truly contrary to nature, and that ignorance of an event’s cause is what produces the feeling of “prodigy,” not anything supernatural.

80. The Legendary Origin of Etruscan Divination: Tages Plowed Up From the Earth (2:XXIII)

Begins at 2:XXIII

Cicero recounts the Etruscan legend of Tages, a being with a child’s face and a sage’s wisdom who sprang from a freshly plowed furrow and dictated the founding texts of haruspicy, and mocks the story as needing no Carneades or Epicurus to refute — absurd whether Tages was a god who chose to hide underground or a man who could not have survived buried.

81. Cato’s Joke, and Predictions That Never Come True or Are Reversed by Events (2:XXIV)

Begins at 2:XXIV

Cicero cites Cato’s remark that he wondered any two soothsayers could meet without laughing, Hannibal’s contempt for reading omens over trusting a veteran general, Caesar’s successful defiance of unfavorable entrails before his African campaign, and the wave of prophecies favoring Pompey that were falsified by events in the civil war.

82. Why Should the Gods Send Warnings We Cannot Understand or Avoid? (2:XXV)

Begins at 2:XXV

Cicero questions the whole premise of prodigy-divination: unlike honest friends or physicians, who withhold news of unavoidable disaster, the gods supposedly send obscure warnings of calamities that cannot be prevented — either they meant to be understood, in which case the signs should have been clear, or they did not, in which case they should not have been sent at all.

83. Interpreters Disagree Like Opposing Lawyers; the Cocks of Lebadia Explained Naturally (2:XXVI)

Begins at 2:XXVI

Cicero compares prodigy-interpretation to opposing legal pleas, equally plausible and equally uncertain, then dismantles the Theban cock-crowing omen by citing Democritus’s natural (digestive) explanation for why cocks crow before dawn, showing no divine signal is needed.

84. Blood, Sweat, and Gnawed Shields: Ordinary Causes for “Prodigies” (2:XXVII)

Begins at 2:XXVII

Cicero offers mundane explanations for reported prodigies — discolored ground mistaken for blood, condensation mistaken for sweating statues — and mocks the panic over mice gnawing shields at Lanuvium by noting mice had also gnawed his own copy of Plato’s Republic, without portending anything, joking that had they eaten Epicurus’s book On Pleasure instead, he ought to have expected the price of corn to rise.

85. Nothing Contrary to Nature Can Happen; Therefore No True Prodigies Exist (2:XXVIII)

Begins at 2:XXVIII

Cicero argues, citing Chrysippus’s own principle that nothing happens without a natural cause, that anything which occurs must by definition be possible in nature and therefore cannot be a true violation of nature — concluding, against the Stoics’ own logic, that prodigies in the superstitious sense do not exist at all.

86. The Snakes of Tiberius Gracchus, and Calchas’s Sparrow-Omen Doubted (2:XXIX)

Begins at 2:XXIX

Cicero questions why two snakes found in a house were treated as more significant than two mice, doubts the fatal snake-release story of Tiberius Gracchus (attributing his death to natural illness instead), and turns to Homer’s story of Calchas predicting the ten-year length of the Trojan War from the number of sparrows a serpent devoured.

87. Cicero Quotes His Own Translation of Homer’s Sparrow-Omen, Then Rejects It (2:XXX)

Begins at 2:XXX

Cicero quotes at length his own poetic translation of Agamemnon’s speech recounting Calchas’s sparrow-prophecy, then dismantles it — asking why years rather than months or days, why sparrows carry meaning at all, and attributing Sulla’s victory at Nola (where a serpent appeared during sacrifice) to the general’s skill, not the omen.

88. Midas, Plato, and Roscius Revisited — and Doubted (2:XXXI)

Begins at 2:XXXI

Cicero casts doubt on the infancy-omens from Book One (Midas’s wheat grains, Plato’s bees, Roscius’s serpent) as either unverifiable or explicable by ordinary circumstance (snakes commonly baking themselves by household fires), and dryly notes the gods never bothered to signal the future greatness of Scipio Africanus.

89. Flaminius’s Fallen Standard and Dionysius’s Horse: Coincidence, Not Prodigy (2:XXXII)

Begins at 2:XXXII

Cicero offers mundane explanations for the omens preceding Flaminius’s defeat (a nervous standard-bearer) and reinterprets Dionysius’s horse-and-bees story and the self-opening doors and rattling armor at the temples of Hercules as ordinary accidents later read backward as omens once the outcome was known.

90. Lysander’s Garland and the Vanishing Stars of Delphi: Theft, Not Divinity (2:XXXIII)

Begins at 2:XXXIII

Cicero explains the garland on Lysander’s statue as wind-blown seeds and the disappearance of the golden stars of Castor and Pollux as simple theft, dismisses the ape scattering the Dodona lots as ordinary mischief, and questions why the deities “Aius the Speaker” and “Juno the Admonitress” never spoke or warned again after their single legendary appearances.

91. Turning to Augury: Even Romulus’s Original System Has Been Corrupted by Time (2:XXXIV)

Begins at 2:XXXIV

Cicero, speaking carefully as an augur himself, concedes Romulus may have believed sincerely in augury, but argues the discipline once required real skill in interpreting silence and signs, whereas now the office is filled carelessly and the sacred “tripudium” has degenerated into merely watching caged, half-starved chickens drop crumbs while eating.

92. The Caged Chickens Reduced to Absurdity (2:XXXV)

Begins at 2:XXXV

Cicero mocks the mechanical modern procedure of consulting the sacred chickens as empty ritual detached from any real observation of “Jupiter’s messengers,” and recalls how Tiberius Gracchus’s irregularly conducted auspices led two consuls to resign — evidence, Cicero says, only of legal convention, not genuine divination.

93. Auguries of Other Nations Contradict Rome’s Own — and Even Marcellus Ignored Them (2:XXXVI)

Begins at 2:XXXVI

Cicero notes that King Deiotarus’s own augural system directly contradicted Roman practice on many points, that Roman commanders had long since stopped bothering with auspices in the field, and that the five-time consul Marcellus deliberately traveled in a closed litter so as never to see an unfavorable omen — a dodge Cicero says modern augurs still practice.

94. Deiotarus’s Loyalty Came From Conscience, Not From Any Bird (2:XXXVII)

Begins at 2:XXXVII

Cicero argues Deiotarus’s praised loyalty to Rome came from his own moral character, not from any auspice, and that if the birds had truly promised him a favorable outcome they lied badly, since he lost his kingdom, his allies, and his standing despite obeying them — proving that duty, not augury, should guide conduct.

95. Legends Like Romulus’s Staff Have No Place in Real Philosophical Inquiry (2:XXXVIII)

Begins at 2:XXXVIII

Cicero dismisses the fireproof-staff and whetstone-cutting legends as unworthy of philosophical discussion, and insists a real inquiry into augury must examine its actual origin and history rather than accept that birds’ flight-directions carry meaning merely by assertion.

96. Universal Practice Proves Nothing; Even Left and Right Omens Contradict Across Nations (2:XXXIX)

Begins at 2:XXXIX

Cicero argues that “everyone believes it” is no better an argument for augury than it is for calling pleasure the highest good, and notes that Roman and Greek augural practice directly contradict each other over whether left-hand or right-hand signs are favorable.

97. Chance Remarks Read as Omens: “Perses” the Dog and the Fig-Seller’s Cry (2:XL)

Begins at 2:XL

Cicero dismisses the omen-collecting habit itself, noting that if Aemilia’s remark about her dead dog “Perses” and Caecilia’s offer of her seat count as omens, then a fig-seller’s cry at Brundisium (“cauneas,” heard as “cave ne eas,” beware of going) should count too — by that logic, every sneeze or stumble becomes prophecy.

98. The Origin of Lots: Numerius Suffucius and the Praenestine Oracle (2:XLI)

Begins at 2:XLI

Cicero compares divination by lots to dice games ruled by pure chance, then recounts the legendary origin of the Praenestine lots (oak tablets found inside a flint stone after repeated dream-warnings), and quotes Carneades’s own joke that he was never luckier than the day he happened to see the goddess Fortune’s shrine at Praeneste.

99. The Chaldean Astrologers’ Theory of the Zodiac’s Influence on Birth (2:XLII)

Begins at 2:XLII

Cicero cites the astronomers Eudoxus, Panaetius, and Scylax who all rejected astrology despite their expertise, then lays out the Chaldean theory that the zodiac and planetary conjunctions at the moment of birth shape a child’s whole future character and destiny.

100. Even the Stoic Diogenes Limits What Astrology Can Claim; Identical Twins Refute It (2:XLIII)

Begins at 2:XLIII

Cicero notes that the Stoic Diogenes himself restricted astrology’s claims to temperament alone, then argues that twins like the Spartan kings Procles and Eurysthenes had wildly different lives and lifespans despite sharing a birth-moment, and questions how the moon’s influence could plausibly reach earth across such vast cosmic distances.

101. Astrology Fails Basic Astronomy: Horizons Differ by Location on Earth (2:XLIV)

Begins at 2:XLIV

Cicero presses the astronomical objection further: since the stars rise and set at different times in different places (the Dog Star rises earlier for the Troglodytes than for Romans), children born “simultaneously” in different regions cannot really share the same stellar influence, contradicting the Chaldeans’ own claim of identical destinies for same-moment births.

102. Local Weather Varies More Than Any Star’s Influence Could Explain (2:XLV)

Begins at 2:XLV

Cicero argues that if even nearby towns like Tusculum and Rome have different weather at the same moment, it is absurd to credit a subtle astral conjunction with shaping a newborn’s character while ignoring that parents visibly pass on their own features and manners to their children through ordinary heredity.

103. Birth Defects Are Cured by Medicine, Not Fixed by the Stars; Climate Shapes Peoples (2:XLVI)

Begins at 2:XLVI

Cicero notes that physical and speech defects (like Demosthenes’s youthful stammer) are corrected by treatment and practice, which would be impossible if the stars had fixed them at birth, and that climate — not the stars — best explains the differing characters of peoples like Indians, Persians, Ethiopians, and Syrians.

104. The Soldiers at Cannae, and Tarutius’s Astrological Horoscope for the City of Rome (2:XLVII)

Begins at 2:XLVII

Cicero notes the men who died together at Cannae were surely not all born under one star, mocks the notion that inanimate matter like brick and cement (a city’s foundation) could be subject to stellar influence via his friend Tarutius’s calculated horoscope for Rome’s founding, and recalls false Chaldean predictions of long, peaceful old age for Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar.

105. Turning to Natural Divination: Quintus Admits His Own Doubts About the Stoics (2:XLVIII)

Begins at 2:XLVIII

Cicero moves on to the two “natural” forms of divination — prophetic frenzy and dreams; Quintus interjects that he has always found the Stoic case less persuasive than the Peripatetic view (Dicaearchus, Cratippus) that the mind has an innate oracular power freed by ecstasy or sleep, and asks Cicero to address these directly.

106. Restating the Stoic Syllogism for Natural Divination (2:XLIX)

Begins at 2:XLIX

Cicero restates Cratippus, Diogenes, and Antipater’s formal argument (if the gods exist and love us, they must warn us of the future, therefore divination exists), and begins his rebuttal by noting the argument simply assumes its premises are granted — starting with the claim that Epicurus, for one, would flatly deny that the gods are “benevolent” in this active sense.

107. Epicurus’s Own Valid Argument for an Infinite Universe, Offered as a Contrast (2:L)

Begins at 2:L

Cicero praises, by contrast, the actual logical rigor of Epicurus’s argument that the universe must be infinite (whatever is finite has a limit; whatever has a limit can be viewed from outside it; the universe, which includes everything, cannot be viewed from outside; therefore the universe is unlimited) as a model of a properly reasoned proof, unlike the Stoics’ divination syllogism.

108. Dismantling Each Premise of the Stoic Syllogism in Turn (2:LI)

Begins at 2:LI

Cicero systematically challenges each assumed premise of the Stoic argument — that the gods made everything, that foreknowledge benefits us (against which he cites Dicaearchus’s whole book arguing the opposite), and that the gods’ existence entails their granting divination — concluding the whole chain of reasoning collapses.

109. Cratippus’s Eye Analogy for Divination Examined (2:LII)

Begins at 2:LII

Cicero takes up Cratippus’s argument that divination, like eyesight, need not be infallible to be real so long as it sometimes truly perceives — and begins to show that Cratippus’s analogy smuggles in exactly what needs to be proved.

110. Why the Eye Analogy Fails: Chance Success Is Not a Faculty (2:LIII)

Begins at 2:LIII

Cicero argues the eye’s clear vision reflects a genuine natural faculty, whereas a mind that occasionally guesses correctly in dreams or ecstasy may simply be reflecting luck, not a real power — and notes this key premise (“presentiments are not fortuitous”) is exactly the point in dispute, not something Cratippus can simply assume.

111. If Cratippus Concedes Ecstasy and Dreams, Why Not All Other Divination Too? (2:LIV)

Begins at 2:LIV

Cicero presses Cratippus that his own logic, if valid, would equally justify the other forms of divination he rejects, then turns to the Sibylline oracles — arguing their obscure, all-purpose phrasing and deliberately crafted acrostic structure prove careful authorship, not genuine ecstatic inspiration.

112. Cassandra’s Verses Are Poetry, Not Evidence; So Are the “Prophecies” of Publicius and Marcius (2:LV)

Begins at 2:LV

Cicero dismisses Cassandra’s tragic verses as beautiful fiction rather than proof, waves off obscure “prophets” like Publicius and Marcius, and re-examines the Rhodian sailor’s supposedly prophetic frenzy at Dyrrhachium as merely a fearful man voicing what everyone present already suspected about the coming battle.

113. Apollo’s Oracles Are Mostly False, Ambiguous, or Fabricated: Croesus and Pyrrhus (2:LVI)

Begins at 2:LVI

Cicero surveys Delphic oracle stories collected by Chrysippus and finds them false, coincidentally true, or hopelessly ambiguous — including the famous double-edged oracle to Croesus about crossing the Halys, and questions whether such stories (like the supposed Latin-language oracle given to Pyrrhus) were ever really uttered at all.

114. Why Would Apollo’s Prophetic Power Simply Fade Away? Not Even Epicurus Was Fooled by Croesus’s Oracle (2:LVII)

Begins at 2:LVII

Cicero argues the Pyrrhus oracle is provably spurious (Apollo never spoke Latin, and had stopped versifying by then), notes the ambiguous Croesus oracle could have deceived even Chrysippus but not Epicurus, and presses the deeper problem: how could a supposedly divine, eternal prophetic power at Delphi simply wear out over time like wine or salt, especially once men grew less credulous, as Demosthenes noted of the bribed Pythia in his own day.

115. Turning to Dreams: The Stoic Theory That the Mind Shares in Divine Reason (2:LVIII)

Begins at 2:LVIII

Cicero introduces the Stoic theory that the mind’s own divine nature allows it, in sleep, to connect with the universal cosmic intelligence, notes Pythagoras’s dietary rules (avoiding beans) meant to produce clearer dreams, and raises Democritus’s rival theory of external images striking the sleeping mind — arguing either account permits false as easily as true dreams.

116. Dreams Are No More Trustworthy Than the Illusions of Drunkards and the Insane (2:LIX)

Begins at 2:LIX

Cicero compares dream-visions to the reliable-seeming but false perceptions of the intoxicated or mad, and to lucky dice-throws, arguing that if we do not trust waking illusions or a favorable throw of Venus as omens, there is no reason to trust dreams as a special exception — and that no art, science, or navigation is or should be guided by dreams rather than study.

117. If the Gods Do Not Care Whether We Heed Dreams, Why Send Them at All? (2:LX)

Begins at 2:LX

Cicero argues that since most people ignore, forget, or despise their dreams, a rational god would not waste effort sending prophetic dreams that go unheeded — concluding that dreams are therefore not of divine origin at all.

118. Why Would the Gods Warn Us Asleep Rather Than Awake, When Awake Is Clearer? (2:LXI)

Begins at 2:LXI

Cicero argues that if the gods truly wished to guide us, clear waking guidance would serve far better than obscure dreams, citing Chrysippus’s own admission that waking impressions are more distinct than dreaming ones — and that not even the Stoics claim all dreams are true.

119. If Only Some Dreams Are True, What Rule Distinguishes Them From the False Ones? (2:LXII)

Begins at 2:LXII

Cicero presses the unresolved problem of true versus false dreams — if both come from God that is senseless, if only some do there is no criterion offered to tell them apart, and if none do (his own view, following Aristotle) then dreams are simply residue of the mind’s waking activity, with no reliable art available to sort true from false.

120. Old Women’s Superstition or Natural Philosophy? The Choice Facing Dream Interpretation (2:LXIII)

Begins at 2:LXIII

Cicero frames the choice starkly: either the gods personally visit every sleeper’s bed each night with cryptic visions, or dreams are natural residue of waking thought — and notes that even dream-interpreters themselves are typically the least learned and least credible class of people, quoting Chrysippus’s own definition of true divination as requiring a wise interpreter.

121. Why Would the Gods Speak to Us in Riddles We Cannot Understand? (2:LXIV)

Begins at 2:LXIV

Cicero mocks the notion of divinely sent dreams so obscure they require professional interpreters, comparing it to a doctor prescribing a “grass-walking, house-carrying” creature instead of simply saying “snail,” and to Pacuvius’s riddling verses that had to be spelled out plainly before anyone understood them.

122. The Egg and the Buried Treasure: Chrysippus’s Own Example Turned Against Him (2:LXV)

Begins at 2:LXV

Cicero retells Chrysippus’s own story of a man who dreamed of an egg and was told it meant buried treasure (gold within, silver without), then asks why countless other egg-dreamers never found treasure, and why the gods would send so oblique a clue instead of a plain instruction, as they supposedly gave Simonides.

123. Even the “Clear” Dreams — Alexander’s Healing Serpent — Prove Nothing (2:LXVI)

Begins at 2:LXVI

Cicero takes up the supposedly unambiguous dream-stories — the Arcadian traveller, Simonides, and Alexander’s dream of a healing herb shown by his mother’s serpent that cured Ptolemy — and notes that most such stories, including Cicero’s and Quintus’s own dreams from Book One, happened to strangers and cannot be verified.

124. What Would a Dream-Image of Marius Even Be, on Democritus’s Own Theory? (2:LXVII)

Begins at 2:LXVII

Cicero turns to his own dream of Marius and asks, on Democritus’s theory that dreams are physical images streaming from real bodies, what body could still be emitting images of the long-dead Marius, and whether such images simply obey the dreamer’s will on command — extending to purely imaginary things one has never seen.

125. The Mind Needs No External Images: It Generates Its Own Visions (2:LXVIII)

Begins at 2:LXVIII

Cicero argues the mind’s own restless energy, unsupported by the body’s senses during sleep, is fully sufficient to generate vivid dream-images from memory and imagination without any external “image-stream,” and explains his own and Quintus’s dreams of Marius and the river as natural elaborations of their genuine waking anxieties and thoughts about each other.

126. What Natural “Sympathy” Could Link an Egg to Treasure, or a Dream to Alcibiades’s Death? (2:LXIX)

Begins at 2:LXIX

Cicero grants physicians can read some bodily dream-signs tied to real physiological states, but denies any conceivable natural sympathy could connect a dreamed egg to treasure, or explain Alcibiades’s dream of wearing his mistress’s robe shortly before she alone covered his murdered body with her own mantle.

127. Rival Interpreters, Opposite Verdicts: The Runner’s Dream and the Sealed Womb (2:LXX)

Begins at 2:LXX

Cicero shows dream-interpretation’s arbitrariness through paired stories — two interpreters give opposite readings of a runner’s chariot dream and of an eagle dream, and two more give opposite verdicts on a woman’s dream of a sealed womb — proving the “art” reflects the interpreter’s cleverness, not any real connection to truth.

128. No Observed Pattern Could Ever Systematize Dreams the Way Astronomy Systematizes the Stars (2:LXXI)

Begins at 2:LXXI

Cicero closes the case against dream-divination by arguing that unlike the regular, observable motions of the planets, dreams show no discoverable order at all — the same dream produces different outcomes for different people, so no genuine art of interpretation could ever be built from observation, and no isolated true dream should outweigh the vast majority that prove false.

129. Cicero’s Closing Statement: Rejecting Superstition While Preserving True Religion (2:LXXII)

Begins at 2:LXXII

Cicero delivers his final verdict, rejecting divination in every form as a corrosive superstition that has oppressed humanity’s intellect, while insisting this in no way undermines true religion — which he grounds instead in reverence for the beauty and order of nature — and closes with an Academic’s disclaimer of dogmatism as Quintus concedes and the dialogue ends.

The Translation (Yonge)

Text - Book One

[Cicero composed this treatise immediately after that on the Nature of the Gods; the two subjects being indeed very closely connected. In the first book all kinds of Divination are represented as maintained by his brother Quintus, on the principles of the Stoics.]

I.

It is an old opinion, derived as far back as from the heroic times, and confirmed by the unanimous agreement of the Roman people, and indeed of all nations, that there is a species of divination in existence among men, which the Greeks call μαντική, that is to say, a presentiment, and fore-knowledge of future events. A truly splendid and serviceable gift, if it only exists in reality; and one by which our mortal nature makes its nearest approach to the power of the Gods. Therefore, as we have done many other things better than the Greeks, so, most especially have we excelled them in giving a name to this most admirable endowment, since our nation derives the name which it gives to it, Divination, from the Gods (Divis), while the Greeks derived the title which they gave it, namely, μαντική, from madness (μανία). For that is Plato’s interpretation of the word.

Now, as far as I know, there is no nation whatever, however polished and learned, or however barbarous and uncivilized, which does not believe it possible that future events may be indicated, and understood, and predicted by certain persons.

In the first place the Assyrians, that I may trace back the authority for this belief to the most remote ages and countries, as a natural consequence of the champaign country in which they lived, and of the vast extent of territories, which lay open to their view in every direction, began to take notice also of the paths and motions of the stars; and having taken these observations for some time, they handed down to their posterity information as to what was indicated by their various positions and revolutions. And among the Assyrians, the Chaldæans, a tribe who had this name not from any art which they professed, but from the district which they inhabited, by a very long course of observation of the stars are considered to have established a complete science, so that it became possible to predict what would happen to each individual, and with what destiny each separate person was born. The Egyptians also are believed to have acquired the knowledge of the same art by extending it through countless ages. But the nature of the Cilicians and Pisidians, and the Pamphylians, nations which we ourselves have had under our government, think that future events are pointed out by the flight and voices of birds as the surest of all indications. And when was there ever a colony of Greece sending any colony into Æolia, Ionia, Asia, Sicily or Italy, without consulting the Pythian or Dodonæan oracle, or that of Jupiter Hammon? or when did that nation ever undertake a war without first asking counsel of the Gods?

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: 1 There is an ancient belief, handed down to us even from mythical times and firmly established by the general agreement of the Roman people and of all nations, that divination of some kind exists among men; this the Greeks call μαντική -- that is, the foresight and knowledge of future events. A really splendid and helpful thing it is -- if only such a faculty exists -- since by its means men may approach very near to the power of gods. And, just as we Romans have done many other things better than the Greeks, so have we excelled them in giving to this most extraordinary gift a name, which we have derived from divi, a word meaning "gods," whereas, according to Plato's interpretation, they have derived it from furor, a word meaning "frenzy."

2 Now I am aware of no people, however refined and learned or however savage and ignorant, which does not think that signs are given of future events, and that certain persons can recognize those signs and foretell events before they occur. First of all -- to seek authority from the most distant sources -- the Assyrians, on account of the vast plains inhabited by them, and because of the open and unobstructed view of the heavens presented to them on every side, took observations of the paths and movements of the stars, and, having made note of them, transmitted to posterity what significance they had for each person. And in that same nation the Chaldeans -- a name which they derived not from their art but their race -- have, it is thought, by means of long-continued observation of the constellations, perfected a science which enables them to foretell what any man's lot will be and for what fate he was born.

The same art is believed to have been acquired also by the Egyptians through a remote past extending over almost countless ages. Moreover, the Cilicians, Pisidians, and their neighbours, the Pamphylians -- nations which I once governed -- think that the future is declared by the songs and flights of birds, which they regard as most infallible signs. And, indeed, what colony did Greece ever send into Aeolia, Ionia, Asia, Sicily, or Italy without consulting the Pythian or Dodonian oracle, or that of Jupiter Hammon? Or what war did she ever undertake without first seeking the counsel of the gods?

Latin: I [1] Vetus opinio est iam usque ab heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque et populi Romani et omnium gentium firmata consensu, versari quandam inter homines divinationem, quam Graeci μαντική appellant, id est praesensionem et scientiam rerum futurarum. Magnifica quaedam res et salutaris, si modo est ulla, quaque proxime ad deorum vim natura mortalis possit accedere. Itaque ut alia nos melius multa quam Graeci, sic huic praestantissimae rei nomen nostri a divis, Graeci, ut Plato interpretatur, a furore duxerunt. [2] Gentem quidem nullam video neque tam humanam atque doctam neque tam immanem tamque barbaram, quae non significari futura et a quibusdam intellegi praedicique posse censeat. Principio Assyrii, ut ab ultimis auctoritatem repetam, propter planitiam magnitudinemque regionum quas incolebant, cum caelum ex omni parte patens atque apertum intuerentur, traiectiones motusque stellarum observitaverunt, quibus notati, quid cuique significaretur memoriae prodiderunt. Qua in natione Chaldaei, non ex artis sed ex gentis vocabulo nominati, diuturna observatione siderum scientiam putantur effecisse, ut praedici posset, quid cuique eventurum et quo quisque fato natus esset. Eandem artem etiam Aegyptii longinquitate temporum innumerabilibus paene saeculis consecuti putantur Cilicum autem et Pisidarum gens et his finituma Pamphylia, quibus nationibus praefuimus ipsi, volatibus avium cantibus que certissimis signis declarari res futuras putant. [3] Quam vero Graecia coloniam misit in Aeoliam, Ioniam, Asiam, Siciliam, Italiam sine Pythio aut Dodonaeo aut Hammonis oraculo? Aut quod bellum susceptum ab ea sine consilio deorum est?

II.

Nor is there only one kind of divination celebrated both in public and private. For, (to say nothing of the practice of other nations,) how many different kinds have been adopted by our own people. In the first place, the founder of this city, Romulus, is said not only to have founded the city in obedience to the auspices, but also to have been himself an augur of the highest reputation. After him the other kings also had recourse to soothsayers; and after the kings were driven out, no public business was ever transacted, either at home or in war, without reference to the auspices. And as there appeared to be great power and usefulness in the system of the soothsayers (haruspices), in reference to the people’s succeeding in their objects, and consulting the Gods, and arriving at an understanding of the meaning of prodigies and averting evil omens, they introduced the whole of their science from Etruria, to prevent the appearance of allowing any kind of divination to be neglected.

And as men’s minds are often seen to be excited in two manners, without any rules of reason or science, by their own mere uncontrolled and free motion, being sometimes under the influence of frenzy, and at others under that of dreams, our ancestors, thinking that the divination which proceeded from frenzy was contained chiefly in verses of the Sibyl, ordained that there should be ten citizens chosen as interpreters of these compositions. And in the same spirit they also, at times, thought the frantic predictions of conjurors and prophets worth attending to; as they did in the case of Cornelius Culleolus. Nor indeed have men of the greatest wisdom thought it beneath their dignity to attend to the warnings of important dreams, if at any time such appeared to have reference to the interests of the republic. Moreover, even in our own time, Lucius Junius, who was consul, was ordered by a vote of the senate to erect a temple to Juno Sospita, in compliance with a dream seen by Cæcilia, the daughter of Balearicus.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: Nor is it only one single mode of divination that has been employed in public and in private. For, to say nothing of other nations, how many our own people have embraced! In the first place, according to tradition, Romulus, the father of this City, not only founded it in obedience to the auspices, but was himself a most skillful augur. Next, the other Roman kings employed augurs; and, again, after the expulsion of the kings, no public business was ever transacted at home or abroad without first taking the auspices. Furthermore, since our forefathers believed that the soothsayers' art had great efficacy in seeking for omens and advice, as well as in cases where prodigies were to be interpreted and their effects averted, they gradually introduced that art in its entirety from Etruria, lest it should appear that any kind of divination had been disregarded by them.

And since they thought that the human mind, when in an irrational and unconscious state, and moving by its own free and untrammelled impulse, was inspired in two ways, the one by frenzy and the other by dreams, and since they believed that the divination of frenzy was contained chiefly in the Sibylline verses, they decreed that ten men should be chosen from the State to interpret those verses. In this same category also were the frenzied prophecies of soothsayers and seers, which our ancestors frequently thought worthy of belief -- like the prophecies of Cornelius Culleolus, during the Octavian War. Nor, indeed, were the more significant dreams, if they seemed to concern the administration of public affairs, disregarded by our Supreme Council. Why, even within my own memory, Lucius Julius, who was consul with Publius Rutilius, by a vote of the Senate rebuilt the temple of Juno, the Saviour, in accordance with a dream of Caecilia, daughter of Balearicus.

Latin: II Nec unum genus est divinationis publice privatimque celebratum. Nam, ut omittam ceteros populos, noster quam multa genera conplexus est! Principio huius urbis parens Romulus non solum auspicato urbem condidisse, sed ipse etiam optumus augur fuisse traditur. Deinde auguribus et reliqui reges usi, et exactis regibus nihil publice sine auspiciis nec domi nec militiae gerebatur. Cumque magna vis videretur esse et impetriendis consulendisque rebus et monstris interpretandis ac procurandis in haruspicum disciplina, omnem hanc ex Etruria scientiam adhibebant, ne genus esset ullum divinationis, quod neglectum ab iis videretur.

Et cum duobus modis animi sine ratione et scientia motu ipsi suo soluto et libero incitarentur, uno furente, altero somniante, furoris divinationem Sibyllinis maxume versibus contineri arbitrati eorum decem interpretes delectos e civitate esse voluerunt. Quo ex genere saepe hariolorum etiam et vatum furibundas praedictiones, ut Octaviano bello Cornelii Culleoli, audiendas putaverunt. Nec vero somnia graviora, si quae ad rem publicam pertinere visa sunt, a summo consilio neglecta sunt. Quin etiam memoria nostra templum Iunonis Sospitae L. Iulius, qui cum P. Rutilio consul fuit, de senatus sententia refecit ex Caeciliae, Baliarici filiae, somnio.

III.

And, as I apprehend, our ancestors were induced to establish this custom more because they had been warned by the events which they saw, to do so, than from any previous conclusion of reason. But some exquisite arguments of philosophers have been collected to prove why divination may well be a true science. Now of these philosophers, to go back to the most ancient ones, Xenophanes the Colophonian appears to have been the only one who admitted the existence of Gods, and yet utterly denied the efficacy of divination. But every other philosopher except Epicurus, who talks so childishly about the nature of the Gods, has sanctioned a belief in divination; though they have not all spoken in the same manner. For, though Socrates, and all his followers, and Zeno, and all those of his school, adhered to the opinion of the ancient philosophers, and the Old Academy and the Peripatetics agreed with them; and though Dicæarchus, who lived some time before these men, had added a great weight of authority to this belief — and indeed he himself wished to acquire the skill of an augur, — and though that most important authority, Democritus, had in very many passages of his writings sanctioned a belief in the foreknowledge of future events; yet Dicæarchus the Peripatetic, on the other hand, denied all other kinds of divination, and left none except those which proceed from frenzy or from dreams. And my own friend Cratippus, whom I consider equal to the most ancient among the Peripatetics, confined his belief to the same matters, and denied the correctness of any other kind of divination.

But as the Stoics defended nearly every kind, because Zeno in his Commentaries had scattered some seeds of such a belief, and Cleanthes had amplified and extended his predecessor’s observations; Chrysippus succeeded them, a man of the most acute and vivid genius; who discussed the whole belief in, and question about, divination in two books on that subject, and a third on oracles, and a fourth on dreams. And he was followed by Diogenes the Babylonian, a pupil of his own, who published one treatise on the same subject; by Antipater, who wrote two books, and our friend Posidonius, who wrote five. But Panætius, the tutor of Posidonius and pupil of Antipater, has degenerated in some degree from the Stoics, or at least from the most eminent men of that school; and yet he did not dare absolutely to deny that there was a power of divination, but said that he had doubts on the subject. Now if he, a Stoic, was allowed to express a doubt on a matter very much against the inclination of the rest of that school, shall we not obtain leave from the Stoics to behave in a similar manner with respect to other subjects? especially when that very question which is a matter of doubt to Panætius, is generally considered a thing as clear as day to the other philosophers of that sect. However, this praise of the Academy has been confirmed by the testimony and deliberate judgment of a most admirable philosopher.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: Now my opinion is that, in sanctioning such usages, the ancients were influenced more by actual results than convinced by reason. However certain very subtle arguments to prove the trustworthiness of divination have been gathered by philosophers. Of these -- to mention the most ancient -- Xenophanes of Colophon, while asserting the existence of gods, was the only one who repudiated divination in its entirety; but all the others, with the exception of Epicurus, who babbled about the nature of the gods, approved of divination, though not in the same degree. For example, Socrates and all of the Socratic School, and Zeno and his followers, continued in the faith of the ancient philosophers and in agreement with the Old Academy and with the Peripatetics. Their predecessor, Pythagoras, who even wished to be considered an augur himself, gave the weight of his great name to the same practice; and that eminent author, Democritus, in many passages, strongly affirmed his belief in a presentiment of things to come. Moreover, Dicaearchus, the Peripatetic, though he accepted divination by dreams and frenzy, cast away all other kinds; and my intimate friend, Cratippus, whom I consider the peer of the greatest of the Peripatetics, also gave credence to the same kinds of divination but rejected the rest.

The Stoics, on the other hand (for Zeno in his writings had, as it were, scattered certain seed which Cleanthes had fertilized somewhat), defended nearly every sort of divination. Then came Chrysippus, a man of the keenest intellect, who exhaustively discussed the whole theory of divination in two books, and, besides, wrote one book on oracles and another on dreams. And following him, his pupil, Diogenes of Babylon, published one book, Antipater two, and my friend, Posidonius, five. But Panaetius, the teacher of Posidonius, a pupil, too, of Antipater, and, even a pillar of the Stoic school, wandered off from the Stoics, and, though he dared not say that there was no efficacy in divination, yet he did say that he was in doubt. Then, since the Stoics -- much against their will I grant you -- permitted this famous Stoic to doubt on one point will they not grant to us Academicians the right to do the same on all other points, especially since that about which Panaetius is not clear is clearer than the light of day to the other members of the Stoic school? At any rate, this praiseworthy tendency of the Academy to doubt has been approved by the solemn judgement of a most eminent philosopher.

Latin: III [5] Atque haec, ut ego arbitror, veteres rerum magis eventis moniti quam ratione docti probaverunt. Philosophorum vero exquisita quaedam argumenta, cur esset vera divinatio, collecta sunt; e quibus, ut de antiquissuma loquar, Colophonius Xenophanes unus, qui deos esse diceret, divinationem funditus sustulit; reliqui vero omnes praeter Epicurum balbutientem de natura deorum divinationem probaverunt, sed non uno modo. Nam cum Socrates omnesque Socratici Zenoque et ii, qui ab eo essent profecti, manerent in antiquorum philosophorum sententia vetere Academia et Peripateticis consentientibus, cumque huic rei magnam auctoritatem Pythagoras iam ante tribuisset, qui etiam ipse augur vellet esse, plurumisque locis gravis auctor Democritus praesensionem rerum futurarum conprobaret, Dicaearchus Peripateticus cetera divinandi genera sustulit, somniorum et furoris reliquit, Cratippusque, familiaris noster, quem ego parem summis Peripateticis iudico, isdem rebus fidem tribuit, reliqua divinationis genera reiecit.

Stoici vero omnia fere illa defenderunt, quod Zeno in suis commentariis quasi semina quaedam sparsisset, quae Cleanthes paulo uberiora fecisset, accessit deinde acutissumo homini nec minus diserto Chrysippo, qui totam de divinatione duobus libris explicavit sententiam, uno praeterea de oraclis, uno de somniis; quem subsequens unum librum Babylonius Diogenes edidit, eius discipulus, duo Antipater, quinque noster Posidonius. Sed a Stoicis vel princeps eius disciplinae, Posidonii doctor, discipulus Antipatri, degeneravit, Panaetius, nec tamen ausus est negare vim esse divinandi, sed dubitare se dixit. Quod illi in aliqua re invitissumis Stoicis Stoico facere licuit, id nobis, ut in reliquis rebus faciamus, contra Stoicos non licebit, praesertim cum id, de quo Panaetio non liquet, liqueat omnibus Stoicis? Sed haec quidem laus Academiae praestantissumi philosophi iudicio et testimonio conprobata.

IV.

Indeed, since we are ourselves inquiring what we are to think of divination, because Carneades maintained a very long argument against the Stoics with great acuteness and variety of resource, and as we wish to be on our guard against admitting rashly any assertion which is incorrect, or the truth of which is not sufficiently ascertained, it appears necessary for us to compare over and over again the arguments on one side with those on the other, as we have done in the three books which we have written on the Nature of the Gods. For, as in every discussion, rashness in assenting to propositions of others, and error in asserting ourselves, is discreditable, so above all is it in a discussion where the question for our decision is how much weight we are to attribute to auspices, and to divine ceremonies, and to religion. For there is danger lest, if we neglect these things, we may become involved in the guilt of blasphemous impiety, or if we embrace them, we may become liable to the reproach of old women’s superstition.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: Accordingly, since I, too, am in doubt as to the proper judgement to be rendered in regard to divination because of the many pointed and exhaustive arguments urged by Carneades against the Stoic view, and since I am afraid of giving a too hasty assent to a proposition which may turn out either false or insufficiently established, I have determined carefully and persistently to compare argument with argument just as I did in my three books On the Nature of the Gods. For a hasty acceptance of an erroneous opinion is discreditable in any case, and especially so in an inquiry as to how much weight should be given to auspices, to sacred rites, and to religious observances; for we run the risk of committing a crime against the gods if we disregard them, or of becoming involved in old women's superstition if we approve them.

Latin: IV Etenim nobismet ipsis quaerentibus quid sit de divinatione iudicandum, quod a Carneade multa acute et copiose contra Stoicos disputata sint, verentibusque, ne temere aut opinionis vanitate aut inscientia rei adducti rem tanti erroris approbemus, causa iusta est, cur diligenter etiam atque etiam, quod feci, quaeramus de omni divinationis genere, quid sentiendum sit. Sed quoniam Stoici physicis quibusdam et quasi necessariis rationibus id evincere volunt, quod nos dicimus, ea res et diligentiorem considerationem et accuratiorem orationem desiderat.

V.

Now these topics I have often discussed, and I did so lately with more than usual minuteness, when I was with my brother Quintus, in my villa at Tusculum. For when, for the purpose of taking walking exercise, we had come into the Lyceum, (for that is the name of the upper Gymnasium) — I read, said he, a little while ago your third book on the Nature of the Gods; in which, although the arguments of Cotta have not wholly shaken my previous opinions, you have undoubtedly done a good deal shaken them. You are very apt to say so, I replied; for, indeed, Cotta himself argues rather with a view to confute the arguments of the Stoics, than to eradicate religion from men’s minds. Then, said Quintus, that is what Cotta himself says, and indeed he repeats it very often; I imagine, because he does not wish to depart from the ordinary opinions; but still the zeal with which he argues against the Stoics seems to carry him on to the extent of wholly denying the existence of the Gods. I do not indeed think it necessary to reply to all he says, for religion has been sufficiently defended in your second book by Lucilius; whose arguments, as you say at the end of the third book, appear to be much nearer to the truth. But with reference to the point which has been passed over in those books, because, I presume, you considered that the inquiry into it could be carried on with more convenience if it were taken separately, I mean Divination — which is a foreknowledge and a foretelling of those events which are usually considered fortuitous, — I should like very much at this moment, if you please, to examine what power that science really has, and what its character is. For my own opinion is this; that if those kinds of divination which we have been in the habit of hearing of and respecting, are real, then there are Gods; and, on the other hand, that if there really are Gods, then there certainly are men who are possessed of the art of divination.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: This subject has been discussed by me frequently on other occasions, but with somewhat more than ordinary care when my brother Quintus and I were together recently at my Tusculan villa. For the sake of a stroll we had gone to the Lyceum which is the name of my upper gymnasium, when Quintus remarked: "I have just finished a careful reading of the third book of your treatise, On the Nature of the Gods, containing Cotta's discussion, which, though it has shaken my views of religion, has not overthrown them entirely." "Very good," said I; "for Cotta's argument is intended rather to refute the arguments of the Stoics than to destroy man's faith in religion." Quintus then replied: "Cotta says the very same thing, and says it repeatedly, in order, as I think, not to appear to violate the commonly accepted canons of belief; yet it seems to me that, in his zeal to confute the Stoics, he utterly demolishes the gods. However, I am really at no loss for a reply to his reasoning; for in the second book Lucilius has made an adequate defense of religion and his argument, as you yourself state at the end of the third book, seemed to you nearer to the truth than Cotta's. But there is a question which you passed over in those books because, no doubt, you thought it more expedient to inquire into it in a separate discussion: I refer to divination, which is the foreseeing and foretelling of events considered as happening by chance. Now let us see, if you will, what efficacy it has and what its nature is. My own opinion is that, if the kinds of divination which we have inherited from our forefathers and now practice are trustworthy, then there are gods and, conversely, if there are gods then there are men who have the power of divination."

Latin: V [8] Quibus de rebus et alias saepe et paulo accuratius nuper, cum essem cum Q. fratre in Tusculano, disputatum est. Nam cum ambulandi causa in Lyceum venissemus (id enim superiori gymnasio nomen est), "Perlegi," ille inquit, "tuum paulo ante tertium de natura deorum, in quo disputatio Cottae quamquam labefactavit sententiam meam, non funditus tamen sustulit." "Optime," inquam, "tu vero; etenim ipse Cotta sic disputat, ut Stoicorum magis argumenta confutet quam hominum deleat religionem." "Dicit quidem hoc idem," inquit Quintus, "et saepe dicit Cotta, atque haud scio an ita sit ut vult; sed tamen, cum studiose omnia refellat, hoc efficere videtur, ut deos esse non tam refellat, quam non intellegat. Utrum igitur eius de hac re quaerimus sententiam an alicuius alterius, qui, quid tandem sit divinum, non intellegat, cum tam multa non modo dicta a philosophis, sed etiam a maioribus nostris constituta esse videat? Nec vero id nunc primum, sed iam pridem ita est, ex quo tempore illud a te positum in tertio libro est, quo commodius nihil dici posse arbitror. Sed quod eo loco de divinatione quaesitum non erat, id, si placet, ordiamur." "Mihi vero," inquam, "et per te, si per te licebit, et otium est, et est animus. Nec enim aliud quicquam habeo, quod agam, et abundo otio, cui te haud paulo faciliorem in ista disputatione fore puto quam Carneadi fuisti."

“Mihi vero,” inquit ille, “ista sunt maxumo argumento esse deos, quod habemus quandam anticipationem futurorum, et id quidem manifestum, si quaeramus a principio, quae divinationis fit ratio et scientia.”

VI.

You are defending, I reply, the very citadel of the Stoics, O Quintus, by asserting the reciprocal dependence of these two conditions on one another; so that if there be such an art as divination, then there are Gods, and if there be such beings as Gods, then there is such an art as divination. But neither of these points is admitted as easily as you imagine. For future events may possibly be indicated by nature without the intervention of any God; and, even although there may be such beings as Gods, still it is possible that no such art as divination may be given by them to the human race.

He replied, — But to me it is quite proof enough, both that there are Gods and that they have a regard for the welfare of mankind, that I perceive that there are manifest and undeniable kinds of divination. With respect to which, I will, if you please, recount to you my own sentiments, provided that at least you have leisure and inclination to hear me, and have nothing which you would like in preference to this discussion. But I, said I, my dear Quintus, have always leisure for philosophical discussion; but at this moment, when I have actually nothing whatever which I wish to do, I shall be all the more glad to hear your sentiments on divination.

You will hear, said he, nothing new from me, nor do I entertain any ideas on the subject different from the rest of the world. For the opinion which I follow is not only the most ancient, but that which has been sanctioned by the unanimous consent of all nations and countries. For there are two methods of divining; one dependent on art, the other on nature. But what nation is there, or what state, which is not influenced by the omens derived from the entrails of victims, or by the predictions of those who interpret prodigies, or strange lights, or of augurs, or astrologers, or by those who expound lots (for these are about what come under the head of art); or, again, by the prophecies derived from dreams, or soothsayers (for these two are considered natural kinds of divination)? And I think it more desirable to examine into the results of these things than into the causes. For there is a certain power and nature, which, by means of indications which have been observed a long time, and also by some instinct and divine inspiration, pronounces a judgment on future events.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "Why, my dear Quintus," said I, "you are defending the very citadel of the Stoics in asserting the interdependence of these two propositions: 'if there is divination there are gods,' and, 'if there are gods there is divination.' But neither is granted as readily as you think. For it is possible that nature gives signs of future events without the intervention of a god, and it may be that there are gods without their having conferred any power of divination upon men."

To this he replied, "I, at any rate, find sufficient proof to satisfy me of the existence of the gods and of their concern in human affairs in my conviction that there are some kinds of divination which are clear and manifest. With your permission I will set forth my views on this subject, provided you are at leisure and have nothing else which you think should be preferred to such a discussion." "Really, my dear Quintus," said I, "I always have time for philosophy. Moreover, since there is nothing else at this time that I can do with pleasure, I am all the more eager to hear what you think about divination." "There is, I assure you," said he, "nothing new or original in my views; for those which I adopt are not only very old, but they are endorsed by the consent of all peoples and nations. There are two kinds of divination: the first is dependent on art, the other on nature. Now -- to mention those almost entirely dependent on art -- what nation or what state disregards the prophecies of soothsayers, or of interpreters of prodigies and lightnings, or of augurs, or of astrologers, or of oracles, or -- to mention the two kinds which are classed as natural means of divination -- the forewarnings of dreams, or of frenzy? Of these methods of divining it behooves us, I think, to examine the results rather than the causes. For there is a certain natural power, which now, through long-continued observation of signs and now, through some divine excitement and inspiration, makes prophetic announcement of the future.

Latin: VI [10] "Arcem tu quidem Stoicorum," inquam, "Quinte, defendis, siquidem ista sic reciprocantur, ut et, si divinatio sit, di sint, et, si di sint, sit divinatio; quorum neutrum tam facile, quam tu arbitraris, conceditur. Nam et natura significari futura sine deo possunt, et, ut sint di, potest fieri, ut nulla ab iis divinatio generi humano data sit."

Ille autem contra: “Mihi vero satis,” inquit, “et esse deos et eos consulere rebus humanis videtur ex eis, quae te dicturum modo, cum quaesissem de divinationum generibus, promisisti; ea si volueris expedire, dabis mihi, quantum instituisti, deos et curare res humanas.”

“Ego vero,” inquam, “philosophandi scientiam mihi numquam desumo, iudicandi statim reliquo, ut arbitratu tuo disputes.”

“Age,” inquit ille, “sed satis in praesentia fuerit, si de his sortibus, quas Fortunae monitu pueri manu miscentur ac ducunt, dixero, cui tale nihil, quale futurum sit, ignoranti non magis apparere possit quam ei, qui numquam istas viderit. Nam quid habent aut Aeneadrum illae sortes, aut quas Fortunae monitu pueri manu miscentur ac ducunt? Duo sunt enim divinandi genera, quorum alterum artis est, alterum naturae. Quae est autem gens aut quae civitas, quae non aut extispicum aut monstra interpretantium aut fulguratorum tenetur scientia, aut augurum aut astrologorum aut sortium (haec enim fere artis sunt) aut somniorum aut vaticinationum (haec enim duo naturalia putantur)? Quorum eventa quidem magis arbitror scrutari conveniet quam causas.”

VII.

So that Carneades may well give up pressing what Panætius used to insist upon, when he asked whether it was Jupiter who had ordained the crow to croak on the right-hand, or the raven on the left. For these occurrences have been observed for an immense series of time, and have been remarked and noted with the signification given to them by subsequent events. But there is nothing which a great length of time may not effect and establish by the use of memory retaining the different events, and handing them down in durable monuments. We may wonder at the way in which the different kinds of herbs and roots have been observed by physicians as good for the bites of beasts, for wounds, and for the eyes, the power and nature of which reason has never explained, but yet both the art and inventor of these medicines have gained universal approval from their utility. Let us also look at those things which, though of another kind, still have a resemblance to divination.

And often, too, the agitated sea Gives certain tokens of impending storms, When through the deep with sudden rage it swells, And the fierce rocky, while with the briny foam, Vie with hoarse Neptune in their sullen roar, While the sad whistling o’er the mountain’s brow Adds horror to the crash of the iron coast.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "Therefore let Carneades cease to press the question, which Panaetius also used to urge, whether Jove had ordered the crow to croak on the left side and the raven on the right. Such signs as these have been observed for an unlimited time, and the results have been checked and recorded. Moreover, there is nothing which length of time cannot accomplish and attain when aided by memory to receive and records to preserve. We may wonder at the variety of herbs that have been observed by physicians, of roots that are good for the bites of wild beasts, for eye affections, and for wounds, and though reason has never explained their force and nature, yet through their usefulness you have won approval for the medical art and for their discoverer. "But come, let us consider instances, which although outside the category of divination, yet resemble it very closely:

The heaving sea oft warns of coming storms, / When suddenly its depths begin to swell; / And hoary rocks, o'erspread with snowy brine, / To the sea, in boding tones, attempt reply; / Or when from lofty mountain-peak upsprings / A shrilly whistling wind, which stronger grows / With each repulse by hedge of circling cliffs.

Latin: VII Quare omittat urguere Carneades, quod faciebat etiam Panaetius, requirens Iuppiterne cornicem a laeva, corvum ab dextera canere iussisset. Observata sunt haec tempore inmenso et in significatione eventis animadversa et notata. Nihil est autem, quod non longinquitas temporum excipiente memoria prodendisque monumentis efficere atque adsequi possit. Mirari licet, quae sint animadversa a medicis herbarum genera, quae radicum ad morsus bestiarum, ad oculorum morbos, ad vulnera, quorum vim atque naturam ratio numquam explicavit, utilitate et ars et inventor probatur. Age ea, quae quamquam ex alio genere sunt, tamen divinationi sunt similiora, videamus:

Saepe etiam pertentat aquas sine vento tranquilla, / turgescitque salis Auster fluctusque supernos / verrit et…

VIII.

And all your prognostics are full of presentiments derived from occurrences of this sort. Who, then, can trace back the causes of these presentiments? Though, indeed, I am aware that Boëthus the Stoic has endeavoured to do so. And indeed he has done some good to this extent, that he has explained the principle of those occurrences which take place in the sea, or in the heaven. But still, who has ever explained, with any appearance of probability, why they take place at all?

And the white gull, uprising from the waves, With horrid scream foretells th’ impending storm, Straining its trembling throat in ceaseless cry; Oft, too, the woodlark from his chest pours forth

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "Your book, Prognostics, is full of such warning signs, but who can fathom their causes? And yet I see that the Stoic Boëthus has attempted to do so and has succeeded to the extent of explaining the phenomena of sea and sky. But who can give a satisfactory reason why the following things occur?

Blue-grey herons, in fleeing the raging abyss of the ocean, / Utter their warnings, discordant and wild, from tremulous gullets, / Shrilly proclaiming that storms are impending and laden with terrors.

Latin: VIII Atque his rerum praesensionibus Prognostica tua referta sunt. Quis igitur elicere causas praesensionum potest? Etsi video Boëthum Stoicum id conatum, qui hactenus aliquid egit, ut earum rationem rerum explicaret, quae in mari caelove fierent; illa quidem, quae paulo ante dixi, cur fierent, neminem, opinor, posse dicere.

Existunt aeriae quasi fumidae nubes / grues, immanes ad aquas, congregantur…

IX.

Notes of unusual sadness, waking up The morn with grievous fear and endless plaint, When first Aurora routs the nightly dew, Sometimes the dusky crow runs o’er the shore, Dipping his head beneath the rising surf.

And we see that these signs of the weather scarcely ever deceive us, though we certainly do not understand why they are so correct.

You too perceive the signs of future times, Children of sweetest waters; and prepare To utter warnings loud and salutary, Rousing the springs and marshes with your cries.

Yet who could ever have suspected frogs of having such perception? However, there is in rivulets, and in frogs too, a certain nature indicating something which is clear enough by itself, but more obscure to the knowledge of men.

And cloven-footed oxen gazing up To heaven’s expanse, have often inhaled the air Laden with moisture.

I do not inquire why all this takes place, since I am acquainted with the fact that it does take place —

The mastic, ever green and ever laden With its rich fruit, that thrice in every year Doth swell to ripeness, by its triple crop Points out three times when men should till the earth.

Here too, again, I do not ask why this one tree should bloom three times a year, or why it should adapt the proper season for ploughing the land to the token given by its bloom. I am content with this, that even if I do not know how everything is done, I nevertheless do know what is done. And so in respect of every kind of divination I will answer as I have done in the cases which I have already mentioned.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: Often at dawn, when Aurora releases the frost in the dew-drops, / Does the nightingale pour from its breast predictions of evil; / Then does it threaten and hurl from its throat its incessant complaining. / Often the dark-hued crow, while restlessly roaming the seashore, / Plunges its crest in the flood, as its neck encounters the billows.

"Hardly ever do we see such signs deceive us and yet we do not see why it is so.

Ye, too, distinguish the signs, ye dwellers in waters delightful, / When, with a clamour, you utter your cries that are empty of meaning, / Stirring the fountains and ponds with absurd and ridiculous croaking.

Who could suppose that frogs had this foresight? And yet they do have by nature some faculty of premonition, clear enough of itself, but too dark for human comprehension.

Slow, clumsy oxen, their glances upturned to the light of the heavens, / Sniff at the air with their nostrils and know it is freighted with moisture. I do not ask why, since I know what happens.

Now 'tis a fact that the evergreen mastic, e'er burdened with leafage, / Thrice is expanding and budding and thrice producing its berries; / Triple its signs for the purpose of showing three seasons for ploughing.

Nor do I ever inquire why this tree alone blooms three times, or why it makes the appearance of its blossoms accord with the proper time for ploughing. I am content with my knowledge that it does, although I may not know why. Therefore, as regards all kinds of divination I will give the same answer that I gave in the cases just mentioned.

Latin: IX [15] Videmus haec signa numquam fere ementientia nec tamen cur ita fiat videmus.

“Vos quoque signa videtis, aquai dulcis alumnae, / cum clamore paratis inanis fundere voces / absurdoque sono fontis et stagna cietis.”

Quis non videt esse in ranunculis hanc naturae vim significantem aliquid, per se ipsam satis certam, ad cognoscendum autem obscuram?

“Iam vero semper viridis semperque gravata / lentiscus triplici solita est grandescere fetu / ter fruges fundens tria tempora monstrat arandi.”

Cur haec eveniant, quaerendum est a physicis; quid significent, satis a me sciri arbitror.

X.

Now I know what effect the root of the scammony has as a purgative, and what the efficacy of the aristolochia is in the case of bites of serpents, (and this herb has derived its name from its discoverer, who discovered it in consequence of a dream) and that knowledge is quite enough. I do not know why these herbs are so efficacious; and in the same way I do not know on what principle the omens which we draw from the signs furnished to us by the winds and storms proceed; but I do know, and am certain of, and thankful for their power, and the results which flow from it. Again, in the same way I know what is indicated by a fissure in the entrails of a victim, or by the appearance of the fibres; but what the cause is that these appearances have this meaning I know not. And life is full of such things; for nearly every one has recourse to the entrails of animals. Need I say more? Is it possible for any one to doubt the power of thunder-storms? Is not this too one of the most marvellous of marvellous things? When Summanus, which was a figure made of clay, standing on the top of the temple of the all-powerful and all-good Jupiter, was struck by lightning, and the head of the statue could not be found anywhere, the soothsayers said that it had been thrown down into the Tiber, and it was found in that very place which had been pointed out by the soothsayers.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "I see the purgative effect of the scammony root and I see an antidote for snake-bite in the aristolochia plant -- which, by the way, derives its name from its discoverer who learned of it in a dream -- I see their power and that is enough; why they have it I do not know. Thus as to the cause of those premonitory signs of winds and rains already mentioned I am not quite clear, but their force and effect I recognize, understand, and vouch for. Likewise as to the cleft or thread in the entrails: I accept their meaning; I do not know their cause. And life is full of individuals in just the same situation that I am in, for nearly everybody employs entrails in divining. Again: is it possible for us to doubt the prophetic value of lightning? Have we not many instances of its marvels? and is not the following one especially remarkable? When the statue of Summanus which stood on the top of the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus -- his statue was then made of clay -- was struck by a thunderbolt and its head could not be found anywhere, the soothsayers declared that it had been hurled into the Tiber; and it was discovered in the very spot which they had pointed out.

Latin: X Quid scammoneae radix ad purgandum, quid aristolochia ad morsus serpentium possit, quae nomen ex inventore repperit, rem ipsam expertus probavi; causam requiro. Quid ventis, quid imbribus praesagiunt anseres, quid columbae, quid ceterae volucres? Sit sane inritum, quod veneno interfectus est Coeranus, quia is fugientis ranas viderat; sed cur eaedem ranae iam ante viderant. Quaero rursus, ut ante: causam ipse non explico, quid significet, video.

XI.

But who is there to whom I may more fitly appeal as an authority and as a witness than yourself? For I have learnt with great pleasure, which I recollect with great pleasure, the verses which the muse Urania pronounces in the second book of your “Consulship” —

See how almighty Jove, inflamed and bright, With heavenly fire fills the spacious world, And lights up heaven and earth with wondrous rays Of his divine intelligence and mind; Which pierces all the inmost sense of men, Vivifies their souls, held fast within The boundless caverns of eternal air. And would you know the high sublimest paths And ever revolving orbits of the stars, And in what constellations they abide, — Stars which the Greeks erratic falsely call, For certain order and fixed laws direct Their onward course; then shall you learn that all Is by divinest wisdom fitly ruled. For when you ruled the state, a consul wise, You noted, and with victims approv’d such, Propitiating the rapid stars, and strange Concurrence of the fiery constellations, Then, when you purified the Alban mount, And celebrated the great Latin feast, Bringing pure milk, meet offering for the gods, You saw fierce comets bright and quivering With light unheard of. In the sky you saw

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "But what authority or what witness can I better employ than yourself? I have even learned by heart and with great pleasure the following lines uttered by the Muse, Urania, in the second book of your poem entitled, My Consulship:

First of all, Jupiter, glowing with fire from regions celestial, / Turns, and the whole of creation is filled with the light of his glory; / And, though the vaults of aether eternal begird and confine him, / Yet he, with spirit divine, ever searching the earth and the heavens, / Sounds to their innermost depths the thoughts and the actions of mortals. / When one has learned the motions and variant paths of the planets, / Stars that abide in the seat of the signs, in the Zodiac's girdle, / (Spoken of falsely as vagrants or rovers in Greek nomenclature, / Whereas in truth their distance is fixed and their speed is determined,) / Then will he know that all are controlled by an Infinite Wisdom. / You, being consul, at once did observe the swift constellations, / Noting the glare of luminous stars in direful conjunction: / Then you beheld the tremulous sheen of the Northern aurora, / When, on ascending the mountainous heights of snowy Albanus, / You offered joyful libations of milk at the Feast of the Latins; / Ominous surely the time wherein fell that Feast of the Latins.

Latin: XI [17] Sed quo potius utar aut auctore aut teste quam te? Cuius edidici etiam versus, et lubenter quidem, quos in secundo de consulatu Urania Musa concinit:

“Principio aetherio flammatus Iuppiter igni / vertitur et totum conlustrat lumine mundum / menteque divina caelum terrasque petessit, / quae penitus sensus hominum vitasque retentat / aetheris aeterni saepta atque inclusa cavernis. / Et si stellarum motus cursusque vagantis / nosse velis, quae sint signorum in sede locatae, / quae verbo et falsis Graiorum vocibus errant, / re vera certo lapsu spatioque feruntur, / omnia iam cernes divina mente notata. / Nam primum astrorum volucris te consule motus / concursusque gravis stellarum ardore micantis / tu quoque, cum tumulos Albano in monte nivatos / lustrasti et laeto mactasti lacte Latinas, / vidisti et claro tremulos ardore cometas…”

XII.

Fierce wars and dread nocturnal massacre; That Latin feast on mournful days did fall, When the pale moon with dim and muffled light Conceal’d her head, and fled, and in the midst Of starry night became invisible. Why should I say how Phœbus’ fiery beam, Sure herald of sad war, in mid-day set, Hastening at undue season to its rest, Or how a citizen struck with th’ awful bolt, Hurl’d by high Jove from out a cloudless sky, Quaked with affright and shook in every part? Then dreadful forms, strange visions stalk’d abroad, Scarce shrouded by the darkness of the night, And warn’d the nations and the land of war. Then many an oracle and augury, Pregnant with evil fate, the soothsayers Pour’d from their agitated breasts. And e’en The Father of the Gods fill’d heaven and earth With signs and tokens, and presages sure Of all the things which have befallen us since.

So now the year when you are at the helm, Collects upon itself each omen dire, Which when Torquatus, with his colleague Cotta, Sat in the curule chairs, the Lydian seer Of Tuscan blood breathed to affrighted Rome. For the great Father of the Gods, whose home Is on Olympus’ height, with glowing hand And hurl’d his darts against the Capitol. Then fell the brazen statue, honour’d long, Of noble Natta; then fell down the laws Graved on the sacred tablets; while the bolts Spared not the images of the immortal gods. Here was that noble nurse of the Roman name, The Wolf of Mars, from whom her kindly breast Fed the immortal children of her god With the life-giving dew of sweetest milk, E’en that the lightning spared not; down she fell, Bearing the royal babes in her descent, Leaving her footmarks on the pedestal.

And who, unfolding records of old time, Has found no words of sad prediction In the dark pages of Etruscan books, All men, all writings, all events combined, To warn the citizens of freeborn race,

Were by the loyal Gauls reveal’d and shown To the astonish’d multitude and senate.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: Many a warning was given, it seemed, of slaughter nocturnal; Then, of a sudden, the moon at her full was blotted from heaven -- Hidden her features resplendent, though night was bejewelled with planets; Then did that dolorous herald of War, the torch of Apollo, Mount all aflame to the dome of the sky, where the sun has its setting; Then did a Roman depart from these radiant abodes of the living, Stricken by terrible lightning from heavens serene and unclouded. Then through the fruit-laden body of earth ran the shock of an earthquake; Spectres at night were observed, appalling and changeful of figure, Giving their warning that war was at hand, and internal commotion; Over all lands there outpoured, from the frenzied bosoms of prophets, Dreadful predictions, gloomy forecasts of impending disaster. And the misfortunes which happened at last and were long in their passing -- These were foretold by the Father of Gods, in earth and in heaven, Through unmistakable signs that he gave and often repeated. Now, of those prophecies made when Torquatus and Cotta were consuls, -- Made by a Lydian diviner, by one of Etruscan extraction -- All, in the round of your crowded twelve months, were brought to fulfillment. For high-thundering Jove, as he stood on starry Olympus, Hurled forth his blows at the temples and monuments raised in his honor, And on the Capitol's site he unloosed the bolts of his lightning. Then fell the brazen image of Natta, ancient and honoured: Vanished the tablets of laws long ago divinely enacted; Wholly destroyed were the statues of gods by the heat of the lightning. Here was the Martian beast, the nurse of Roman dominion, Suckling with life-giving dew, that issued from udders distended, Children divinely begotten, who sprang from the loins of the War God; Stricken by lightning she toppled to earth, bearing with her the children; Torn from her station, she left the prints of her feet in descending. Then what diviner, in turning the records and tomes of the augurs, Failed to relate the mournful forecasts the Etruscans had written? Seers all advised to beware the monstrous destruction and slaughter, Plotted by Romans who traced their descent from a noble ancestry.

Latin: XII Nunc ea, Torquato quae quondam et consule Cotta Lydius ediderat Tyrrhenae gentis haruspex, omnia fixa tuus glomerans determinat annus. Nam pater altitonans stellanti nixus Olympo ipse suos quondam tumulos ac templa petivit et Capitolinis iniecit sedibus ignis. Tum species ex aere vetus venerataque Nattae concidit, elapsaeque vetusto numine leges, et divom simulacra peremit fulminis ardor.

[20] Hic silvestris erat Romani nominis altrix Martia, quae parvos Mavortis semine natos uberibus gravidis vitali rore rigabat; quae tum cum pueris flammato fulminis ictu concidit atque avolsa pedum vestigia liquit. Tum quis non artis scripta ac monumenta volutans voces tristificas chartis promebat Etruscis? Omnes civilem generosa stirpe profectam volvier ingentem cladem pestemque monebant; tum legum exitium constanti voce ferebant, templa deumque adeo flammis urbemque iubebant eripere et stragem horribilem caedemque vereri; atque haec fixa gravi fato ac fundata teneri, ni prius excelsum ad columen formata decore sancta Iovis species claros spectaret in ortus: tum fore ut occultos populus sanctusque senatus cernere conatus posset, si solis ad ortum conversa inde patrum sedes populique videret.

[21] Haec tardata diu species multumque morata consule te tandem celsa est in sede locata atque una fixi ac signati temporis hora Iuppiter excelsa clarabat sceptra columna, et clades patriae flamma ferroque parata vocibus Allobrogum patribus populoque patebat.

XIII.

Well then did ancient men, whose monuments You keep among you, — they who will maintain Virtue and moderation; by these arts Ruling the lands and subject people to them. Well, too, your loyal sires, whose spotless faith, And piety, and deep sagacity, Have far surpass’d the men of other lands, Worship’d in every age the mighty Gods. They with sagacious care these things foresaw, Spending in virtuous studies all their leisure, And in the shady Academic groves, And fair Lyceum; where they well pour’d forth The treasures of their pure and learned hearts. And, like them, you have been by virtue placed, To save your country, in the imminent breach; Still with philosophy you soothe your cares, With prudent care dividing all your hours Between the Muses and your country’s claims.

Will you then be able to persuade your mind to speak against the arguments which I adduce on the subject of divination, being a man who has performed such exploits as you have done, and who has so admirably composed those verses which I have just recited? What — do you ask me, Carneades, why these things take place in this manner, or by what art it is possible for them to be brought about? I confess that I do not know; but that they do happen, I assert that you yourself are a witness. Yes, they happen by chance, you say. Is it so? Can anything be done by chance which has in itself all the features of reality? Four dice when thrown by chance come up sixes. Do you think that if you were to throw four hundred dice all to come up sixes by any chance in the world? Paints scattered at random on a canvas may by chance represent the features of a human face; but do you think that you could by any chance scattering of colours represent the beauty of the Coan Venus? Suppose a pig by burrowing in the ground with his snout were to make the letter A, would you on that account think it possible that the animal should by chance write out the Andromache of Ennius? Carneades used to tell a story that in cutting stones in the stone-quarries at Chios, there was once discovered a natural head of a Pan. I dare say there may have been a figure not wholly unlike such a head, but still certainly it was not such that you could fancy it wrought by Scopas. For this is the nature of things, that chance can never imitate reality to perfection.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: Rightly, therefore, the ancients whose monuments you have in keeping, Romans whose rule over peoples and cities was just and courageous, Rightly your kindred, foremost in honour and pious devotion, Far surpassing the rest of their fellows in shrewdness and wisdom, Held it a duty supreme to honour the Infinite Godhead. Such were the truths they beheld who painfully searching for wisdom Gladly devoted their leisure to study of all that was noble, Who, in Academy's shade and Lyceum's dazzling effulgence, Uttered the brilliant reflections of minds abounding in culture. Torn from these studies, in youth's early dawn, your country recalled you, Giving you place in the thick of the struggle for public preferment; Yet, in seeking surcease from the worries and cares that oppress you, Time, that the State leaves free, you devote to us and to learning.

"In view, therefore, of your acts, and in view too of your own verses which I have quoted and which were composed with the utmost care, could you be persuaded to controvert the position which I maintain in regard to divination? "But what? You ask, Carneades, do you, why these things so happen, or by what rules they may be understood? I confess that I do not know, but that they do so fall out I assert that you yourself see. 'Mere accidents,' you say. Now, really, is that so? Can anything be an 'accident' which bears upon itself every mark of truth? Four dice are cast and a Venus throw results -- that is chance; but do you think it would be chance, too, if in one hundred casts you made one hundred Venus throws? It is possible for paints flung at random on a canvas to form the outlines of a face; but do you imagine that an accidental scattering of pigments could produce the beautiful portrait of Venus of Cos? Suppose that a hog should form the letter 'A' on the ground with its snout; is that a reason for believing that it would write out Ennius's poem The Andromache? "Carneades used to have a story that once in the Chian quarries when a stone was split open there appeared the head of the infant god Pan; I grant that the figure may have borne some resemblance to the god, but assuredly the resemblance was not such that you could ascribe the work to a Scopas. For it is undeniably true that no perfect imitation of a thing was ever made by chance.

Latin: XIII Rite igitur veteres, quorum monumenta tenetis, / qui populos urbisque modo ac virtute regebant, / rite etiam vestri, quorum pietasque fidesque / praestitit et longe vicit sapientia cunctos, / praecipue coluere vigenti numine divos. / Haec adeo penitus cura videre sagaci, / otia qui studiis laeti tenuere decoris / inque Academia umbrifera nitidoque Lyceo / fuderunt claras fecundi pectoris artes. / E quibus ereptum primo iam a flore iuventae / te patria in media virtutum mole locavit; / tu tamen anxiferas curas requiete relaxans, / quod patriae vacat, id studiis nobisque sacrasti.

“Tibi ergo, ut litteris, ut supra dixi, ut tuis nostrisque studiis prope aequali constitisti loco, hoc onus imponimus, ut de omni hoc genere quid sentias disputes.”

“Quid tu igitur,” inquam, “Carneades, quaerebat, cur haec ita fierent aut qua arte perspici possent? Fieri, credo, ista dicebas; cur fierent, nesciebas. At in explicandis causis continentiae, gravitatis, iustitiae, fidei, ceterarumque virtutum, in quibus omnis est vitae constantia, nulla umquam a Peripateticis nostrisve ratio praetermissa est. Quattuor tali iacti casu Venerium efficiunt; num etiam centum talis centum Venerios, si abieceris, casu futuros putas? Aspersa temere pigmenta in tabula oris lineamenta efficere possunt; num etiam Coae Veneris pulchritudinem effici posse aspersione fortuita putas? Sus rostro si humi A litteram inpresserit, num propterea suspicari poteris Andromacham Enni ab ea posse describi? Fingebat Carneades in Chiorum lapicidinis saxo diffisso caput extitisse Pani; credo, aliquam non dissimilem effigiem, sed nullam eam similitudinem ut eam factam a Scopa diceres. Sic enim, credo, res se habet, ut numquam perfecte veritatem casus imitetur.

XIV.

But, you will say, things which have been predicted sometimes fail to happen. What act is not liable to this observation? I mean of those acts which proceed on conjecture, and are founded on opinion. Is not medicine to be considered a real art? And yet how often is it deceived! Need I say more? Are not pilots of ships often deceived? Did not the army of the Greeks and the captains of all that numerous fleet, depart from Troy, as Pacuvius says —

So glad at their departure, that they gazed In idle mirth upon the wanton fish, And never ceased from laughing at their gambols, Meanwhile at sunset the vast sea grows rough, The darkness lowers, black night and clouds surround them.

Does, however, the shipwreck of so many illustrious generals and sovereigns prove that there was no such art as navigation? Or is the science of generals good for nothing because a most illustrious general has lately been put to flight, after the total loss of his army? Or are we to say that there is no room for the display of sound principles of politics, or wisdom in the administration of affairs of state, because Cnæus Pompeius was often deceived, and even Cato and yourself have been deceived in more instances than one? The same rule applies to the answers of soothsayers, and to all divination which rests on opinion: for it depends only on conjecture, and has no means of advancing further. And that perhaps sometimes deceives us, but still it more frequently directs us to the truth. For it is traced back to all eternity. And as in the infinite duration of time, things have happened in an almost countless number of ways with the self-same indications preceding each occurrence, an art has been concocted and reduced to rules from a frequent observation and notice of the same circumstances.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "'But,' it is objected, 'sometimes predictions are made which do not come true.' And pray what art -- and by art I mean the kind that is dependent on conjecture and deduction -- what art, I say, does not have the same fault? Surely the practice of medicine is an art, yet how many mistakes it makes! And pilots -- do they not make mistakes at times? For example, when the armies of the Greeks and the captains of their mighty fleet set sail from Troy, they, as Pacuvius says,

Glad at leaving Troy behind them, gazed upon the fish at play, / Nor could get their fill of gazing -- thus they whiled the time away. / Meantime, as the sun was setting, high uprose the angry main: / Thick and thicker fell the shadows; night grew black with blinding rain.

Then, did the fact that so many illustrious captains and kings suffered shipwreck deprive navigation of its right to be called an art? And is military science of no effect because a general of the highest renown recently lost his army and took to flight? Again, is statecraft devoid of method or skill because political mistakes were made many times by Gnaeus Pompey, occasionally by Marcus Cato, and once or twice even by yourself? So it is with the responses of soothsayers, and, indeed, with every sort of divination whose deductions are merely probable; for divination of that kind depends on inference and beyond inference it cannot go. It sometimes misleads perhaps, but none the less in most cases it guides us to the truth. For this same conjectural divination is the product of boundless eternity and within that period it has grown into an art through the repeated observation and record of almost countless instances in which the same results have been preceded by the same signs.

Latin: XIV [24] "At non numquam ea, quae praedicta sunt, minus eveniunt." Quae tandem id ars non habet? Earum dico artium, quae coniectura continentur et sunt opinabiles. An medicina ars non putanda est? Quam tamen multa fallunt. Quid vero gubernatores? Nonne falluntur? An, cum Achivorum exercitus tantus et tam classis funditus periit, num etiam gubernatoriam scientiam esse deletam navium credamus? An imperatoris ars nulla est, quia summus imperator nuper amisit exercitum? Aut num propterea nulla est rei publicae gerendae ratio atque prudentia, quia multa Cn. Pompeium, quaedam et M. Catonem, non nulla etiam te ipsum fefellerunt? Similis est haruspicum responsio omniumque, quae sunt opinabilia; coniectura enim nititur, ultra quam progredi non potest; ea fallit fortasse non numquam, sed tamen ad veritatem saepissime dirigit; est enim ab omni aeternitate repetita, in qua cum paene innumerabilibus saeclis verum eventum monstra, fulgura, ostenta praecesserint, hac tot saeculorum observatione iam facta ars est.

XV.

But your auspices, how clear — how well at this time are known to nobody by the Roman augurs, (excuse me for saying this so plainly,) though they are maintained by the Cilicians, Pamphylians, Pisidians, and Lycians. For why should I mention that most illustrious and excellent man, king Deiotarus? He never does anything whatever without taking the auspices. And it happened once that he had started on a journey which he had arranged and determined some time before; but, being warned by the flight of an eagle, he returned back again, and the very next night the house in which he would have been lodging if he had persisted in his journey, fell to the ground. And he was so moved by this occurrence, that, as he himself used to tell me, he often turned back in a journey, even when he had advanced many days on it. And what is most remarkable in his conduct is, that after he had been deprived by Cæsar of his tetrarchy, his kingdom, and his property, he still asserted that he did not repent of obeying those auspices which had promised success to him when he was setting out to join Pompey; for he considered that the authority of the senate, and the liberty of the empire had been upheld by his arms; and that those birds had taken good care of his honour and real interests, inasmuch as they had been his counsellors in adhering to the claims of good faith and duty; for that character was a thing dearer to him than his possessions. And in saying this he seems to me to form a very just estimate. For our magistrates at times use compulsion. For it is quite impossible, if a cake is thrown down before a chicken, but what some crumbs must fall out of its mouth when it feeds. And as you have it set down in your books that a tripudium takes place if any of the food falls on the ground, so you also call this compulsory augury which I have spoken of tripudium solistimum. And so, as that wise Cato complains, owing to the negligence of the college, many auguries and many auspices have been wholly lost and abandoned.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "Indeed how trustworthy were the auspices taken when you were augur! At the present time -- pray pardon me for saying so -- Roman augurs neglect auspices, although the Cilicians, Pamphylians, Pisidians, and Lycians hold them in high esteem. I need not remind you of that most famous and worthy man, our guest-friend, King Deiotarus, who never undertook any enterprise without first taking the auspices. On one occasion after he had set out on a journey for which he had made careful plans beforehand, he returned home because of the warning given him by the flight of an eagle. The room in which he would have been staying, had he continued on his road, collapsed the very next night. This is why, as he told me himself, he had time and again abandoned a journey even though he might have been travelling for many days. By the way, that was a very noble utterance of his which he made after Caesar had deprived him of his tetrarchy and kingdom, and had forced him to pay an indemnity too. 'Notwithstanding what has happened,' said he, 'I do not regret that the auspices favoured my joining Pompey. By so doing I enlisted my military power in defence of senatorial authority, Roman liberty, and the supremacy of the empire. The birds, at whose instance I followed the course of duty and of honour, counselled well, for I value my good name more than riches.' His conception of augury, it seems to me, is the correct one.

"For with us magistrates make use of auspices, but they are 'forced auspices,' since the sacred chickens in eating the dough pellets thrown must let some fall from their beaks. But, according to the writings of you augurs, a tripudium results if any of the food should fall to the ground, and what I spoke of as a 'forced augur' your fraternity calls tripudium solistimum. And so through the indifference of the college, as Cato the Wise laments, many auguries and auspices have been entirely abandoned and lost.

Latin: [25] XV Auspicia vero vestra quam constant! Quae quidem nunc a Romanis auguribus ignorantur (bona hoc tua venia dixerim), a Cilicibus, Pamphyliis, Pisidis, Lyciis tenentur. [26] Nam quid ego hospitem nostrum, clarissumum atque optumum virum, Deiotarum regem, commemorem? Qui nihil umquam nisi auspicato gerit. Qui cum ex itinere quodam proposito et constituto revertisset aquilae admonitus volatu, conclave illud, ubi erat mansurus, si ire perrexisset, proxima nocte corruit. [27] Itaque, ut ex ipso audiebam, persaepe revertit ex itinere, cum iam progressus esset multorum dierum viam. Quoius quidem hoc praeclarissimum est, quod, posteaquam a Caesare tetrarchia et regno pecuniaque multatus est, negat se tamen eorum auspiciorum, quac sibi ad Pompeium proficiscenti secunda evenerint, paenitere; senatus enim auctoritatem et populi Romani libertatem atque imperii dignitatem suis armis esse defensam, sibique eas aves, quibus auctoribus officium et fidem secutus esset, bene consuluisse; antiquiorem enim sibi fuisse possessionibus suis gloriari. Ille mihi videtur igitur vere augurari. Nam nostri quidem magistratus auspiciis utuntur coactis; necesse est enim offa obiecta cadere frustum ex pulli ore, cum pascitur; [28] quod autem scriptum habetis, tripudium fieri, si ex ea quid in solidum ceciderit, hoc quoque, quod dixi, coactum tripudium solistimum dicitis. Itaque multa auguria, multa auspicia, quod Cato ille sapiens queritur, neglegentia collegii amissa plane et deserta sunt.

XVI.

Formerly there was, I may almost say, no affair of importance, not even if it only related to private business, which was transacted without taking the auspices. And this is proved even now by the Auspices Nuptiarum, who, though the custom has fallen into disuse, still preserve the name. For just as we now consult the entrails of victims — though even that very practice is observed less than it used to be — so in ancient times, before all transactions of importance, men used to consult birds; and, therefore, from want of paying proper regard to ill omens, we often run into alarming and destructive dangers; — as Publius Claudius, the son of Appius Cæcus, and his colleague Lucius Junius, lost a fine fleet, because they had put to sea in defiance of the omens. And, indeed, something of the same kind befel Agamemnon; for he, when the Grecians had begun

To murmur loudly, and with open scorn T’ asperse the skill of holy soothsayers, Bade the crew bend the sails and put to sea, Choosing the people’s voice before the omens.

But why need we look for old examples of this? We have ourselves seen what happened to Marcus Crassus, because he neglected the notice which was given to him that the auspices were unfavourable. On which occasion, Appius, your colleague, a good augur, as I have often heard you say, branded, when he was censor, an excellent man and a most illustrious citizen, Caius Ateius, without sufficient consideration, because he had co-operated in falsifying the auspices. However, let that pass. It may have been the duty of the censor, if he thought that the auspices were falsified. But it certainly was not the duty of an augur to set down in the books that this was the cause of a fearful calamity befalling the Roman people. For even if that was the cause of the calamity, still the fault was not in the man who announced the state of the auspices, but in him who disregarded the announcement. For that the announcement was a correct one, as the same augur and censor bears witness, was proved by the event; for if the announcement had been false, it could not possibly have caused any calamity at all. In truth,

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "In ancient times scarcely any matter out of the ordinary was undertaken, even in private life, without first consulting the auspices, clear proof of which is given even at the present time by our custom of having 'nuptial auspices,' though they have lost their former religious significance and only preserve the name. For just as today on important occasions we make use of entrails in divining -- though even they are employed to a less extent than formerly -- so in the past resort was usually had to divination by means of birds. And thus it is that by failing to seek out the unpropitious signs we run into awful disasters. For example, Publius Claudius, son of Appius Caecus, and his colleague Lucius Junius, lost very large fleets by going to sea when the auguries were adverse. The same fate befell Agamemnon; for, after the Greeks had begun to raise aloft their frequent clamours, showing scorn of augur's art, noise prevailed and not the omen: he then bade the ships depart.

"But why cite such ancient instances? We see what happened to Marcus Crassus when he ignored the announcement of unfavourable omens. It was on the charge of having on this occasion falsified the auspices that Gaius Ateius, an honourable man and a distinguished citizen, was, on insufficient evidence, stigmatized by the then censor Appius, who was your associate in the augural college, and an able one too, as I have often heard you say. I grant you that in pursuing the course he did Appius was within his rights as a censor, if, in his judgement, Ateius had announced a fraudulent augury. But he showed no capacity whatever as an augur in holding Ateius responsible for that awful disaster which befell the Roman people. Had this been the cause then the fault would not have been in Ateius, who made the announcement that the augury was unfavourable, but in Crassus, who disobeyed it; for the issue proved that the announcement was true, as this same augur and censor admits. But even if the augury had been false it could not have been the cause of the disaster; for unfavourable auguries -- and the same may be said of auspices, omens, and all other signs -- are not the causes of what follows: they merely foretell what will occur unless precautions are taken. Therefore Ateius, by his announcement, did not create the cause of the disaster; but having observed the sign he simply advised Crassus what the result would be if the warning was ignored. It follows, then, that the announcement by Ateius of the unfavourable augury had no effect; or if it did, as Appius thinks, then the sin is not in him who gave the warning, but in him who disregarded it.

Latin: XVI Nihil fere quondam maioris rei nisi auspicato ne privatim quidem gerebatur, quod etiam nunc nuptiarum auspices declarant, qui re omissa nomen tantum tenent. Nam ut nunc extis (quamquam id ipsum aliquanto minus quam olim), sic tum avibus magnae res impetriri solebant. Itaque, sinistra dum non exquirimus, in dira et in vitiosa incurrimus. [29] Ut P. Claudius, Appi Caeci filius, eiusque collega L. Iunius classis maxumas perdiderunt, cum vitio navigassent. Quod eodem modo evenit Agamemnoni; qui, cum Achivi coepissent "inter sese strepere aperteque artem obterere extispicum solvere imperat secundo rumore adversaque avi." Sed quid vetera? M. Crasso quid acciderit videmus, dirarum obnuntiatione neglecta. In quo Appius, collega tuus, bonus augur, ut ex te audire soleo, non satis scienter virum bonum e civem egregium censor C. Ateium notavit, quod ementitu auspicia subscriberet. Esto; fuerit hoc censoris, si iudicabat ementitum; at illud minime auguris, quod adscripsit ob ea causam populum Romanum calamitatem maxumam cepisse. Si enim ea causa calamitatis fuit, non in eo est culpa, qui obnuntiavit, sed in eo, qui non paruit. Veram enim fuisse obnuntiationem, ut ait idem augur et censor, exitus adprobavit; quae si falsa fuisset, nullam adferre potuisset causam calamitatis. Etenim dirae, sicut cetera auspicia, ut omina, ut signa, non causas adferunt, cur quid eveniat, sed nuntiant eventura, nisi provideris. [30] Non igitur obnuntiatio Atei causam finxit calamitatis, sed signo obiecto monuit Crassum quid eventurum esset, nisi cavisset. Ita aut illa obnuntiatio nihil valuit aut, si, ut Appius iudicat, valuit, id valuit, ut peccatum haereat non in eo qui monuerit, sed in eo qui non obtemperarit.

XVII.

prognostics of calamity, like other auspices, and omens, and tokens, do not produce causes why anything should happen, but merely give notice of what will happen unless you provide against it. It was not, therefore, the announcement of unfavourable omens, made by Ateius, which was the cause of calamity; all that he did, by declaring to him what signs had been seen, was to warn him what would happen if he did not take precautions against it. Accordingly, either that announcement had no effect at all, or else if, as Appius thinks, it had an effect, the effect was this, that guilt was attached, not to the man who gave the warning, but to him who did not attend to it.

What shall I say more? From whence have you received that staff (lituus) of yours, which is the most celebrated ensign of your augurship? That is the staff with which Romulus parted out the several districts, when he founded the city. And that staff of Romulus, (that is to say, a stick curved and slightly bent forward at the top, which has derived its name from its resemblance to the trumpet (lituus) used in sounding signals,) having been laid up in the meeting-house of the Salii, which was in the Palatine-hill, when that house was burnt to the ground, was found unhurt. What more need I say? Who of the ancient authors is there who does not relate what an arrangement of the districts of the city was made, many years after the time of Romulus, in the reign of Tarquinius Priscus, by Attius Navius, who employed his staff in this manner? And it is said that, when he, as a boy, was forced through poverty to act as a swineherd; and one day, having lost one of his pigs, he made a vow that if he recovered it, he would give the finest grape which there was in the whole vineyard. Accordingly, when he had found the pig, he placed himself in the middle of the vineyard, with his eyes directed towards the south; and after he had divided the vineyard into four divisions, and had been directed by the birds to disregard three of the portions, in the fourth division, which remained, he found a grape of most wonderful size, as we find recorded in our books. And when this fact became known, all the neighbours used to consult him on all their affairs, until he gained a great name and reputation; in consequence of which king Priscus sent for him.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "And whence, pray, did you augurs derive that staff, which is the most conspicuous mark of your priestly office? It is the very one, indeed with which Romulus marked out the quarter for taking observations when he founded the city. Now this staff is a crooked wand, slightly curved at the top, and, because of its resemblance to a trumpet, derives its name from the Latin word meaning 'the trumpet with which the battle-charge is sounded.' It was placed in the temple of the Salii on the Palatine hill and, though the temple was burned, the staff was found uninjured. What ancient chronicler fails to mention the fact that in the reign of Tarquinius Priscus, long after the time of Romulus, a quartering of the heavens was made with this staff by Attus Navius? Because of poverty Attus was a swineherd in his youth. As the story goes, he, having lost one of his hogs, made a vow that if he recovered it he would make an offering to the god of the largest bunch of grapes in his vineyard. Accordingly, after he had found the hog, he took his stand, we are told, in the middle of the vineyard, with his face to the south and divided the vineyard into four parts. When the birds had shown three of these parts to be unfavourable, he subdivided the fourth and last part and then found, as we see it recorded, a bunch of grapes of marvellous size.

"This occurrence having been noised abroad, all his neighbours began to consult him about their own affairs and thus greatly enhanced his name and fame. The consequence was that King Priscus summoned him to his presence. The king, wishing to make trial of his skill as an augur, said to him: 'I am thinking of something; tell me whether it can be done or not.' Attus, having taken the auspices, replied that it could be done. Thereupon Tarquinius said that what he had been thinking of was the possibility of cutting a whetstone in two with a razor, and ordered the trial to be made. So the stone was brought into the comitium, and, while the king and his people looked on, it was cut in two with a razor. The result was that Tarquin employed him as his augur, and the people consulted him about their private concerns. Moreover, according to tradition, the whetstone and razor were buried in the comitium and a stone curbing placed over them.

"Let us declare this story wholly false; let us burn the chronicles that contain it; let us call it a myth and admit almost anything you please rather than the fact that the gods have any concern in human affairs. But look at this: does not the story about Tiberius Gracchus found in your own writings acknowledge that augury and soothsaying are arts? He, having placed his tabernaculum, unwittingly violated augural law by crossing the pomerium before completing the auspices; nevertheless he held the consular election. The fact is well known to you since you have recorded it. Besides, Tiberius Gracchus, who was himself an augur, confirmed the authority of auspices by confessing his error; and the soothsayers, too, greatly enhanced the reputation of their calling, when brought into the Senate immediately after the election, by declaring that the election supervisor had acted without authority.

Latin: XVII Quid? Lituus iste vester, quod clarissumum est insigne auguratus, unde vobis est traditus? Nempe eo Romulus regiones direxìt tum, cum urbem condidit. Qui quidem Romuli lituus, id est incurvum et leviter a summo inflexu bacillum, quod ab eius litui, quo canitur, similitudine nomen invenit, cum situs esset in curia Saliorum, quae est in Palatio eaque defiagravisset, inventus est integer. [31] Quid? Multis annis post Romulum, Prisco regnante Tarquinio, quis veterum scriptorum non loquitur quae sit ab Atto Navio per lituum regionum facta discriptio? Qui cum propter paupertatem sues puer pasceret, una ex iis amissa, vovisse dicitur, si recuperasset, uvam se deo daturum, quae maxima esset in vinea; itaque, sue inventa, ad meridiem spectans in vinea media dicitur constitisse, cumque in quattuor partis vineam divisisset trisque partis aves abdixissent, quarta parte, quae erat reliqua, in regiones distributa, mirabili magnitudine uvam, ut scriptum videmus, invenit. Qua re celebrata, cum vicini omnes ad eum de rebus suis referrent, erat in magno nomine et gloria. [32] Ex quo factum est, ut eum ad se rex Priscus arcesseret. Cuius cum temptaret scientiam auguratus, dixit ei cogitare se quiddam; id possetne fieri, consuluit. Ille augurio acto posse respondit. Tarquinius autem dixit se cogitasse cotem novacula posse praecidi; tum Attum iussisse experiri. Ita cotem in comitium allatam inspectante et rege et populo novacula esse discissam. Ex eo evenit ut et Tarquinius augure Atto Navio uteretur et populus de suis rebus ad eum referret. [33] Cotem autem illam et novaculam defossam in comitio supraque impositum puteal accepimus. Negemus omnia, comburamus annales, fiera haec esse dicamus, quidvis denique potius quam deos res humanas curare fateamur; quid quod scriptum apud te est de Ti. Graccho, nonne et augurum et haruspicum comprobat disciplinam? Qui cum tabernaculum vitio cepisset inprudens, quod inauspicato pomerium transgressus esset, comitia consulibus rogandis habuit. Nota res est et a te ipso mandata monumentis. Sed et ipse augur Ti. Gracchus auspiciorum auctoritatem confessione errati sui comprobavit, et haruspicum disciplinae magna accessit auctoritas, qui recentibus comitiis in senatum introducti negaverunt iustum comitiorum rogatorem fuisse.

XVIII.

And when he had come to the king, he, wishing to make proof of his skill in augury, told him that he was thinking of something, and asked him whether it could possibly be done. He, having taken an augury, answered that it could. But Tarquin said that he had been thinking that it was possible that a whetstone might be cut through by a razor. On this Attius bade him try; and accordingly a whetstone was brought into the assembly, and, in the sight of king and people, cut through with a razor. And in consequence of this it happened that Tarquinius always consulted Attius Navius as an augur, and that the people also were used to refer their private affairs to him. And we are told that that whetstone and razor were buried in the comitium, and that the puteal was built over it.

Let us deny everything; let us burn our annals; let us say that all these statements are false; let us, in short, confess everything rather than admit that the Gods regard the affairs of mankind. What? do not even your own writings about Tiberius Gracchus sanction the theories of augurs and haruspices? For when he had unintentionally erected a tent to take the auspices informally, because he had crossed the pomœrium without taking auspices, he held there the comitia for the election of the consuls. (The matter is one of notoriety, and committed to writing by yourself.) However, Tiberius Gracchus, who was himself an augur, ratified the authority of the auspices by a confession of his error, and added great authority to the system of the haruspices; who, having at the recent comitia been introduced into the senate, asserted that the person who proposed that candidates to the comitia had no right to do so.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "I agree, therefore, with those who have said that there are two kinds of divination: one, which is allied with art; the other, which is devoid of art. Those diviners employ art, who, having learned the known by observation, seek the unknown by deduction. On the other hand those do without art who, unaided by reason or deduction or by signs which have been observed and recorded, forecast the future while under the influence of mental excitement, or of some free and unrestrained emotion. This condition often occurs to men while dreaming and sometimes to persons who prophesy while in a frenzy -- like Bacis of Boeotia, Epimenides of Crete and the Sibyl of Erythraea. In this latter class must be placed oracles -- not oracles given by means of 'equalized lots' -- but those uttered under the impulse of divine inspiration; although divination by lot is not in itself to be despised, if it has the sanction of antiquity, as in the case of those lots which, according to tradition, sprang out of the earth; for in spite of everything, I am inclined to think that they may, under the power of God, be so drawn as to give an appropriate response. Men capable of correctly interpreting all these signs of the future seem to approach very near to the divine spirit of the gods whose wills they interpret, just as scholars do when they interpret the poets.

"What sort of cleverness is it, then, that would attempt by sophistry to overthrow facts that antiquity has established? I fail -- you tell me -- to discover their cause. That, perhaps, is one of Nature's hidden secrets. God has not willed me to know the cause, but only that I should use the means which he has given. Therefore, I will use them and I will not allow myself to be persuaded that the whole Etruscan nation has gone stark mad on the subject of entrails, or that these same people are in error about lightnings, or that they are false interpreters of portents; for many a time the rumblings and roarings and quakings of the earth have given to our republic and to other states certain forewarnings of subsequent disaster. Why, then, when here recently a mule (which is an animal ordinarily sterile by nature) brought forth a foal, need anyone have scoffed because the soothsayers from that occurrence prophesied a progeny of countless evils to the state?

"What, pray, do you say of that well-known incident of Tiberius Gracchus, the son of Publius? He was censor and consul twice; beside that he was a most competent augur, a wise man and a pre-eminent citizen. Yet he, according to the account left us by his son Gaius, having caught two snakes in his home, called in the soothsayers to consult them. They advised him that if he let the male snake go his wife must die in a short time; and if he released the female snake his own death must soon occur. Thinking it more fitting that a speedy death should overtake him rather than his young wife, who was the daughter of Publius Africanus, he released the female snake and died within a few days.

Latin: XVIII [34] Iis igitur adsentior, qui duo genera divinationum esse dixerunt, unum, quod particeps esset artis, alterum, quod arte careret. Est enim ars in iis, qui novas res coniectura persequuntur, veteres observatione didicerunt. Carent autem arte ii qui non ratione aut coniectura observatis ac notatis signis, sed concitatione quadam animi aut soluto liberoque motu futura praesentiunt, quod et somniantibus saepe contingit et non numquam vaticinantibus per furorem, ut Bacis Boeotius, ut Epimenides Cres, ut Sibylla Erythrea. Cuius generis oracla etiam habenda sunt, non ea quae aequatis sortibus ducuntur, sed illa quae instinctu divino adflatuque funduntur; etsi ipsa sors contemnenda non est, si et auctoritatem habet vetustatis, ut eae sunt sortes, quas e terra editas accepimus; quae tamen ductae ut in rem apte cadant fieri credo posse divinitus. Quorum omnium interpretes, ut grammatici poetarum, proxime ad eorum, quos interpretantur, divinationem videntur accedere. [35] Quae est igitur ista calliditas, res vetustate robustas calumniando velle pervertere? "Non reperio causam." Latet fortasse obscuritate involuta naturae; non enim me deus ista scire, sed his tantum modo uti voluit. Utar igitur nec adducar aut in extis totam Etruriam delirare aut eandem gentem in fulgoribus errare aut fallaciter portenta interpretari, cum terrae saepe fremitus, saepe mugitus, saepe motus multa nostrae rei publicae, multa ceteris civitatibus gravia et vera praedixerint. [36] Quid? qui inridetur partus hic mulae nonne, quia fetus exstitit in sterilitate naturae, praedictus est ab haruspicibus incredibilis partus malorum? Quid? Ti. Gracchus Publi filius, qui bis consul et censor fuit, idemque et summus augur et vir sapiens civisque praestans, nonne, ut C. Gracchus, filius eius, scriptum reliquit, duobus anguibus domi comprehensis haruspices convocavit? Qui cum respondissent, si marem emisisset, uxori brevi tempore esse moriendum, si feminam, ipsi, aequius esse censuit se maturam oppetere mortem quam P. Africani filia adulescentem; feminam emisit, ipse paucis post diebus est mortuus.

XIX.

I therefore agree with those authors who have asserted that there are two kinds of divination; one partaking of art, and the other wholly devoid of it. For art is visible in those persons who pursue anything new by conjecture, and have learnt to judge of what is old by observation. But those men, on the other hand, are devoid of art, who give way to presentiments of future events, not proceeding by reason or conjecture, nor on the observation and consideration of particular signs, but yielding to some excitement of mind, or to some unknown influence subject to no precise rules or restraint, (as is often the case with men who dream, and sometimes with those who deliver predictions in a frenzied manner,) as Bacis of Bœotia, Epimenides the Cretan, and the Erythrean Sibyl. And under this head we ought also to rank oracles; not those which are drawn by lot, but those which are uttered under the influence of some divine instinct and inspiration. Although even lots are not to be despised where they are sanctioned by the authority of antiquity, like those which we are told to rise out of the earth; which, however, are drawn in such a manner as to be apposite to the subject under consideration, which, indeed, is a thing that I conceive to be very possible by divine management. The interpreters of all of which appear to me to come very near to the divining power of those whose interpreters they are (just as those grammarians do who are the interpreters of poets). What proof of sagacity is it, then, to wish to disparage things sanctioned by antiquity, by vile calumnies? I admit that I cannot discover the cause. Perhaps it lies hid, involved in the obscurity of nature. For God has not intended me to understand these matters, but only to use them. I will use them, then; nor will I be persuaded to think, either that all Etruria is mad on the subject of the entrails of victims, or that the same nation is all wrong about lightnings, or that it interprets prodigies fallaciously, when it has so often happened that subterranean noises and crashes, and often that earthquakes, have predicted, with terrible truth, many of the evils which have befallen our own republic and other states.

Why should I say more? The fact of a mule having brought forth is much ridiculed by some people; but because this parturition did take place in the case of an animal of natural barrenness, was there not an incredible crop of evils predicted by the soothsayers? Need I go further? Did not Tiberius Gracchus, the son of Publius Gracchus, who had been twice consul and censor, and who was also an augur of the highest skill and reputation, and a wise man, and a most virtuous citizen, — did not he (as Caius Gracchus, his son, has left recorded in his writings), when two snakes were caught in his house, convoke the soothsayers? And the answer which they gave him was, that if he let the male escape, his wife would die in a short time; but if he let the female escape, he would die himself: on which he thought it more becoming to encounter an early death himself, than to expose the youthful daughter of Publius Africanus to it. Accordingly, he released the female snake, and died himself a few days afterwards.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "Let us laugh at the soothsayers, brand them as frauds and impostors and scorn their calling, even though a very wise man, Tiberius Gracchus, and the results and circumstances of his death have given proof of its trustworthiness; let us scorn the Babylonians, too, and those astrologers who, from the top of Mount Caucasus, observe the celestial signs and with the aid of mathematics follow the courses of the stars; let us, I say, convict of folly, falsehood, and shamelessness the men whose records, as they themselves assert, cover a period of four hundred and seventy thousand years; and let us pronounce them liars, utterly indifferent to the opinion of succeeding generations. Come, let us admit that the barbarians are all base deceivers, but are the Greek historians liars too?

"Speaking now of natural divination, everybody knows the oracular responses which the Pythian Apollo gave to Croesus, to the Athenians, Spartans, Tegeans, Argives, and Corinthians. Chrysippus has collected a vast number of these responses, attested in every instance by abundant proof. But I pass them by as you know them well. I will urge only this much, however, in defense: the oracle at Delphi never would have been so much frequented, so famous, and so crowded with offerings from peoples and kings of every land, if all ages had not tested the truth of its prophecies. For a long time now that has not been the case. Therefore, as at present its glory has waned because it is no longer noted for the truth of its prophecies, so formerly it would not have enjoyed so exalted a reputation if it had not been trustworthy in the highest degree. Possibly, too, those subterraneous exhalations which used to kindle the soul of the Pythian priestess with divine inspiration have gradually vanished in the long lapse of time; just as within our own knowledge some rivers have dried up and disappeared, while others, by winding and twisting, have changed their course into other channels. But explain the decadence of the oracle as you wish, since it offers a wide field for discussion, provided you grant what cannot be denied without distorting the entire record of history, that the oracle at Delphi made true prophecies for many hundreds of years.

Latin: XIX Inrideamus haruspices, vanos, futtiles esse dicamus quorumque disciplinam et sapientissimus vir et eventus ac re comprobavit contemnamus; condemnemus etiam Babylonem et eos qui e Caucaso caeli signa servantes numeris motibus stellarum cursus persequuntur; condemnemus, in quam, hos aut stultitiae aut vanitatis aut impudentiae, qui quadringenta septuaginta milia annorum, ut ipsi dicunt, monumentis comprehensa continenti et mentiri iudicemus ne saeculorum reliquorum iudicium, quod de ipsis futurum sit pertimescere. [37] Age, barbari vani atque fallaces; num etiam Graiorum historia mentita est? quae Croeso Pythius Apollo, ut de naturali divinatione dicam, quae Atheniensibu quae Lacedaemoniis, quae Tegeatis, quae Argivis, quae Corinthiis responderit, quis ignorat? Conlegit innumerabilia oracula Chrysippus nec ullum sine locuplete auctore atque teste; quae, quia nota tibi sunt, relinquo; defendo unum hoc numquam illud oraclum Delphis tam celebre et tam clarum fuisset neque tantis donis refertum omnium populorum atque regum, nisi omnis aetas oraclorum illorum veritatem esse experta. [38] "Idem iam diu non facit." Ut igitur nunc minore gloria est, quia minus oraculorum veritas excellit, sic tum, nisi summa veritate, in tanta gloria non fuisset. Potest autem vis illa terrae, quae mentem Pythiae divino adflatu concitabat, evanuisse vetustate, ut quosdam evanuisse et exaruisse amnes aut in alium cursum contortos et deflexos videmus. Sed ut vis acciderit (magna enim quaestio est), modo maneat id quod negari non potest nisi omnem historiam perverterimus: multis saeclis verax fuisse id oraculum.

XX.

Let us, after this, laugh at the soothsayers; let us call them useless and triflers, and despise those men whose principles the wisest men, and subsequent events and occurrences, have often proved. Let us despise also the Babylonians, and those who on mount Caucasus observe the stars of heaven, and follow all their revolutions in regular number and motion. Let us, say I, condemn all those people for folly, or vanity, or impudence, who, as they themselves assert, have exact records for four hundred and seventy thousand years carefully noted down, and let us decide that they are telling lies, and have no regard as to what the judgment of future ages concerning them will be. Come, then, you vain and deceitful barbarians, has the history of the Greeks likewise spoken falsely? Who is ignorant of the answer (that I may speak at present of natural divination) which the Pythian Apollo gave to Crœsus, to the Athenians, the Lacedæmonians, the Tegeans, the Argives, and the Corinthians? Chrysippus has collected a countless list of oracles — not one without a witness and authority of sufficient weight; but as they are known to you, I will pass them over. This one I will mention and defend. Would that oracle at Delphi have ever been so celebrated and illustrious, and so loaded with such splendid gifts from all nations and kings, if all ages had not had experience of the truth of its predictions? At present, you will say, it has no such reputation. Granted, then, that it has a lower reputation now, because the truth of oracles is less notorious; still I affirm that it would not have had such a reputation then, if it had not been distinguished for extraordinary accuracy. But it is possible that that power in the earth, which excited the mind of the Pythian priestess by divine inspiration, may have disappeared through old age, just as we know that some rivers have dried up, or become changed and diverted into another channel. However, let it be owing to whatever you please; for it is a great question: only let this fact remain — which cannot be denied, unless we will overthrow all history — that that oracle told the truth for many ages.

However, let us pass over the oracles; let us come to dreams. And Chrysippus discussing them, after collecting many minute instances, does the same that Antipater does when he investigates this subject, and those dreams which were explained according to the interpretation of Antipho, which indeed prove the acuteness of the interpreter, but still are not examples of such importance as to have been worthy of being brought forward.

The mother of Dionysius — of that Dionysius, I mean, who was the tyrant of Syracuse, as it is recorded by Philistus, a man of learning and diligence, and who was a contemporary of the tyrant — when she was pregnant with this very Dionysius, dreamt that she had become the mother of a little Satyr. The interpreters of prodigies, who at that time were in Sicily called Galeotæ, gave her for answer when she consulted them about it, (according to the story told by Philistus,) that the child whom she was about to bring forth would be the most illustrious man of Greece, with very lasting good fortune. Am I recalling you to the fables of the Greek poets and those of our country? For the Vestal Virgin, in Ennius, says —

The agitated dame with trembling limbs Brings in a lamp, and with unbridled tears, Starting from broken sleep, pours forth these words: — O daughter of the fair Eurydice, You whom my father loved, see strength and life Desert my limbs, and leave me helpless all. I thought I saw a man of handsome form Seize me, and bear me through the willow groves, Along the river banks and places yet unknown. And then alone, — I tell you true, my sister, — I seem’d to wander, with tardy steps To seek to trace you, but my efforts fail’d; While no clear path did guide my doubtful feet. And then, I thought, my father thus address’d me, With evil-boding voice: — Alas! my daughter, What numerous woes by you must be endured; Though fortune shall in after times arise. From out of the waters of this river here. Thus, sister, spake my father, and then vanish’d; Nor, though much wish’d for, did he once return. In vain, with many tears, I raised my hands Up to the azure vault of the highest heaven, And with caressing voice invoked his name, Or seem’d to do so. And ‘twas long ere sleep, Freighted with such sad dreams, did quit my breast.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "But let us leave oracles and come to dreams. In his treatise on this subject Chrysippus, just as Antipater does, has assembled a mass of trivial dreams which he explains according to Antiphon's rules of interpretation. The work, I admit, displays the acumen of its author, but it would have been better if he had cited illustrations of a more serious type. Now, Philistus, who was a learned and painstaking man and a contemporary of the times of which he writes, gives us the following story of the mother of Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse: while she was with child and was carrying this same Dionysius in her womb, she dreamed that she had been delivered of an infant satyr. When she referred this dream to the interpreters of portents, who in Sicily were called 'Galeotae,' they replied, so Philistus relates, that she should bring forth a son who would be very eminent in Greece and would enjoy a long and prosperous career.

"May I not recall to your memory some stories to be found in the works of Roman and of Greek poets? For example, the following dream of the Vestal Virgin is from Ennius, describing her fright at a dream vision of a stranger bearing her off through willowed places, and her father's warning of sorrows to come before her fortune should rise from the Tiber.

Latin: XX [39] Sed omittamus oracula, veniamus ad somnia. De quibus disputans Chrysippus, multis et minutis somniis configendis, facit idem quod Antipater, ea conquirens quae, Antiphontis interpretatione esplicata, declarant illa quidem acumen interpretis, sed exemplis grandioribus decuit uti. Dionysi mater, eius qui Syracosiorum tyrannus fuit, ut scriptum apud Philistum est, et doctum hominem et diligentem et aequalem temporum illorum, cum praegnans hunc ipsum Dionysium alvo contineret, somniavit se peperisse Satyriscum. Huic interpretes portentorum, qui Galeotae tum in Sicilia nominabantur, responderunt, ut ait Philistus, eum, quem illa peperisset, clarissimum Graeciae diuturna cum fortuna fore. [40] Num te ad fabulas revoco vel nostrorum vel Graecorum poetarum? Narrat enim et apud Ennium Vestalis illa, in a passage of verse describing her frightened waking and her father's warning spoken in the dream, "vires vitaque corpus meum nunc deserit omne... aerumnae, post ex fluvio fortuna resistet."

XXI.

Now these accounts, though they perhaps may be the mere inventions of the poets, still are not inconsistent with the general character of dreams. We may grant that that is a fictitious one by which Priam is represented to have been disturbed —

Queen Hecuba dream’d — an ominous dream of fate — That she did bear no human child of flesh, But a fierce blazing torch, Priam, alarm’d, Ponder’d with anxious fear the fatal dream, And sought the gods with smoking sacrifice. Then the diviner’s aid he did entreat, With many a prayer to the prophetic god, If haply he might learn the dream’s intent. Thus spake Apollo with all-knowing mind: — “The queen shall have a son, who, if he grow To man’s estate, shall set all Troy in flames — The ruin of his city and his land.”

Let us grant, then, that these dreams are, as I have said, merely poetic fictions, and let us add the dream of Æneas, which Numerius Fabius Pictor relates in his Annals, as one of the same kind; in which Æneas is represented as foreseeing, in his trance, all his future exploits and adventures.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "This dream, I admit, is the fiction of a poet's brain, yet it is not contrary to our experience with real dreams. It may well be that the following story of the dream which greatly disturbed Priam's peace of mind is fiction too: that Hecuba, great with child, dreamed she brought forth a flaming torch, and Priam, alarmed, sought Apollo's oracle to learn what the vision foretold -- the answer being that the son about to be born would prove the destruction of Troy and of Pergamos. Grant, I repeat, that these dreams are myths and in the same category put Aeneas's dream, related in the Greek annals of our countryman, Fabius Pictor. According to Pictor everything that Aeneas did or suffered turned out just as it had been predicted to him in a dream.

Latin: XXI [42] Haec, etiamsi ficta sunt a poeta, non absunt tamen a consuetudine somniorum. Sit sane etiam illud commenticium, quo Priamus est conturbatus, quia mater gravida parere se ardentem facem visa est in somnis Hecuba; quo facto pater rex ipse Priamus somnio, mentis metu perculsus, curis sumptus suspirantibus, exsacrificabat hostiis balantibus. Tum coniecturam postulat pacem petens, ut se edoceret obsecrans Apollinem quo sese vertant tantae sortes somnium. Ibi ex oraclo voce divina edidit Apollo: puerum, primus Priamo qui foret postilla natus, temperaret tollere: eum esse exitium Troiae, pestem Pergamo. [43] Sint haec, ut dixi, somnia fabularum, hisque adiungatur etiam Aeneae somnium, quod nimirum in Fabi Pictoris Graecis annalibus eius modi est, ut omnia quae ab Aenea gesta sunt quaeque illi acciderunt, ea fuerint quae ei secundum quietem visa sunt.

XXII.

But let us come nearer home. What kind of dream was that of Tarquin the Proud, which the poet Accius, in his Tragedy of Brutus, puts into the mouth of Tarquin himself —

Sleep closed my weary eyelids, when a shepherd Brought me two rams. The one I sacrificed, The other rushing at me with wild force Hurl’d me upon the ground. Prostrate I gazed Upon the heavens, when a new prodigy Dazzled my eyes. The flashing orb of day Took a new course, diverging to the right, With all his kindling beams strangely transversed.

Of this dream the diviners gave the following interpretation —

Dreams are in general reflex images Of things that men in waking hours have known; But sometimes dreams of loftier character Rise in the tranced soul, inspired by Jove, Prophetic of the future. Then beware Of him, whom thou dost think as stupid as The ram thou dreamest of. For in his breast Dwells manliest wisdom. He may yet expel Thee from thy kingdom. Mark the prophecy: That change in the sun’s course thou didst behold, Betoken’d revolution in the state, And as the sun did turn from left to right, we predict So shall that revolution meet success.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "But let us look at examples nearer our own times. Would you dare call that famous dream of Tarquin the Proud a myth? He describes it himself in the following lines from the Brutus of Accius: how a shepherd drove toward him a beautiful flock, from which he chose and sacrificed one of two brother rams, while the other, charging with lowered horns, bore him to the ground -- and how, as he lay there wounded, he beheld the blazing star of day reverse its course and glide away to the right. Now observe how the diviners interpreted this dream: that it warned him to beware of the man he deemed as stupid as the ram, lest that man, armed with wisdom, rise up and drive him from his throne -- and that the sun's changed course, from left to right, portended the best of auguries, that Rome would be supreme over all the earth.

Latin: XXII Sed propiora videamus. Cuiusnam modi est Superbi Tarquini somnium, de quo in Bruto Acci loquitur ipse? [44] "Quoniam quieti corpus nocturno impetu dedi, sopore placans artus languidos, visust in somnis pastor ad me appellere pecus lanigerum eximia pulchritudine; duos consanguineos arietes inde eligi praeclarioremque alterum immolare me; deinde eius germanum cornibus conitier, in me arietare, eoque ictu me ad casum dari; exim prostratum terra, graviter saucium, resupinum in caelo contueri maxumum ac mirificum facinus: dextrorsum orbem flammeum radiatum solis liquier cursu novo." [45] Eius igitur somnii a coniectoribus quae sit interpretatio facta videamus: "Rex, quae in vita usurpant homines, cogitant curant vident, quaeque agunt vigilantes agitantque, ea si cui in somno accidunt, minus mirandum est; sed in re tanta haud temere visa se offerunt. Proin vide ne, quem tu esse hebetem deputes aeque ac pecus, is sapientia munitum pectus egregium gerat teque regno expellat; nam id, quod de sole ostentum est tibi, populo commutationem rerum portendit fore perpropinquam. Haec bene verruncent populo! Nam quod ad dexteram cepit cursum ab laeva signum praepotens, pulcherrume auguratum est rem Romanam publicam summam fore."

XXIII.

Let us again return to foreign events. Heraclides of Pontus, an intelligent man, who was one of Plato’s disciples and followers, writes that the mother of Phalaris fancied that she saw in a dream the statues of the gods which Phalaris had consecrated in his house. Among them it appeared to her that Mercury held a cup in his right hand, from which he poured blood, which as soon as it touched the earth gushed forth like a fresh fountain, and filled the house with streaming gore. The dream of the mother was too fatally realized by the cruelty of the son.

Why need I also relate, out of the history of Persia by Dinon, the interpretations which the Magi gave to the celebrated prince, Cyrus? For he dreamed that beholding the sun at his feet, he thrice endeavoured to grasp it in his hands, but the sun rolled away and departed, and escaped from him. The Magi (who were accounted sages and teachers in Persia) thus interpreted the dream, saying, that the three attempts of Cyrus to catch the sun in his hands, signified that he would reign thirty years; and what they predicted really came to pass; for he was forty years old when he began to reign, and he reached the age of seventy. Among all barbarous nations, indeed, we meet with proof that they likewise possess the gift of divination and presentiment. The Indian Calanus, when led to execution, said, while ascending the funeral pile, “O what a glorious departure from life! when, as happened to Hercules, after my body has been consumed by fire, my soul shall depart to a world of light.” And when Alexander asked him if he had anything to say to him; “Yes,” replied he, “we shall soon meet again;” and this prophecy was soon fulfilled, for a few days afterwards Alexander died in Babylon.

I will quit the subject of dreams for awhile, and return to them presently. On the very night that Olympias was delivered of Alexander, the temple of Diana of the Ephesians was burned; and when the morning dawned, the Magi declared that the ruin and destroyer of Asia had been born that night. So much for the Magi and the Indians. Now let us return to dreams.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "But come now and let us return to foreign instances. Heraclides Ponticus, a man of learning, and both a pupil and a disciple of Plato's, relates a dream of the mother of Phalaris. She fell asleep and dreamed that, while looking at the consecrated images of the gods set up in her house, she saw the statue of Mercury pouring blood from a bowl which it held in its right hand and that the blood, as it touched the ground, welled up and completely filled the house. The truth of the dream was subsequently established by the inhuman cruelty of her son.

"Why need I bring forth from Dinon's Persian annals the dreams of that famous prince, Cyrus, and their interpretations by the magi? But take this instance: Once upon a time Cyrus dreamed that the sun was at his feet. Three times, so Dinon writes, he vainly tried to grasp it and each time it turned away, escaped him, and finally disappeared. He was told by the magi, who are classed as wise and learned men among the Persians, that his grasping for the sun three times portended that he would reign for thirty years. And thus it happened; for he lived to his seventieth year, having begun to reign at forty.

"It certainly must be true that even barbarians have some power of foreknowledge and of prophecy, if the following story of Callanus of India be true: As he was about to die and was ascending the funeral pyre, he said: 'What a glorious death! The fate of Hercules is mine. For when this mortal frame is burned the soul will find the light.' When Alexander directed him to speak if he wished to say anything to him, he answered: 'Thank you, nothing, except that I shall see you very soon.' So it turned out, for Alexander died in Babylon a few days later. I am getting slightly away from dreams, but I shall return to them in a moment. Everybody knows that on the same night in which Olympias was delivered of Alexander the temple of Diana at Ephesus was burned, and that the magi began to cry out as day was breaking: 'Asia's deadly curse was born last night.' But enough of Indians and magi.

Latin: [46] Age nunc ad externa redeamus. Matrem Phalaridis scribit Ponticus Heraclides, doctus vir, auditor et discipulus Platonis, visam esse videre in somnis simulacra deorum, quae ipsa domi consecravisset; ex iis Mercurium e patera, quam dextera manu teneret, sanguinem visum esse fundere; qui cum terram attigisset, refervescere videretur sic, ut tota domus sanguine redundaret. Quod matris somnium immanis filii crudelitas comprobavit. Quid ego, quae magi Cyro illi principi interpretati sint, ex Dinonis Persicis fibris proferam? Nam cum dormienti ei sol ad pedes visus esset, ter eum scribit frustra adpetivisse manibus, cum se convolvens sol elaberetur et abiret; ei magos dixisse, quod genus sapientium et doctorum habebatur in Persis, ex triplici adpetitione solis triginta annos Cyrum regnaturum esse portendi. Quod ita contigit; nam ad septuagesimum pervenit, cum quadraginta natus annos regnare coepisset. [47] Est profecto quiddam etiam in barbaris gentibus praesentiens atque divinans, siquidem ad mortem proficiscens Cafianus Indus, cum inscenderet in rogum ardentem, "O praeclarum discessum," inquit, "e vita, cum, ut Herculi contigit, mortali corpore cremato, in lucem animus excesserit!" Cumque Alexander eum rogaret, si quid vellet, ut diceret, "Optume," inquit; "propediem te videbo." Quod ita contigit; nam Babylone paucis post diebus Alexander est mortuus. Discedo parumper a somniis, ad quae mox revertar. Qua nocte templum Ephesiae Dianae deflagravit, eadem, constat ex Olympiade natum esse Alexandrum, atque, ubi lucere coepisset, clamitasse magos pestem ac perniciem Asiae proxuma nocte natam.

XXIV.

Cœlius relates that Hannibal, wishing to remove a golden column from the temple of Juno Lacinia, and not knowing whether it was solid gold or merely gilt, bored a hole in it; and as he had found it solid, he determined to take it away. But the following night Juno appeared to him in a dream, and warned him against doing so, and threatened him that if he did, she would take care that he should lose an eye with which he could see well. He was too prudent a man to neglect this threat; and therefore, of the gold which had been abstracted from the column in boring it, he made a little heifer, which he fixed on the capital.

And the same story is told in the Grecian history of Silenus, whom Cœlius follows. And he was an author who was particularly diligent in relating the exploits of Hannibal. He says that when Hannibal had taken Saguntum, he dreamed in his sleep that he was summoned to a council of the gods, and that when he arrived at it, Jupiter commanded him to carry the war into Italy, and one of the deities in council was appointed to be his conductor in the enterprise. He therefore began his march under the direction of this divine protector, who enjoined him not to look behind him. Hannibal, however, could not long keep in his obedience, but yielded to a great desire to look back, when he immediately beheld a huge and terrible monster, surrounded with serpents, which, wherever it advanced, destroyed all the trees, and shrubs, and buildings. He then, marvelling at this, inquired of the god what this monster might mean; and the god replied, that it signified the desolation of Italy; and commanded him to advance without delay, and not to concern himself with the evils that lay behind him and in his rear.

In the history of Agathocles it is said, that when Hamilcar the Carthaginian, when he was besieging Syracuse, dreamed that he heard a voice announcing to him, that he should sup on the succeeding day in Syracuse. When the morning dawned a great sedition arose in his camp between the Carthaginian and Sicilian soldiers. And when the Syracusans found this out, they made a vigorous sally and attacked the camp unexpectedly, and succeeded in making Hamilcar prisoner while alive, and thus his dream was verified. All history is full of similar accounts; and the experience of real life is equally rich in them.

That illustrious man, Publius Decius, the son of Quintus Decius, the first of the Decii who was a consul, being a military tribune in the consulship of Marcus Valerius and Aulus Cornelius, when our army was sorely pressed by the Samnites, and being accustomed to expose himself to great personal danger in battle, was warned to take greater care of himself; on which he replied (as our annals report), that he had had a dream, which informed him that he should die with the greatest glory, while engaged in the midst of the enemy. For that time he succeeded in happily rescuing his army from the perils that surrounded it. But three years after, when he was consul, he devoted himself to death for his country, and threw himself armed among the ranks of the Latins; by which gallant action the Latins were defeated and destroyed: and his death was so glorious that his son desired a similar fate.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "Let us go back to dreams. Coelius writes that Hannibal wished to carry off a golden column from Juno's temple at Lacinium, but since he was in doubt whether it was solid or plated, he bored into it. Finding it solid he decided to take it away. But at night Juno came to him in a vision and warned him not to do so, threatening that if he did she would cause the loss of his good eye. That clever man did not neglect the warning. Moreover out of the gold filings he ordered an image of a calf to be made and placed on top of the column. Another story of Hannibal is found in the history written in Greek by Silenus, whom Coelius follows: after his capture of Saguntum Hannibal dreamed that Jupiter summoned him to a council of the gods, and ordered him to carry the war into Italy under the guidance of one of the divine council, who cautioned him not to look back. Overcome by curiosity, he looked back and saw a horrible beast of enormous size, enveloped with snakes, and wherever it went it overthrew every tree and shrub and every house. The god replied that it was the desolation of Italy and ordered him to press right on.

"We read in a history by Agathocles that Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, during his siege of Syracuse heard a voice in his sleep telling him that he would dine the next day in Syracuse. At daybreak the following day a serious conflict broke out in his camp between the troops of the Carthaginians and their allies, the Siculi. When the Syracusans saw this they made a sudden assault on the camp and carried Hamilcar off alive. Thus the event verified the dream.

"History is full of such instances, and so is everyday life. And yet let me cite another: the famous Publius Decius, son of Quintus, and the first of that family to become consul, was military tribune while our army was being hard pressed by the Samnites. When, because of his rushing too boldly into the dangers of battle, he was advised to be more cautious, he replied, according to the annals, 'I dreamed that by dying in the midst of the enemy I should win immortal fame.' And though he was unharmed at that time and extricated the army from its difficulties, yet three years later, when consul, he devoted himself to death and rushed full-armed against the battle-line of the Latins. By this act of his the Latins were overcome and destroyed; and so glorious was his death that his son sought the same fate.

Latin: [48] Haec de Indis et magis; redeamus ad somnia. Hannibalem Coelius scribit, cum columnam auream, quae esset in fano Iunonis Laciniae, auferre vellet dubitaretque utrum ea solida esset an extrinsecus inaurata, perterebravisse, cumque solidam invenisset, statuisse tollere. Ei secundum quietem visam esse Iunonem praedicere ne id faceret, minarique, si fecisset, se curaturam ut eum quoque oculum, quo bene videret, amitteret; idque ab homine acuto non esso neglectum; itaque ex eo auro, quod exterebratum esset, buculam curasse faciendam et eam in summa columna conlocavisse. [49] Hoc item in Sileni, quem Coelius sequitur, Graeca historia est: Hannibalem, cum cepisset Saguntum, visum esse in somnis a Iove in deorum concilium vocari; quo cum venisset, Iovem imperavisse, ut Italiae bellum inferret, ducemque ei unum e concilio datum, quo illum utentem cum exercitu progredi coepisse; tum ei ducem illum praecepisse ne respiceret; illum autem id diutius facere non potuisse elatumque cupiditate respexisse; tum visam beluam vastam et immanem circumplicatam serpentibus, quacumque incederet, omnia arbusta, virgulta, tecta pervertere, et eum admiratum quaesisse de deo quodnam illud esset tale monstrum, et deum respondisse vastitatem esse Italiae praecepisseque ut pergeret protinus, quid retro atque a tergo fieret ne laboraret. [50] Apud Agathoclem scriptum in historia est Hamilcarem Karthaginiensem, cum oppugnaret Syracusas, visum esse audire vocem se postridie cenaturum Syracusis; cum autem is dies inluxisset, magnam seditionem in castris eius inter Poenos et Siculos milites esse factam; quod cum sensissent Syracusani, improviso eos in castra inrupisse Hamilcaremque ab iis vivum esse sublatum: ita res somnium comprobavit. Plena exemplorum est historia, tum referta vita communis. [51] At vero P. Decius ille Quinti filius, qui primus e Deciis consul fuit, cum esset tribunus militum M. Valerio A. Cornelio, consulibus, a Samnitibusque premeretur noster exercitus, cum pericula proeliorum iniret audacius monereturque, ut cautior esset, dixit, quod exstat in annalibus, sibi in somnis visum esse, cum in mediis hostibus versaretur, occidere cum maxuma gloria. Et tum quidem incolumis exercitum obsidione liberavit; post triennium autem, cum consul esset, devovit se et in aciem Latinorum inrupit armatus. Quo eius facto superati sunt et deleti Latini. Cuius mors ita gloriosa fuit, ut eandem concupisceret filius.

XXV.

But let us now come, if you please, to the dreams of philosophers. We read in Plato that Socrates, when he was in the public prison at Athens, said to his friend Crito that he should die in three days, for that he had seen in a dream a woman of extreme beauty who called him by his name, and quoted in his presence this verse of Homer —

On the third day you’ll reach the fruitful Pithia.

And it is said that it happened just as it had been foretold.

Again, what a man, and how great a man, was Xenophon the pupil of Socrates! He, too, in his account of that war in which he accompanied the younger Cyrus, relates the dreams which he saw, the accomplishment of which was marvellous. Shall we then say that Xenophon was a liar or dotard? What shall we say, too, of Aristotle, a man of singular and almost divine genius? Was he deceived or does he wish others to be deceived, when he informs us that Eudemus of Cyprus, his own intimate friend, on his way to Macedonia, came to Pheræ, a celebrated city of Thessaly, which was then under the cruel sway of the tyrant Alexander. In that town he was seized with a severe illness, so that he was given over by all the physicians, when he beheld in a dream a young man of extreme beauty, who informed him that in a short time he should recover, and also that the tyrant Alexander would die in a few days; and that Eudemus himself would, after five years’ absence, at length return home. Aristotle relates that the first two predictions of this dream were immediately accomplished; for Eudemus speedily recovered, and the tyrant perished at the hands of his wife’s brother; and that towards the end of the fifth year, when, in consequence of that dream, there was a hope that he would return into Cyprus from Sicily, they heard that he had been slain in a battle near Syracuse; from which it appeared that his dream was susceptible of being interpreted as meaning, that when it appeared that the soul of Eudemus had quitted his body, it would then appear to have signified the return home.

To the philosophers we may add the testimony of Sophocles, a most learned man, and as a poet quite divine, who, when a golden goblet of great weight had been stolen from the temple of Hercules, saw in a dream the god himself appearing to him, and declaring who was the robber. Sophocles paid no attention to this vision, though it was repeated more than once. When it had presented itself to him several times, he proceeded up to the court of Areopagus, and laid the matter before them. On this, the judges issued an order for the arrest of the offender nominated by Sophocles. On the application of the torture the criminal confessed his guilt, and restored the goblet; from which event this temple of Hercules was afterwards called the temple of Hercules the Indicator.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "But let us come now, if you please, to the dreams of philosophers. We read in Plato that Socrates, while in prison, said in a conversation with his friend Crito: 'I am to die in three days; for in a dream I saw a woman of rare beauty, who called me by name and quoted this verse from Homer.' And history informs us that his death occurred as he had foretold. That disciple of Socrates, Xenophon -- and what a man he was! -- records the dreams he had during his campaign with Cyrus the Younger, and their remarkable fulfillment. Shall we say that Xenophon is either a liar or a madman?

"And Aristotle, who was endowed with a matchless and almost godlike intellect, -- is he in error, or is he trying to lead others into error in the following account of his friend, Eudemus the Cyprian? Eudemus, while on his way to Macedonia, reached Pherae, then under the cruel sway of the tyrant Alexander. There he became so violently ill that the physicians despaired of his recovery. While sick he had a dream in which a youth of striking beauty told him that he would speedily get well; that the despot Alexander would die in a few days, and that he himself would return home five years later. The first two prophecies were immediately fulfilled; but at the end of five years, when, in reliance upon the dream, he hoped to return to Cyprus from Sicily, he was killed in battle before Syracuse. Accordingly the dream was interpreted to mean that when his soul left the body it then had returned home.

"To the testimony of philosophers let us add that of a most learned man and truly divine poet, Sophocles. A heavy gold dish having been stolen from the temple of Hercules, the god himself appeared to Sophocles in a dream and told who had committed the theft. But Sophocles ignored the dream a first and second time. When it came again and again, he went up to the Areopagus and laid the matter before the judges who ordered the man named by Sophocles to be arrested. The defendant after examination confessed his crime and brought back the dish. This is the reason why that temple is called 'the temple of Hercules the Informer.'

Latin: XXV [52] Sed, veniamus nunc, si placet, ad somnia philosophorum. Est apud Platonem Socrates, cum esset in custodia publica, dicens Critoni, suo familiari, sibi post tertium die esse moriendum; vidisse se in somnis pulchritudine eximia feminam, quae se nomine appellans diceret Homericum quendam eius modi versum: "Tertia te Phthiae tempestas laeta locabit." quod, ut est dictum, sic scribitur contigisse. Xenophon Socraticus (qui vir et quantus!) in ea militia qua cum Cyro minor perfunctus est sua scribit somnia, quorum eventus mirabile exstiterunt. [53] Mentiri Xenophontem an delirare dicemus? Quid, singolari vir ingenio Aristoteles et paene divino ipsene errat an alios vult errare, cum scribit Eudemum Cyprium familiarem suum, iter in Macedoniam facientem Pheras venisse, quae erat urbs in Thessalia tum admodum nobilis, ab Alexandro autem tyranno crudeli dominatu tenebatur; in igitur oppido ita graviter aegrum Eudemum fuisse, ut omne medici diffiderent; ei visum in quiete egregia facie iuvenem dicere fore ut perbrevi convalesceret, paucisque diebus interiturum Alexandrum tyrannum, ipsum autem Eudemum quinquennio post domum esse rediturum. Atque ita quidem prima statim scribit Aristoteles consecuta: et convaluisse Eudemum et ab uxoris fratribus interfectum tyrannum; quinto autem anno exeunte, cum esset spes ex illo somnio in Cyprum illum ex Sicilia esse rediturum, proeliantem eum ad Syracusas occidisse; ex quo ita illud somnium esse interpretatum, ut, cum animus Eudemi e corpore excesserit, tum domum revertisse videatur. [54] Adiungamus philosophis doctissimum hominem, poëtam quidem divinum, Sophoclem; qui, cum aede Herculis patera aurea gravis subrepta esset, in somni vidit ipsum deum dicentem qui id fecisset. Quod semel ille iterumque neglexit. Ubi idem saepius, ascendit in Ariu pagum, detulit rem; Areopagitae comprehendi iubent eum, qui a Sophocle erat nominatus; is quaestione adhibita confessus est pateramque rettulit. Quo facto fanum illud Indicis Herculis nominatum est.

XXVI.

But why do I continue to cite the Greeks? when, somehow or other, I feel more interest in the examples of my fellow-countrymen. All our historians, — the Fabii, the Gellii, and, more recently, Cœlius, bear witness to similar facts. In the Latin war, when they first celebrated the votive games in honour of the gods, the city was suddenly roused to arms, and the games being thus interrupted, it was necessary to appoint new ones. Before their commencement, however, just as the people had taken their places in the circus, a slave who had been beaten with rods was led through the circus, bearing a gibbet. After this event, a certain Roman rustic had a dream, in which an apparition informed him that he had been displeased with the president of the games, and the rustic was ordered to apprise the senate of that fact. He, however, did not dare to do so; on which the apparition appeared to him a second time, and warned him not to provoke him to exert his power. Even then he could not summon courage to obey, and presently his son died. After this, the same admonition was repeated in his dreams for the third time. Then the peasant himself became extremely ill, and related the cause of his trouble to his friends, by whose advice he was carried on a litter to the senate-house; and as soon as he had related his dreams to the senate, he recovered his health and strength, and returned home on foot perfectly cured. Thereupon, the truth of his dreams being admitted by the senate, it is related that these games were repeated a second time.

It is recorded in the history of the same Cœlius, that Caius Gracchus informed many persons that during the time he was soliciting the questorship, his brother Tiberius Gracchus appeared to him in a dream, and said to him, that he might delay as much as he pleased, but that nevertheless he was fated to die by the same death which he himself had suffered. Cœlius asserts that he heard this fact, and related it to many persons, before Caius Gracchus had become tribune of the people. And what can be more certain than such a dream as this?

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "But why am I dwelling on illustrations from Greek sources when -- though I can't explain it -- those from our own history please me more? Now here is a dream which is mentioned by all our historians, by the Fabii and the Gellii and, most recently, by Coelius: During the Latin War when the Great Votive Games were being celebrated for the first time the city was suddenly called to arms and the games were interrupted. Later it was determined to repeat them, but before they began a slave bearing a yoke was led about the circus and beaten with rods. After that a Roman rustic had a dream in which someone appeared to him and said that he disapproved of the leader of the games and ordered this statement to be reported to the Senate. But the rustic dared not do as he was bid. The order was repeated by the spectre with a warning not to put his power to the test. Not even then did the rustic dare obey. After that his son died and the same vision was repeated the third time. Thereupon he became ill and told his friends of his dream. On their advice he was carried to the Senate-house on a litter and, having related his dream to the Senate, his health was restored and he walked home unaided. And so, the tradition is, the Senate gave credence to the dream and had the games repeated.

"According to this same Coelius, Gaius Gracchus told many persons that his brother Tiberius came to him in a dream when he was a candidate for the quaestorship and said: 'However much you may try to defer your fate, nevertheless you must die the same death that I did.' This happened before Gaius was tribune of the people, and Coelius writes that he himself heard it from Gaius who had repeated it to many others. Can you find anything better authenticated than this dream?

Latin: XXVI [55] Sed quid ego Graecorum? Nescio quo modo me magis nostra delectant. Omnes hoc historici, Fabii, Gellii, se proxume Coelius: cum bello Latino ludi votivi maxumi primum fierent, civitas ad arma repente est excitata, itaque ludis intermissis instaurativi constituti sunt. Qui ante quam fierent, cumque iam populus consedisset, servus per circum cum virgis caederetur, furcam ferens ductus est. Exin cuidam rustico Romano dormienti visus est venire qui diceret praesulem sibi non placuisse ludis, idque ab eodem iussum esse eum senatui nuntiare; illum non esse ausum. Iterum esse idem iussum et monitum, ne vim suam experiri vellet; ne tu quidem esse ausum. Exin filium eius esse mortuum, eandem in somnis admonitionem fuisse tertiam. Tum illum etiam debilem factum rem ad amicos detulisse, quorum de sententia lecticula in curiam esse delatum, cumque senatui somnium enarravisset, pedibus suis salvum domum revertisse. Itaque somnio comprobato a senatu ludos illos iterum instauratos memoriae proditum est. [56] Gaius vero Gracchus multis dixit, ut scriptum apud eundem Coelium est, sibi in somnis quaesturam petenti Tiberium fratrem visum esse dicere, quam vellet cunctaretur, tamen eodem sibi leto, quo ipse interisset, esse pereundum. Hoc, ante quam tribunus plebi C. Gracchus factus esset, et se audisse scribit Coelius et dixisse multis. Quo somnio quid inveniri potest certius?

XXVII.

Who, again, can despise those two dreams, which are so frequently dwelt upon by the Stoics? — one concerning Simonides, who, having found the dead body of a man who was a stranger to him lying in the road, buried it. Having performed this office, he was about to embark in a ship, when the man whom he had buried appeared to him in a dream at night, and warned him not to undertake the voyage, for that if he did he would perish by shipwreck. Therefore, he returned home again, but all the other people who sailed in that vessel were lost.

The other dream, which is a very celebrated one, is related in the following manner: — Two Arcadians, who were intimate friends, were travelling together, and arriving at Megara, one of them took up his quarters at an inn, the other at a friend’s house. After supper, when they had both gone to bed, the Arcadian, who was staying at his friend’s house, saw an apparition of his fellow-traveller at the inn, who prayed him to come to his assistance immediately, as the innkeeper was going to murder him. Alarmed at this intimation, he started from his sleep; but on recollection, thinking it nothing but an idle dream, he lay down again. Presently, the apparition appeared to him again in his sleep, and entreated him, though he would not come to his assistance while yet alive, at least not to leave his death unavenged. He told him further, that the innkeeper had first murdered him, and then cast him into a dungcart, where he lay covered with filth; and begged him to go early to the gate of the town, before any cart could leave the town. Much excited by this second vision, he went early next morning to the gate of the town, and met with the driver of the cart, and asked him what he had in his waggon. The driver, upon this question, ran away in a fright. The dead body was then discovered, and the innkeeper, the evidence being clear against him, was brought to punishment.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "And who, pray, can make light of the two following dreams which are so often recounted by Stoic writers? The first one is about Simonides, who once saw the dead body of some unknown man lying exposed and buried it. Later, when he had it in mind to go on board a ship he was warned in a vision by the person to whom he had given burial not to do so and that if he did he would perish in a shipwreck. Therefore he turned back and all the others who sailed were lost.

"The second dream is very well known and is to this effect: Two friends from Arcadia who were taking a journey together came to Megara, and one traveller put up at an inn and the second went to the home of a friend. After they had eaten supper and retired, the second traveller, in the dead of the night, dreamed that his companion was imploring him to come to his aid, as the innkeeper was planning to kill him. Greatly frightened at first by the dream he arose, and later, regaining his composure, decided that there was nothing to worry about and went back to bed. When he had gone to sleep the same person appeared to him and said: 'Since you would not help me when I was alive, I beg that you will not allow my dead body to remain unburied. I have been killed by the innkeeper, who has thrown my body into a cart and covered it with dung. I pray you to be at the city gate in the morning before the cart leaves the town.' Thoroughly convinced by the second dream he met the cart-driver at the gate in the morning, and, when he asked what he had in the cart, the driver fled in terror. The Arcadian then removed his friend's dead body from the cart, made complaint of the crime to the authorities, and the innkeeper was punished. What stronger proof of a divinely inspired dream than this can be given?

Latin: XXVII Quid? illa duo somnia, quae creberrume commemorantur a Stoicis, quis tandem potest contemnere? Unum de Simonide: qui, cum ignotum quendam proiectum mortuum vidisset eumque humavisset haberetque in animo nave conscendere, moneri visus est, ne id faceret, ab eo quem sepultura adfecerat; si navigavisset, eum naufragio esse periturum; itaque Simonidem redisse, perisse ceteros, qui tum navigassent. [57] Alterum ita traditum clarum admodum somnium: cum duo quidam Arcades familiares iter una facerent et Megaram venissent, alterum ad cauponem devertisse, ad hospitem alterum. Qui ut cenati quiescerent, concubia nocte visum esse in somnis ei qui erat in hospitio illum alterum orare ut subveniret, quod sibi a caupone interitus pararetur; eum primo, perterritum somnio, surrexisse; dein, cum se conlegisset idque visum pro nihilo habendum esse duxisset, recubuisse; tum ei dormienti eundem illum visum esse rogare, ut, quoniam sibi vivo non subvenisset, mortem suam ne inultam esse pateretur; se interfectum in plaustrum a caupone esse coniectum et supra stercus iniectum; petere, ut mane ad portam adesset, prius quam plaustrum ex oppido exiret. Hoc vero eum somnio commotum mane bubulco praesto ad portam fuisse, quaesisse ex eo, quid esset in plaustro; illum perterritum fugisse, mortuum erutum esse, cauponem re patefacta, poenas dedisse. Quid hoc somnio dici potest divinius?

XXVIII.

What can be more akin to divination than such a dream as this?

But why do I relate any more ancient instances of similar things, when such dreams have occurred to ourselves? for I have often told you mine, and I have as often heard you talk of yours.

When I was proconsul in Asia, it appeared to me as I slept, that I saw you riding on horseback till you reached the banks of a great river, and that you were suddenly thrown off and precipitated into the waters, and so disappeared. At this I trembled exceedingly, being overcome with fear and apprehension. But suddenly you reappeared before me with a joyful countenance, and, with the same horse, ascended the opposite bank, and then we embraced each other. It is easy to conjecture the signification of such a dream as this; and hence the learned interpreters of Asia predicted to me that those events would take place which afterwards did come to pass.

I now come to your own dream, which I have sometimes heard from yourself, but more often from our friend Sallust. He used to say, that in that flight and exile of yours, which was so glorious for you, so calamitous for our country, you stayed awhile in a certain villa of the territory of Atina, when, having sat up a great part of the night, you fell into a deep and heavy slumber towards the morning. And from this slumber your attendants would not awake you, as you had given orders that you were not to be disturbed, though your journey was sufficiently urgent.

When at length you awoke about the second hour of the day, you related to Sallust the following dream: — That it had seemed to you, as you were wandering sorrowfully through some solitary district, Caius Marius appeared to you with his fasces covered with laurel, and asked you why you were afflicted. And when you informed him that you had been driven from your country by the violence of the disaffected, he seized your right hand, and urged you to be of good cheer, and ordered the lictor nearest to him to lead you to his monument, saying, that there you should find security. Sallust told me, that upon hearing this dream, he himself exclaimed at once that your return would be speedy and glorious; and that you also appeared to be delighted with your dream. A short time afterwards I was informed, as you well know, that it was in the monument of Marius that, on the instance of that excellent and famous consul Lentulus, that most honourable decree of the senate was passed for your recall, which was applauded with shouts of incredible exultation in a very full assembly; so that, as you yourself observed, no dream could have a higher character of divination than this which occurred to you at Atina.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "But why go on seeking illustrations from ancient history? I had a dream which I have often related to you, and you one which you have often told to me. When I was governor of Asia I dreamed that I saw you on horseback riding toward the bank of some large river, when you suddenly plunged forward, fell into the stream, and wholly disappeared from sight. I was greatly alarmed and trembled with fear. But in a moment you reappeared mounted on the same horse, and with a cheerful countenance ascended the opposite bank where we met and embraced each other. The meaning of the dream was readily explained to me by experts in Asia who from it predicted those events which subsequently occurred.

"I come now to your dream. I heard it, of course, from you, but more frequently from our Sallustius. In the course of your banishment, which was glorious for us but disastrous to the State, you stopped for the night at a certain country-house in the plain of Atina. After lying awake most of the night, finally, about daybreak, you fell into a very profound sleep, and Sallustius gave instructions to maintain quiet and would not permit you to be disturbed. But you awoke about the second hour and related your dream to him. In it you seemed to be wandering sadly about in solitary places when Gaius Marius, with his fasces wreathed in laurel, asked you why you were sad, and you replied that you had been driven from your country by violence. He then bade you be of good cheer, took you by the right hand, and delivered you to the nearest lictor to be conducted to his memorial temple, saying that there you should find safety. Sallustius thereupon, as he relates, cried out, 'a speedy and a glorious return awaits you.' He further states that you too seemed delighted at the dream. Immediately thereafter it was reported to me that as soon as you heard that it was in Marius' temple that the glorious decree of the Senate for your recall had been enacted, and that the decree had been greeted by unprecedented shouts of approval in a densely crowded theatre, you said that no stronger proof could be given of a divinely inspired dream than this.

Latin: XXVIII [58] Sed quid aut plura aut vetera quaerimus? Saepe tibi meum narravi, saepe ex te audivi tuum somnium: me, cum Asiae pro consule praeessem, vidisse in quiete, cum tu, equo advectus ad quandam magni fluminis ripam, provectus subito atque delapsus in flumen nusquam apparuisses, me contremuisse timore perterritum; tum te repente laetum exstitisse eodemque equo adversam ascendisse ripam, nosque inter nos esse complexos. Facilis coniectura huius somnii, mihique a peritis in Asia praedictum est fore eos eventus rerum qui acciderunt. [59] Venio nunc ad tuum. Audivi equidem ex te ipso, sed mihi saepius noster Sallustius narravit, cum in illa fuga nobis gloriosa, patriae calamitosa in villa quadam campi Atinatis maneres magnamque partem noctis vigilasses, ad lucem denique arte dormitare coepisse; itaque, quamquam iter instaret, tamen silentium fieri iussisse neque esse passum te excitari; cum autem experrectus esses hora secunda fere, te sibi somnium narravisse: visum tibi esse, cum in locis solis maestus errares, C. Marium cum fascibus laureatis quaerere ex te quid tristis esses, cumque te tu patria vi pulsum esse dixisses, prehendisse eum dextram tuam et bono animo te iussisse esse lictorique proxumo tradidisse ut te in monumentum suum deduceret, et dixisse in eo tibi salutem fore. Tum et se exclamasse Sallustius narrat reditum tibi celerem et gloriosum paratum, et te ipsum visum somnio delectari. Nam illud mihi ipsi celeriter nuntiatum est, ut audivisses in monumento Mari de tuo reditu magnificentissumum illud senatus consultum esse factum, referente optumo et clarissumo viro consule, idque frequentissimo theatro incredibili clamore et plausu comprobatum, dixisse te nihil illo Atinati somnio fieri posse divinius.

XXIX.

But you will say that there are likewise many false dreams. No doubt there are some which are perhaps obscure to us; but, even allow that there are some which are actually false, what argument is that against those which are true? — of which, indeed, there would be a great many more if we went to bed in perfect health; but as it is, from our being overcharged with wine and luxuries, all our perceptions are troubled and confused. Consider what Socrates, in the Republic of Plato, says on this subject.

“When,” says he, “that part of the soul which is capable of intelligence and reason is subdued or reduced to languor, that part in which there is a species of ferocity and uncivilized savageness being excited by immoderate eating and drinking, exults in our sleep and wantons about unrestrainedly; and therefore all kinds of visions present themselves to it, such as are destitute of all sense or reason, in which we appear to be giving ourselves up to incest and all kinds of bestiality, or to be committing bloody murders, and massacres, and all kinds of execrable deeds, with a triumphant defiance of all prudence and decency. But in the case of a man who is accustomed to a sober and regular life, when he commits himself to sleep, then that part of his soul which is the seat of intellect and reason is still active and awake, being replenished with a banquet of virtuous thoughts; and that portion which is nourished by pleasure, is neither destroyed by exhaustion nor swollen by satiety, either of which is accustomed to impair the vigour of the soul, whether nature is deficient in anything, or super-abundant or overstocked; and that third division also, in which the vehemence of anger is situated, is lulled and restrained; so, consequently, it happens, that owing to the due regulation of the two more violent portions of the soul, the third, or intellectual part, shines forth conspicuously, and is fresh and active for the admission of dreams; and therefore the visions of sleep which present themselves before it are tranquil and true.”

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: " 'Ah,' it is objected, 'but many dreams are untrustworthy.' Rather, perhaps, their meaning is hidden from us. But grant that some are untrustworthy, why do we declaim against those that are trustworthy? The fact is the latter would be much more frequent if we went to our rest in proper condition. But when we are burdened with food and drink our dreams are troubled and confused. Observe what Socrates says in Plato's Republic:

" 'When a man goes to sleep, having the thinking and reasoning portion of his soul languid and inert, but having that other portion, which has in it a certain brutishness and wild savagery, immoderately gorged with drink and food, then does that latter portion leap up and hurl itself about in sleep without check. In such a case every vision presented to the mind is so devoid of thought and reason that the sleeper dreams that he is committing incest with his mother, or that he is having unlawful commerce indiscriminately with gods and men, and frequently too, with beasts; or even that he is killing someone and staining his hands with impious bloodshed; and that he is doing many vile and hideous things recklessly and without shame. But, on the other hand, when the man, whose habits of living and of eating are wholesome and temperate, surrenders himself to sleep, having the thinking and reasoning portion of his soul eager and erect, and satisfied by a feast of noble thoughts, and having that portion which feeds on carnal pleasures neither utterly exhausted by abstinence nor cloyed by over-indulgence -- for, as a rule, the edge of thought is dulled whether nature is starved or overfed -- and, when such a man, in addition, has that third portion of the soul, in which the fire of anger burns, quieted and subdued -- thus having the two irrational portions under complete control -- then will the thinking and reasoning portion of his soul shine forth and show itself keen and strong for dreaming and then will his dreams be peaceful and worthy of trust.' I have reproduced Plato's very words.

Latin: [60] "At multa falsa," Immo obscura fortasse nobis. Sed sint falsa quaedam; contra vera quid dicimus? Quae quidem multo plura evenirent, si ad quietem integrì iremus. Nunc onusti cibo et vino perturbata et confusa cernimus. Vide quid Socrates in Platonis Politia loquatur. Dicit enim cum dormientibus ea pars animi quae mentis et rationis sit particeps sopita langueat, illa autem in qua feritas quaedam sit atque agrestis immanitas cum sit immoderato obstupefacta potu atque pastu, exsultare eam in somno immoderateque iactari. "Itaque huic omnia visa obiciuntur a mente ac ratione vacua, ut aut cum matre corpus miscere videatur aut cum quovis alio vel nomine vel deo, saepe belua, atque etiam trucidare aliquem et impie cruentari multaque facere impure atque taetre cum temeritate et impudentia. [61] At qui salubri et moderato cultu atque victu quieti se tradiderit ea parte animi quae mentis et consilii est agitàta et erecta saturataque bonarum cogitationum epulis, eaque parte animi quae voluptate alitur nec inopia eneeta nec satietate adfluenti (quorum utrumque praestringere aciem mentis solet, sive deest naturae quippiam, sive abundat atque adfluit), illa etiam tertia parte animi, in qua irarum exsistit ardor, sedata atque restincta, tum eveniet, duabus animi temerariis partibus compressis, ut illa tertia pars rationis et mentis eluceat et se vegetam ad somniandum acremque praebeat: tum ei visa quietis occurrent tranquilla atque veracia." Haec verba ipsa Platonis expressi.

XXX.

Such are the very words of Plato. Shall we, then, prefer listening to the doctrine of Epicurus on this point? As for Carneades, he sometimes says one thing and sometimes another, from his mere fondness for discussion. And yet, what are the sentiments which he utters? At all events, they are never expressed either with elegance or propriety. And will you prefer such a man as this to Plato and Socrates? men who, even if they were to give no reason for their tenets, should, by the mere authority of their names, outweigh these minute philosophers.

Plato then asserts that we should bring our bodies into such a disposition before we go to sleep as to leave nothing which may occasion error or perturbation in our dreams. For this reason, perhaps, Pythagoras laid it down as a rule, that his disciples should not eat beans, because this food is very flatulent, and contrary to that tranquillity of mind which a truth-seeking spirit should possess.

When, therefore, the mind is thus separated from the society and contagion of the body, it recollects things past, examines things present, and anticipates things to come. For the body of one who is asleep lies like that of one who is dead, while the spirit is full of vitality and vigour. And it will be yet more so after death, when it will have got rid of the body altogether; and therefore as it becomes much more divine on the approach of death it becomes much more divine. For it often happens that those who are attacked by a severe and mortal malady, foresee that their death is at hand. And in this state they often behold ghosts and phantoms of the dead. Then they are more than ever anxious about their reputations; and they who have lived otherwise than as they ought, then most especially repent of their sins.

And that the dying are often possessed of the gift of divination, Posidonius confirms by that notorious example of a certain Rhodian who, being on his death-bed, named six of his contemporaries, saying which of them would die first, which second, which next to him, and so on.

There are, as he imagines, besides this, three ways in which men dream under the immediate impulse of the Gods: one, the mind intuitively perceives things by the relation which it bears to the air being full of immortal spirits, in all whom the signs of truth are, as it were, stamped and visible; the third, when the Gods themselves converse with sleepers, — and that, as I have said before, takes place more especially at the approach of death, enabling the minds of the dying to anticipate future events. An instance of this is the prediction of Calanus, of whom I have already spoken. Another is that of Hector, in Homer, who, when dying himself, foretels the approaching death of Achilles.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "Then shall we listen to Epicurus rather than to Plato? As for Carneades, in his ardour for controversy he asserts this and now that. 'But,' you retort, 'Epicurus says what he thinks.' But he thinks nothing that is ever well reasoned, or worthy of a philosopher. Will you, then, put this man before Plato or Socrates, who though they gave no reason, would yet prevail over these petty philosophers by the mere weight of their name? Now Plato's advice to us is to set out for the land of dreams with bodies so prepared that no error or confusion may assail the soul. For this reason, it is thought, the Pythagoreans were forbidden to indulge in beans; for that food produces great flatulence and induces a condition at war with a soul in search for truth. When, therefore, the soul has been withdrawn by sleep from contact with sensual ties, then does it recall the past, comprehend the present, and foresee the future. For though the sleeping body then lies as if it were dead, yet the soul is alive and strong, and will be much more so after death when it is wholly free of the body. Hence its power to divine is much enhanced by the approach of death. For example, those in the grasp of a serious and fatal sickness realize the fact that death impends; and so, visions of dead men generally appear to them and then their desire for fame is strongest; while those who have lived otherwise than as they should, feel, at such a time, the keenest sorrow for their sins.

Moreover, proof of the power of dying men to prophesy is also given by Posidonius in his well-known account of a certain Rhodian, who, when on his death-bed, named six men of equal age and foretold which of them would die first, which second, and so on. Now Posidonius holds the view that there are three ways in which men dream as the result of divine impulse: first, the soul is clairvoyant of itself because of its kinship with the gods; second, the air is full of immortal souls, already clearly stamped, as it were, with the marks of truth; and third, the gods in person converse with men when they are asleep. And, as I said just now, it is when death is at hand that men most readily discern signs of the future. This is illustrated by the story which I related about Callanus and by Homer's account of Hector, who, as he was dying, prophesied the early death of Achilles.

Latin: [62] Epicurum igitur audiemus potius? Namque Carneades concertationis studio modo ait hoc, modo illud; at ille quod sentit: sentit autem nihil umquam elegans, nihil decorum. Hunc ergo antepones Platoni et Socrati? Qui ut rationem non redderent, auctoritate tamen hos minutos philosophos vincerent. Iubet igitur Plato sic ad somnum proficisci corporibus adfectis, ut nihil sit, quod errorem animis perturbationemque adferat. Ex quo etiam Pythagoreis interdictum putatur, ne faba vescerentur, quod habet infiationem magnam is cibus tranquillitati mentis quaerenti vera contrariam. [63] Cum ergo est somno sevocatus animus a societate et a contagione corporis, tum meminit praeteritorum, praesentia cernit, futura providet; iacet enim corpus dormientis ut mortui, viget autem et vivit animus. Quod multo magis faciet post mortem, cum omnino corpore excesserit. Itaque adpropinquante morte multo est divinior. Nam et id ipsum vident, qui sunt morbo gravi et mortifero adfecti, instare mortem; itaque iis occurrunt plerumque imagines mortuorum, tumque vel maxume laudi student, eosque, qui secus quam decuit vixerunt, peccatorum suorum tum maxume paenitet. [64] Divinare autem morientes illo etiam exemplo confirmat Posidonius, quod adfert, Rhodium quendam morientem sex aequales nominasse et dixisse, qui primus eorum, qui secundus, qui deinde deinceps moriturus esset. Sed tribus modis censet deorum adpulsu homines somniare: uno, quod provideat animus ipse per sese, quippe qui deorum cognatione teneatur; altero, quod plenus aer sit immortalium animorum, in quibus tamquam insignitae notae veritatis appareant; tertio, quod ipsi di cum dormientibus conloquantur. ldque, ut modo dixi, facilius evenit adpropinquante morte, ut animi futura augurentur. [65] Ex quo et illud est Calliani, de quo ante dixi, et Homerici Hectoris, qui moriens propinquam Achilli mortem denuntiat.

XXXI.

If there were no such thing as divination, Plautus would not have been so much applauded for the following line —

My mind presaged (praesagibat), when I first went out, That I was going on a fruitless journey; —

for the verb sagio means, to feel shrewdly. Hence old women are sometimes called sagæ (witches), because they are ambitious of knowing many things; and dogs are called sagacious. Whoever, therefore, sagit (knows) before the event has come to pass, is said prægsagire (to have the power of knowing the future beforehand).

There exists, therefore, in the mind, a presentiment, which strikes the soul from without, and which is enclosed in the soul by divine operation. If this becomes very vivid, it is termed frenzy, as happens when the soul, being abstracted from the body, is stirred up by a divine inspiration.

What sudden transport fires my virgin soul! My mother, oh, my mother! — dearest name Of all dear names! But oh, my breast is full Of divination and impending fates, While dread Apollo with his mighty impulse Urges me onward. Sisters, my sweet sisters! Of our most royal parents. You are all More filial and more dutiful than I. I only am enjoin’d this cruel task, To utter imminent ruin. You deserve them; I injure them; and your obedience Shines well, set-off by my disloyal rage.

O what a tender, moral, and delicate poem! though the beauty of it does not affect the question. What I wish to prove is, that frenzy often predicts what is true and real.

I see the blazing torch of Troy’s last doom, Fire, and massacre, and death. Arm, citizens! Bring aid and quench the flames.

In the following lines, it is not so much Cassandra who speaks, as the Deity enclosed in human form —

Already is the fleet prepared to sail; It bears destruction — rapidly it speeds: A dreadful army traverses the shores, Destined to slaughter.

I seem to be doing nothing but quoting tragedies and fables.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: It is clear that, in our ordinary speech, we should not have made such frequent use of the word praesagire, meaning "to sense in advance, or to presage," if the power of presaging had been wholly non-existent. An illustration of its use is seen in the following well-known line from Plautus:

My soul presaged as I left home that my leaving was in vain.

Now sagire means "to have a keen perception." Accordingly certain old women are called sagae, because they are assumed to know a great deal, and dogs are said to be "sagacious." And so one who has knowledge of a thing before it happens is said to "presage," that is, to perceive the future in advance.

Therefore the human soul has an inherent power of presaging or of foreknowing infused into it from without, and made a part of it by the will of God. If that power is abnormally developed, it is called "frenzy" or "inspiration," which occurs when the soul withdraws itself from the body and is violently stimulated by a divine impulse, as in the following instance, where Hecuba says to Cassandra:

But why those flaming eyes, that sudden rage? And whither fled that sober modesty, till now so maidenly and yet so wise?

and Cassandra answers:

O mother, noblest of thy noble sex! I have been sent to utter prophecies: against my will Apollo drives me mad to revelation make of future ills. O virgins! comrades of my youthful hours, my mission shames my father, best of men. O mother dear! great loathing for myself and grief for thee I feel. For thou hast borne to Priam goodly issue -- saving me, 'tis sad that unto thee the rest bring weal, I woe; that they obey, but I oppose.

What a tender and pathetic poem, and how suitable to her character! though it is not altogether relevant, I admit. However, the point which I wish to press, that true prophecies are made during frenzy, has found expression in the following lines:

It comes! it comes! that bloody torch, in fire enwrapped, though hid from sight these many years! Bring aid, my countrymen, and quench its flames!

It is not Cassandra who next speaks, but a god in human form:

Already, on the mighty deep is built a navy swift that hastes with swarms of woe, its ships are drawing nigh with swelling sails, and bands of savage men will fill our shores.

Latin: [66] Etenim tam multa a nostris scriptoribus, item a Graecis Sicilis geruntur, ut sagire sensu acuto fuisse, sic hominem non solum "sagire" verbum et "sagae" anus, quia multa scire vellent, dictae, et "canes sagaces." Igitur is qui ante sagit quam oblata res est, dicitur praesagire, id est futura ante sentire.

[67] Est igitur animi natura et propria vis; quae si extrinsecus infusa, si a divina mente animorum tracta, si insita et a natura ipsa hausta est, indissolubile est id ei cum quo est copulata; qua ex re, cum evolet immortalis, si ita evenit, praeclare, sin autem, ut mortali corpori adhaeret, tamen deus ille, quicumque est, qui in eo tenet mentem, membra corporis in usus rerum idoneos habet.

XXXII.

I would mention a story I have heard from yourself, and that not an imaginary, but a real circumstance, and closely related to our present discussion. Caius Coponius, a skilful general, and a man of the highest character for learning and wisdom, who commanded the fleet of the Rhodians, with the appointment of prætor, came to you at Dyrrhachium, and informed you that a certain sailor in a Rhodian galley had predicted that, in less than a month, Greece would be deluged with blood, that Dyrrhachium would be pillaged, that the people would flee and take to their ships; that, looking back in their flight, they would see a terrible conflagration. He added, moreover, that the fleet of the Rhodians would soon return, and retire to Rhodes. You told me that you yourself were surprised at this intelligence, and that Marcus Varro and Marcus Cato, both men of great learning, who were with you, were exceedingly alarmed. A few days afterwards, Labienus, having escaped from the battle of Pharsalia, arrived and brought an account of the defeat of the army: and the rest of the prediction was soon accomplished; for the corn was dragged out of the granaries, and strewed about all the streets and alleys, and destroyed. You all embarked on board the ships in haste and alarm; and at night, when you looked back towards the town, you beheld the barges on fire, which were burned by the soldiers because they would not follow. At last you were deserted by the fleet of the Rhodians, and then you found that the prophet had been a true one.

I have explained as concisely as possible the forewarnings of dreams and frenzy, with which I said that art had nothing to do; for both these kinds of prediction arise from the same cause, which our friend Cratippus adopts as the true explanation—namely, that the souls of men are partly inspired and agitated from without. By which he meant to say, that there is in the exterior world a sort of divine soul, whence the human soul is derived; and that that portion of the human soul which is the fountain of sensation, motion, and appetite, is not separate from the action of the body; but that portion which partakes of reason and intelligence is then most energetic, when it is most completely abstracted from the body.

Therefore, after having recounted verifiable instances of presentiments and dreams, Cratippus used to sum up his conclusions in this manner: — “If,” he would say, “the existence of the eyes is necessary to the existence and operation of the function of sight, though the eyes may not be always exercising that function, still he who has once made use of his eyes so as to see correctly, is possessed of eyes capable of the sensation of correct sight: just so if the function and gift of divination cannot exist without the exercise of divination, and yet a man who has this gift may sometimes err in its exercise, and not foresee correctly; then it is sufficient to prove the existence of divination, that some event should have been once so correctly divined that none of its circumstances appear to have happened fortuitously. And as a multitude of such events have occurred, the existence of divination ought not to be doubted.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "I seem to be relying for illustrations on myths drawn from tragic poets. But you yourself are my authority for an instance of the same nature, and yet it is not fiction but a real occurrence. Gaius Coponius, a man of unusual capacity and learning, came to you at Dyrrachium while he, as praetor, was in command of the Rhodian fleet, and told you of a prediction made by a certain oarsman from one of the Rhodian quinqueremes. The prediction was that in less than thirty days Greece would be bathed in blood; Dyrrachium would be pillaged; its defenders would flee to their ships and, as they fled, would see behind them the unhappy spectacle of a great conflagration; but the Rhodian fleet would have a quick passage home. This story gave you some concern, and it caused very great alarm to those cultured men, Marcus Varro and Marcus Cato, who were at Dyrrachium at the time. In fact, a few days later Labienus reached Dyrrachium in flight from Pharsalus, with the news of the loss of the army. The rest of the prophecy was soon fulfilled. For the granaries were pillaged and their contents scattered and strewn all about the streets and alleys. You and your companions, in great alarm, suddenly embarked, and as you looked back at night towards town you saw the flames of the merchant ships, which the soldiers (not wishing to follow) had set on fire. Finally, when your party had been deserted by the Rhodian fleet you realized that the prophecy had been fulfilled.

"As briefly as I could, I have discussed divination by means of dreams and frenzy, which, as I said, are devoid of art. Both depend on the same reasoning, which is that habitually employed by our friend Cratippus: "The human soul is in some degree derived and drawn from a source exterior to itself. Hence we understand that outside the human soul there is a divine soul from which the human soul is sprung. Moreover, that portion of the human soul which is endowed with sensation, motion, and carnal desire is inseparable from bodily influence; while that portion which thinks and reasons is most vigorous when it is most distant from the body."

And so, after giving examples of true prophecies through frenzy and dreams, Cratippus usually concludes his argument in this way: "Though without eyes it is impossible to perform the act and function of sight, and though the eyes sometimes cannot perform their appointed function, yet when a person has even once so employed his eyes as to see things as they are, he has a realization of what correct vision is. Likewise, therefore, although without the power of divination it is impossible for the act and function of divining to exist, and though one with that power may sometimes be mistaken and may make erroneous prophecies, yet it is enough to establish the existence of divination that a single event has been so clearly foretold as to exclude the hypothesis of chance. But there are many such instances; therefore, the existence of divination must be conceded."

Latin: [68] Tragoedias loqui videor et fabulas. At ex te ipso non commenticiam rem, sed factam eiusdem generis audivi: C. Coponium ad te venisse Dyrrachium, cum praetorio imperio classi Rhodiae praeesset, cum primo hominem prudentem atque doctum, eumque dixisse remigem quendam e quinqueremi Rhodiorum vaticinatum madefactum iri minus xxx diebus Graeciam sanguine, rapinas Dyrrachii et conscensionem in naves cum fuga fugientibusque miserabilem respectum incendiorum fore; sed Rhodiorum classi propinquum reditum ac domum itionem dari. Tum neque te ipsum non esse commotum Marcumque Varronem et M. Catonem, qui tum ibi erant, doctos homines, vehementer esse perterritos. Paucis sane post diebus ex Pharsalia fuga venisse Labienum; qui cum interitum exercitus nuntiavisset, reliqua vaticinationis brevi esse confecta. [69] Nam et ex horreis direptum effusumque frumentum vias omnis angiportusque constraverat, et naves subito perterriti metu conscendistis et noctu ad oppidum respicientes flagrantis onerarias, quas incenderant milites quia sequi noluerant, videbatis; postremo a Rhodia classe deserti verum vatem fuisse sensistis.

[70] Exposui quam brevissime potui somnii et furoris oracla, quae carere arte dixeram. Quorum amborum generum una ratio est, qua Cratippus noster uti solet, animos hominum quadam ex parte extrinsecus esse tractos et haustos (ex quo intellegitur esse extra divinum animum, humanus unde ducatur), humani autem animi eam partem, quae sensum, quae motum, quae adpetitum habeat, non esse ab actione corporis seiugatam; quae autem pars animi rationis atque intellegentiae sit particeps, eam tum maxume vigere, cum plurimum absit a corpore. [71] Itaque expositis exemplis verarum vaticinationum et somniorum Cratippus solet rationem concludere hoc modo: "Si sine oculis non potest exstare officium et munus oculorum, possunt autem aliquando oculi non fungi suo munere, qui vel semel ita est usus oculis, ut vera cerneret, is habet sensum oculorum vera cernentium. Item igitur, si sine divinatione non potest et officium et munus divinationis exstare, potest autem quis, cum divinationem habeat, errare aliquando nec vera cernere, satis est ad confirmandam divinationem semel aliquid esse ita divinatum, ut nihil fortuito cecidisse videatur. Sunt autem eius generis innumerabilia; esse igitur divinationem confitendum est."

XXXIII.

But as to those divinations which are explained by conjecture, or by the observation of events; these, as I have said before, are not of the natural, but artificial order; in which artificial class we place the haruspices and augurs and interpreters. These are discredited by the Peripatetics, and defended by the Stoics. Some of them are established by certain monuments and systems, as is evident from the ritual books of the ancient Etruscans respecting electrical interpretation of the omens conveyed by the entrails of victims and by lightning, and by our own books on the discipline of the augurs. Other divinations are explained by conjecture, without reference to any written authorities; such as the prophecy of Calchas in Homer, who, by a certain number of flying sparrows, predicted the number of years which would be occupied in the siege of Troy; and as an event which we read recorded in the history of Sylla, which happened under your own eyes. For when Sylla was in the territory of Nola, and was sacrificing in front of his tent, a serpent suddenly glided out from beneath the altar; and when, upon this, the soothsayer Posthumius exhorted him to give orders for the immediate march of the army, Sylla obeyed the injunction, and entirely defeated the Samnites, who lay before Nola, and took possession of their richly-provided camp.

It was by this kind of conjectural divination that the fortune of the tyrant Dionysius was announced a little before the commencement of his reign; for when he was travelling in the territory of Leontini, he dismounted and drove his horse into a river; but the horse was carried away by the current, and Dionysius, not being able with all his efforts to extricate him, departed, as Philistus reports, lamenting his loss. Some time afterwards, as he was journeying further down the river, he suddenly heard a neighing, and to his great joy found his horse in very comfortable condition, with a swarm of bees hanging on his mane. And this prodigy intimated the event which took place a few days after this, when Dionysius was called to the throne.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "But those methods of divination which are dependent on conjecture, or on deductions from events previously observed and recorded, are, as I have said before, not natural, but artificial, and include the inspection of entrails, augury, and the interpretation of dreams. These are disapproved of by the Peripatetics and defended by the Stoics. Some are based upon records and usage, as is evident from the Etruscan books on divination by means of inspection of entrails and by means of thunder and lightning, and as is also evident from the books of your augural college; while others are dependent on conjecture made suddenly and on the spur of the moment. An instance of the latter kind is that of Calchas in Homer, prophesying the number of years of the Trojan War from the number of sparrows. We find another illustration of conjectural divination in the history of Sulla in an occurrence which you witnessed. While he was offering sacrifices in front of his head-quarters in the Nolan district a snake suddenly came out from beneath the altar. The soothsayer, Gaius Postumius, begged Sulla to proceed with his march at once. Sulla did so and captured the strongly fortified camp of the Samnites which lay in front of the town of Nola.

"Still another instance of conjectural divination occurred in the case of Dionysius, a little while before he began to reign. He was travelling through the Leontine district, and led his horse down into a river. The horse was engulfed in a whirlpool and disappeared. Dionysius did his utmost to extricate him but in vain and, so Philistus writes, went away greatly troubled. When he had gone on a short distance he heard a whinny, looked back and, to his joy, saw his horse eagerly following and with a swarm of bees in its mane. The sequel of this portent was that Dionysius began to reign within a few days.

Latin: [72] Quae vero aut coniectura explicantur aut eventis animadversa ac notata sunt, ea genera divinandi, ut supra dixi, non naturale, sed artificiosa dicuntur; in quo haruspices, augures coniectoresque numerantur. Haec inprobantur a Peripateticis, a Stoicis defenduntur. Quorum alia sunt posata in monumentis et disciplina, quod Etruscorum declarant, et haruspicini et fulgurales et rituales libri, vestri etiam augurales; alia autem subito ex tempore coniectura explicantur, ut apud Homerum Calchas, qui ex passerum numero belli Troiani annos auguratus est, et ut in Sullae scriptum historia videmus, quod te inspectante factum est, ut, cum ille in agro Nolano immolaret ante praetorium, ab infima ara subito anguis emergeret, cum quidem C. Postumius haruspex oraret illum, ut in expeditionem exercitum educeret; id cum Sulla fecisset, tum ante oppidum Nolam florentissuma Samnitium castra cepit.

[73] Facta coniectura etiam in Dionysio est, paulo ante quam regnare coepit; qui cum per agrum Leontinum iter faciens equum ipse demisisset in flumen, submersus equus voraginibus non exstitit; quem cum maxima contentione non potuisset extrahere, discessit, ut ait Philistus, aegre ferens. Cum autem aliquantum progressus esset, subito exaudivit hinnitum respexitque et equum alacrem laetus adspexit, cuius in iuba examen apium consederat. Quod ostentum babuit hanc vim, ut Dionysius paucis post diebus regnare coeperit.

XXXIV.

Need I say more? How many intimations were given to the Lacedæmonians a short time before the disaster of Leuctra, when arms rattled in the temple of Hercules, and his statue streamed with profuse sweat! At the same time, at Thebes (as Callisthenes relates), the folding-doors in the temple of Hercules, which were closed with bars, opened of their own accord, and the armour which was suspended on the walls was found fallen to the ground. And at the same period, at Lebadia, where divine rites were being performed in honour of Trophonius, all the cocks in the neighbourhood began to crow so incessantly as never to leave off at all; and the Bœotian augurs affirmed that this was a sign of victory to the Thebans, because these birds crow only on occasions of victory, and maintain silence in case of defeat.

Many other signs, at this time, announced to the Spartans the calamities of the battle of Leuctra; for, at Delphi, on the head of the statue of Lysander, who was the most famous of the Lacedæmonians, there suddenly appeared a garland of wild prickly herbs. And the golden stars which the Lacedæmonians had set up as symbols of Castor and Pollux, in the temple of Delphi, after the famous naval victory of Lysander, in which the power of Athens was broken, those divinities were reported to have appeared in the Lacedæmonjan fleet during that engagement, fell down, and were seen no more.

And the greatest of all the prodigies which were sent as warnings to those same Lacedæmonians, happened when they sent to Dodona to consult the oracle of Jupiter on the success of the combat; and when the ambassadors had cast their questions into the urn from which the responses were to be drawn, an ape, whom the king of Molossus kept as a pet, disturbed and confounded all the lots, and everything else which had been prepared for the purpose of giving a reply in due form. Upon which the priestess who presided at the oracular rites, declared that the Lacedæmonians must rather look to their safety than expect a victory.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "Again: what a warning was given to the Spartans just before the disastrous battle of Leuctra, when the armour clanked in the temple of Hercules and his statue dripped with sweat! But at the same time, according to Callisthenes, the folding doors of Hercules' temple at Thebes, though closed with bars, suddenly opened of their own accord, and the armour which had been fastened on the temple walls, was found on the floor. And, at the same time, at Lebadia, in Boeotia, while divine honours were being paid to Trophonius, the cocks in the neighbourhood began to crow vigorously and did not leave off. Thereupon the Boeotian augurs declared that the victory belonged to the Thebans, because it was the habit of cocks to keep silence when conquered and to crow when victorious.

"The Spartans received many warnings given at that time of their impending defeat at Leuctra. For example, a crown of wild, prickly herbs suddenly appeared on the head of the statue erected at Delphi in honour of Lysander, the most eminent of the Spartans. Furthermore, the Spartans had set up some golden stars in the temple of Castor and Pollux at Delphi to commemorate the glorious victory of Lysander over the Athenians, because, it was said, those gods were seen accompanying the Spartan fleet in that battle. Now, just before the battle of Leuctra these divine symbols -- that is, the golden stars at Delphi, already referred to -- fell down and were never seen again. But the most significant warning received by the Spartans was this: they sent to consult the oracle of Jupiter at Dodona as to the chances of victory. After their messengers had duly set up the vessel in which were the lots, an ape, kept by the king of Molossia for his amusement, disarranged the lots and everything else used in consulting the oracle, and scattered them in all directions. Then, so we are told, the priestess who had charge of the oracle said that the Spartans must think of safety and not of victory.

Latin: [74] Quid? Lacedaemoniis paulo ante Leuctricam calamitatem quae significatio facta est, cum in Herculis fano arma sonuerunt Herculisque simulacrum multo sudore manavit! At eodem tempore Thebis, ut ait Callisthenes, in templo Herculis valvae clausae repagulis subito se ipsae aperuerunt, armaque, quae fixa in parietibus fuerant, ea sunt humi inventa. Cumque eodem tempore apud Lebadiam Trophonio res divina fieret, gallos gallinaceos in eo loco sic adsidue canere coepisse, ut nihil intermitterent; tum augures dixisse Boeotios Thebanorum esse victoriam, propterea quod avis illa victa siliere soleret, canere, si vicisset.

[75] Eademque tempestate multis signis Lacedaemoniis Leuctricae pugnae calamitas denuntiabatur. Namque et in Lysandri, qui Lacedaemoniorum clarissumus fuerat, statua, quae Delphis stabat, in capite corona subito exstitit ex asperis herbis et agrestibus, stellaeque aureae quae Delphis erant a Lacedaemoniis positae post navalem illam victoriam Lysandri qua Athenienses conciderunt, qua in pugna quia Castor et Pollux cum Lacedaemoniorum classe visi esse dicebantur, - eorum insignia deorum, stellae aureae, quas dixi, Delphis positae, paulo ante Leuctricam pugnam deciderunt neque repertae sunt.

[76] Maximum vero illud portentum isdem Spartiatis fuit, quod, cum oraclum ab love Dodonaeo petivissent de victoria sciscitantes legatique [vas] illud in quo inerant sortes collocavissent, simia, quam rex Molossorum in deliciis habebat, et sortes ipsas et cetera quae erant ad sortem parata disturbavit et aliud alio dissupavit, Tum ea, quae praeposita erat oraclo, sacerdos dixisse dicitur de salute Lacedaemoniis esse, non de victoria cogitandum.

XXXV.

Must I say more? In the second Punic war, when Flaminius, being consul for the second time, despised the signs of future events, did he not by such conduct occasion great disasters to the state? For, after having reviewed the troops, he was moving his camp towards Arezzo, and leading his legions against Hannibal, his horse suddenly fell with him before the statue of Jupiter Stator, without any apparent cause. But though those who were skilful in divination declared it was an evident sign from the Gods that he should not engage in battle, he paid no attention to it. Afterwards, when it was proposed to consult the auspices of the consecrated chickens, the augur indicated the propriety of deferring the battle. Flaminius asked him what was to be done the next day, if the chickens still refused to feed? He replied that in that case he must still rest quiet. “Fine auspices, indeed,” replied Flaminius, “if we may only fight when the chickens are hungry, but must do nothing if they are full.” And so he commanded the standards to be moved forward, and the army to follow him; on which occasion, the standard-bearer of the first battalion could not extricate his standard from the ground in which it was pitched, and several soldiers who endeavoured to assist him were foiled in the attempt. Flaminius, to whom they related this incident, despised the warning, as was usual with him; and in the course of three hours from that time, the whole of his army was routed, and he himself slain.

And it is a wonderful story, too, that is told by Cœlius, as having happened at this very time, that such great earthquakes took place in Liguria, Gallia, and many of the islands, and throughout all Italy, that many cities were destroyed, and the earth was broken into chasms in many places, and rivers rolled backwards, while the waters of the sea rushed into their channels.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "Again, did not Gaius Flaminius by his neglect of premonitory signs in his second consulship in the Second Punic War cause great disaster to the State? For, after a review of the army, he had moved his camp and was marching towards Arretium to meet Hannibal, when his horse, for no apparent reason, suddenly fell with him just in front of the statue of Jupiter Stator. Although the soothsayers considered this a divine warning not to join battle, he did not so regard it. Again, after the auspices by means of the tripudium had been taken, the keeper of the sacred chickens advised the postponement of battle. Flaminius then asked, "Suppose the chickens should never eat, what would you advise in that case?" "You should remain in camp," was the reply. "Fine auspices indeed!" said Flaminius, "for they counsel action when chickens' crops are empty and inaction when chickens' crops are filled." So he ordered the standards to be plucked up and the army to follow him. Then, when the standard-bearer of the first company could not loosen his standard, several soldiers came to his assistance, but to no purpose. This fact was reported to Flaminius, and he, with his accustomed obstinacy, ignored it. The consequence was that within three hours his army was cut to pieces and he himself was slain. Coelius has added the further notable fact that, at the very time this disastrous battle was going on, earthquakes of such violence occurred in Liguria, in Gaul, on several islands, and in every part of Italy, that a large number of towns were destroyed, landslips took place in many regions, the earth sank, rivers flowed upstream, and the sea invaded their channels.

Latin: [77] Quid? Bello Punico secundo nonne C. Flaminius, consul iterum, neglexit signa rerum futurarum magna cum clade rei publicae? Qui exercitu lustrato cum Arretium versus castra movisset et contra Hannibalem legiones duceret, et ipse et equus eius ante signum lovis Statoris sine causa repente concidit nec eam rem habuit religioni, obiecto signo, ut peritis videbatur, ne committeret proelium. Idem, cum tripudio auspicaretur, pullarius diem proelii committendi differebat. Tum Flaminius ex eo quaesivit, si ne postea quidem pulli pascerentur, quid faciendum censeret. Cum ille quiescendum respondisset, Flaminius: "Praeclara vero auspicia, si esurientibus pullis res geri poterit, saturis nihil geretur!" Itaque signa convelli et se sequi iussit. Quo tempore cum signifer primi hastati signum non posset movere loco, nec quicquam proficeretur plures cum accederent, Flaminius re nuntiata suo more neglexit. Itaque tribus iis horis concisus exercitus atque ipse interfectus est.

[78] Magnum illud etiam, quod addidit Coelius, eo tempore ipso, cum hoc calamitosum proelium fìeret, tantos terrae motus in Liguribus, Gallia compluribusque insulis totaque in Italia factos esse, ut multa oppida conruerint, multis locis labes factae sint terraeque desiderint fluminaque in contrarias partes fluxerint atque in amnes mare influxerit.

XXXVI.

Skilful diviners can certainly derive correct presentiments from slight circumstances. When Midas, who became king of Phrygia, was yet an infant, some ants carried some grains of wheat into his mouth while he was sleeping. On this the diviners predicted that he would become exceedingly rich, as indeed afterwards happened. While Plato was an infant in his cradle, a swarm of bees settled on his lips during his slumbers; and the diviners answered that this prediction of his future eloquence was made before he even knew how to speak.

Why should I speak of your dear and delightful friend, Roscius? Did he tell lies himself, or did the whole city of Lanuvium tell lies for him? When he was in his cradle at Solonium, (a place which belongs to the Lanuvian territory,) the story goes, that one night, there being a light in the room, his nurse arose and found a serpent coiled around him, and in her alarm at this sight she made a great outcry. The father of Roscius related the circumstance to the soothsayers, and they answered that the child would become preeminently distinguished and illustrious. This adventure was afterwards engraved by Praxiteles in silver, and our friend Archias celebrated it in verse.

What, then, are we to wait for? Are we to wait till the Gods are conversant with us as our affairs, while we are in the forum, and on our journeys, and when we are at home? yet though they do not openly discover themselves to us, they diffuse their divine influence far and wide — an influence which they not only inclose in the caverns of the earth, but sometimes extend to the constitutions of men. For it was this divine influence of the earth which inspired the Pythia at Delphi, while the Sibyl received her power of divination from nature. Why should we wonder at this? Do we not see how various are the species and specific properties of earths? — of which some parts are injurious, as the earth of Ampsanctus in Hirpinum, and the Plutonian land in Asia: and some portions of the soil of the fields are pestilential, others salubrious; some spots produce acute capacities, others heavy characters. All which things depend on the varieties of atmosphere, and are inequalities of the exhalations of the different soils.

It likewise often happens that minds are affected more or less powerfully by certain expressions of countenance, and certain tones of voice or modulations, — often also by fits of anxiety and terror — a condition indicated in these lines of the poet: —

Madden’d in heart, and weeping like as one By the mysterious rites of Bacchus wrought Into wild ecstasy, she wanders lone Amid the tombs, and mourns her Teucer lost.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "Trustworthy conjectures in divining are made by experts. For instance, when Midas, the famous king of Phrygia, was a child, ants filled his mouth with grains of wheat as he slept. It was predicted that he would be a very wealthy man; and so it turned out. Again, while Plato was an infant, asleep in his cradle, bees settled on his lips and this was interpreted to mean that he would have a rare sweetness of speech. Hence in his infancy his future eloquence was foreseen. And what about your beloved and charming friend Roscius? Did he lie or did the whole of Lanuvium lie for him in telling the following incident: In his cradle days, while he was being reared in Solonium, a plain in the Lanuvian district, his nurse suddenly awoke during the night and by the light of a lamp observed the child asleep with a snake coiled about him. She was greatly frightened at the sight and gave an alarm. His father referred the occurrence to the soothsayers, who replied that the boy would attain unrivalled eminence and glory. Indeed, Pasiteles has engraved the scene in silver and our friend Archias has described it in verse.

Latin: Fiunt certae divinationum coniecturae a peritis. Midae illi Phrygi, cum puer esset, dormienti formicae in os tritici grana congesserunt. Divitissumum fore praedictum est; quod evenit. At Platoni cum in cunis parvulo dormienti apes in labellis consedissent, responsum est singolari illum suavitate orationis fore: ita futura eloquente provisa in infante est. [79] Quid? amores ac deliciae tuae, Roscius, num aut ipse aut pro eo Lanuvium totum mentiebatur? Qui cum esset in cunabulis educareturque in Solonio, qui est campus agri Lanuvini, noctu lumine apposito experrecta nutrix animadvertit puerum dormientem circumplicatum serpentis amplexu. Quo aspectu exterrita clamorem sustulit. Pater autem Rosci ad haruspices rettulit, qui responderunt nihil illo pucro clarius, nihil nobilius fore. Atque hanc speciem Pasiteles caelavit argento et noster expressit Archias versibus.

XXXVII.

And this state of excitement also proves that there is a divine energy in human souls. And so Democritus asserts, that without something of this ecstasy no man can become a great poet; and Plato utters the same sentiment: and he may call this poetic inspiration an ecstasy or madness as much as he pleases, so long as he eulogizes it as eloquently as he does in his Phædrus.

What is your art of oratory in pleading causes? What is your action? Can it be forcible, commanding, and copious, unless your mind and heart are in some degree animated by a kind of inspiration? I have often beheld in yourself, and, to descend to a less dignified example, in your friend Æsop, such fire and splendour of expression and action, that it seemed as if some potent inspiration had altogether abstracted him from all present sensation and thought.

Besides this, forms often come across us which have no real existence, but which nevertheless have a distinct appearance. Such an apparition is said to have occurred to Brennus, and to his Gallic troops, when he was waging an impious war upon the temple of Apollo at Delphi. For on that occasion it is reported that the Pythian priestess pronounced these words: — “I and the white virgins will provide for the future.” In accordance with which, it happened that the Gauls fancied that they saw white virgins bearing arms against them, and that their entire army was overwhelmed in the snow.

Aristotle thinks that those who become ecstatic or furious through some disease, especially melancholy persons, possess a divine gift of presentiment in their minds.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "Then what do we expect? Do we wait for the immortal gods to converse with us in the forum, on the street, and in our homes? While they do not, of course, present themselves in person, they do diffuse their power far and wide -- sometimes enclosing it in caverns of the earth and sometimes imparting it to human beings. The Pythian priestess at Delphi was inspired by the power of the earth and the Sibyl by that of nature. Why need you marvel at this? Do we not see how the soils of the earth vary in kind? Some are deadly, like that about Lake Ampsanctus in the country of the Hirpini and that of Plutonia in Asia, both of which I have seen. Even in the same neighbourhood, some parts are salubrious and some are not; some produce men of keen wit, others produce fools. These diverse effects are all the result of differences in climate and differences in the earth's exhalations. It often happens, too, that the soul is violently stirred by the sight of some object, or by the deep tone of a voice, or by singing. Frequently anxiety or fear will have that effect, as it did in the case of Hesione, who

Did rave like one by Bacchic rites made mad and mid the tombs her Teucer called aloud.

"And poetic inspiration also proves that there is a divine power within the human soul. Democritus says that no one can be a great poet without being in a state of frenzy, and Plato says the same thing. Let Plato call it "frenzy" if he will, provided he praises it as it was praised in his Phaedrus. And what about your own speeches in law suits. Can the delivery of you lawyers be impassioned, weighty, and fluent unless your soul is deeply stirred? Upon my word, many a time have I seen in you such passion of look and gesture that I thought some power was rendering you unconscious of what you did; and, if I may cite a less striking example, I have seen the same in your friend Aesopus.

"Frequently, too, apparitions present themselves and, though they have no real substance, they seem to have. This is illustrated by what is said to have happened to Brennus and to his Gallic troops after he had made an impious attack on the temple of Apollo at Delphi. The story is that the Pythian priestess, in speaking from the oracle, said to Brennus:

To this the virgins white and I will see.

The result was that the virgins were seen fighting against the Gauls, and their army was overwhelmed with snow.

Latin: Quid igitur expectamus? An dum in foro nobiscum di immortales, dum in viis versentur, dum domi? Qui quidem ipsi se nobis non offerunt, vim autem suam longe lateque diffundunt, quam tum terrae cavernis includunt, tum hominum naturis implicant. Nam terrae vis Pythiam Delphis incitabat, naturae Sibyllam. Quid enim? Non videmus quam sint varia terrarum genera? Ex quibus et mortifera quaedam pars est, ut et Ampsancti in Hirpinis et in Asia Plutonia quae vidimus, et sunt partes agrorum aliae pestilentes, aliae salubres, aliae quae acuta ingenia gignant, aliae quae retusa: quac omnia fiunt et ex caeli varietate et ex disparili adspiratione terrarum. [80] Fit etiam saepe specie quadam, saepe vocum gravitate et cantibus, ut pellantur animi vehementius, saepe etiam cura et timore, qualis est illa "flexanima tamquam lymphata aut Bacchi sacris commota in tumulis Teucrum commemorans suum."

Atque etiam illa concitatio declarat vini in animis esse divinam. Negat enim sine furore Democritus quemquam poetam magnum esse posse, quod idem dicit Plato. Quem, si placet, appellet furorem, dum modo is furor ita laudetur ut in Phaedro [Platonis] laudatus est. Quid? Vestra oratio in causis, quid? ipsa actio potest esse vehemens et gravis et copiosa, nisi est animus ipse commotior? Equidem etiam in te saepe vidi et, ut ad leviora veniamus, in Aesopo, familiari tuo, tantum ardorem vultuum atque motuum, ut eum vis quaedam abstraxisse a sensu mentis videretur. [81] Obiciuntur etiam saepe formae, quae reapse nullae sunt; speciem autem offerunt; quod contigisse Brenno dicitur eiusque Gallicis copiis, cum fano Apollinis Delphici nefarium bellum intulisset. Tum enim ferunt ex oraclo ecfatam esse Pythiam: "Ego providebo rem istam et albae virgines." Ex quo factum ut viderentur virgines ferre arma contra et nive Gallorum obrueretur exercitus.

XXXVIII.

But I know not whether it is right to attribute anything of this kind to men with diseases of the stomach, or to persons in a frenzy, for true divination rather appertains to a sound mind than to a sick body.

The Stoics attempt to prove the reality of divination in this way: — If there are Gods, and they do not intimate future events to men, they either do not love men, or else are ignorant of the future; or else they conceive that that knowledge of the future can be of no service to men; or they conceive that it does not become their majesty to condescend to intimate beforehand what must be hereafter; or lastly, we must say that even the Gods themselves cannot tell how to forewarn us of them.

But it is not true that the Gods do not love men, for they are essentially benevolent and philanthropic; and cannot be ignorant of those events which take place by their own direction and appointment. Again, it cannot be a matter of indifference to us to be apprised of what is about to happen, for we shall become more cautious if we do know such things. Nor do they think it beneath their dignity to give such intimations, for nothing is more excellent than beneficence. And lastly, the Gods cannot be ignorant of future events.

Therefore there are no Gods, and they do not give intimations of the future. But there are Gods: so therefore they do give such intimations; and if they do give such intimations, they must give us the means of understanding them, or else they would give their information to no purpose. And if they do give us such means, divination must needs exist; therefore divination does exist.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "Aristotle thought that even the people who rave from the effects of sickness and are called "hypochondriacs" have within their souls some power of foresight and of prophecy. But, for my part, I am inclined to think that such a power is not to be distributed either to a diseased stomach or to a disordered brain. On the contrary, it is the healthy soul and not the sickly body that has the power of divination.

The Stoics, for example, establish the existence of divination by the following process of reasoning: "If there are gods and they do not make clear to man in advance what the future will be, then they do not love man; or, they themselves do not know what the future will be; or, they think that it is of no advantage to man to know what it will be; or, they think it inconsistent with their dignity to give man forewarnings of the future; or, finally, they, though gods, cannot give intelligible signs of coming events. But it is not true that the gods do not love us, for they are the friends and benefactors of the human race; nor is it true that they do not know their own decrees and their own plans; nor is it true that it is of no advantage to us to know what is going to happen, since we should be more prudent if we knew; nor is it true that the gods think it inconsistent with their dignity to give forecasts, since there is no more excellent quality than kindness; nor is it true that they have not the power to know the future; therefore it is not true that there are gods and yet that they do not give us signs of the future; but there are gods, therefore they give us such signs; and if they give us such signs, it is not true that they give us no means to understand those signs -- otherwise their signs would be useless; and if they give us the means, it is not true that there is no divination; therefore there is divination."

Latin: Aristoteles quidem eos etiam, qui valetudinis vitio furerent et melancholici dicerentur, censebat habere aliquid in animis praesagiens atque divinum. Ego autem haud scio an nec cardiacis tribuendum hoc sit nec phreneticis; animi enim integri, non vitiosi est corporis divinatio.

[82] Quam quidem esse re vera hac Stoicorum ratione concluditur: "Si sunt di neque ante declarant hominibus quae futura sint, aut non diligunt homines, aut quid eventurum sit ignorant, aut existumant nihil interesse hominum scire quid sit futurum, aut non censent esse suae maiestatis praesignificare hominibus quae sunt futura, aut ea ne ipsi quidem di significare possunt. At neque non diligunt nos (sunt enim benefici generique hominum amici), neque ignorant ea quae ab ipsis constituta et designata sunt, neque nostra nihil interest scire ea quae eventura sint (erimus enim cautiores, si sciemus), neque hoc alienum ducunt maiestate sua (nihil est enim beneficentia praestantius), neque non possunt futura praenoscere. [83] Non igitur sunt di nec significant futura. Sunt autem di; significant ergo. Et non, si significant, nullas vias dant nobis ad significationis scientiam (frustra enim significarent); nec, si dant vias, non est divinatio: est igitur divinatio."

XXXIX.

Such is the argument in favour of divinity by which Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Antipater endeavour to demonstrate their side of the question. Why, then, should any doubt be entertained that the arguments that I have advanced are entirely true? If both reason and fact are on my side, — if whole nations and peoples, Greeks and barbarians, and our own ancestors also, confirm all my assertions, — if also it has always been maintained by the greatest philosophers and poets, and by the wisest legislators who have framed constitutions and founded cities, must we not be content with the unanimous authority of all mankind? Nor indeed is any other argument brought forward to prove that all these kinds of divination which I uphold have no existence, than that it appears difficult to explain what are the different principles and causes of each kind of divination. For what reason can the soothsayer allege why an injury in the lungs of otherwise favourable entrails should compel us to alter a day previously appointed, and defer an enterprise? How can an augur explain why the croak of a raven on the right hand, and a crow on the left, should be reckoned a good omen? What can an astrologer say by way of explaining why a conjunction of the planet Jupiter or Venus with the moon is propitious to the birth of a child, and why the conjunction of Saturn or Mars is injurious? or why God should warn us during sleep, and neglect us when we are awake? or lastly, what is the reason why the frantic Cassandra could foresee future events, while the sage Priam remained ignorant of them?

Do you ask why everything takes place as it does? Very right; but that is not the question now; what we are trying to find out is whether such is the case or not. As, if I were to assert that the magnet is a kind of stone which attracts and draws iron to itself, but were unable to give the reason why that is the case, would you deny the fact altogether? And you treat the subject of divination in the same way, though we see it, and hear of it, and read of it, and have received it as a tradition from our ancestors. Nor did the world in general ever doubt of it before the introduction of that philosophy which has recently been invented, and even since the appearance of philosophy, no philosopher who was of any authority at all has been of a contrary opinion. I have already quoted in its favour Pythagoras, Democritus, and Socrates. There is no exception but Xenophanes among the ancients. I have likewise added the old Academicians, the Peripatetics, and the Stoics: all supported divination; Epicurus alone was of the opposite opinion. But what can be more shameless than such a man as he, who asserted that there was no gratuitous and disinterested virtue in the world?

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Antipater employ the same reasoning. Then what ground is there to doubt the absolute truth of my position? For I have on my side reason, facts, peoples, and races, both Greek and barbarian, our own ancestors, the unvarying belief of all ages, the greatest philosophers, the poets, the wisest men, the builders of cities, and the founders of republics. Are we not satisfied with the unanimous judgement of men, and do we wait for beasts to give their testimony too? The truth is that no other argument of any sort is advanced to show the futility of the various kinds of divination which I have mentioned except the fact that it is difficult to give the cause or reason of every kind of divination. You ask, "Why is it that the soothsayer, when he finds a cleft in the lung of the victim, even though the other vitals are sound, stops the execution of an undertaking and defers it to another day?" "Why does an augur think it a favourable omen when a raven flies to the right, or a crow to the left?" "Why does an astrologer consider that the moon's conjunction with the planets Jupiter and Venus at the birth of children is a favourable omen, and its conjunction with Saturn or Mars unfavourable?" Again, "Why does God warn us when we are asleep and fail to do so when we are awake?" Finally, "Why is it that mad Cassandra foresees coming events and wise Priam cannot do the same?"

"You ask why everything happens. You have a perfect right to ask, but that is not the point at issue now. The question is, Does it happen, or does it not? For example, if I were to say that the magnet attracted iron and drew it to itself, and I could not tell you why, then I suppose you would utterly deny that the magnet had any such power. At least that is the course you pursue in regard to the existence of the power of divination, although it is established by our reading and by the traditions of our forefathers. Why, even before the dawn of philosophy, which is a recent discovery, the average man had no doubt about divination, and, since its development, no philosopher of any sort of reputation has had any different view. I have already cited Pythagoras, Democritus, and Socrates and, of the ancients, I have excluded no one except Xenophanes. To them I have added the Old Academy, the Peripatetics, and the Stoics. The only dissenter is Epicurus. But why wonder at that? for is his opinion of divination any more discreditable than his view that there is no such thing as a disinterested virtue?

Latin: [84] Hac ratione et Chrysippus et Diogenes et Antipater utitur. Quid est igitur cur dubitandum sit quin sint ea, quae disputavi, verissuma, si ratio mecum facit, si eventa, si populi, si nationes, si Graeci, si barbari, si maiores etiam nostri, si denique hoc semper ita putatum est, si summi phdosophi, si poëtae, si sapientissumi viri, qui res publicas constituerunt, qui urbes condiderunt? An dum bestiae loquantur exspectamus, hominum consentiente auctoritate contenti non sumus? [85] Nec vero quicquam aliud adfertur cur ea quae dico divinandi genera nulla sint, nisi quod difficile dictu videtur quae cuiusque divinationis ratio, quae causa sit. Quid enim habet haruspex, cur pulmo incisus etiam in bonis extis dirimat tempus et proferat diem? Quid augur, cur a dextra corvus, a sinistra cornix faciat ratum? Quid astrologus, cur stella Iovis aut Veneris coniuncta cum luna ad ortus puerorum salutaris sit, Saturni Martisve contraria? Cur autem deus dormientes nos moneat, vigilantes neglegat? Quid deinde causae est, cur Cassandra furens futura prospiciat, Priamus sapiens hoc idem facere non queat?

[86] Cur fiat quidque, quaeris. Recte omnino; sed non nunc id agitur; fiat necne fiat, id quaeritur: ut si magnetem lapidem esse dicam qui ferrum ad se adliciat et adtrahat, rationem cur id fiat adferre nequeam, fieri omnino neges. Quod idem facis in divinatione, quam et cernimus ipsi et audimus et legimus et a patribus accepimus. Neque ante philosophiam patefactam, quae nuper inventa est, hac de re communis vita dubitavit, et, posteaquam philosophia processit, nemo aliter philosophus sensit, in quo modo esset auctoritas. [87] Dixi de Pythagora, de Democrito, de Socrate, excepi de antiquis praeter Xenophanem neminem, adiunxi veterem Academiam, Peripateticos, Stoicos; unus dissentit Epicurus. Quid vero hoc turpius, quam quod idem nullam censet gratuitam esse virtutem?

XL.

But what man is there who is not moved by the testimony and declarations of antiquity? Homer writes that Calchas was a most excellent augur, and that he conducted the fleet of the Greeks to Troy, — more, I imagine, by his knowledge of the auspices than of the country. Amphilochus and Mopsus were kings of the Argives, and also augurs, and built the Greek cities on the coast of Cilicia. And before them lived Amphiaraus and Tiresias, men of no lowly rank or obscure fame, not like those men of whom Ennius says —

They hire out their prophecies for gold:

no; they were renowned and first rate men, who predicted the future by means of the knowledge which they derived from birds and omens; and Homer, speaking of the latter even in the infernal regions, says that he alone was consistently wise, while others were wandering about like shadows. As to Amphiaraus, he was so honoured by the general praise of all Greece, that he was accounted a god, and oracles were established at the spot where he was buried.

Why need I speak of Priam king of Asia? had not he two children possessed of this gift of divination, namely a son named Helenus, and a daughter named Cassandra, who both prophesied, one by means of an excited state of mind and divine inspiration, of which description likewise were two brothers of the noble family of the Marcii, who are recorded as having lived in the days of our ancestors. Does not Homer inform us, too, that Polyidus the Corinthian predicted the various fates of many persons, and the death of his son when he was going to the siege of Troy? And as a general rule, among the ancients, those who were possessed of authority also possessed the knowledge of auguries; for, as they thought wisdom a regal attribute, so also did they esteem divination. And of this our state of Rome is an instance, in which several of our kings were also augurs, and afterwards even private persons, endued with the same sacerdotal office, ruled the commonwealth by the authority of religion.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "But is there a man anywhere who is uninfluenced by clear and unimpeachable records signed and sealed by the hand of Time? For example, Homer writes that Calchas was by far the best augur among the Greeks and that he commanded the Greek fleet before Troy. His command of the fleet I suppose was due to his skill as an augur and not to his skill in seamanship. Amphilochus and Mopsus were kings of Argos, but they were augurs too, and they founded Greek cities on the coasts of Cilicia. And even before them were Amphiaraus and Tiresias. They were no lowly and unknown men, nor were they like the person described by Ennius,

Who, for their own gain, uphold opinions that are false,

but they were eminent men of the noblest type and foretold the future by means of augural signs. In speaking of Tiresias, even when in the infernal regions, Homer says that he alone was wise, that the rest were mere wandering shadows. As for Amphiaraus, his reputation in Greece was such that he was honoured as a god, and oracular responses were sought in the place where he was buried.

"Furthermore, did not Priam, the Asiatic king, have a son, Helenus, and a daughter, Cassandra, who prophesied, the first by means of auguries and the other when under a heaven-inspired excitement and exaltation of soul? In the same class, as we read in the records of our forefathers, were those famous Marcian brothers, men of noble birth. And does not Homer relate that Polyidus of Corinth not only made many predictions to others, but that he also foretold the death of his own son, who was setting out for Troy? As a general rule among the ancients the men who ruled the state had control likewise of augury, for they considered divining, as well as wisdom, becoming to a king. Proof of this is afforded by our State wherein the kings were augurs; and, later, private citizens endowed with the same priestly office ruled the republic by the authority of religion.

Latin: Quis est autem, quem non moveat clarissumis monumentis testata consignataque antiquitas? Calchantem augurem scribit Homerus longe optumum, eumque ducem classium fuisse ad Ilium, - auspiciorum, credo, scientia, non locorum. [88] Amphilochus et Mopsus Argivorum reges fuerunt, sed iidem augures, iique urbis in ora marituma Ciliciae Graecas condiderunt; atque etiam ante hos Amphiaraus et Tiresias non humiles et obscuri neque eorum similes, ut apud Ennium est, "qui sui quaestus causa fictas suscitant sententias" sed clari et praestantes viri, qui avibus et signis admoniti futura dicebant; quorum de altero etiam apud inferos Homerus ait solum sapere, ceteros umbrarum vagari modo; Amphiaraum autem sic bonoravit fama Graeciae, deus ut haberetur, atque ut ab eius solo, in quo est humatus, oracla peterentur.

[89] Quid? Asiae rex Priamus nonne et Helenum filium et Cassandram filiam divinantes habebat, alterum auguriis, alteram mentis incitatione et permotione divina? Quo in genere Marcios quosdam fratres, nobili loco natos, apud maiores nostros fuisse scriptum videmus. Quid? Polyidum Corinthium nonne Homerus et aliis multa et filio ad Troiam proficiscenti mortem praedixisse commemorat? Omnino apud veteres, qui rerum potiebantur, iidem auguria tenebant; ut enim sapere sic divinare regale ducebant: [ut] testis est nostra civitas, in qua et reges augures et postea privati eodem sacerdotio praediti rem publicam religionum auctoritate rexerunt.

XLI.

And this kind of divination has not been neglected even by barbarous nations; for the Druids in Gaul are diviners, among whom I myself have been acquainted with Divitiacus Æduus, your own friend and panegyrist, who pretends to the science of nature which the Greeks call physiology, and who asserts that, partly by auguries and partly by conjecture, he foresees future events. Among the Persians they have augurs and diviners, called magi, who at certain seasons all assemble in a temple for mutual conference and consultation; as your college also used once to do on the nones of the month. And no man can become a king of Persia who is not previously initiated in the doctrine of the magi.

There are even whole families and nations devoted to divination. The entire city of Telmessus in Caria is such. Likewise in Elis, a city of Peloponnesus, there are two families, called Iamidæ and Clutidæ, distinguished for their proficiency in divination. And in Syria the Chaldeans have become famous for their astrological predictions, and the subtlety of their genius. Etruria is especially famous for possessing an intimate acquaintance with omens connected with thunderbolts and things of that kind, and the art of explaining the signification of prodigies and portents. This is the reason why our ancestors, during the flourishing days of the empire, enacted that six of the children of the principal senators should be sent, one to each of the Etrurian tribes, to be instructed in the divination of the Etrurians, in order that this science of divination, so intimately connected with religion, might not, owing to the poverty of its professors, be cultivated for merely mercenary motives, and falsified by bribery.

The Phrygians, the Pisidians, the Cilicians, and Arabians are accustomed to regulate many of their affairs by the omens which they derive from birds. And the Umbrians do the same, according to report.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "Nor is the practice of divination disregarded even among uncivilized tribes, if indeed there are Druids in Gaul -- and there are, for I knew one of them myself, Divitiacus, the Aeduan, your guest and eulogist. He claimed to have that knowledge of nature which the Greeks call "physiologia," and he used to make predictions, sometimes by means of augury and sometimes by means of conjecture. Among the Persians the augurs and diviners are the magi, who assemble regularly in a sacred place for practice and consultation, just as formerly you augurs used to do on the Nones. Indeed, no one can become king of the Persians until he has learned the theory and the practice of the magi. Moreover, you may see whole families and tribes devoted to this art. For example, Telmessus in Caria is a city noted for its cultivation of the soothsayer's art, and there is also Elis in Peloponnesus, which has permanently set aside two families as soothsayers, the Iamidae and the Clutidae, who are distinguished for superior skill in their art. In Syria the Chaldeans are pre-eminent for their knowledge of astronomy and for their quickness of mind.

"Again, the Etruscans are very skilful in observing thunderbolts, in interpreting their meaning and that of every sign and portent. That is why, in the days of our forefathers, it was wisely decreed by the Senate, when its power was in full vigour, that, of the sons of the chief men, six should be handed over to each of the Etruscan tribes for the study of divination, in order that so important a profession should not, on account of the poverty of its members, be withdrawn from the influence of religion, and converted into a means of mercenary gain. On the other hand the Phrygians, Pisidians, Cilicians, and Arabians rely chiefly on the signs conveyed by the flights of birds, and the Umbrians, according to tradition, used to do the same.

Latin: [90] Eaque divinationum ratio ne in barbaris quidem gentibus neglecta est, siquidem et in Gallia Druidae sunt, e quibus ipse Divitiacum Haeduum hospitem tuum laudatoremque cognovi, qui et naturae rationem, quam fisiologi/an Graeci appellant, notam esse sibi profitebatur, et partim auguriis, partim coniectura, quae essent futura dicebat, et in Persis augurantur et divinant magi, qui congregantur in fano commentando causa atque inter se conloquendi, quod etiam idem vos quondam facere Nonis solebatis; [91] nec quisquam rex Persarum potest esse, qui non ante magorum disciplinam scientiamque perceperit. Licet autem videre et genera quaedam et nationes huic scientiae deditas. Telmessus in Caria est, qua in urbe excellit haruspicum disciplina; itemque Elis in Peloponneso familias duas certas habet, lamidarum unam, alteram Clutidarum, haruspicinae nobilitate praestantes. In Syria Chaldaei cognitione astrorum sollertiaque ingeniorum antecellunt.

[92] Etruria autem de caelo tacta scientissume animadvertit, eademque interpretatur quid quibusque ostendatur monstris atque portentis. Quocirca bene apud maiores nostros senatus, tum cum florebat imperium, decrevit ut de principum filiis x ex singulis Etruriae populis in disciplinam traderentur, ne ars tanta propter tenuitatem hominum a religionis auctoritate abduceretur ad mercedem atque quaestum. Phryges autem et Pisidae et Cilices et Arabum natio avium significationibus plurimum obtemperant, quod idem factitatum in Umbria accepimus.

XLII.

It appears to me that the different characteristics of divination have originated in the nature of the localities themselves in which they have been cultivated. For as the Egyptians and Babylonians, who reside in vast plains, where no mountains obstruct their view of the entire hemisphere, have applied themselves principally to that kind of divination called astrology, the Etrurians, on the other hand, since they, as men more devoted to the rites of religion, were used to sacrifice victims with more zeal and frequency, have especially applied themselves to the examination of the entrails of animals; and as, from the character of their climate and the denseness of their atmosphere, they are accustomed to witness many meteorological phenomena, and because for the same reason many singular prodigies take place among them, arising alike from the conceptions or offspring of men or cattle, they have become wonderfully skilful in the interpretation of such curiosities, the force of which, as you often say, is clearly declared by the very names given to them by their ancestors, for because they point out (ostendunt), portend, show (monstrant), and predict, they are called ostents, portents, monsters, and prodigies.

Again, the Arabians, the Phrygians, and Cilicians, because they rear large herds of cattle, and, both in summer and winter, traverse the plains and mountainous districts, have on that account taken especial notice of the songs and flight of birds. The Pisidians, and in our country the Umbrians, have applied themselves to the same art for the same reason. The whole nation of the Carians, and most especially the Telmessians, who reside in the most productive and fertile plains, in which the exuberance of nature gives birth to many extraordinary productions, have been very careful in the observation of prodigies.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: Now, for my part, I believe that the character of the country determined the kind of divination which its inhabitants adopted. For example, the Egyptians and Babylonians, who live on the level surface of open plains, with no hills to obstruct a view of the sky, have devoted their attention wholly to astrology. But the Etruscans, being in their nature of a very ardent religious temperament and accustomed to the frequent sacrifice of victims, have given their chief attention to the study of entrails. And as on account of the density of the atmosphere signs from heaven were common among them, and furthermore since that atmospheric condition caused many phenomena both of earth and sky and also certain prodigies that occur in the conception and birth of men and cattle -- for these reasons the Etruscans have become very proficient in the interpretation of portents. Indeed, the inherent force of these means of divination, as you like to observe, is clearly shown by the very words so aptly chosen by our ancestors to describe them. Because they "make manifest" (ostendunt), "portend" (portendunt), "intimate" (monstrant), "predict" (praedicunt), they are called "manifestations," "portents," "intimations," and "prodigies." But the Arabians, Phrygians, and Cilicians, being chiefly engaged in the rearing of cattle, are constantly wandering over the plains and mountains in winter and summer and, on that account, have found it quite easy to study the songs and flight of birds. The same is true of the Pisidians and of our fellow-countrymen, the Umbrians. While the Carians, and especially the Telmessians, already mentioned, because they live in a country with a very rich and prolific soil, whose fertility produces many abnormal growths, have turned their attention to the study of prodigies.

Latin: XLII [93] Ac mihi quidem videntur e locis quoque ipsis, qui a quibusque incolebantur, divinationum opportunitates esse ductae. Etenim Aegyptii et Babylonii in camporum patentium aequoribus habitantes, cum ex terra nihil emineret quod contemplationi caeli officere posset, omnem curam in siderum cognitione posuerunt; Etrusci autem, quod religione imbuti studiosius et crebrius hostias immolabant, extorum cognitioni se maxume dediderunt, quodque propter aeris crassitudinem de caelo apud eos multa fiebant, et quod ob eandem causam multa invisitata partim e caelo, alia ex terra oriebantur, quaedam etiam ex hominum pecudumve conceptu et satu, ostentorum exercitatissumi interpretes exstiterunt. Quorum quidem vim, ut tu soles dicere, verba ipsa prudenter a maioribus posita declarant. Quia enim ostendunt, portendunt, monstrant, praedicunt, ostenta, portenta, monstra, prodigia dicuntur. [94] Arabes autem et Phryges et Cilices, quod pastu pecudum maxume utuntur, campos et montes hieme et aestate peragrantes, propterea facilius cantus avium et volatus notaverunt; eademque et Pisidiae causa fuit et huic nostrae Umbriae. Tum Caria tota praecipueque Telmesses, quos ante dixi, quod agros uberrumos maximeque fertiles incolunt, in quibus multa propter fecundidatem fingi gignique possunt, in ostentis animadvertendis diligentes fuerunt.

XLIII.

But who can shut his eyes to the fact that in every well constituted state auspices, and other kinds of divination, have been much esteemed? What monarch or what people has ever neglected to make use of them in the transactions of peace, and still more especially in time of war, when the safety or welfare of the commonwealth is implicated in a greater degree? I do not speak merely of our own countrymen, — who have never undertaken any martial enterprise without inspection of the entrails, and who never conduct the affairs of the city without consulting the auspices, — I rather allude to foreign nations. The Athenians, for example, always consulted certain divining priests, (whom they called μάντεις,) when they convoked their public assemblies. The Spartans always appointed an augur as the assessor of their king, and also they ordained that an augur should be present at the council of their Elders, which was the name they gave to their public council; and in every important transaction they invariably consulted the oracle of Apollo at Delphi, or that of Jupiter Hammon, or that of Dodona. Lycurgus, who formed the Lacedæmonian commonwealth, desired that his code of laws should receive confirmation from the authority of Apollo at Delphi; and when Lysander sought to change them, the same authority forbade his innovations. Moreover, the Spartan magistrates, not content with a careful superintendence of the state affairs, went occasionally to spend a night in the temple of Pasiphae, which is in the country in the neighbourhood of their city, for the sake of dreaming there, because they considered the oracles received in sleep to be true.

But I return to the divination of the Romans. How often has our senate enjoined the decemvirs to consult the books of the Sibyls! For instance, when two suns had been seen, or when three moons had appeared, or when flames of fire were noticed in the sky; or on that other occasion, when the sun was beheld in the night, when noises were heard in the sky, and the heaven itself seemed to burst open, and strange globes were remarked in it. Again, information was laid before the senate, that a portion of the territory of Privernum had been swallowed up, and that the land had sunk down to an incredible depth, and that Apulia had been convulsed by terrific earthquakes; which portentous events announced to the Romans terrible wars and disastrous seditions. On all these occasions the diviners and their auspices were in perfect accordance with the prophetic verses of the Sibyl.

Again, when the statue of Apollo at Cuma was covered with a miraculous sweat, and that of Victory was found in the same condition at Capua, and when the hermaphrodite was born, — were not these things significant of horrible disasters? Or again, when the Tiber was discoloured with blood, or when, as has often happened, showers of stones, or sometimes of blood, or of mud, or of milk, have fallen, — when the thunderbolt fell on the Centaur of the Capitol, and struck the gates of Mount Aventine, and slew some of the inhabitants; or again, when it struck the temple of Castor and Pollux at Tusculum, and the temple of Piety at Rome, — did not the soothsayers in reply announce the events which subsequently took place, and were not similar predictions found in the Sibylline volumes?

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "But who fails to observe that auspices and all other kinds of divination flourish best in the best regulated states? And what king or people has there ever been who did not employ divination? I do not mean in time of peace only, but much more even in time of war, when the strife and struggle for safety is hardest. Passing by our own countrymen, who do nothing in war without examining entrails and nothing in peace without taking the auspices, let us look at the practice of foreign nations. The Athenians, for instance, in every public assembly always had present certain priestly diviners, whom they call manteis. The Spartans assigned an augur to their kings as a judicial adviser, and they also enacted that an augur should be present in their Council of Elders, which is the name of their Senate. In matters of grave concern they always consulted the oracle at Delphi, or that of Jupiter Hammon or that of Dodona. Lycurgus himself, who once governed the Spartan state, established his laws by authority of Apollo's Delphic oracle, and Lysander, who wished to repeal them, was prevented from doing so by the religious scruples of the people. Moreover, the Spartan rulers, not content with their deliberations when awake used to sleep in a shrine of Pasiphaë which is situated in a field near the city, in order to dream there, because they believed that oracles received in repose were true.

"I now return to instances at home. How many times the Senate has ordered the decemvirs to consult the Sibylline books! How often in matters of grave concern it has obeyed the responses of the soothsayers! Take the following examples: When at one time, two suns and, at another, three moons, were seen; when meteors appeared; when the sun shone at night; when rumblings were heard in the heavens; when the sky seemed to divide, showing balls of fire enclosed within; again, on the occasion of the landslip in Privernum, report of which was made to the Senate; and when Apulia was shaken by a most violent earthquake and the land sank to an incredible depth -- in all these cases of portents which warned the Roman people of mighty wars and deadly revolutions, the responses of the soothsayers were in agreement with the Sibylline verses.

"And what of those other instances? As when, for example, the statue of Apollo at Cumae and that of Victory at Capua dripped with sweat; when that unlucky prodigy, the hermaphrodite, was born; when the river Atratus ran with blood; when there were showers frequently of stone, sometimes of blood, occasionally of earth and even of milk; and finally, when lightning struck the statue of the Centaur on the Capitoline hill, the gates and some people on the Aventine and the temples of Castor and Pollux at Tusculum and of Piety at Rome -- in each of these cases did not the soothsayers give prophetic responses which were afterwards fulfilled? And were not these same prophecies found in the Sibylline books?

Latin: XLIII [95] Quis vero non videt in optuma quaque re publica plurimum auspicia et reliqua divinandi genera valuisse? Quis rex umquam fuit, quis populus, qui non uteretur praedictione divina? Neque solum in pace, sed in bello multo etiam magis, quo maius erat certamen et discrimen salutis. Omitto nostros, qui nihil in bello sine extis agunt, nihil sine auspiciis domi [habent auspicia]; externa videamus. Namque et Athenienses omnibus semper publicis consiliis divinos quosdam sacerdotes, quos manteis vocant, adhibuerunt, et Lacedaemonii regibus suis augurem adsessorem dederunt, itemque senibus (sic enim consilium publicum appellant) augurem interesse voluerunt, iidemque de rebus maioribus semper aut Delphis oraclum aut ab Hammone aut a Dodona petebant; [96] Lycurgus quidem, qui Lacedaemoniorum rem publicam temperavit, leges suas auctoritate Apollinis Delphici confirmavit; quas cum vellet Lysander commutare, eadem est prohibitus religione. Atque etiam qui praeerant Lacedaemoniis, non contenti vigilantibus curis, in Pasiphaae fano, quod est in agro propter urbem, somniandi causa excubabant, quia vera quietis oracla ducebant. [97] Ad nostra iam redeo. Quotiens senatus decemviros ad libros ire iussit! Quantis in rebus quamque saepe responsis haruspicum paruit! nam et cum duo visi soles essent, et cum tres lunae, et cum faces, et cum sol nocte visus esset, et cum e caelo fremitus auditus, et cum caelum discessisse visum esset atque in eo animadversi globi. Delata etiam ad senatum labes agri Privernatis, cum ad infinitam altitudinem terra desidisset Apuliaque maximis terrae motibus conquassata esset. Quibus portentis magna populo Romano bella perniciosaeque seditiones denuntiabantur, inque his omnibus responsa haruspicum cum Sibyllae versibus congruebant. [98] Quid cum Cumis Apollo sudavit, Capuae Victoria? Quid, ortus androgyni nonne fatale quoddam monstrum fuit? Quid cum fluvius Atratus sanguine fluxit? Quid quod saepe lapidum, sanguinis non numquam, terrae interdum, quondam etiam lactis imber effluxit? Quid cum in Capitolio ictus Centaurus, in Aventino portae et homines, Tusculi aedes Castoris et Pollucis Romaeque Pietatis? Nonne et haruspices ea responderunt, quae evenerunt, et in Sibyllae libris eaedem repertae praedictiones sunt?

XLIV.

How often has the senate commanded the decemvirs to consult the Sibylline books! In what important affairs, and how often has it not been guided wholly by the answers of the soothsayers! In the Marsic war, not long ago, the temple of Juno the Protectress was restored by the senate, which was excited to this holy act by a dream of Cæcilia, the daughter of Quintus Metellus. But after Sisenna, who mentions this dream, had related the wonderful correspondence of the event with the prediction, he nevertheless (being influenced, I suppose, by some Epicurean) proceeded to argue that dreams should never be trusted: however, he states nothing against the credit of the prodigies which took place, and which he reports, at the beginning of the Marsic war, when the images of the gods were seen to sweat, and blood flowed in the streams, and the heavens opened, and voices were heard from secret places, which foretold the dangers of the combat; and at Lanuvium the sacred bucklers were found to have been gnawed by mice, which appeared to the augurs the worst presage of all.

Shall I add further what we read recorded in our annals, that in the war against the Veientes, when the Alban lake had risen enormously, one of their most distinguished nobles came over to us and said, that it was predicted in the sacred books concerning the destinies of the Veientes, which had in their own possession, that their city could never be captured while the lake remained full; and that if, when the lake was opened, its waters were allowed to run into the sea, the Romans would suffer loss, — if, on the contrary, they were so drawn off that they did not reach the sea, then we should have good success? And from this circumstance arose the series of immense labours, subsequently undertaken by our ancestors in conducting away the waters of the Alban lake. But when the Veientes, being weary of war, sent ambassadors to the Roman senate, one of them exclaimed that that deserter had not ventured to tell them all he knew, for that in some other sacred books it was predicted that Rome should soon be ravaged by the Gauls, — an event which happened six years after the city of Veii surrendered.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "In recent times, during the Marsian war, the temple of Juno Sospita was restored because of a dream of Caecilia, the daughter of Quintus Caecilius Metellus. This is the same dream that Sisenna discussed as marvellous, in that its prophecies were fulfilled to the letter, and yet later -- influenced no doubt by some petty Epicurean -- he goes on inconsistently to maintain that dreams are not worthy of belief. This writer, however, has nothing to say against prodigies; in fact he relates that, at the outbreak of the Marsian War, the statues of the gods dripped with sweat, rivers ran with blood, the heavens opened, voices from unknown sources were heard predicting dangerous wars, and finally -- the sign considered by the soothsayers the most ominous of all -- the shields at Lanuvium were gnawed by mice.

"And what do you say of the following story which we find in our annals? During the Veientian War, when Lake Albanus had overflowed its banks, a certain nobleman of Veii deserted to us and said that, according to the prophecies of the Veientian books, their city could not be taken while the lake was at flood, and that if its waters were permitted to overflow and take their own course to the sea the result would be disastrous to the Roman people; on the other hand, if the waters were drained off in such a way that they did not reach the sea the result would be to our advantage. In consequence of this announcement our forefathers dug that marvellous canal to drain off the waters from the Alban lake. Later when the Veientians had grown weary of war and had sent ambassadors to the Senate to treat for peace, one of them is reported to have said that the deserter had not dared to tell the whole of the prophecy contained in the Veientian books, for those books, he said, also foretold the early capture of Rome by the Gauls. And this, as we know, did occur six years after the fall of Veii.

Latin: XLIV [99] Caeciliae Q. filiae somnio modo Marsico bello templum est a senatu Iunoni Sospitae restitutum. Quod quidem somnium Sisenna cum disputavisset mirifice ad verbum cum re convenisse, tum insolenter, credo ab Epicureo aliquo inductus, disputat somniis credi non oportere. Idem contra ostenta nihil disputat exponitque initio belli Marsici et deorum simulacra sudavisse, et sanguinem fluxisse, et discessisse caelum, et ex occulto auditas esse voces, quae pericula belli nuntiarent, et Lanuvii clipeos, quod haruspicibus tristissumum visum esset, a muribus esse derosos. [100] Quid quod in annalibus habemus Veienti bello, cum lacus Albanus praeter modum crevisset, Veientem quendam ad nos hominem nobilem perfugisse, eumque dixisse ex fatis, quae Veientes scripta haberent, Veios capi non posse, dum lacus is redundaret, et, si lacus emissus lapsu et cursu suo ad mare profluxisset, perniciosum populo Romano; sin autem ita esset eductus, ut ad mare pervenire non posset, tum salutare nostris fore? Ex quo illa mirabilis a maioribus Albanae aquae facta deductio est. Cum autem Veientes bello fessi legatos ad senatum misissent, tum ex iis quidam dixisse dicitur non omnia illum transfugam ausum esse senatui dicere: in isdem enim fatis scriptum Veientes habere fore ut brevi a Gallis Roma caperetur, quod quidem sexennio post Veios captos factum esse videmus.

XLV.

The cry of the fauns, too, has often been heard in battle; and prophetic voices have often sounded from secret places in periods of trouble; of which, among others, we have two notable examples, — for shortly before the capture of Rome a voice was heard which proceeded from the grove of Vesta, which skirts the new road at the foot of the Palatine Hill, exhorting the citizens to repair the walls and gates, for that if they were not taken care of the city would be taken. The injunction was neglected till it was too late, and after the disaster had occurred, our citizens erected an altar to Aius the Speaker, which we may still see carefully fenced round, opposite the spot where the warning was uttered. Many authors have reported that once, after a great earthquake had happened, they heard a voice from the temple of Juno, commanding that expiation should be made by the sacrifice of a pregnant sow, and hence it was afterwards called the temple of Juno the Admonitress. Shall we then despise these oracular intimations, which the Gods themselves vouchsafed us, and which our ancestors have confirmed by their testimony?

The Pythagoreans had not only high reverence for the voice of the Gods, but they likewise respected the warnings of men (hominum), which they call omina. And our ancestors were persuaded that much virtue resides in certain words, and therefore prefaced their various enterprises with certain auspicious phrases, such as, “May good and prosperous and happy fortune attend.” They commenced all the public ceremonies of religion with these words, — “Keep silence;” and when they announced any holidays, they commanded that all lawsuits and quarrels should be suspended. Likewise, when the chief who forms a colony makes a lustration and review of it, or when a general musters an army, or a censor the people, they always choose those who have lucky names to prepare the sacrifices. The consuls in their military enrolments likewise take care that the first soldier enrolled shall be one with a fortunate name; and you know that you yourself were very attentive to these ceremonial observances when you were consul and imperator. Our ancestors have likewise enjoined that the name of the tribe which had the precedence should be regarded as the presage of a legitimate assembly of the Comitia.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "Again, we are told that fauns have often been heard in battle and that during turbulent times truly prophetic messages have been sent from mysterious places. Out of many instances of this class I shall give only two, but they are very striking. Not long before the capture of the city by the Gauls, a voice, issuing from Vesta's sacred grove, which slopes from the foot of the Palatine Hill to New Road, was heard to say, "the walls and gates must be repaired; unless this is done the city will be taken." Neglect of this warning, while it was possible to heed it, was atoned for after the supreme disaster had occurred; for, adjoining the grove, an altar, which is now to be seen enclosed with a hedge, was dedicated to Aius the Speaker. The other illustration has been reported by many writers. At the time of the earthquake a voice came from Juno's temple on the citadel commanding that an expiatory sacrifice be made of a pregnant sow. From this fact the goddess was called Juno the Adviser. Are we, then, lightly to regard these warnings which the gods have sent and our forefathers adjudged to be trustworthy?

"Nor is it only to the voices of the gods that the Pythagoreans have paid regard but also to the utterances of men which they term "omens." Our ancestors, too, considered such "omens" worthy of respect, and for that reason, before entering upon any business enterprise, used to say, "May the issue be prosperous, propitious, lucky, and successful." At public celebrations of religious rites they gave the command, "Guard your tongues"; and in issuing the order for the Latin festival the customary injunction was, "Let the people refrain from strife and quarrelling." So too, when the sacred ceremony of purification was held by one starting on an expedition to found a colony, or when the commander-in-chief was reviewing his army, or the censor was taking his census, it was the rule to choose men with names of good omen to lead the victims. Furthermore, the consuls in making a levy of troops take pains to see that the first soldier enlisted is one with a lucky name. You, of course, are aware that you, both as consul at home and later as commander in the field, employed the same precaution with the most scrupulous care. In the case, too, of the prerogative tribe or century, our forefathers determined that it should be the "omen" of a proper election.

Latin: XLV [101] Saepe etiam et in proeliis Fauni auditi et in rebus turbidis veridicae voces ex occulto missae esse dicuntur; cuius generis duo sint ex multis exempla, sed maxuma. Nam non multo ante urbem captam exaudita vox est a luco Vestae, qui a Palati radice in novam viam devexus est, ut muri et portae reficerentur; futurum esse, nisi provisum esset, ut Roma caperetur. Quod neglectum cum caveri poterat, post acceptam illam maximam cladem expiatum est; ara enim Aio Loquenti, quam saeptam videmus, exadversus eum locum consecrata est. Atque etiam scriptum a multis est, cum terrae motus factus esset ut sue plena procuratio fieret, vocem ab aede Iunonis ex arce exstitisse; quocirca Iunonem iram appellatam Monetam. Haec igitur et a dis significata et a nostris maioribus iudicata contemnimus? [102] Neque solum deorum voces Pythagorei observitaverunt, sed etiam hominum, quae vocant omina. Quae maiores nostri quia valere censebant, idcirco omnibus rebus agendis "quod bonum, faustum, felix fortunatumque esset" praefabantur, rebusque divinis, quae publice fierent, ut "faverent linguis" imperabatur, inque feriis imperandis ut "litibus et iurgiis se abstinerent". Itemque in lustranda colonia ab eo qui eam deduceret, et cum imperator exercitum, censor populum lustraret, bonis nominibus qui hostias ducerent eligebantur. Quod idem in dilectu consules observant, ut primus miles fiat bono nomine. [103] Quae quidem a te scis et consule et imperatore summa cum religione esse servata. Praerogativam etiam maiores omen iustorum comitiorum esse voluerunt.

XLVI.

And of presages of this kind I can relate to you several celebrated examples. Under the second consulship of Lucius Paulus, when the charge of making war against the king Perses had not been allotted to him, it happened that on the evening of that very same day, when he returned home and kissed his little daughter Tertia, he noticed that she was very sorrowful. “What is the matter, my Tertia,” said he, “why are you so sad?” “My father,” replied she, “Perses has perished.” Upon which he caught her in his arms, and, caressing her, exclaimed, “I embrace the omen, my daughter.” But the real truth was, that her dog, who happened to be called Perses, had died.

I have heard Lucius Flaccus, a priest of Mars, say, that Cæcilia, the daughter of Metellus, intending to make a matrimonial engagement for her sister’s daughter, went to a certain temple, in order to procure an omen, according to the ancient custom. Here the maiden stood, and Cæcilia sat for a long time without hearing any sound, till the girl, who grew tired of standing, begged her aunt to allow her to occupy her seat for a short period, in order to rest herself. Cæcilia replied, “Yes, my child, I willingly resign my seat to you.” And this reply of hers was an omen, confirmed by the event, for Cæcilia died soon after, and her niece married her aunt’s husband.

I know that men may despise such stories, or even laugh at them, but such conduct amounts to a disbelief in the existence of the Gods themselves, and to a contempt of their revealed will.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "Now let me give some well-known examples of omens: When Lucius Paulus was consul the second time, and had been chosen to wage war against King Perses, upon returning home on the evening of the day on which he had been appointed, he noticed, as he kissed his little daughter Tertia (at that time a very small child), that she was rather sad. "What is the matter, Tertia, my dear? Why are you sad?" "Oh! father, Persa is dead." Paulus clasped the child in a closer embrace and said, "Daughter, I accept that as an omen." Now "Persa" was the name of a little dog that had died. I heard Lucius Flaccus, the high priest of Mars, relate the following story: Metellus' daughter, Caecilia, who was desirous of arranging a marriage for her sister's daughter, went, according to the ancient custom, to a small chapel to receive an omen. A long time passed while the maiden stood and Caecilia was seated on a chair without any word being spoken. Finally, the former grew weary and said to her aunt: "Let me sit awhile on your chair." "Certainly, my child," said Caecilia, "you may have my place." And this was an omen of what came to pass, for in a short time Caecilia died and the girl married her aunt's husband. I realize perfectly well that the foregoing omens may be lightly regarded and even be laughed at, but to make light of signs sent by the gods is nothing less than to disbelieve in the existence of the gods.

Latin: XLVI Atque ego exempla ominum nota proferam. L. Paulus consul iterum, cum ei bellum ut cum rege Perse gereret obtigisset, ut ea ipsa die domum ad vesperum rediit, filiolam suam Tertiam, quae tum erat admodum parva, osculans animadvertit tristiculam. "Quid est," inquit, "mea Tertia? quid tristis es?" "Mi pater," inquit, "Persa periit." Tum ille artius puellam complexus: "Accipio," inquit, "mea filia, omen." Erat autem mortuus catellus eo nomine. [104] L. Flaccum, flaminem Martialem, ego audivi, cum diceret Caeciliam Metelli, cum vellet sororis suae filiam in matrimonium conlocare, exisse in quoddam sacellum ominis capiendi causa, quod fieri more veterum solebat. Cum virgo staret et Caecilia in sella sederet, neque diu ulla vox exstitisset, puellam defatigatam petisse a matertera, ut sibi concederet paulisper ut in eius sella requiesceret; illam autem dixisse: "Vero, mea puella, tibi concedo meas sedes." Quod omen res consecuta est; ipsa enim brevi mortua est, virgo autem nupsit, cui Caecilia nupta fuerat. Haec posse contemni vel etiam rideri praeclare intellego, sed id ipsum est deos non putare, quae ab iis significantur contemnere.

XLVII.

Why need I speak of the augurs? — that part of the question concerns you. The defence of the auguries, I say, belongs peculiarly to you. When you were a consul, Publius Claudius, who was one of the augurs, announced to you, when the augury of the Goddess of Salus was doubted, that a disastrous domestic and civil war would take place, which happened a few months afterwards in still fewer days. And I highly approve of that augur, who alone for a long period remained constant to the study of divination, without making a parade of his auguries, while his colleagues and yours persisted in laughing at him, sometimes terming him an augur of Pisidia or Sora by way of ridicule.

Those who assert that neither auguries nor auspices can give us any insight into or foreknowledge of the future, say that they are merely superstitious practices, wisely invented to impose on the ignorant; which, however, is far from being the case: for our pastoral ancestors under Romulus were not, nor indeed was Romulus himself, so crafty and cunning as to invent religious impositions for the purpose of deceiving the multitude. But the difficulty of acquiring a thorough knowledge of the auspices renders many who are indifferent to them eloquent in their disparagement, for they would rather deny that there is anything in the auspices than take the pains of studying what there really is. What can be more divine than that prediction, which you cite in your poem of Marius, that I may quote your own authority in favour of my argument? —

Jove’s eagle, wounded by a serpent’s bite, In his strong talons caught the writhing snake, And with his goring beak tortured his foe And slaked his vengeance in his blood. At last He let the venomous reptile from on high Fall in the whelming flood, then wing’d his flight To the far east. Marius beheld, and mark’d The augury divine, and inly smiled To view the presage of his coming fame; Meanwhile the thunder sounded on the left, And thus confirm’d the omen.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "Why need I speak of augurs? That is your role; the duty to defend auspices, I maintain, is yours. For it was to you, while you were consul, that the augur Appius Claudius declared that because the augury of safety was unpropitious a grievous and violent civil war was at hand. That war began few months later, but you brought it to an end in still fewer days. Appius is one augur of whom I heartily approve, for not content merely with the sing-song ritual of augury, he, alone, according to the record of many years, has maintained a real system of divination. I know that your colleagues used to laugh at him and call him the one time "a Pisidian" and at another "a Soran." They did not concede to augury any power of prevision or real knowledge of the future, and used to say that it was a superstitious practice shrewdly invented to gull the ignorant. But the truth is far otherwise, for neither those herdsmen whom Romulus governed, nor Romulus himself, could have had cunning enough to invent miracles with which to mislead the people. It is the trouble and hard work involved in mastering the art that has induced this eloquent contempt; for men prefer to say glibly that there is nothing in auspices rather than to learn what auspices are.

"Now -- to employ you as often as I can as my authority -- what could be more clearly of divine origin than the auspice which is thus described in your Marius?

Latin: XLVII [105] Quid de auguribus loquar? Tuae partes sunt, tuum, inquam, auspiciorum atrocinium debet esse. Tibi App. Claudius augur consuli nuntiavit addubitato salutis augurio bellum domesticum triste ac turbulentum fore; quod paucis post mensibus exortum paucioribus a te est diebus oppressum. Cui quidem auguri vehementer adsentior; solus enim multorum annorum memoria non decantandi augurii, sed divinandi tenuit disciplinam. Quem inridebant collegae tui eumque tum Pisidam, tum Soranum augurem esse dicebant; quibus nulla videbatur in auguriis aut praesensio aut scientia veritatis futurae; sapienter aiebant ad opinione imperitorum esse fictas religiones. Quod longe secus est neque enim in pastoribus illis, quibus Romulus praefuit, ne in ipso Romulo haec calliditas esse potuit, ut ad errorem multitudinis religionis simulacra fingerent. Sed difficultas laborque discendi disertare neglegentiam reddidit; malunt enim disserere nihil esse in auspiciis quam, quid sit, ediscere. [106] Quid est illo auspicio divinius, quod apud te in Mario est?

XLVIII.

Moreover, the augurial system of Romulus was a pastoral rather than a civic institution. Nor was it framed to suit the opinions of the ignorant, but derived from men of approved skill, and so handed down to posterity by tradition. Therefore Romulus was himself an augur as well as his brother Remus, if we may trust the authority of Ennius, —

Both wish’d to reign, and both agreed to abide The fair decision of the augury Here Remus stood alone, and watch’d for signs Of far’ring omen, while fair Romulus On the Aventine summit raised his eyes To see what lofty flying birds should pass, A goodly contest which should rule, and which With his own name should stamp the future city. Now like spectators in the circus, till The consul’s signal loses from the goal The eager chariots, so the obedient crowd Awaited the strife’s victor and their king. The golden sun departed into night, And the pale moon shone with reflected ray, When on the left a joyful bird appear’d, And golden Sol brought back the radiant day. Twelve holy forms of Jove-directed birds Wing’d their propitious flight. Great Romulus The omen hail’d, for now to him was given The power to found and name th’ eternal city.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "As for that augural art of Romulus of which I spoke, it was pastoral and not city-bred, nor was it "invented to gull the ignorant," but received by trustworthy men, who handed it on to their descendants. And so we read in Ennius the following story of Romulus, who was an augur, and of his brother Remus, who also was an augur.

"But let us bring the discussion back to the point from which it wandered. Assume that I can give no reason for any of the instances of divination which I have mentioned and that I can do no more than show that they did occur, is that not a sufficient answer to Epicurus and to Carneades? And what does it matter if, as between artificial and natural divination, the explanation of the former is easy and of the latter is somewhat hard? For the results of those artificial means of divination, by means of entrails, lightnings, portents, and astrology, have been the subject of observation for a long period of time. But in every field of inquiry great length of time employed in continued observation begets an extraordinary fund of knowledge, which may be acquired even without the intervention or inspiration of the gods, since repeated observation makes it clear what effect follows any given cause, and what sign precedes any given event.

Latin: XLVIII [107] Atque ille Romuli auguratus pastoralis, non urbanus fuit, nec fictus ad opiniones imperitorum, sed a certis acceptus et posteris traditus. Itaque Romulus augur, ut apud Ennium est, cum fratre item augure divinaturi fuerunt urbem. [108] Sed ut, unde huc digressa est, eodem redeat oratio: si nihil queam disputare quam ob rem quidque fiat, et tantum modo fieri ea quae commemoravi doceam, parumne Epicuro Carneadive respondeam? Quid si etiam ratio exstat artificiosae praesensionis facilis, divinae autem paulo obscurior? Quae enim extis, quae fulgoribus, quae portentis, quae astris praesentiuntur, haec notata sunt observatione diuturna; adfert autem vetustas omnibus in rebus longinqua observatione incredibilem scientiam; quae potest esse etiam sine motu atque impulsu deorum, cum quid ex quoque eveniat et quid quamque rem significet crebra animadversione perspectum est.

XLIX.

Now, however, let us return to the original point from which we have been digressing. Though I cannot give you a reason for all these separate facts, and can only distinctly assert that those things which I have spoken of did really happen, yet have I not sufficiently answered Epicurus and Carneades by facing the facts themselves? Why may I not admit, that though it may be easy to find principles on which to explain artificial presages, the subject of divine intimations is more obscure? for the presages which we deduce from an examination of a victim’s entrails, from thunder and lightning, from prodigies, and from the stars, are founded on the accurate observation of many centuries. Now it is certain, that a long course of careful observation, thus carefully conducted for a series of ages, usually brings with it an incredible accuracy of knowledge; and this can exist even without the inspiration of the Gods, when it has been once ascertained by constant observation what follows after each omen, and what is indicated by each prodigy.

The other kind of divination is natural, as I have said before, and may by physical subtlety of reasoning appear referable to the nature of the Gods, from which, as the wisest men acknowledge, we derive and enjoy the energies of our souls; and as everything is filled and pervaded by a divine intelligence and eternal sense, it follows of necessity that the soul of man must be influenced by its kindred with the soul of the Deity. But when we are not asleep, our faculties are employed on the necessary affairs of life, and so are hindered from communication with the Deity by the bondage of the body.

There are, however, a small number of persons, who, as it were, detach their souls from the body, and addict themselves, with the utmost anxiety and diligence, to the study of the nature of the Gods. The presentiments of men like these are derived not from divine inspiration, but from human reason; for from a contemplation of nature, they anticipate things to come, — as deluges of water, and the future deflagration, at some time or other, of heaven and earth.

There are others who, being concerned in the government of states, foresee the rise of new tyranies. Such we usually term prudent men; like Thales the Milesian, who, wishing to convict his slanderers, and to show that even a philosopher could make money, if he should be so inclined, bought up all the olive-trees in Miletus before they were in flower; for he had probably, by some knowledge of his own, calculated that there would be a heavy crop of olives. And Thales is said to have been the first man by whom an eclipse of the sun was ever predicted, which happened under the reign of Astyages.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "The second division of divination, as I said before, is the natural; and it, according to exact teaching of physics, must be ascribed to divine Nature, from which, as the wisest philosophers maintain, our souls have been drawn and poured forth. And since the universe is wholly filled with the Eternal Intelligence and the Divine Mind, it must be that human souls are influenced by their contact with divine souls. But when men are awake their souls, as a rule, are subject to the demands of everyday life and are withdrawn from divine association because they are hampered by the chains of the flesh.

"However, there is a certain class of men, though small in number, who withdraw themselves from carnal influences and are wholly possessed by an ardent concern for the contemplation of things divine. Some of these men make predictions, not as the result of direct heavenly inspiration, but by the use of their own reason. For example, by means of natural law, they foretell certain events, such as a flood, or the future destruction of heaven and earth by fire. Others, who are engaged in public life, like Solon of Athens, as history describes him, discover the rise of tyranny long in advance. Such men we may call "foresighted" -- that is, "able to foresee the future"; but we can no more apply the term "divine" to them than we can apply it to Thales of Miletus, who, as the story goes, in order to confound his critics and thereby show that even a philosopher, if he sees fit, can make money, bought up the entire olive crop in the district of Miletus before it had begun to bloom. Perhaps he had observed, from some personal knowledge he had on the subject, that the crop would be abundant. And, by the way, he is said to have been the first man to predict the solar eclipse which took place in the reign of Astyages.

Latin: XLIX [109] Altera divinatio est naturalis, ut ante dixi; quae physica disputandi subtilitate reverenda est ad naturam deorum, a qua, ut doctissimis sapientissimisque placuit, haustos animos et libatos habemus; cumque omnia completa et referta sint aeterno sensu et mente divina, necesse est cognatione divinorum animorum animos humanos commoveri. Sed vigilantes animi vitae necessitatibus serviunt diiunguntque se a societate divina vinclis corporis impediti. [110] (Rarum est quoddam genus eorum qui se a corpore avocent et ad divinarum rerum cognitionem cura omni studioque rapiantur). Horum sunt auguria non divini impetus, sed rationis humanae; nam et natura futura praesentiunt, ut aquarum eluviones et deflagrationem futuram aliquando caeli atque terrarum; alii autem in re publica exercitati, ut de Atheniensi Solone accepimus, orientem tyrannidem multo ante prospiciunt. Quos prudentes possumus dicere, id est providentes, divinos nullo modo possumus, non plus quam Milesium Thalem, qui, ut obiurgatores suos convinceret ostenderetque etiam philosophum, si ei commodum esset, pecuniam facere posse, omnem oleam, ante quam florere coepisset, in agro Milesio coemisse dicitur. [111] Animadverterat fortasse quadam scientia olearum ubertatem fore. Et quidem idem primus defectionem solis, quae Astyage regnante facta est, praedixisse fertur.

L.

Physicians, pilots, and husbandmen have likewise presentiments of many events: but I do not choose to call this divination; neither do I call that warning which was given by the natural philosopher Anaximander to the Lacedæmonians, when he forewarned them to quit their city and homes, and to spend the whole night in arms on the plain, because he foresaw the approach of a great earthquake, which took place that very night, and demolished the whole town; and even the lower part of Mount Taygetus was torn away from the rest, like the stern of a ship might be. In the same way, it is not so much as a diviner, as a natural philosopher that we should esteem Pherecydes, the master of Pythagoras, who, when he beheld the water exhausted in a running spring, predicted that an earthquake was nigh at hand.

The mind of man, however, never exerts the power of natural divination, unless when it is so free and disengaged as to be wholly disentangled from the body, as happens in the case of prophets and sleepers.

Therefore, as I have said before, Dicæarchus and our friend Cratippus approve of these two sorts of divination, as long as it is understood that, inasmuch as they proceed from nature, though they may be the highest, they are not the only kind. But if they deny that there is any force in observation, then by such denial they exclude many things which are connected with the common experience and institutions of mankind. However, since they grant us some, and those not insignificant things, namely, prophecies and dreams, there is no reason why we should consider these as very formidable antagonists, especially when there are some who deny the existence of divination altogether.

Those, therefore, whose minds, as it were, despising their bodies, fly forth, and wander freely through the universe, being inspired and influenced by a certain divine ardour, doubtless perceive those things which those who prophecy predict. And spirits like these are excited by many influences that have no connexion with the body, as those which are excited by certain intonations of voice, and by Phrygian melodies, or by the silence of groves and forests, or the murmur of torrents, or the roar of the sea. Such are the minds which are susceptible of ecstasies, and which long beforehand foresee the events of futurity: — to which the following lines refer: —

Ah, see you not the vengeance apt to come, Because a mortal has presumed to judge Between three rival goddesses? — he’s doom’d More dreadful than all furies.

Many things have in the same way been predicted by prophets, and not only in ordinary language, but also

In verses which the fauns of olden times And white-hair’d prophets chanted.

It was thus that the diviners, Marcius and Publicius, are said to have sung their predictions. The mysterious responses of Apollo were of the same nature. I believe also that there were certain exhalations of certain earths, by which gifted minds were inspired to utter oracles. These, then, are the views which we must entertain of prophets.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "There are many things foreseen by physicians, pilots, and also by farmers, but I do not call the predictions of any of them divination. I do not even call that a case of divination when Anaximander, the natural philosopher, warned the Spartans to leave the city and their homes and to sleep in the fields under arms, because an earthquake was at hand. Then the whole city fell down in ruins and the extremity of Mount Taygetus was torn away like the stern of a ship in a storm. Not even Pherecydes, the famous teacher of Pythagoras, will be considered a prophet because he predicted an earthquake from the appearance of some water drawn from an unfailing well.

"In fact, the human soul never divines naturally, except when it is so unrestrained and free that it has absolutely no association with the body, as happens in the case of frenzy and of dreams. Hence both these kinds of divination have been sanctioned by Dicaearchus and also, as I said, by our friend Cratippus. Let us grant that these two methods (because they originate in nature) take the highest rank in divination; but we will not concede that they are the only kind. But if, on the other hand, Dicaearchus and Cratippus believe that there is nothing in observation, they hold a doctrine destructive of the foundation on which many things in everyday life depend. However, since these men make us some concession -- and that not a small one -- in granting us divination by frenzy and dreams, I see no cause for any great war with them, especially in view of the fact that there are some philosophers who do not accept any sort of divination whatever.

"Those then, whose souls, spurning their bodies, take wings and fly abroad -- inflamed and aroused by a sort of passion -- these men, I say, certainly see the things which they foretell in their prophecies. Such souls do not cling to the body and are kindled by many different influences. For example, some are aroused by certain vocal tones, as by Phrygian songs, many by groves and forests, and many others by rivers and seas. I believe, too, that there were certain subterranean vapours which had the effect of inspiring persons to utter oracles. In all these cases the frenzied soul sees the future long in advance, as Cassandra did. It is in this state of exaltation that many predictions have been made, not only in prose but also in verse. Likewise Marcius and Publicius, according to tradition, made their prophecies in verse, and the cryptic utterances of Apollo were expressed in the same form.

Latin: L Multa medici multa gubernatores, agricolae etiam multa praesentiunt, sed nullam eorum divinationem voco, ne illam quidem, qua ab Anaximandro physico moniti Lacedaemonii sunt, ut urbem et tecta linquerent armatique in agro excubarent, quod terrae motus instaret, tum cum et urbs tota corruit et e monte Taygeto extrema quasi puppis avolsa est. Ne Pherecydes quidem, ille Pythagorae magister, potius divinus habebitur quam physicus, quod, cum vidisset haustam aquam de iugi puteo, terrae motus dixit instare. [112] Nec vero umquam animus hominis naturaliter divinat, nisi cum ita solutus est et vacuus, ut ei plane nihil sit cum corpore; quod aut vatibus contingit aut dormientibus. Itaque ea duo genera a Dicaearcho probantur et, ut dixi, a Cratippo nostro; si propterea quod ea proficiscuntur a natura, sint summa sane, modo ne sola; sin autem nihil esse in observatione putant, multa tollunt quibus vitae ratio continetur. Sed quoniam dant aliquid, idque non parvum, nihil est quod cum his magnopere pugnemus, praesertim cum sint, qui omnino nullam divinationem probent. [113] Ergo et ii, quorum animi spretis corporibus evolant atque excurrunt foras, ardore aliquo inflammati atque incitati cernunt illa profecto quae vaticinantes pronuntiant, multisque rebus inflammantur tales animi, qui corporibus non inhaerent, ut ii qui sono quodam vocum et Phrygiis cantibus incitantur. Multos nemora silvaeque, multos amnes aut maria commovent, quorum furibunda mens videt ante multo quae sint futura. Eodem enim modo multa a vaticinantibus saepe praedicta sunt neque solum solutis verbis, sed etiam versibus quos olim Fauni vatesque canebant. [114] Similiter Marcius et Publicius vates cecinisse dicuntur; quo de genere Apollinis operta prolata sunt. Credo etiam anhelitus quosdam fuisse terrarum, quibus inflatae mentes oracla funderent.

LI.

Divinations by dreams are of a similar order, because presentiments which happen to diviners when awake, happen to ourselves during sleep. For in sleep the soul is vigorous, and free from the obstruction of the senses, and the obstruction of the cares of the body, which lies prostrate and deathlike; and, since the soul has lived from all eternity, and is engaged with spirits innumerable, it therefore beholds all things in the universe, if it only preserves a watchful attitude, unencumbered by excess of food or drinking, so that the mind is awake during the slumber of the body, — this is the divination of dreamers.

Here, then, comes in an important, and far from natural, but a very artificial interpretation of dreams by Antipho: and he interprets oracles and prophecies in the same way; for they are explainers of these things just as grammarians are expounders of poets. For, as it would have been in vain for nature to have produced gold, silver, iron, and copper, if she had not taught us the means of extracting them from her bosom for our use and benefit; and as it would have been in vain for her to have bestowed seeds and fruits upon men, if she had not taught them to distinguish and cultivate them, — for what use would any materials whatsoever be to us, if we had no means of working them up? — thus with every useful thing which the Gods have bestowed on us, they have vouchsafed us the sagacity by which its utility may be appreciated; and so, because in dreams, oracles, and prophecies there are many things necessarily obscure and ambiguous, there some have received the gift of interpretation of them.

But by what means prophets and sleepers behold those things, which do not at the time exist in sensible reality, is a great question. But when we have once cleared up those points which ought to be investigated first, then the other subjects of our examination will be easier. For the discussion about the Nature of the Gods, which you have so clearly explained in your second book on that subject, embraces the whole question; for if we grant that there are Gods, and that their providence governs the affairs of all human affairs, and that not only in general, but in particular, — if we grant this, which indeed appears to me to be undeniable, then we must hold it as a necessary consequence that these Gods have bestowed on men the signs and indications of futurity.

The mode, however, by which the Gods endue us with the gift and power of divination requires some notice.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "Such is the rationale of prophecy by means of frenzy, and that of dreams is not much unlike it. For the revelations made to seers when awake are made to us in sleep. While we sleep and the body lies as if dead, the soul is at its best, because it is then freed from the influence of the physical senses and from the worldly cares that weigh it down. And since the soul has lived from all eternity and has had converse with numberless other souls, it sees everything that exists in nature, provided that moderation and restraint have been used in eating and in drinking, so that the soul is in a condition to watch while the body sleeps. Such is the explanation of divination by dreams.

"At this point it is pertinent to mention Antiphon's well-known theory of the interpretation of dreams. His view is that the interpreters of dreams depend upon technical skill and not upon inspiration. He has the same view as to the interpretation of oracles and of frenzied utterances; for they all have their interpreters, just as poets have their commentators. Now it is clear that divine nature would have done a vain thing if she had merely created iron, copper, silver, and gold and had not shown us how to reach the veins in which those metals lie; the gift of field crops and orchard fruits would have been useless to the human race without a knowledge of how to cultivate them and prepare them for food; and building material would be of no service without the carpenter's art to convert it into lumber. So it is with everything that the gods have given for the advantage of mankind, there has been joined some art whereby that advantage may be turned to account. The same is true of dreams, prophecies, and oracles: since many of them were obscure and doubtful, resort was had to the skill of professional interpreters.

"Now there is a great problem as to how prophets and dreamers can see things, which, at the time, have no actual existence anywhere. But that question would be solved quite readily if we were to investigate certain other questions which demand consideration first. For the theory in regard to the nature of the gods, so clearly developed in the second book of your work on that subject, includes this whole question. If we maintain that theory we shall establish the very point which I am trying to make: namely, "that there are gods; that they rule the universe by their foresight; and that they direct the affairs of men -- not merely of men in the mass, but of each individual." If we succeed in holding that position -- and for my part I think it impregnable -- then surely it must follow that the gods give to men signs of coming events.

Latin: LI Atque haec quidem vatium ratio est, nec dissimilis sane somniorum. Nam quae vigilantibus accidunt vatibus, eadem nobis dormientibus. Viget enim animus in somnis liber ab sensibus omnique impeditione curarum, iacente et mortuo paene corpore. Qui quia vixit ab omni aeternitate versatusque est cum innumerabilibus animis, omnia quae in natura rerum sunt videt, si modo temperatis escis modicisque potionibus ita est adfectus, ut sopito corpore ipse vigilet. Haec somniantis est divinatio. [115] Hic magna quaedam exoritur, neque ea naturalis, sed artificiosa somniorum interpretatio eodemque modo et oraculorum et vaticinationum: sunt enim explanatores, ut grammatici poetarum. [116] Quo modo autem aut vates aut somniantes ea videant, quae nusquam etiam tunc sint, magna quaestio est. Sed explorata si sint ea quae ante quaeri debeant, sint haec quae quaerimus faciliora. Continet enim totam hanc quaestionem ea ratio, quae est de natura deorum, quae a te secundo libro est explicata dilucide. Quam si obtinemus, stabit illud quod hunc locum continet de quo agimus: esse deos, et eorum providentia mundum administrari, eosdemque consulere rebus humanis, nec solum universis, verum etiam singulis. Haec si tenemus, quae mihi quidem non videntur posse convelli, profecto hominibus a dis futura significari necesse est.

LII.

The Stoics will not allow that the Deity can be interested in each cleft in entrails, or in the chirping of birds. They affirm that such interference is altogether indecorous — unworthy of the majesty of the Gods, and an incredible impossibility. They maintain that from the beginning of the world it has been ordained that certain signs must needs precede certain events, some of which are drawn from the entrails of animals, some from the note and flight of birds, some from the sight of lightning, some from prodigies, some from stars, some from visions of dreamers, and some from exclamations of men in frenzy: and those who have a clear perception of these things are not often deceived. Bad conjectures and incorrect interpretations are false, not because of any imposture in the signs themselves, but because of the ignorance of their expounders.

It being, therefore, granted and conceded that there exists a certain divine energy, by which human life is supported and surrounded, it is not hard to conceive how all that happens to men may happen by the direction of heaven; for this divine and sentient energy, which expands throughout the universe, may select a victim for sacrifice, and may, by exterior agency, effect any change in the condition of its entrails at the period of its immolation: so that any given characteristic may be found excessive or defective in the animal’s body, or new-model, or diminish many things. And the prodigies which happened a little before Cæsar’s death are of great weight in preventing us from doubting this, — when on that very day on which he first sat on the golden throne and went forth clad in a purple robe, when he was sacrificing, no heart was found in the intestines of the fat ox. Do you then suppose that any warm-blooded animal, unless by divine interference, can live an instant without a heart? He was himself surprised at the novelty of the phenomenon; on which Spurinna observed that he had reason to fear that he would lose both sense and life, since both of these proceed from the heart. The next day the liver of the victim was found defective in the upper extremity. Doubtless the immortal Gods vouchsafed Cæsar these signs to apprize him of his approaching death, though not to enable him to guard against it.

When, therefore, we cannot discover in the entrails of the victim those organs without which the animal cannot live, we must necessarily suppose that they have been annihilated by a superintending Providence at the very instant that the sacrifice is offered.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "But it seems necessary to settle the principle on which these signs depend. For, according to the Stoic doctrine, the gods are not directly responsible for every fissure in the liver or for every song of a bird; since, manifestly, that would not be seemly or proper in a god and furthermore is impossible. But, in the beginning, the universe was so created that certain results would be preceded by certain signs, which are given sometimes by entrails and by birds, sometimes by lightnings, by portents, and by stars, sometimes by dreams, and sometimes by utterances of persons in a frenzy. And these signs do not often deceive the persons who observe them properly. If prophecies, based on erroneous deductions and interpretations, turn out to be false, the fault is not chargeable to the signs but to the lack of skill in the interpreters.

"Assuming the proposition to be conceded that there is a divine power which pervades the lives of men, it is not hard to understand the principle directing those premonitory signs which we see come to pass. For it may be that the choice of a sacrificial victim is guided by an intelligent force, which is diffused throughout the universe; or, it may be that at the moment when the sacrifice is offered, a change in the vitals occurs and something is added or taken away; for many things are added to, changed, or diminished in an instant of time. Conclusive proof of this fact, sufficient to put it beyond the possibility of doubt, is afforded by incidents which happened just before Caesar's death. While he was offering sacrifices on the day when he sat for the first time on a golden throne and first appeared in public in a purple robe, no heart was found in the vitals of the votive ox. Now do you think it possible for any animal that has blood to exist without a heart? Caesar was unmoved by this occurrence, even though Spurinna warned him to beware lest thought and life should fail him -- both of which, he said, proceeded from the heart. On the following day there was no head to the liver of the sacrifice. These portents were sent by the immortal gods to Caesar that he might foresee his death, not that he might prevent it. Therefore, when those organs, without which the victim could not have lived, are found wanting in the vitals, we should understand that the absent organs disappeared at the very moment of immolation.

Latin: LII [117] Sed distinguendum videtur quonam modo. Nam non placet Stoicis singulis iecorum fissis aut avium cantibus interesse deum (neque enim decorum est nec dis dignum nec fieri ullo pacto potest), sed ita a principio incohatum esse mundum, ut certis rebus certa signa praecurrerent, alia in extis, alia in avibus, alia in fulgoribus, alia in ostentis, alia in stellis, alia in somniantium visis, alia in furentium vocibus. Ea quibus bene percepta sunt, ii non saepe falluntur; male coniecta maleque interpretata falsa sunt non rerum vitio, sed interpretum inscientia. Hoc autem posito atque concesso, esse quandam vim divinam hominum vitam continentem, non difficile est, quae fieri certe videmus, ea qua ratione fiant suspicari. Nam et ad hostiam deligendam potest dux esse vis quaedam sentiens, quae est toto confusa mundo, et tum ipsum, cum immolare velis, extorum fieri mutatio potest, ut aut absit aliquid aut supersit; parvis enim momentis multa natura aut adfingit aut mutat aut detrahit. [118] Quod ne dubitare possimus, maximo est argumento quod paulo ante interitum Caesaris contigit. Qui cum immolaret illo die quo primum in sella aurea sedit et cum purpurea veste processit, in extis bovis opimi cor non fuit. Num igitur censes ullum animal, quod sanguinem habeat, sine corde esse posse? Qua ille rei novitate perculsus, cum Spurinna diceret timendum esse ne et consilium et vita deficeret: earum enim rerum utramque a corde proficisci. Postero die caput in iecore non fuit. Quae quidem illi portendebantur a dis immortalibus ut videret interitum, non ut caveret. Cum igitur eae partes in extis non reperiuntur, sine quibus victuma illa vivere nequisset, intellegendum est in ipso immolationis tempore eas partes, quae absint, interisse.

LIII.

And the same divine influence may likewise be the cause why birds fly in different directions on different occasions, why they hide themselves sometimes in one place and sometimes in another, and why they sing on the right hand or on the left. For if every animal according to its own will can direct the motions of its body, so as to stoop, to look on one side, or to look up, and can bend, twist, contract, or extend its limbs as it pleases, and does those things almost before thinking of doing them, how much more easy is it for God to do so, whose deity governs and regulates all things.

It is the Deity, too, which presents various signs to us, many of which history has recorded for us; as for instance, we find it stated that if the moon was eclipsed a little before sunrise in the sign of Leo, it was a sign that Darius should be slain and the Persians be defeated by Alexander and the Macedonians. And if a girl was born with two heads, this was a sign that there was to be a sedition among the people and corruption and adultery at home. If a woman should dream that she was delivered of a lion, the country in which such an occurrence took place would soon be subjected to foreign domination. Of the same kind is the fact mentioned by Herodotus, that the son of Crœsus spoke, though the gift of speech was by nature denied him; which prodigy was an indication that his father’s kingdom and family would be utterly destroyed. And all our histories relate that the head of Servius Tullius while sleeping appeared to be on fire, which was a sign of the extraordinary events which followed.

As, therefore, a man who falls asleep while his mind is full of pure meditations, and all circumstances around him adapted to tranquillity, will experience in his dreams true and certain presentiments; so also the chaste and pure mind of a waking man is better suited to the observation of the course of the stars, or the flight of birds, and the intimations of the truth to be collected from entrails.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "The Divine Will accomplishes like results in the case of birds, and causes those known as alites, which give omens by their flight, to fly hither and thither and disappear now here and now there, and causes those known as oscines, which give omens by their cries, to sing now on the left and now on the right. For if every animal moves its body forward, sideways, or backward at will, it bends, twists, extends, and contracts its members as it pleases, and performs these various motions almost mechanically; how much easier it is for such results to be accomplished by a god, whose divine will all things obey! The same power sends us signs, of which history has preserved numerous examples. We find the following omens recorded: when just before sunrise the moon was eclipsed in the sign of Leo, this indicated that Darius and the Persians would be overcome in battle by the Macedonians under Alexander, and that Darius would die. Again, when a girl was born with two heads, this foretold sedition among the people and seduction and adultery in the home. When a woman dreamed that she had been delivered of a lion, this signified that the country in which she had the dream would be conquered by foreign nations.

"Another instance of a similar kind is related by Herodotus: Croesus's son, when an infant, spoke, and this prodigy foretold the utter overthrow of his father's family and kingdom. What history has failed to record the fact that while Servius Tullius slept his head burst into flame? Therefore, just as a man has clear and trustworthy dreams, provided he goes to sleep, not only with his mind prepared by noble thoughts, but also with every precaution taken to induce repose; so, too, he, when awake, is better prepared to interpret truly the messages of entrails, stars, birds, and all other signs, provided his soul is pure and undefiled.

Latin: LIII [119] Eademque efficit in avibus divina mens, ut tum huc, tum illuc volent alites, tum in hac, tum in illa parte se occultent, tum a dextra, tum a sinistra parte canant oscines. Nam si animal omne, ut vult, ita utitur motu sui corporis, prono, obliquo, supino, membraque quocumque vult flectit, contorquet, porrigit, contrahit eaque ante efficit paene quam cogitat, quanto id deo est facilius, cuius numini parent omnia! [120] Idemque mittit et signa nobis eius generis qualia permulta historia tradidit, quale scriptum illud videmus: si luna paulo ante solis ortum defecisset in signo Leonis, fore ut armis Dareus et Persae ab Alexandro et Macedonibus vincerentur Dareusque moreretur; et si puella nata biceps esset, seditionem in populo fore, corruptelam et adulterium domi; et si mulier leonem peperisse visa esset, fore, ut ab exteris gentibus vinceretur ea res publica, in qua id contigisset. Eiusdem generis etiam illud est quod scribit Herodotus, Croesi filium, cum esset infans, locutum; quo ostento regnum patris et domum funditus concidisse. Caput arsisse Servio Tullio dormienti quae historia non prodidit? Ut igitur qui se tradidit quieti praeparato animo cum bonis cogitationibus, tum rebus ad tranquillitatem accommodatis, certa et vera cernit in somnis, sic castus animus purusque vigilantis et ad astrorum et ad avium reliquorumque signorum et ad extorum veritatem est paratior.

LIV.

And connected with this principle is the tradition which we have received concerning Socrates, which is often affirmed by himself in the books of his disciples — that he possessed a certain divinity, which he called a demon, and to which he was always obedient, — a genius which never compelled him to action, but often deterred him from it. The same Socrates (and where can we find a better authority?) being consulted by Xenophon, whether he should follow Cyrus to the wars, gave him his counsel, and then added these words, — “The advice I give you is merely human: in such obscure and uncertain cases, it is best to consult the oracle of Apollo, to whom the Athenians have always publicly appealed in questions of importance.”

It is likewise written of Socrates, that having once seen his friend Crito with his eye bandaged, and having asked him what was the matter with it, he received for answer, that as he was walking in the fields, a branch of a tree he had attempted to bend sprang back, and hit him in the eye. Upon this, Socrates replied, “This is the consequence of your not having obeyed me when I recalled you, following the divine presentiment, according to my custom.”

Another remarkable story is told of Socrates. After the battle in which the Athenians were defeated at Delium, under the command of Laches, he was obliged to fly with that unfortunate general. At length reaching a spot where three ways meet, he refused to pursue the same track as the rest. When they inquired the cause of his behaviour, he said that he was restrained by a God. The others, who left Socrates, fell in with the enemy’s cavalry.

Antipater has collected many other instances of the admirable divination of Socrates, which I omit, for they are quite familiar to you, and I need not further enumerate them. I cannot, however, avoid mentioning one fact in the history of this philosopher, which strikes me as magnificent, and almost divine; — namely, that when he had been condemned by the sentence of impious men, he said, he was prepared to die with the most perfect equanimity; because the God within him had not suffered him to be afflicted with any idea of impending evil, either when he left his home, or when he appeared before the court.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "It is the purity of soul, no doubt, that explains that famous utterance which history attributes to Socrates and which his disciples in their books often represent him as repeating: "There is some divine influence" -- daimonion, he called it -- "which I always obey, though it never urges me on, but often holds me back." And it was the same Socrates -- and what better authority can we quote? -- who was consulted by Xenophon as to whether he should join Cyrus. Socrates, after stating what seemed to him the best thing to do, remarked: "But my opinion is only that of a man. In matters of doubt and perplexity I advise that Apollo's oracle be consulted." This oracle was always consulted by the Athenians in regard to the more serious public questions.

"It is also related of Socrates that one day he saw his friend Crito with a bandage on his eye. "What's the matter, Crito?" he inquired. "As I was walking in the country the branch of a tree, which had been bent, was released and struck me in the eye." "Of course," said Socrates, "for, after I had had divine warning, as usual, and tried to call you back, you did not heed." It is also related of him that after the unfortunate battle was fought at Delium under command of Laches, he was fleeing in company with his commander, when they came to a place where three roads met. Upon his refusal to take the road that the others had chosen he was asked the reason and replied: "The god prevents me." Those who fled by the other road fell in with the enemy's cavalry. Antipater has gathered a mass of remarkable premonitions received by Socrates, but I shall pass them by, for you know them and it is useless for me to recount them. However, the following utterance of that philosopher, made after he had been wickedly condemned to death, is a noble one -- I might almost call it "divine": "I am very content to die," he said; "for neither when I left my home nor when I mounted the platform to plead my cause, did the god give any sign, and this he always does when some evil threatens me."

Latin: LIV [121] Hoc nimirum est illud, quod de Socrate accepimus, quodque ab ipso in libris Socraticorum saepe dicitur: esse divinum quiddam, quod daimonion appellat, cui semper ipse paruerit numquam impellenti, saepe revocanti. Et Socrates quidem (quo quem auctorem meliorem quaerimus?) Xenophonti consulenti sequereturne Cyrum, posteaquam exposuit quae ipsi videbantur, "Et nostrum quidem," inquit, "humanum est consilium; sed de rebus et obscuris et incertis ad Apollinem censeo referundum, ad quem etiam Athenienses publice de maioribus rebus semper rettulerunt. [122] Scriptum est item, cum Critonis, sui familiaris, oculum adligatum vidisset, quaesivisse quid esset; cum autem ille respondisset in agro ambulanti ramulum adductum, ut remissus esset, in oculum suum recidisse, tum Socrates: "Non enim paruisti mihi revocanti, cum uterer, qua soleo, praesagatione divina." Idem etiam Socrates, cum apud Delium male pugnatum esset Lachete praetore fugeretque cum ipso Lachete, ut ventum est in trivium, eadem, qua ceteri, fugere noluit. Quibus quaerentibus cur non eadem via pergeret, deterreri se a deo dixit; cum quidem ii, qui alia via fugerant, in hostium equitatum inciderunt. Permulta conlecta sunt ab Antipatro, quae mirabiliter a Socrate divinata sunt; quae praetermittam; tibi enim nota sunt, mihi ad commemorandum non necessaria. [123] Illud tamen eius philosophi magnificum ac paene divinum, quod, cum impiis sententiis damnatus esset, aequissimo animo se dixit mori; neque enim domo egredienti neque illud suggestum, in quo causam dixerat, ascendenti signum sibi ullum, quod consuesset, a deo quasi mali alicuius impendentis datum.

LV.

I think, therefore, that true divination exists, although those men are often deceived who appear to proceed on conjecture, or on artificial rules. For men are fallible in all arts, and we cannot suppose that they are infallible here. It may happen that some sign, which has an ambiguous signification, is received in a certain one. It may happen that some particular has escaped the notice of the inquirer, or is purposely concealed by him, because it interests his interest.

I should, however, consider my plea for divination sufficiently established, if only a few well-authenticated cases of presentiment and prophecies could be discovered; whereas, in truth, there are many. I will even declare without hesitation, that a single instance of presage and prediction, all the points of which are borne out by subsequent events — and that definitely and regularly, not casually and fortuitously — would suffice to compel an admission of the reality of divination from all reasonable minds.

It appears to me, moreover, that we should refer all the virtue and power of divination to the Divinity, as Posidonius has done, as before observed; in the next place to Fate, and afterwards to the nature of things. For reason compels us to admit that by Fate all things take place. By Fate I mean that which the Greeks call εἱμαρμένη, that is, a certain order and series of causes — for cause linked to cause produces all things: and in this connexion of cause consists the constant truth which flows through all eternity. From whence it follows that nothing happens which is not predestined to happen; and in the same way nothing is predestined to happen, the nature of which does not contain the efficient causes of its happening.

From which it must be understood that fate is not a mere superstitious imagination, but is what is called, in the language of natural philosophy, the eternal cause of things; the cause why past things have happened, why present things do happen, and why future things will happen. And thus we are taught by exact observation, what consequences are usually produced, by what causes, though not invariably. And thus the causes of future events may truly be discerned by those who behold them in states of ecstasy or quiet.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "And so my opinion is that the power of divination exists, notwithstanding the fact that those who prophesy by means of art and conjecture are oftentimes mistaken. I believe that, just as men may make mistakes in other callings, so they may in this. It may happen that a sign of doubtful meaning is assumed to be certain or, possibly, either a sign was itself unobserved or one that annulled an observed sign may have gone unnoticed. But, in order to establish the proposition for which I contend it is enough for me to find, not many, but even a few instances of divinely inspired prevision and prophecy. Nay, if even one such instance is found and the agreement between the prediction and the thing predicted is so close as to exclude every semblance of chance or of accident, I should not hesitate to say in such a case, that divination undoubtedly exists and that everybody should admit its existence.

"Wherefore, it seems to me that we must do as Posidonius does and trace the vital principle of divination in its entirety to three sources: first, to God, whose connexion with the subject has been sufficiently discussed; secondly to Fate; and lastly, to Nature. Reason compels us to admit that all things happen by Fate. Now by Fate I mean the same that the Greeks call heimarmene, that is, an orderly succession of causes wherein cause is linked to cause and each cause of itself produces an effect. That is an immortal truth having its source in all eternity. Therefore nothing has happened which was not bound to happen, and, likewise, nothing is going to happen which will not find in nature every efficient cause of its happening. And it is probable that these causes of coming events are perceived by those who see them during frenzy or in sleep.

Latin: LV Equidem sic arbitror, etiamsi multa fallant eos, qui aut arte aut coniectura divinare videantur, esse tamen divinationem; homines autem, ut in ceteris artibus, sic in hac posse falli. Potest accidere ut aliquod signum dubie datum pro certo sit acceptum, potest aliquod latuisse aut ipsum aut quod esset illi contrarium. Mihi autem ad hoc, de quo disputo, probandum satis est non modo plura, sed etiam pauciora divine praesensa et praedicta reperiri. [124] Quin etiam hoc non dubitans dixerim, si unum aliquid ita sit praedictum praesensumque, ut, cum evenerit, ita cadat, ut praedictum sit, neque in eo quicquam casu et fortuito factum esse appareat, esse certe divinationem, idque esse omnibus confitendum. Quocirca primum mihi videtur, ut Posidonius facit, a deo, de quo satis dictum est, deinde a fato, deinde a natura vis omnis divinandi ratioque repetenda. Fieri igitur omnia fato ratio cogit fateri. Fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci heimarmenen, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat. Ea est ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna. Quod cum ita sit, nihil est factum quod non futurum fuerit, eodemque modo nihil est futurum cuius non causas id ipsum efficientes natura contineat. [125] Ex quo intellegitur ut fatum sit non id quod superstitiose, sed id quod physice dicitur, causa aeterna rerum, cur et ea, quae praeterierunt, facta sint et, quae instant, fiant et, quae sequuntur, futura sint. Ita fit ut et observatione notari possit quae res quamque causam plerumque consequatur, etiamsi non semper, easdemque causas veri simile est rerum futurarum cerni ab iis qui aut per furorem eas aut in quiete videant.

LVI.

Since, then, all things happen by a certain fate, (as will be shown in another place,) if any man could exist who could comprehend this succession of causes in his intellectual view, such a man would be infallible. For being in possession of a knowledge of the causes of all events, he would necessarily foresee what and when all events would take place.

But as no being except the Deity alone can do this, man can attain no more than a kind of presentiment of futurity, by observing the events which are the usual consequences of certain signs. For those events that are to happen in future do not start into existence on a sudden. But the regular course of time resembles the untwisting of a cable, producing nothing absolutely new, but all things in a grand concatenation or series of repetitions.

And this has been observed by those who possess the gift of natural divination, and by those who study the regular successions of certain things. For though they do not always apprehend the causes, yet they clearly discern the signs and marks of the causes. And by diligently investigating and committing to memory all such signs, and the traditions of our ancestors concerning them, they produce an elaborate system of that divination which is termed technical respecting the entrails of victims, thunder and lightning, prodigies, and celestial phenomena.

We must not, therefore, be astonished that those who addict themselves to divination foresee many events which have no place in existence. For all things do even now exist, though they are removed in point of time. And as the vital embryo of all vegetation exists in seeds, from which they afterwards germinate, so are all things even now hidden in their causes, and perceived as hereafter to happen by the mind when it is thrown into an ecstasy, or relaxed in sleep, and cool reason and calculation is often granted a presentiment of them. And as the astrologers who watch the risings, settings, and various courses of the sun, moon, and other stars, can predict long before all their revolutions and phenomena; so those who have noted the series and consequence of events, with constant and indefatigable attention, during a very long period, do generally, or (if that is too difficult) at least occasionally, foresee with certainty the things that are to come to pass.

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "Moreover, since, as will be shown elsewhere, all things happen by Fate, if there were a man whose soul could discern the links that join each cause with every other cause, then surely he would never be mistaken in any prediction he might make. For he who knows the causes of future events necessarily knows what every future event will be. But since such knowledge is possible only to a god, it is left to man to presage the future by means of certain signs which indicate what will follow them. Things which are to be do not suddenly spring into existence, but the evolution of time is like the unwinding of a cable: it creates nothing new and only unfolds each event in its order. This connexion between cause and effect is obvious to two classes of diviners: those who are endowed with natural divination and those who know the course of events by the observation of signs. They may not discern the causes themselves, yet they do discern the signs and tokens of those causes. The careful study and recollection of those signs, aided by the records of former times, has evolved that sort of divination, known as artificial, which is divination by means of entrails, lightnings, portents, and celestial phenomena.

"Therefore it is not strange that diviners have a presentiment of things that exist nowhere in the material world: for all things "are," though, from the standpoint of "time," they are not present. As in seeds there inheres the germ of those things which the seeds produce, so in causes are stored the future events whose coming is foreseen by reason or conjecture, or is discerned by the soul when inspired by frenzy, or when it is set free by sleep. Persons familiar with the rising, setting, and revolutions of the sun, moon, and other celestial bodies, can tell long in advance where any one of these bodies will be at a given time. And the same thing may be said of men who, for a long period of time, have studied and noted the course of facts and the connexion of events, for they always know what the future will be; or, if that is putting it too strongly, they know in a majority of cases; or, if that will not be conceded either, then, surely, they sometimes know what the future will be. These and a few other arguments of the same kind for the existence of divination are derived from Fate.

Latin: LVI [126] Praeterea, cum fato omnia fiant, id quod alio loco ostendetur, si quis mortalis possit esse, qui conligationem causarum omnium perspiciat animo, nihil eum profecto fallat. Qui enim teneat causas rerum futurarum, idem necesse est omnia teneat quae futura sint. Quod cum nemo facere nisi deus possit, relinquendum est homini, ut signis quibusdam consequentia declarantibus futura praesentiat. Non enim illa quae futura sunt subito exsistunt, sed est quasi rudentis explicatio sic traductio temporis nihil novi efficientis et primum quidque replicantis. Quod et ii vident, quibus naturalis divinatio data est, et ii, quibus cursus rerum observando notatus est. Qui etsi causas ipsas non cernunt, signa tamen causarum et notas cernunt; ad quas adhibita memoria et diligentia et monumentis superiorum efficitur ea divinatio, quae artificiosa dicitur, extorum, fulgorum, ostentorum signorumque caelestium. [127] Non est igitur ut mirandum sit ea praesentiri a divinantibus quae nusquam sint; sunt enim omnia, sed tempore absunt. Atque ut in seminibus vis inest earum rerum, quae ex iis progignuntur, sic in causis conditae sunt res futurae, quas esse futuras aut concitata mens aut soluta somno cernit aut ratio aut coniectura praesentit. Atque ut ii qui solis et lunae reliquorumque siderum ortus, obitus motusque cognorunt, quo quidque tempore eorum futurum sit multo ante praedicunt, sic, qui cursum rerum eventorumque consequentiam diuturnitate pertractata notaverunt, aut semper aut, si id difficile est, plerumque, quodsi ne id quidem conceditur, non numquam certe quid futurum sit intellegunt. Atque haec quidem et quaedam eiusdem modi argumenta, cur sit divinatio, ducuntur a fato.

LVII.

Such are some of the arguments derived from the nature of fate, by which the reality of divination may be proved.

Another powerful plea in favour of divination, may be drawn from Nature herself, which teaches us how great is the energy of the mind when abstracted from the bodily senses, as it is most especially in ecstasy and sleep. For even as the Gods know what passes in our minds without the aid of eyes, ears, or tongues, (on which divine omniscience is founded the feeling of men, that when they wish in silence for, or offer up a prayer for anything, the Gods hear them,) so when the soul of man is disengaged and set at freedom, either from being relaxed in sleep, or in a state of mental excitement, it beholds those wonders which, when entangled beneath the veil of the flesh, it is unable to see.

It may be difficult, perhaps, to connect this principle of nature with that kind of divination which we have stated to result from study and art. Posidonius, however, thinks that there are in nature certain signs and symbols of future events. We are informed that the inhabitants of Cea, according to the report of Heraclides of Pontus, are accustomed carefully to observe the circumstances attending the rising of the Dog Star, in order to know the character of the ensuing season, and how far it will prove salubrious or pestilential. For if the star rose with an obscure and dim appearance, it proved that the atmosphere was gross and foggy, and its respiration would be heavy and unwholesome. But if it appeared bright and lucid, then that was a sign that the air was light and pure, and therefore healthful.

Democritus believed that the ancients had wisely enjoined the inspection of the entrails of animals which had been sacrificed, because by their condition and colour it is possible to determine the salubrity or pestilential state of the atmosphere, and sometimes even what is likely to be the fertility or sterility of the earth. And if careful observation and practice recognise these rules as proceeding from nature, then every day might bring us many examples which might deserve notice and remark; so that the natural philosopher whom Pacuvius introduces in his Chryses, seems to me to be very ignorant of the nature of things, when he says, —

All those who understand the speech of birds And hearts of victims better than their own, May be just listen’d to, but not obey’d.

Why should he make such a remark here, when a little after he speaks thus plainly in a contrary sense? —

Whatever God may be, ‘tis he who forms, Preserves and nurtures all. Unto himself He back absorbs all beings, — evermore The universal Sire, — at once the source And end of nature.

Why, then, since the universe is the sole and common home of all creatures, and since the minds of men always have existed, and will exist, why, I say, should they not be able to perceive the consequences, and what is the result indicated by each sign, and what events each sign foreshows?

These are the arguments which I had to bring forward on the subject of divination. For the rest, I in nowise believe in those who predict by lots, or those who tell fortunes for the sake of gain, nor those necromancers who evoke the manes, whom your friend Appius consulted.

Of little service are the Marsian prophet, The Haruspex of the village, the astrologer Of the throng’d circus, or the priest of Isis, Or interpreter of dreams, Who have no skill to read futurity, They are but hypocrites, urged on by hunger; Ignorant of themselves, they would teach others, To whom they promise boundless wealth, and beg A penny in return, paid in advance.

Such is the style in which Ennius speaks of those pretenders of divination; and a few words before, he has affirmed that though the Gods exist, he takes no care of the human race. I am of a contrary opinion, and approve of divination, because I believe that the Gods do watch over men, and admonish them, and presignify many things to them, all levity, vanity, and malice being excluded.

And when Quintus had said this, You are, indeed, said I, admirably prepared.

[The rest of this Book is lost.]

Compare Falconer's translation and the Latin

Falconer: "Moreover, divination finds another and a positive support in nature, which teaches us how great is the power of the soul when it is divorced from the bodily senses, as it is especially in sleep, and in times of frenzy or inspiration. For, as the souls of the gods, without the intervention of eyes or ears or tongue, understand each other and what each one thinks (hence men, even when they offer silent prayers and vows, have no doubt that the gods understand them), so the souls of men, when released by sleep from bodily chains, or when stirred by inspiration and delivered up to their own impulses, see things that they cannot see when they are mingled with the body. And while it is difficult, perhaps, to apply this principle of nature to explain that kind of divination which we call artificial, yet Posidonius, who digs into the question as deep as one can, thinks that nature gives certain signs of future events. Thus Heraclides of Pontus records that it is the custom of the people of Ceos, once each year, to make a careful observation of the rising of the Dog-star and from such observation to conjecture whether the ensuing year will be healthy or pestilential. For if the star rises dim and, as it were enveloped in a fog, this indicates a thick and heavy atmosphere, which will give off very unwholesome vapours; but if the star appears clear and brilliant, this is a sign that the atmosphere is light and pure and, as a consequence, will be conducive to good health.

"Again, Democritus expresses the opinion that the ancients acted wisely in providing for the inspection of the entrails of sacrifices; because, as he thinks, the colour and general condition of the entrails are prophetic sometimes of health and sometimes of sickness and sometimes also of whether the fields will be barren or productive. Now, if it is known by observation and experience that these means of divination have their source in nature, it must be that the observations made and records kept for a long period of time have added much to our knowledge of this subject. Since all things have one and the same and that a common home, and since the human soul has always been and will always be, why, then, should it not be able to understand what effect will follow any cause, and what sign will precede any event? "This," said Quintus, "is all that I had to say on divination."

"I will assert, however, in conclusion, that I do not recognize fortune-tellers, or those who prophesy for money, or necromancers, or mediums, whom your friend Appius makes it a practice to consult -- for they are not diviners either by knowledge or skill, but superstitious quacks who prey on the credulous. Such are the words of Ennius, who only a few lines further back expresses the view that there are gods and yet says that the gods do not care what human beings do. But for my part, believing as I do that the gods do care for man, and that they advise and often forewarn him, I approve of divination which is not trivial and is free from falsehood and trickery."

Latin: LVII [128] A natura autem alia quaedam ratio est, quae docet, quanta sit animi vis seiuncta a corporis sensibus, quod maxime contingit aut dormientibus aut mente permotis. Ut enim deorum animi sine oculis, sine auribus, sine lingua sentiunt inter se quid quisque sentiat (ex quo fit ut homines, etiam cum taciti optent quid aut voveant, non dubitent quin di illud exaudiant), sic animi hominum, cum aut somno soluti vacant corpore aut mente permoti per se ipsi liberi incitati moventur, cernunt ea quae permixti cum corpore videre non possunt. [129] Atque hanc quidem rationem naturae difficile est fortasse traducere ad id genus divinationis, quod ex arte profectum dicimus; sed tamen id quoque rimatur, quantum potest, Posidonius. Esse censet in natura signa quaedam rerum futurarum. Etenim Ceos accepimus ortum Caniculae diligenter quotannis solere servare coniecturamque capere, ut scribit Ponticus Heraclides, salubrisne an pestilens annus futurus sit: nam si obscurior quasi caliginosa stella exstiterit, pingue et concretum esse caelum, ut eius adspiratio gravis et pestilens futura sit; sin inlustris et perlucida stella apparuerit, significari caelum esse tenue purumque et propterea salubre. [130] Democritus autem censet sapienter instituisse veteres ut hostiarum immolatarum inspicerentur exta; quorum ex habitu atque ex colore tum salubritatis, tum pestilentiae signa percipi, non numquam etiam quae sit vel sterilitas agrorum vel fertilitas futura. Quid est igitur cur, cum domus sit omnium una, eaque communis, cumque animi hominum semper fuerint futurique sint, cur ii, quid ex quoque eveniat, et quid quamque rem significet, perspicere non possint? Haec habui," inquit, "de divinatione quae dicerem. [131] Nunc illa testabor, non me sortilegos neque eos, qui quaestus causa hariolentur, ne psychomantia quidem, quibus Appius, amicus tuus, uti solebat, agnoscere; non habeo denique nauci Marsum augurem, non vicanos haruspices, non de circo astrologos, non Isiacos coniectores, non interpretes somniorum; non enim sunt ii aut scientia aut arte divini. Atque haec quidem Ennius, qui paucis ante versibus esse deos censet, sed eos non curare opinatur quid agat humanum genus. Ego autem, qui et curare arbitror et monere etiam ac multa praedicere, levitate, vanitate, malitia exclusa divinationem probo".

Text - Book Two

I.

When I have been considering, as I frequently have, with deep and prolonged cogitation, by what means I might serve as many persons as possible, so as never to cease from doing service to my country, no better method has occurred to me than that of instructing my fellow-citizens in the noblest arts. And this I flatter myself that I have already in some degree effected in the numerous works which I have written. In the treatise which I have entitled “Hortensius,” I have earnestly recommended them to the study of philosophy; and in the four books of Academic Questions, I have laid open that species of philosophy which I think the least arrogant, and at the same time the most consistent and elegant.

Again, as the foundation of all philosophy is the knowledge of the chief good and evil which we should seek or shun, I have thoroughly discussed these topics in five books, in order to explain the different arguments and objections of the various schools in relation thereto. In five other books of Tusculan Questions, I have explained what most conduces to render life happy. In the first, I treat of the contempt of death; in the second, of the endurance of pain and sorrow; in the third, of mitigating melancholy; in the fourth, of the other perturbations of the mind; and in the fifth, I elaborate that most glorious of all philosophic doctrines — the all-sufficiency of virtue — and prove that virtue can secure our perpetual bliss without foreign appliances and assistances.

When these works were completed, I wrote three books on the Nature of the Gods. I have discussed all the different bearings and topics of that subject, and now I proceed in the composition of a treatise on Divination, in order to give that subject the amplest development. And if, when this is finished, I add another on Fate, I shall have abundantly examined the whole of that question.

To this catalogue of my writings, I must likewise add my six books on the Republic, which I composed when I was directing the government of the State. A grand subject, indeed, and one peculiarly connected with philosophy, and one which has been richly elaborated by Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and the whole tribe of the Peripatetics.

I must not forget to mention my Essay on Consolation, which afforded me myself no inconsiderable comfort, and will, I trust, be of some benefit to others. Besides this, I lately wrote a work on Old Age, which I addressed to Atticus; and since it is owing to philosophy that our friend Cato is the good and brave man that he is, he is well entitled to an honourable place in the list of my writings.

Moreover, as Aristotle and Theophrastus, two authors eminently distinguished both for the penetration and fertility of their genius, have united with their philosophy precepts likewise for eloquence, so I think that I too may class among my philosophical writings my treatise on the Oratorical Art. So there are three books on Oratory, a fourth named Brutus, and a fifth named the Orator.

Compare the Latin

Latin: [1] Quaerenti mihi multumque et diu cogitanti quanam re possem prodesse quam plurimis, ne quando intermitterem consulere rei publicae, nulla maior occurrebat, quam si optimarum artium vias traderem meis civibus; quod compluribus iam libris me arbitror consecutum. Nam et cohortati sumus ut maxime potuimus ad philosophiae studium eo libro qui est inscriptus Hortensius, et, quod genus philosophandi minime adrogans maximeque et constans et elegans arbitraremur, quattuor Academicis libris ostendimus. [2] Cumque fundamentum esset philosophiae positum in finibus bonorum et malorum, perpurgatus est is locus a nobis quinque libris, ut quid a quoque et quid contra quemque philosophum diceretur intellegi posset. Totidem, subsecuti libri Tusculanarum disputationum res ad beate vivendum maxime necessarias aperuerunt. Primus enim est de contemnenda morte, secundus de tolerando dolore, de aegritudine lenienda tertius, quartus de reliquis animi perturbationibus, quintus eum locum complexus est, qui totam philosophiam maxime inlustrat: docet enim ad beate vivendum virtutem se ipsa esse contentam. [3] Quibus rebus editis tres libri perfecti sunt de natura deorum, in quibus omnis eius loci quaestio continetur. Quae ut plane esset cumulateque perfecta, de divinatione ingressi sumus his libris scribere; quibus, ut est in animo, de fato si adiunxerimus, erit abunde satisfactum toti huic quaestioni. Atque his libris adnumerandi sunt sex de re publica, quos tum scripsimus, cum gubernacula rei publicae tenebamus: magnus locus philosophiaeque proprius a Platone, Aristotele, Theophrasto totaque Peripateticorum familia tractatus uberrime. Nam quid ego de Consolatione dicam? quae mihi idem ipsi sane aliquantum medetur, ceteris item multum illam profuturam puto. Interiectus est etiam nuper liber is, quem ad nostrum Atticum de senectute misimus; in primisque quoniam philosophia vir bonus efficitur et fortis, Cato noster in horum librorum numero ponendus est. [4] Cumque Aristoteles itemque Theophrastus, excellentes viri cum subtilitate tum copia, cum philosophia dicendi etiam praecepta coniunxerint, nostri quoque oratorii libri in eundem librorum numerum reverendi videntur: ita tres erunt de oratore, quartus Brutus, quintus Orator.

II.

Such are the works I have already written, and I am girding myself up to what remains, with the desire (if I am not hindered by weightier business) of leaving no philosophical topic otherwise than fully explained and illustrated in the Latin language. For what greater or better service can we render to our country, than by thus educating and instructing the rising generation, especially in times like these, and in the present state of morality, when society has fallen into such disorders as to require every one to use his best exertions to check and restrain it?

Not that I expect to succeed (for that, indeed, cannot be even hoped) in winning all the young to the study of philosophy. I shall be glad to gain even a few, the fruits of whose industry may have an extended effect on the republic.

Indeed, I already begin to gather some fruit of my labour, from those of more advanced years, who are pleased with my various books. By their eagerness for reading what I write, my ambition for writing is from day to day more vehemently excited. And indeed such individuals are far more numerous than I could have imagined. A magnificent thing it will be, and glorious indeed for the Romans, when they shall no longer find it necessary to resort to the Greeks for philosophical literature. And this desideratum I shall certainly effect for them, if I do but succeed in accomplishing my design.

To the undertaking of explaining philosophy I was originally prompted by disastrous circumstances of the state. For during the civil wars I could not defend the commonwealth by professional exertions; while at the same time I could not remain inactive. And yet I could not find anything worthy of myself for me to undertake. My fellow-citizens, therefore, will pardon me, or rather will thank me; because when Rome had become the property of one man, I neither concealed myself, nor deserted them, nor yielded to grief, nor conducted myself like a politician indignant at either an individual or the times, — nor played the part of a flatterer of, or courtier to, the power of another, so as to be ashamed of myself. For from Plato and philosophy I had learnt this lesson, that certain revolutions are natural to all republics, which alternately come under the power of monarchs, democracies, and aristocracies.

And when this fate had befallen our own Commonwealth, then, being deprived of my customary employments, I applied myself anew to the study of philosophy, doing so both to alleviate my own sorrow for the calamities of the state, and also in the hope of serving my fellow-countrymen by my writings. And thus in my books I continued to plead and harangue, and took the same care to advance the interests of philosophy as I had before to promote the cause of the Republic. Now, however, since I am again engaged in the affairs of government, I must devote my attention to the state, or I should rather say that all my labours and cares must be occupied about that; and I shall only be able to give to philosophy whatever little leisure I can steal from public business and public employments. Of these matters, however, I shall find a better occasion to speak; let me now return to the subject of divination. For when my brother Quintus had concluded his arguments on the subject of divination, contained in the preceding book, and we had walked enough to satisfy us, we sat down in my library, which, as I before noticed, is in my Lyceum.

Compare the Latin

Latin: II Adhuc haec erant; ad reliqua alacri tendebamus animo sic parati, ut, nisi quae causa gravior obstitisset, nullum philosophiae locum esse pateremur, qui non Latinis litteris inlustratus pateret. Quod enim munus rei publicae adferre maius meliusve possumus, quam si docemus atque erudimus iuventutem, his praesertim moribus atque temporibus, quibus ita prolapsa est, ut omnium opibus refrenanda ac coercenda sit? [5] Nec vero id effici posse confido, quod ne postulandum quidem est, ut omnes adulescentes se ad haec studia convertant. Pauci utinam! quorum tamen in re publica late patere poterit industria. Equidem ex iis etiam fructum capio laboris mei, qui iam aetate provecti in nostris libris adquiescunt; quorum studio legendi meum scribendi studium vehementius in dies incitatur; quos quidem plures quam rebar esse cognovi. Magnificum illud etiam Romanisque hominibus gloriosum, ut Graecis de philosophia litteris non egeant; [6] quod adsequar profecto, si instituta perfecero. Ac mihi quidem explicandae philosophiae causam attulit casus gravis civitatis, cum in armis civilibus nec tueri meo more rem publicam nec nihil agere poteram, nec quid potius, quod quidem me dignum esset, agerem reperiebam. Dabunt igitur mihi veniam mei cives, vel gratiam potius habebunt, quod, cum esset in unius potestate res publica, neque ego me abdidi neque deserui neque adflixi neque ita gessi quasi homini aut temporibus iratus, neque porro ita aut adulatus aut admiratus fortunam sum alterius, ut me meae paeniteret. Id enim ipsum a Platone philosophiaque didiceram, naturales esse quasdam conversiones rerum publicarum, ut eae tum a principibus tenerentur, tum a populis, aliquando a singulis. [7] Quod cum accidisset nostrae rei publicae, tum pristinis orbati muneribus haec studia renovare coepimus, ut et animus molestiis hac potissimum re levaretur et prodessemus civibus nostris qua re cumque possemus. In libris enim sententiam dicebamus, contionabamur, philosophiam nobis pro rei publicae procuratione substitutam putabamus. Nunc quoniam de re publica consuli coepti sumus, tribuenda est opera rei publicae, vel omnis potius in ea cogitatio et cura ponenda; tantum huic studio relinquendum, quantum vacabit a publico officio et munere. Sed haec alias pluribus; nunc ad institutam disputationem revertamur. [8] Nam cum de divinatione Quintus frater ea disseruisset quae superiore libro scripta sunt, satisque ambulatum videretur, tum in bibliotheca quae in Lycio est adsedimus.

III.

Then I said, — Quintus, you have defended the doctrine of the Stoics, respecting divination, with great accuracy, and on the strictest Stoical principles. And what particularly pleased me was, that you supported your cause chiefly by authorities, and those, too, of great force and dignity, borrowed from our own countrymen. It is now my part to notice what you have advanced. But I shall do so without offering anything absolutely on one side or the other, examining all your arguments, often expressing doubts and distrusting myself. For if I assumed anything I could say on this subject as certain, I should play the part of a diviner even while denying divination.

I am, no doubt, greatly influenced by that preliminary question which Carneades used to raise, — namely, What is the subject matter of divination? Is it things perceived by the senses, or not? Such things as we see, or hear, or taste, or smell, or touch. Is there, then, among such, anything which we perceive more by some foreseeing power, or agitation of the mind, than through nature herself? Or could a diviner, if he were blind as Tiresias, somehow or other distinguish between white and black? or if he were deaf, could he distinguish between the articulations and modulations of voices? Divination, therefore, cannot be applied to those objects which come under the cognisance of the senses.

Nor is it of much use, even in matters of art and science. In medicine for instance, if a person is sick we do not call in the diviner or the conjuror, but the physician; and in music, if we wish to learn the flute or the harp, we do not take lessons from the soothsayer, but from the musician.

It is the same in literature, and in all those sciences which are matters of education and discipline. Do you think that those who addict themselves to the art of divination can thereby inform us whether the sun is larger than the earth or of the same size as it appears, or whether the moon shines by her own light or by a radiance borrowed from the sun, or what are the laws of motion obeyed by these orbs, or by those other five stars which are termed the planets?

None of those who pass for diviners pretend to be able to instruct mankind in these matters, nor can they prove the truth or falsehood of the problems of geometry. Such matters belong to the mathematician, not to conjurors.

Compare the Latin

Latin: III Atque ego: "Adcurate tu quidem", inquam, "Quinte, et stoice Stoicorum sententiam defendisti, quodque me maxime delectat, plurimis nostris exemplis usus es, et iis quidem claris et inlustribus. Dicendum est mihi igitur ad ea quae sunt a te dicta, sed ita nihil ut adfirmem, quaeram omnia, dubitans plerumque et mihi ipse diffidens. Si enim aliquid certi haberem quod dicerem, ego ipse divinarem, qui esse divinationem nego. [9] Etenim me movet illud quod in primis Carneades quaerere solebat, quarumnam rerum divinatio esset. Earumne, quae sensibus perciperentur? At eas quidem cernimus, audimus, gustamus, olfacimus, tangimus. Num quid ergo in his rebus est, quod provisione aut permotione mentis magis quam natura ipsa sentiamus? Aut num nescio qui ille divinus, si oculis captus sit, ut Tiresias fuit, possit, quae alba sint, quae nigra dicere, aut, si surdus sit, varietates vocum aut modos noscere? Ad nullam igitur earum rerum quae sensu accipiuntur divinatio adhibetur. Atqui ne in iis quidem rebus quae arte tractantur divinatione opus est. Etenim ad aegros non vates aut hariolos, sed medicos solemus adducere; nec vero qui fidibus aut tibiis uti volunt ab haruspicibus accipiunt earum tractationem, sed a musicis. [10] Eadem in litteris ratio est reliquisque rebus, quarum est disciplina. Num censes eos, qui divinare dicuntur, posse rispondere, sol maiorne quam terra sit an tantus quantus videatur, lunaque suo lumine an solis utatur? sol, luna quem motum habeat? quem quinque stellae, quae errare dicuntur? Nec haec qui divini habentur profitentur se esse dicturos, nec eorum, quae in geometria describuntur, quae vera, quae falsa sint: sunt enim ea mathematicorum, non hariolorum.

IV.

And in those questions which are agitated in moral philosophy, is there any one with respect to which any diviner ever gives an answer, or is ever consulted as to what is good, bad, or indifferent? For such topics properly belong to philosophers. As to duties, who ever consulted a diviner how to regulate his behaviour to his parents, his brethren, or his friends? or in what light he should regard wealth, and honour, and authority? These things are referred to sages, not to diviners.

Again, as to the subjects which belong to dialecticians, and natural philosophers. What diviner can tell whether there is one world or more than one? what are the principles of things from which all things derive their being? That is the science of the natural philosopher. Or who asks a diviner to solve the difficulty of a fallacy, or disentangle the perplexity of a sorites, which we may render by the Latin word acervalem (an accumulation), though it is unnecessary; for just as the word philosophy, and many other Grecian terms, have become naturalized in our language, so this word sorites is already sufficiently familiar among us. These subjects belong to the logician, not to the diviner.

Again, if the question be, which is the best form of government, what are the relative advantages or disadvantages of such and such laws and moral regulations, should we dream of advising with a soothsayer from Etruria, or with princes and chosen men experienced in political matters?

Now, if divination regards neither those things which are perceived by the senses, nor those which are taught by art, nor those which affect the policy of the state, I scarcely understand what can be its object. It must either bear upon all topics, or else some particular one must be allotted to it in which it may be exercised. Now common sense certifies us that it does not bear on all topics, and we are at a loss to discover what particular topic, or subject matter, it can embrace. It follows, therefore, that divination does not exist.

Compare the Latin

Latin: IV De illis vero rebus quae in philosophia versantur, num quid est quod quisquam divinorum aut rispondere soleat aut consuli quid bonum sit, quid malum, quid neutrum? Sunt enim haec propria philosophorum. [11] Quid? de officio num quis haruspicem consulit quem ad modum sit cum parentibus, cum fratribus, cum amicis vivendum, quem ad modum utendum pecunia, quem ad modum honore, quem ad modum imperio? Ad sapientes haec, non ad divinos referri solent. Quid? quae a dialecticis aut physicis tractantur, num quid eorum divinari potest, unusne mundus sit an plures, quae sint initia rerum, ex quibus nascuntur omnia? Physicorum est ista prudente. Quomodo autem "mentientem", quem ψευδόμενον vocant, dissolvas aut quem ad modum soriti resistas (quem, si necesse sit, Latino verbo liceat "acervalem" appellare; sed nihil opus est: ut enim ipsa "philosophia" et multa verba Graecorum, sic "sorites", satis Latino sermone tritus est), ergo haec quoque dialectici dicent, non divini. Quid? cum quaeritur qui sit optimus rei publicae status, quae leges, qui mores aut utiles aut inutiles, haruspicesne ex Etruria arcessentur an principes statuent et delecti viri periti rerum civilium? [12] Quodsi nec earum rerum, quae subiectae sensibus sunt, una divinatio est nec earum quae artibus continentur, nec earum, quae in philosophia disseruntur, nec earum, quae in re publica versantur, quarum rerum sit nihil prorsus intellego. Nam aut omnium debet esse, aut aliqua ei materia danda est in qua versari possit. Sed nec omnium divinatio est, ut ratio docuit, nec locus nec materia invenitur, cui divinationem praeficere possimus.

V.

There is a common Greek proverb to this effect: —

The wisest prophet ‘s he who guesses best.

Will, then, a soothsayer conjecture what sort of weather is coming better than a pilot? or will he divine the character of an illness more acutely than a doctor? or the proper way to carry on a war better than a general?

But I observe, O Quintus, that you have prudently distinguished the topics of divination from those matters which lie within the sphere of art and skill, and from those which are perceived by the observation of the senses, or by any system. You have defined it thus: — Divination is the presentiment and power of foretelling and predicting those things which are fortuitous. But, in the first place, you are only arguing in a circle. For does not a pilot or a physician, or a general foresee the probabilities of things fortuitous as well as your diviner? Can, then, any augur whatsoever, or soothsayer, or diviner, conjecture better whether a patient will escape from sickness, or a ship from peril, or the army from the manoeuvres of the enemy, than a physician, or a pilot, or a general?

But you said that these matters did not belong to the diviner; but that men could foresee impending winds or showers by certain signs; and to confirm this argument, you have cited certain verses of my translation of Aratus. And yet these atmospheric phenomena are fortuitous; for they only happen occasionally, and not always. What, then, is this presentiment of things fortuitous, which you call divination, and to what can it be applied? For those things of which we can have a previous notion by some art or reason, you speak of as belonging not to diviners, but to men of skill in them. Thus you have left divination nothing but the power of predicting those fortuitous things which cannot be foreseen by any art or any prudence.

If, for example, any one had, many years before, predicted that Marcus Marcellus, who was thrice consul, was to perish by a shipwreck, he would, doubtless, have been a true diviner, because such a fact could not have been foreseen by any other means than that of divination. Divination, therefore, is a foreknowledge of events which depend upon fortune.

Compare the Latin

Latin: V Vide igitur, ne nulla sit divinatio. Est quidam Graecus vulgaris in hanc sententiam versus: "Bene qui coniciet, vatem hunc perhibebo optumum." Num igitur aut, quae tempestas impendeat, vates melius coniciet quam gubernator, aut morbi naturam acutius quam medicus, aut belli administrationem prudentius quam imperator coniectura adsequetur? [13] Sed animadverti, Quinte, te caute et ab iis coniecturis quae haberent artem atque prudentiam, et ab iis rebus quae sensibus aut artificiis perciperentur, abducere divinationem eamque ita definire: divinationem esse earum rerum praedictionem et praesensionem quae essent fortuitae. Primum eodem revolveris: nam et medici et gubernatoris et imperatoris praesensio est rerum fortuitarum. Num igitur aut haruspex aut augur aut vates quis aut somnians melius coniecerit aut e morbo evasurum aegrotum aut e periculo navem aut ex insidiis exercitum quam medicus, quam gubernator, quam imperator? [14] Atqui ne illa quidem divinantis esse dicebas, ventos aut imbres impendentes quibusdam praesentire signis (in quo nostra quaedam Aratea memoriter a te pronuntiata sunt) etsi haec ipsa fortuita sunt: plerumque enim, non semper eveniunt. Quae est igitur aut ubi versatur fortuitarum rerum praesensio, quam divinationem vocas? Quae enim praesentiri aut arte aut ratione aut usu aut coniectura possunt, ea non divinis tribuenda putas, sed peritis. Ita relinquitur ut ea fortuita divinari possint quae nulla nec arte nec sapientia provideri possunt: ut, si quis M. Marcellum illum, qui ter consul fuit, multis annis ante dixisset naufragio esse periturum, divinasset profecto: nulla enim arte alia id nec sapientia scire potuisset. Talium ergo rerum, quae in fortuna positae sunt, praesensio divinatio est.

VI.

But can there be a just presentiment of those things which do not admit of any rational conjecture to explain why they will happen? For what do we mean when we say a thing happens by chance, or fortune, or hazard, or accident, but that something has happened or taken place which might never have happened or taken place at all, or which might have happened or taken place in a different manner? Now how can that be fairly foreseen or predicted which thus takes place by chance, and the mere caprice of fortune?

It is by reason that the physician foresees that a malady will increase, a pilot that a tempest will descend, and a general that the enemy will make certain diversions. And yet these men, who have generally good reasons on which their opinions respecting relative probabilities are founded, are themselves often deceived. As when the husbandman sees his olive-trees in blossom, he ventures to expect that they will also bear fruit; nevertheless, he is sometimes mistaken.

Now, if those who never assert anything but from some probable conjecture founded on reason, are often mistaken, what are we to think of the conjectures of those men who derive their presages of futurity from the entrails of victims, or birds, or prodigies, or oracles, or dreams? I have not as yet come to show how utterly null and vain such signs are, as the cleft of a liver, the note of a crow, the flight of an eagle, the shooting of a star, the voices of people in frenzy, lots and dreams, of each of which I shall speak in its turn; at present I dwell only on the general argument. How can it be foreseen that anything will happen which has neither any assignable cause, or mark, to show why it will happen?

The eclipses of the sun and moon are predicted for a series of many years before they happen, by those who make regular calculations of the courses and motions of the stars. They only foretell that which the invariable order of nature will necessarily bring about. For they perceive that in the undeviating course of the moon’s motions, she will arrive at a given period at a point opposite to the sun, and become exactly under the shadow of the earth, which is the boundary of night, that she must be eclipsed. They likewise know, that when the same moon comes between the earth and the sun, the latter must appear eclipsed to the eyes of men. They know in what sign each of the wandering stars will be at a future period, and when each sign will rise and set on any specific day. So that you know on what principles those men proceed who predict these things.

Compare the Latin

Latin: VI [15] Potestne igitur earum rerum, quae nihil habent rationis quare futurae sint, esse ulla praesensio? Quid est enim aliud fors, quid fortuna, quid casus, quid eventus, nisi cum sic aliquid cecidit, sic evenit, ut vel aliter cadere atque evenire potuerit? Quomodo ergo id quod temere fit, caeco casu et volubilitate fortunae, praesentiri et praedici potest? [16] Medicus morbum ingravescentem ratione providet, insidias imperatori tempestates gubernator; et tamen ii ipsi saepe falluntur, qui nihil sine certa ratione opinantur; ut agricola, cum florem oleae videt, bacam quoque se visurum putat, non sine ratione ille quidem, sed non numquam tamen fallitur. Quodsi falluntur ii qui nihil sine aliqua probabili coniectura ac ratione dicunt, quid existimandum est de coniectura eorum qui extis aut avibus aut ostentis aut oraclis aut somniis futura praesentiunt? Nondum dico quam haec signa nulla sint, fissum iecoris, corvi cantus, volatus aquilae, stellae traiectio, voces furentium, sortes, somnia; de quibus singulis dicam suo loco; nunc de universis. [17] Qui potest provideri quicquam futurum esse quod neque causam habet ullam neque notam cur futurum sit? Solis defectiones itemque lunae praedicuntur in multos annos ab iis qui siderum motus numeris persequuntur; ea praedicunt enim quae naturae necessitas perfectura est. Vident ex constantissimo motu lunae quando illa e regione solis incurrat in umbram terrae, quae est meta noctis, ut eam obscurari necesse sit, quandoque eadem luna subiecta atque opposita soli nostris oculis eius lumen obscuret, quo in signo quaeque errantium stellarum quoque tempore futura sit, qui exortus quoque die signi alicuius aut qui occasus futurus sit. Haec qui ante dicunt, quam rationem sequantur vides.

VII.

But what rational rule can guide those men who predict the discovery of a treasure, or the accession to an estate? And by what series of cause and effect are the approach of events of this kind indicated? If these events, and others of the same kind, happen by any kind of necessity, then what is there that we can suppose to be brought about by chance or fortune? For nothing is so opposite to regularity and reason as this same fortune; so that it seems to me that God himself cannot foreknow absolutely those things which are to happen by chance and fortune. For if he knows it, then it will certainly happen; and if it will certainly happen, there is no chance in the matter. But there is chance; therefore there is no such thing as a presentiment of the future.

If, however, you maintain that there is no such thing as fortune, and that all things which happen, and are about to happen, are determined by fate from all eternity, then you must change your definition of divination, which you have termed the presentiment of things fortuitous. For if nothing can come, or take place, unless it has been determined from all eternity that it shall happen at a certain time, what chance can there be in anything? And if there is no such thing as chance, what becomes of your definition of divination, which you have called “a presentiment of fortuitous events?” although you said that everything which happened, or which was about to happen, depended on fate. Nevertheless, a great deal is said on this subject of fate by the Stoics. But of this elsewhere.

To return to the question at issue. If all things happen by fate, what is the use of divination?

Compare the Latin

Latin: VII [18] Qui thesaurum inventum aut hereditatem venturam dicunt, quid sequuntur? Aut in qua rerum natura inest id futurum? Quodsi haec eaque quae sunt eiusdem generis habent aliquam talem necessitatem, quid est tandem quod casu fieri aut forte fortuna putemus? Nihil enim est tam contrarium rationi et constantiae quam fortuna, ut mihi ne in deum quidem cadere videatur ut sciat quid casu et fortuito futurum sit. Si enim scit, certe illud eveniet; sin certe eveniet, nulla fortuna est; est autem fortuna; rerum igitur fortuitarum nulla praesensio est. [19] Aut si negas esse fortunam, et omnia, quae fiunt quaeque futura sunt, ex omni aeternitate definita dicis esse fataliter, muta definitionem divinationis, quam dicebas praesensionem esse rerum fortuitarum. Si enim nihil fieri potest, nihil accidere, nihil evenire, nisi quod ab omni aeternitate certum fuerit esse futurum rato tempore, quae potest esse fortuna? Qua sublata qui locus est divinationi, quae a te fortuitarum rerum est dicta praesensio? Quamquam dicebas omnia, quae fierent futurave essent, fato contineri. Anile sane et plenum superstitionis fati nomen ipsum; sed tamen apud Stoicos de isto fato multa dicuntur; de quo alias; nunc ad institutam disputationem, id est ad ea quae restant, revertamur.

VIII.

For that which he who divines predicts, will truly come to pass; so that I do not know what character to affix to that circumstance of an eagle making our friend King Deiotarus renounce his journey; when, if he had not turned back, he would have slept in a chamber which fell down in the ensuing night, and have been crushed to death in the ruins. For if his death had been decreed by fate, he could not have avoided it by divination; and if it was not decreed by fate, he could not have experienced it.

What, then, is the use of divination, or what reason is there why I should be moved by lots, or entrails, or any kind of prediction? For if in the first Punic war it had been settled by fate, that one of the Roman fleets, commanded by the consuls Lucius Junius and Publius Clodius, should perish by a tempest, and that the other should be defeated by the Carthaginians, then even if the chickens had eaten ever so greedily, still the fleets must have been lost. But if the fleets would not have perished, if the auspices had been obeyed, then they were not destroyed by fate. But you say that everything is owing to fate; therefore there is no such thing as divination.

If fate had determined, that in the second Punic war the army of the Romans should be defeated near the lake Thrasimenus, then could this event have been avoided, even if Flaminius the consul had been obedient to those signs and auspices which forbade him to engage in battle? Certainly it might. Either, then, the army did not perish by fate — for the fates cannot be changed, — or if it did perish by fate (as you are wont to assert), then, even if Flaminius had obeyed the auspices, he must still have been defeated.

Where, then, is the divination of the Stoics? which is of no use to us whatever to warn us to be more prudent, if all things happen by destiny. For do what all that, which is fated to happen, must happen. On the other hand, whatever event may be averted is not fated. There is, therefore, no divination, since that appertains to things which are certain to happen; and nothing is certain to happen, which may by any means be frustrated.

Compare the Latin

Latin: VIII [20] Si omnia fato, quid mihi divinatio prodest? Quod enim is qui divinat praedicit, id vero futurum est, ut ne illud quidem sciam quale sit, quod Deiotarum, necessarium nostrum, ex itinere aquila revocavit; qui nisi revertisset, in eo conclavi ei cubandum fuisset, quod proxuma nocte corruit; ruina igitur oppressus esset. At id neque, si fatum fuerat, effugisset nec, si non fuerat, in eum casum incidisset. Quid ergo adiuvat divinatio, aut quid est quod me moneant aut sortes aut exta aut ulla praedictio? Si enim fatum fuit classes populi Romani bello Punico primo alteram naufragio, alteram a Poenis depressam interire, etiamsi tripudium solistumum pulli fecissent L. Iunio et P. Claudio consulibus, classes tamen interissent. Sin, cum auspiciis obtemperatum esset, interiturae classes non fuerunt, non interierunt fato; vultis autem omnia fato; nulla igitur est divinatio. [21] Quodsi fatum fuit bello Punico secundo exercitum populi Romani ad lacum Trasumennum interire num id vitari potuit, si Flaminius consul iis signis iisque auspiciis quibus pugnare prohibebatur paruisset? Certe potuit. Aut igitur non fato interiit exercitus (mutari enim fata non possunt) aut, si fato (quod certe vobis ita dicendum est), etiamsi obtemperasset auspiciis, idem eventurum fuisset. Ubi est igitur ista divinatio Stoicorum? Quae, si fato omnia fiunt, nihil nos admonere potest ut cautiores simus; quoquo enim modo nos gesserimus, fiet tamen illud quod futurum est; sin autem id potest flecti, nullum est fatum; ita ne divinatio quidem, quoniam ea rerum futurarum est; nihil autem est pro certo futurum, quod potest aliqua procuratione accidere ne fiat.

IX.

Moreover, I do not even think that the knowledge of futurity would be useful to us. How miserable would have been the life of King Priam if from his youth he could have foreseen the calamities which awaited his old age! Let us, however, leave alone fables, and come to facts that are more near to us. I have recounted, in my essay entitled “Consolation,” the misfortunes which happened to the greatest men of our commonwealth. Omitting, therefore, the ancients, do you think that it would have been any advantage to Marcus Crassus, when he was flourishing with the amplest riches and gifts of fortune, to have foreknown that he should behold his son Publius slain, his forces defeated, and lose his own life beyond the Euphrates with ignominy and disgrace? Or do you think that Pompey would have experienced much satisfaction in being thrice made consul, and having attained three triumphs, and having attained the summit of glory by his heroic actions, if he could have foreseen that he should be assassinated in the deserts of Egypt after the defeat of his army, and that after his death those disasters should happen which we cannot mention without tears?

What do we think of Caesar? Would it have been any pleasure to him to have anticipated by divination, that one day, in the midst of the throng of senators whom he himself had elected, in the temple of Victory built by Pompey, and before that general’s statue, and before the eyes of so many of his own centurions, some of whom were indebted to him for their dignities, he should be slain by the noblest citizens, — ay, slain under such circumstances that not one of his friends, or even of his servants, would venture to approach him? Could he have foreseen all this, in what wretchedness would he have passed his life?

It is, therefore, certainly more advantageous for man to be ignorant of future evils than to know them. For it cannot be said, at least not by the Stoics, that Pompey would not have taken up arms, nor Crassus passed the Euphrates, nor Caesar engaged in the civil war, if they had foreseen the future; therefore the end which they met with was not inevitably ordained by fate. It would even have deprived them of all enjoyment in the earlier part of their lives; for what gratification could they have enjoyed if they had been always thinking of their end?

Therefore, to whatever argument the Stoics resort in defence of divination, their ingenuity is always baffled. For if that which is to happen may happen in different modes, then, indeed, fortune may have great power; but that which is fortuitous cannot be certain. If, on the other hand, every event is absolutely determined by fate, and the time and circumstance in connexion with which it is to take place, what service can diviners render us by informing us that very sad events are portended for us?

Compare the Latin

Latin: IX [22] Atque ego ne utilem quidem arbitror esse nobis futurarum rerum scientiam. Quae enim vita fuisset Priamo, si ab adulescentia scisset quos eventus senectutis esset habiturus? Abeamus a fabulis, propiora videamus. Clarissimorum hominum nostrae civitatis gravissimos exitus in Consolatione conlegimus. Quid igitur? Ut omittamus superiores, Marcone Crasso putas utile fuisse tum, cum maxumis opibus fortunisque florebat, scire sibi interfecto Publio filio exercituque deleto trans Euphratem cum ignominia et dedecore esse pereundum? An Cn. Pompeium censes tribus suis consulatibus, tribus triumphis, maximarum rerum gloria laetaturum fuisse, si sciret se in solitudine Aegyptiorum trucidatum iri amisso exercitu, post mortem vero ea consecutura, quae sine lacrimis non possumus dicere? [23] Quid vero Caesarem putamus, si divinasset fore ut in eo senatu quem maiore ex parte ipse cooptasset, in curia Pompeia, ante ipsius Pompei simulacrum, tot centurionibus suis inspectantibus, a nobilissumis civibus, partim etiam a se omnibus rebus ornatis, trucidatus ita iaceret, ut ad eius corpus non modo amicorum, sed ne servorum quidem quisquam accederet, quo cruciatu animi vitam acturum fuisse? Certe igitur ignoratio futurorum malorum utilior est quam scientia. [24] Nam illud quidem dici, praesertim a Stoicis, nullo modo potest: "Non isset ad arma Pompeius, non transisset Crassus Euphratem, non suscepisset bellum civile Caesar." Non igitur fatalis exitus habuerunt. Vultis autem evenire omnia fato: nihil ergo illis profuisset divinare; atque etiam omnem fructum vitae superioris perdidissent; quid enim posset iis esse laetum exitus suos cogitantibus? Ita, quoquo sese verterint Stoici, iaceat necesse est omnis eorum sollertia. Si enim id, quod eventurum est, vel hoc vel illo modo potest evenire, fortuna valet plurimum; quae autem fortuita sunt, certa esse non possunt. Sin autem certum est quid quaque de re quoque tempore futurum sit, quid est quod me adiuvent haruspices, cum res tristissumas portendi dixerunt,

X.

They add, moreover, that when we are duly attentive to religious ceremonies, all things will fall more lightly on us. But if everything happens by fate, no religious ceremonies can lighten the event. Homer acknowledges this, when he introduces Jupiter uttering complaints that he cannot save the life of his son Sarpedon against the order of fate; and the same sentiment is expressed in the Greek verse —

Great Destiny o’ermaster’d Jove himself.

It appears to me that such a fate as this is justly ridiculed by the Atellane plays; but on such a serious subject we must not allow ourselves to be facetious.

I therefore conclude with this observation. If we cannot foresee anything which happens by chance, since that thing is necessarily uncertain, then there is no divination; and if, on the contrary, things that are to happen can be foreseen because they happen by an infallible fatality, there is no divination, because you say divination only relates to fortuitous events.

But what I have hitherto said respecting divination may be looked upon as a mere slight skirmishing of oratory. I must now enter on the contest in good earnest, and prepare to encounter the most formidable arguments of your cause.

Compare the Latin

Latin: X [25] addunt ad extremum omnia levius casura rebus divinis procuratis. Si enim nihil fit extra fatum, nihil levari re divina potest. Hoc sentit Homerus, cum querentem Iovem inducit, quod Sarpedonem filium a morte contra fatum eripere non posset. Hoc idem significat Graecus ille in eam sententiam versus: "quod fore paratum est, id summum exsuperat Iovem." Totum omnino fatum etiam Atellanio versu iure mihi esse inrisum videtur; sed in rebus tam severis non est iocandi locus. Concludatur igitur ratio: si enim provideri nihil potest futurum esse eorum quae casu fiunt, quia esse certa non possunt, divinatio nulla est; sin autem idcirco possunt provideri, quia certa sunt et fatalia, rursus divinatio nulla est; eam enim tu fortuitarum rerum esse dicebas. [26] Sed haec fuerit nobis tamquam levis armaturae prima orationis excursio; nunc comminus agamus experiamurque si possimus cornua commovere disputationis tuae.

XI.

For you say that there exist two kinds of divination, — one artificial, the other natural. The artificial consists partly in conjecture, partly in continued observation. The natural, on the other hand, is what the mind lays hold of or receives externally from the divinity, from which we all derive the origin, and fashioning, and preservation of our minds. Under the artificial divination you enumerate several varieties of divination connected with the inspection of entrails, the observation of thunderstorms and prodigies, and the auguries of those who deal in signs and omens. And under this artificial class you include all kinds of conjectural divination.

As to the natural species of divination, it appears to be sent forth and to issue either from an ecstasy of the spirit, or to be conceived by the mind when disengaged from the senses and from cares by sleep. But you suppose that all divination is derived from three things — God, Fate, and Nature. But as you could give no sound explanation, you laboured to confirm it by a wonderful multitude of imaginary examples, concerning which you must permit me to say, that a philosopher ought not to use evidences which may be true through accident, or false and fictitious through malice. It behoves you to show, by reason and argument, why each circumstance happens as it does, rather than by the events, especially when they are such as I am quite unable to give credit to.

Compare the Latin

Latin: XI Duo enim genera divinandi esse dicebas, unum artificiosum, alterum naturale; artificiosum constare partim ex coniectura, partim ex observatione diuturna; naturale, quod animus adriperet aut exciperet extrinsecus ex divinitate, unde omnes animos haustos aut acceptos aut libatos haberemus. Artificiosa divinationis illa fere genera ponebas: extispicum eorumque qui ex fulgoribus ostentisque praedicerent, tum augurum eorumque qui signis aut ominibus uterentur, omneque genus coniecturale in hoc fere genere ponebas. [27] Illud autem naturale aut concitatione mentis edi et quasi fundi videbatur aut animo per somnum sensibus et curis vacuo provideri. Duxisti autem divinationem omnem a tribus rebus, a deo, a fato, a natura. Sed tamen cum explicare nihil posses, pugnasti commenticiorum exemplorum mirifica copia. De quo primum hoc libet dicere: hoc ego philosophi non esse arbitror, testibus uti qui aut casu veri aut malitia falsi fictique esse possunt; argumentis et rationibus oportet quare quidque ita sit docere, non eventis, iis praesertim quibus mihi liceat non credere.

XII.

To begin then with the Soothsayers, whose science I believe that the interest of Religion and the State requires to be upheld. But as we are alone, it behoves us, myself more especially, to examine the truth without partiality, since I am in doubt on many points.

Let us proceed, if you please, first to consider the inspection of the entrails of victims. Can you persuade any man in his senses, that those events which are said to be signified by the augurs, are known in consequence of a long series of observations? How long, I wonder! For what period of time can such observations have been continued? What conferences must the augurs hold among themselves to determine which part of the victim’s entrails represents the enemy, and which the people; what sort of cleft in the liver denoted danger, and what sort presaged advantage? Have the augurs of the Etrurians, the Eleans, the Egyptians, and the Carthaginians arranged these matters with one another? But that, besides its being impossible, cannot be imagined. For we see that some interpret the auspices in one way, and some in another, and no common rule of discipline is acknowledged among the professors of the art; and certainly if some secret virtue existed in the victim’s entrails which clearly declared the future, it must either belong to the universal nature of things, or be connected in some way or other with the Deity himself. But what communication can there exist between so great and so divine a nature of things, one so beautiful, and so admirably diffused throughout every part and motion, and (I will not say) the gall of the cock, (though that, indeed, is said by many to be the most significant of all signs,) but can such things possibly teach us the hidden mysteries of futurity?

Compare the Latin

Latin: XII [28] Ut ordiar ab haruspicina, quam ego rei publicae causa communisque religionis colendam censeo -- sed soli sumus; licet verum exquirere sine invidia, mihi praesertim de plerisque dubitanti --, inspiciamus, si placet, exta primum. Persuaderi igitur cuiquam potest ea, quae significari dicuntur extis, cognita esse ab haruspicibus observatione diuturna? Quam diuturna ista fuit? Aut quam longinquo tempore observari potuit? Aut quo modo est collatum inter ipsos, quae pars inimica, quae pars familiaris esset, quod fissum periculum, quod commodum aliquod ostenderet? An haec inter se haruspices Etrusci, Elii, Aegyptii, Poeni contulerunt? At id, praeterquam quod fieri non potuit, ne fingi quidem potest; alios enim alio more videmus exta interpretari, nec esse unam omnium disciplinam. [29] Et certe si est in extis aliqua vis quae declaret futura, necesse est eam aut cum rerum natura esse coniunctam aut conformari quodam modo numine deorum vique divina. Cum rerum natura, tanta tamque praeclara, in omnes partes motusque diffusa, quid habere potest commune non dicam gallinaceum fel (sunt enim qui vel argutissima haec exta esse dicant), sed tauri opimi iecur aut cor aut pulmo quid habet naturale, quod declarare possit quid futurum sit?

XIII.

Democritus, speaking as a natural philosopher, than which no class of men are more arrogant, on this subject, trifles ingeniously enough.

Man, who knows not the common facts of earth, Must waste his time in star-gazing.

He remarks, that the colour and condition of the victim’s entrails may indicate the nature of the pasturage, and the

Compare the Latin

Latin: XIII [30] Democritus tamen non inscite nugatur, ut physicus, quo genere nihil adrogantius: "quod est ante pedes nemo spectat, caeli scrutantur plagas". Verum is tamen habitu extorum et colore declarari censet haec dumtaxat: pabuli genus et earum rerum, quas terra procreet, vel ubertatem vel tenuitatem; salubritatem etiam aut pestilentiam extis significari putat. O mortalem beatum, cui certo scio ludum numquam defuisse! Huncine hominem tantis delectatum esse nugis, ut non videret tum futurum id veri simile, si omnium pecudum exta eodem tempore eundem habitum se coloremque converterent? Sed si eadem hora aliae pecudis iecur nitidum atque plenum est, aliae horridum et exile, quid est quod declarari possit habitu extorum et colore? [31] An hoc eiusdem modi est quale Pherecydeum illud quod est a te dictum, qui, cum aquam ex puteo vidisset haustam, terrae motum dixit futurum? Parum, credo, impudenter, quod, cum factus est motus, dicere audent quae vis id effecerit; etiamne futurum esse aquae iugis colore praesentiunt? Multa istius modi dicuntur in scholis, sed credere omnia vide ne non sit necesse. [32] Verum sint sane ista Democritea vera; quando ea nos extis exquirimus? Aut quando aliquid eius modi ab haruspice inspectis extis audivimus? Ab aqua aut ab igni pericula monent; tum hereditates, tum damna denuntiant; fissum familiare et vitale tractant; caput iecoris ex omni parte diligentissume considerant; si vero id non est inventum, nihil putant accidere potuisse tristius.

XIV.

abundance or scarcity of those things which the earth brings forth. He even supposes they may guide our opinions respecting the wholesomeness or pestilential state of the atmosphere. O happy man! such a person can certainly never want amusement. The idea of any one being so enchanted with such trifling, as not to see that this theory would be plausible, if, indeed, the entrails of all animals assumed the same appearance and colour at one and the same time! But if we discover that the liver of one animal is sound and healthy, and that of another withered and diseased at the same moment, what indication can we draw from the state and colour of the entrails?

Does this at all resemble the indications from which that Pherecydes, in a case which you have cited, predicted the approach of an earthquake from the drying up of a spring? It required a little confidence, I think, after the earthquake had taken place, to presume to say what power had produced it; [but] could they even foresee that it would take place all from the appearance of a running spring? Many such stories are recounted in the schools, but we are not obliged to believe the whole of them. But even supposing that what Democritus is true, when do we seek to know the general phenomena of nature by an examination of entrails; or when did soothsayers ever tell us anything of the sort from such an inspection? They warn us of danger from fire or water. Sometimes they predict that inheritances will be added to our fortunes, and sometimes that we shall lose what we already possess. They regard the cleft in the lungs as a matter of vital importance to our property and our very life; they investigate the top of the liver on all sides with the most scrupulous exactness, and if by any chance they cannot discover it, they affirm that nothing more disastrous could have happened.

XIV. It is impossible, as I have before observed, that such a system of observation can have any certainty about it; such divination as this flourished not among the ancients; it is the invention of mere art, if, indeed, there can be any art, properly so called, of things unknown. But what connexion has it with the nature of things? And even if it were united and joined therewith, so as to form one harmonious whole, which I see is the opinion of the natural philosophers,

Compare the Latin

Latin: XIV [33] Haec observari certe non potuerunt, ut supra docui. Sunt igitur artis inventa, non vetustatis, si est ars ulla rerum incognitarum; cum rerum autem natura quam cognationem habent? Quae ut uno consensu iuncta sit et continens (quod video placuisse physicis, eisque maxume, qui omne, quod esset, unum esse dixerunt), quid habere mundus potest cum thesauri inventione coniunctum? Si enim extis pecuniae mihi amplificatio ostenditur idque fit natura, primum exta sunt coniuncta mundo, deinde meum lucrum natura rerum continetur. Nonne pudet physicos haec dicere? Ut enim iam sit aliqua in natura rerum contagio, quam esse concedo (multa enim Stoici conligunt; nam et musculorum iecuscula bruma dicunt augeri, et puleium aridum florescere brumali ipso die et inflatas rumpi vesiculas, et semina malorum, quae in iis mediis inclusa sint, in contrarias partis se vertere; iam nervos in fidibus aliis pulsis resonare alios, ostreisque et conchyliis omnibus contingere ut cum luna pariter crescant pariterque decrescant, arboresque ut hiemali tempore cum luna simul senescente, quia tum exsiccatae sint, tempestive caedi putentur; [34] quid de fretis aut de marinis aestibus plura dicam, quorum accessus et recessus lunae motu gubernantur? Sescenta licet eiusdem modi proferri, ut distantium rerum cognatio naturalis appareat) -- demus hoc: nihil enim huic disputationi adversatur; num etiam, si fissum cuiusdam modi fuerit in iecore, lucrum ostenditur? Qua ex coniunctione naturae et quasi concentu atque consensu, quam συμπάθειαν Graeci appellant, convenire potest aut fissum iecoris cum lucello meo aut meus quaesticulus cum caelo, terra rerumque natura?

XV.

and especially of those who say that all things that exist are but one whole; still what correspondence there can be between the order of the universe and the discovery of a treasure? For if an increase of my wealth is indicated by the entrails of a victim, and this fact is a necessary link in the chain of nature, then it follows, in the first place, that we must suppose the entrails themselves form other links; and secondly, that my private gain is connected with the nature of things. Are not the natural philosophers ashamed to say such things as these? For, although there may be some connexion in the nature of things, which I admit to be possible, — (for the Stoics have collected many cases which they think confirm the notion, as when they assert that the little livers of little mice increase in winter, and that dry pennyroyal flourishes in the coldest weather, and that the distended vesicles, in which the seeds of its berries are contained, then burst asunder; that the chords of a stringed instrument at times give notes different from their usual ones; that oysters and other shell-fish increase and decrease with the growth and waning of the moon; and that trees lose their vitality as the moon declines, just as they dry up in winter, and that this is the time to cut them.) Why need I speak of the seas, and the tides of the ocean, the flow and ebb of which are said to be governed by the moon? and many other examples might be related to prove that some natural connexion subsists between objects apparently remote and incongruous.

XV. Let us grant this, for it does not in the least make against our argument;) — granting, I say, that there is a cleft of some kind in a liver, does that indicate any one? By what natural affinity, by what harmony, by what secret accord of nature, or, to use the Greek term, by what sympathy can you discern a necessary relation between a cleft liver and my gain, or between my gain and heaven and earth, and the universal nature of things?

I may even grant you this, though I shall be greatly damaging my argument if I allow that there is any connexion between nature and entrails.

But suppose I make this concession, how does it happen that he who would obtain some benefit from the Gods can discover, just when he wishes, a victim exactly adapted to his purpose? I had thought this objection was unanswerable, but see how cleverly you get over it. I do not blame you for this, I rather commend your memory. But I am ashamed of Antipater, Chrysippus, and Posidonius, who all assert the same proposition — namely, that the divine and sentient energy which extends through the universe, directs us even in the choice of the victim by whose entrails we are to frame our divinations. And to improve upon this theory, you agree with them in asserting that at the very instant that the sacrifice is offered, a certain appropriate change takes place in the victim’s entrails, so that we can therein discover some significant addition or deficiency, since all things are obedient to the will of the Gods.

Believe me, there is not an old woman in the world so superstitious as to gravely believe these things. Can you imagine that the same bullock, if chosen by one man, will have the head of the liver, and if chosen by another will not have it? Can this same head come and go at the instant just to accommodate the individual who offers the sacrifice? Do you not perceive that there must be considerable chance in the choice of the victim? and in fact the thing speaks for itself, that this must be the case. For when one ill-omened victim is discovered to have had no head to its liver, it often happens that the one which is offered immediately afterwards has the most perfect entrails imaginable. What then becomes of the menaces of the first victim’s entrails, or how have the Gods been so suddenly appeased?

Compare the Latin

Latin: XV Concedam hoc ipsum, si vis, etsi magnam iacturam causae fecero, si ullam esse convenientiam naturae cum extis concessero. [35] Sed tamen eo concesso qui evenit, ut is qui impetrire velit convenientem hostiam rebus suis immolet? Hoc erat, quod ego non rebar posse dissolvi. At quam festive dissolvitur! Pudet me non tui quidem, cuius etiam memoriam admiror, sed Chrysippi, Antipatri, Posidoni, qui idem istuc quidem dicunt quod est dictum a te, ad hostiam deligendam ducem esse vim quandam sentientem atque divinam, quae toto confusa mundo sit. Illud vero multo etiam melius, quod et a te usurpatum est et dicitur ab illis: cum immolare quispiam velit, tum fieri extorum mutationem, ut aut absit aliquid aut supersit; deorum enim numini parere omnia. [36] Haec iam, mihi crede, ne aniculae quidem existimant. An censes eundem vitulum si alius delegerit, sine capite iecur inventurum; si alius, cum capite? Haec decessio capitis aut accessio subitone fieri potest, ut se exta ad immolatoris fortunam accommodent? Non perspicitis aleam quandam esse in hostiis deligendis, praesertim cum res ipsa doceat? Cum enim tristissuma exta sine capite fuerunt, quibus nihil videtur esse dirius, proxuma hostia litatur saepe pulcherrume. Ubi igitur illae minae superiorum extorum? Aut quae tam subito facta est deorum tanta placatio?

XVI.

But you will say, that in the entrails of the fat bull which Caesar offered, there was no heart, and since it was not possible that this animal could have lived without a heart, we must suppose that the heart was annihilated at the instant of immolation. How is it that you think it impossible that an animal can live without a heart, and yet do not think it impossible that its heart could vanish so suddenly, nobody knows whither? For myself, I know not how much vigour in a heart is necessary to carry on the vital function, and suspect that if afflicted by any disease, the heart of a victim may be found so withered, and wasted, and small, as to be quite unlike a heart. But on what argument can you build an opinion that the heart of this same fat bullock, if it existed in him before, disappeared at the instant of immolation? Did the bullock behold Caesar in a heartless condition even while arrayed in the purple, and thus lose its own heart by mere force of sympathy?

Believe me, you are betraying the city of philosophy while defending its castles. In trying to prove the truth of the auguries, you are overturning the whole system of physics. A victim has a heart, and head of the liver: the moment that you sprinkle him with meal and wine they depart, some God carries them off, or consumes them. It is not nature alone, therefore, which causes the decay and destruction of everything; and there are some things which arise out of nothing, and some which suddenly perish and become nothing. What natural philosopher ever said such a thing as this? The soothsayers affirm it. Do you then think that you are to believe them rather than the natural philosophers?

Compare the Latin

Latin: XVI Sed adfers in tauri opimi extis immolante Caesare, cor non fuisse; id quia non potuerit accidere, ut sine corde victuma illa viveret, iudicandum esse tum interisse cor, cum immolaretur. [37] Qui fit, ut alterum intellegas, sine corde non potuisse bovem vivere, alterum non videas, cor subito non potuisse nescio quo avolare? Ego enim possum vel nescire quae vis sit cordis ad vivendum, vel suspicari contractum aliquo morbo bovis exile et exiguum et vietum cor et dissimile cordis fuisse; tu vero quid habes, quare putes, si paulo ante cor fuerit in tauro opimo, subito id in ipsa immolatione interisse? An quod adspexerit vestitu purpureo excordem Caesarem, ipse corde privatus est? Urbem philosophiae, mihi crede, proditis, dum castella defenditis; nam, dum haruspicinam veram esse vultis, physiologiam totam pervertitis. Caput est in iecore, cor in extis: iam abscedet, simul ac molam et vinum insperseris; deus id eripiet, vis aliqua conficiet aut exedet. Non ergo omnium interitus atque ortus natura conficiet, et erit aliquid quod aut ex nihilo oriatur aut in nihilum subito occidat. Quis hoc physicus dixit umquam? Haruspices dicunt; his igitur quam physicis credendum potius existumas?

XVII.

Again, when you sacrifice to several Gods at the same time, how is it that the sacrifice is favourably received by some, and is rejected by others? And what inconsistency must be among the Gods, if they threaten by the first entrails, and promise good fortune by the second! Or is there such strong dissension among the Deities, even when they are nearly related to each other, that certain entrails bode good when offered to Apollo, and evil when offered to his sister Diana? It is clear that since the victims are brought by chance, the entrails must, in the case of each sacrificer, depend upon what victim falls to his share, and that very thing requires some divination to know what victim falls to each person’s share, as, in the case of lots, what is drawn by each person.

Then you will speak of lots, though you are not strengthening the authority of sacrifices by comparing them to lots, but weakening that of lots by comparing them to sacrifices.

Do you think, when we send a messenger to Æquimelium to bring us a lamb to sacrifice, and the lamb which is brought to me possesses entrails peculiarly accommodated to the circumstances of the case, that the messenger has been guided to him not by chance, but by divine direction? For if you wish to signify that in this case interferes, as being some lot connected with the will of the Gods, I am sorry that your friends the Stoics should give the Epicureans such occasion to ridicule them, for you know well how they deride all such ideas.

And, indeed, it is no harder matter to be facetious on such an idea. Epicurus, in order to show his wit on the subject, introduced transparent airy deities, residing, as it were, between the two worlds as between two groves, that they may avoid destruction from the fall of either. These deities, it seems, possess bodies like ourselves, though I cannot find that they make any use of them.

Epicurus therefore, who, by a roundabout argument of this kind, takes away the Gods, naturally feels no hesitation in taking away all divination also. But though he is consistent with himself in this the Stoics are not; for as the God of Epicurus never troubles himself with any business, either regarding himself or others; he, therefore, cannot grant divination to men. On the other hand, the God of the Stoics, even though he does not grant divination, must still regulate the affairs of the universe and take care of mankind.

Why, then, do you involve yourselves in these dilemmas which you can never disentangle? For this is the way in which, when they are in a hurry, they usually sum up the matter—“If there are Gods, there must be divination; but there are gods, therefore there is divination.” It would be much more plausible to say—“There is no divination, therefore there are no Gods.” Observe how imprudently the Stoics make this assertion, that if there is no divination, there are no Gods; for divination is plainly discarded, and yet we must retain a belief in Gods.

Compare the Latin

Latin: XVII [38] Quid? Cum pluribus deis immolatur, qui tandem evenit ut litetur aliis, aliis non litetur? Quae autem inconstantia deorum est, ut primis minentur extis, bene promittant secundis? Aut tanta inter eos dissensio, saepe etiam inter proxumos, ut Apollinis exta bona sint, Dianae non bona? Quid est tam perspicuum quam, cum fortuito hostiae adducantur, talia cuique exta esse, qualis cuique obtigerit hostia? "At enim id ipsum habet aliquid divini, quae cuique hostia obtingat, tamquam in sortibus, quae cui ducatur." Mox de sortibus; quamquam tu quidem non hostiarum causam confirmas sortium similitudine, sed infirmas sortis conlatione hostiarum. [39] An, cum in Aequimaelium misimus qui adferat agnum quem immolemus, is mihi agnus adfertur qui habet exta rebus accommodata, et ad eum agnum non casu, sed duce deo servus deducitur? Nam si casum in eo quoque esse dicis quasi sortem quandam cum deorum voluntate coniunctam, doleo tantam Stoicos nostros Epicureis inridendi sui facultatem dedisse; non enim ignoras quam ista derideant. [40] Et quidem illi facilius facere possunt: deos enim ipsos iocandi causa induxit Epicurus perlucidos et perflabilis et habitantis tamquam inter duos lucos sic inter duos mundos propter metum ruinarum, eosque habere putat eadem membra, quae nos, nec usum ullum habere membrorum. Ergo hic, circumitione quadam deos tollens, recte non dubitat divinationem tollere; sed non, ut hic sibi constat item Stoici. Illius enim deus, nihil habens nec sui nec alieni negoti, non potest hominibus divinationem impertire; vester autem deus potest non impertire, ut nihilo minus mundum regat et hominibus consulat. [41] Cur igitur vos induitis in eas captiones, quas numquam explicetis? Ita enim cum magis properant, concludere solent: "si di sunt, est divinatio; sunt autem di; est ergo divinatio." Multo est probabilius: "non est autem divinatio; non sunt ergo di." Vide quam temere committant ut, si nulla sit divinatio, nulli sint di. Divinatio enim perspicue tollitur, deos esse retinendum est.

XVIII.

After having thus destroyed divination by the inspection of entrails, all the rest of the science of the soothsayers is at an end; for prodigies and lightning follow in the same category. With respect to the latter, their predictions are founded on a long series of observations, while the interpretation of prodigies proceeds chiefly on inference and conjecture.

What observations, then, have been made about lightning? The Etrurians, forsooth, have divided heaven into sixteen parts; for it was not very difficult to double the four quarters, which we recognise, into eight, and then to repeat the process, so as by that means to say from what direction the lightning had come. But in the first place, what difference does it make? Secondly, what does such a thing intimate?

Is it not plain from the astonishment which was at first excited in men’s minds, because they feared the thunder and the hurling of the thunderbolt, that they believed that they were the immediate manifestations brought about by the all-powerful ruler of all things, Jupiter? This is the reason of the enactment in the public registers, that the comitia of the people shall not be held when Jupiter thunders and lightens. It was enacted, perhaps with a view to the interest of the state, for our ancestors wished to have pretexts for not holding the comitia. Therefore, in the case of the comitia, lightning is the only vitiating irregularity. But in all other matters it is a most favourable auspice if it comes on the left hand. But we will speak of the auspices hereafter; at present we will confine ourselves to lightning.

Compare the Latin

Latin: XVIII [42] Atque hac extispicum divinatione sublata omnis haruspicina sublata est. Ostenta enim sequuntur et fulgura. Valet autem in fulguribus observatio diuturna, in ostentis ratio plerumque coniecturaque adhibetur. Quid est igitur quod observatum sit in fulgure? Caelum in sedecim partes diviserunt Etrusci. Facile id quidem fuit, quattuor, quas nos habemus, duplicare, post idem iterum facere, ut ex eo dicerent fulmen qua ex parte venisset. Primum id quid interest, deinde quid significat? Nonne perspicuum est ex prima admiratione hominum, quod tonitrua iactusque fulminum extimuissent, credidisse ea efficere rerum omnium praepotentem Iovem? Itaque in nostris commentariis scriptum habemus: "Iove tonante fulgurante comitia populi habere nefas." [43] Hoc fortasse rei publicae causa constitutum est; comitiorum enim non habendorum causas esse voluerunt. Itaque comitiorum solum vitium est fulmen, quod idem omnibus rebus optumum auspicium habemus si sinistrum fuit. Sed de auspiciis alio loco; nunc de fulgoribus.

XIX.

What can be less proper for natural philosophers to say, than that anything certain is indicated by things which are uncertain? I cannot believe that you are one of those who imagine that there were Cyclopes in mount Ætna who forged Jove’s thunderbolt, for it would be wonderful indeed if Jupiter should so often throw it away when he had but one. Nor would he warn men by his thunderbolts what they should do or what they should avoid.

For the opinion of the Stoics on this point is, that the exhalations of the earth which are cold, when they begin to flow abroad, become winds; and when they form themselves into clouds, and begin to divide and break up their fine particles by repeated and vehement gusts, then thunder and lightning ensue; and that when by the conflict of the clouds the heat is squeezed out so as to emit itself, then there is lightning. Can we, then, look for any intimation of futurity in a thing which we see brought about by the mere force of nature, without any regularity or any determined periods?

If Jupiter wished that we should form divinations by lightnings, would he throw away so many flashes in vain? For what good does he do when he throws a thunderbolt into the middle of the sea, or upon lofty mountains, which is very common, or upon deserts, or in the countries of those nations among which no meteorological observations are made? Oh! but a head was discovered in the Tyber. As if I affirmed that those soothsayers had no skill! What I deny is only their divination. For the distribution of the firmament, which we have just mentioned, and their various observations, enable them to note the direction from which the lightning has proceeded, and where it falls. But no reason can inform us of its signification.

Compare the Latin

Latin: XIX Quid igitur minus a physicis dici debet quam quicquam certi significari rebus incertis? Non enim te puto esse eum qui Iovi fulmen fabricatos esse Cyclopas in Aetna putes; [44] nam esset mirabile, quo modo id Iuppiter totiens iaceret, cum unum haberet; nec vero fulminibus homines quid aut faciendum esset aut cavendum moneret. Placet enim Stoicis eos anhelitus terrae qui frigidi sint cum fluere coeperint ventos esse; cum autem se in nubem induerint eiusque tenuissimam quamque partem coeperint dividere atque disrumpere idque crebrius facere et vehementius, tum et fulgores et tonitrua exsistere; si autem nubium conflictu ardor expressus se emiserit, id esse fulmen. Quod igitur vi naturae, nulla constantia, nullo raro tempore videmus effici, ex eo significationem rerum consequentium quaerimus? Scilicet, si ista Iuppiter significaret, tam multa frustra fulmina emitteret! [45] Quid enim proficit cum in medium mare fulmen iecit? Quid cum in altissimos montis, quod plerumque fit? Quid cum in desertas solitudines? Quid cum in earum gentium oras, in quibus haec ne observantur quidem?

XX.

You will, however, urge against me my own verses—

The father of the Gods who reigns supreme On high Olympus, smote his proper fane, And hurl’d his lightnings through the heart of Rome.

At the same time the statue of Natta and the images of the Gods, and Romulus and Remus, with that of the beast who was nursing them, were struck by the thunderbolt and thrown down; and the answers of the soothsayers, with reference to these prodigies, were found perfectly correct. That also was a surprising thing, that the statue of Jupiter was placed in the Capitol, two years later than it had been contracted for, at the very time that information of the conspiracy was being laid before the senate. Will you, then, (for this is the way you are used to argue with me,) bring yourself to uphold that side of the question in opposition to your own actions and writings?

You are my brother, and all you say is entitled to my respect. Yet what is there here that offends you? Is it the thing itself, of such and such a character, or I myself, who only wish to get at the truth? I therefore say nothing upon it for the sake of contradiction, and only seek from you yourself information respecting all the principles of the art of soothsaying.

But you have involved yourself in an inextricable dilemma; for foreseeing that you would be hard pressed, when I should urge you to explain the cause of every divination, you made many excuses to show why, when you were sure of the fact, you did not inquire into its principles and causes,—that the question was, what was done, and not why it was done; as if I granted that it was done at all, or as if it were not the duty of a philosopher to inquire into the reason why every thing takes place. At the same time you quoted my prognostics, and spoke of the scammony, the aristoloch, and other herbs, whose virtues were evident to you from their effects, though the law of their operation was unknown to you.

Compare the Latin

Latin: XX "At inventum est caput in Tiberi." Quasi ego artem aliquam istorum esse negem! Divinationem nego. Caeli enim distributio, quam ante dixi, et certarum rerum notatio docet, unde fulmen venerit, quo concesserit; quid significet autem, nulla ratio docet. Sed urges me meis versibus: "nam pater altitonans stellanti nixus Olympo ipse suos quondam tumulos ac templa petivit et Capitolinis iniecit sedibus ignis." Tum statua Nattae, tum simulacra deorum Romulusque et Remus cum altrice belua vi fulminis icti conciderunt, deque his rebus haruspicum exstiterunt responsa verissuma. [46] Mirabile autem illud, quod, eo ipso tempore quo fieret indicium coniurationis in senatu, signum Iovis biennio post quam erat locatum in Capitolio conlocabatur. "Tu igitur animum induces -- sic enim mecum agebas -- causam istam et contra facta tua et contra scripta difendere?" Frater es; eo vereor. Verum quid tibi hic tandem nocet? Resne quae talis est an ego qui verum explicari volo? Itaque nihil contra dico, a te rationem totius haruspicinae peto. Sed te mirificam in latebram coniecisti; quod enim intellegeres fore ut premerere, cum ex te causas unius cuiusque divinationis exquirerem, multa verba fecisti: te, cum res videres, rationem causamque non quaerere; quid fieret, non cur fieret, ad rem pertinere; quasi ego aut fieri concederem aut esset philosophi causam, cur quidque fieret, non quaerere! [47] Et eo quidem loco et Prognostica nostra pronuntiabas et genera herbarum, scammoniam aristolochiaeque radicem, quarum causam ignorares, vim et effectum videres.

XXI.

All this is, however, beside the main question. For the Stoic Boethus, whose name you have cited, and even our friend Posidonius have investigated the causes of prognostics, and though it is not easy to discover the cause of such occult mysteries, yet the facts themselves may be observed and animadverted upon.

But as to the statue of Natta and the tables of the law which were struck by lightning, what observations were made, or what was there ancient connected with the matter? The Pinarii Nattae are noble, therefore danger was to be feared from the nobility. This was a very cunning device of Jupiter! Romulus, represented by the sculptor as sucking a she-wolf, was likewise smitten by the lightning. Hence, according to you, some danger to the city of Rome was threatened. How cleverly does Jupiter make us acquainted with future events by such signs as these! Again, his statue was erected at the very same time that the conspiracy was being discovered in the senate, and you conceive that this coincidence happened rather by the providence of God than by any chance of fortune. And you think that the statuary who had contracted for the making of that column with Torquatus and Cotta, was not so long delayed in accomplishing his work by idleness or poverty, but by the special interposition of the immortal Gods.

Now I do not absolutely deny that such might possibly be the case; but I do not know that it was, and wish to be instructed by you. For when some things appeared to me to have happened by chance in the way in which the soothsayers had predicted, you launched out into a long discourse on the doctrine of chances, saying that four dice thrown at hazard may produce Venus by accident, but that four hundred dice cannot produce a hundred Venuses. In the first place, I know not what reason why they should not do even this; but I will not argue that point, for you have plenty of similar examples, and talk about a chance dashing of colours, the snout of a pig, and many other similar instances. You say that Carneades argued in the same way about the head of a little Pan; as if that might not have happened by chance, and as if there must not be in all marble the raw material of even such a head as Praxiteles would have made. For a perfect head is only formed by cutting away. Praxiteles adds nothing to the marble, but when much that was superfluous is removed, and the features are arrived at, then you learn that that which is now polished up was always contained within.

Such a figure, therefore, may have spontaneously existed in the quarries of Chios. But grant that this is a fiction, have you never fancied that you could discover in the clouds the figures of lions and centaurs? Accident may, therefore, sometimes imitate nature, though you denied that just now.

Compare the Latin

Latin: XXI Dissimile totum; nam et prognosticorum causas persecuti sunt et Boethus Stoicus, qui est a te nominatus, et noster etiam Posidonius; et, si causae non reperiantur istarum rerum, res tamen ipsae observari animadvertique potuerunt. Nattae vero statua aut aera legum de caelo tacta quid habent observatum ac vetustum? "Pinarii Nattae nobiles; a nobilitate igitur periculum." Hoc tam callide Iuppiter cogitavit! "Romulus lactens fulmine ictus, urbi igitur periculum ostenditur, ei quam ille condidit." Quam scite per notas nos certiores facit Iuppiter! "At eodem tempore signum Iovis conlocabatur quo coniuratio indicabatur." Et tu scilicet mavis numine deorum id factum quam casu arbitrari; et redemptor, qui columnam illam de Cotta et de Torquato conduxerat faciendam, non inertia aut inopia tardior fuit, sed a deis immortalibus ad istam horam reservatus est! [48] Non equidem plane despero ista esse vera, sed nescio et discere a te volo. Nam cum mihi quaedam casu viderentur sic evenire ut praedicta essent a divinantibus, dixisti multa de casu, ut Venerium iaci posse casu quattuor talis iactis, sed quadringentis centum Venerios non posse casu consistere. Primum nescio cur non possint, sed non pugno; abundas enim similibus. Habes et respersionem pigmentorum et rostrum suis et alia permulta. Idem Carneadem fingere dicis de capite Panisci; quasi non potuerit id evenire casu et non in omni marmore necesse sit inesse vel Praxitelia capita! Illa enim ipsa efficiuntur detractione, neque quicquam illuc adfertur a Praxitele; sed cum multa sunt detracta et ad liniamenta oris perventum est, tum intellegas illud, quod iam expolitum sit, intus fuisse. [49] Potest igitur tale aliquid etiam sua sponte in lapicidinis Chiorum exstitisse. Sed sit hoc fictum; quid? in nubibus numquam animadvertisti leonis formam aut hippocentauri? Potest igitur, quod modo negabas, veritatem casus imitari.

XXII.

But as we have sufficiently discussed divination by entrails and lightning, we must now consider portents and prodigies, in order that we may leave no branch of the system of the soothsayers untouched.

You have mentioned a wonderful story of a mule that was delivered of a colt; a strange event, because of its extreme rarity. But if such a thing were impossible, it would never happen at all; and this may be said against all sorts of prodigies, that those things which are believed never happened impossible at all; and if they are possible, it need not surprise us that they happen occasionally.

Besides, in extraordinary events, ignorance of their causes produces astonishment; but in ordinary events such ignorance occasions no such result. The man who is astonished that a mule brings forth a foal, does not know how it is that a mare brings forth a foal, or indeed how, in any case, nature effects the birth of a living animal; but he is not surprised at what he sees frequently, even if he does not know why he sees it; but if that which he never beheld before happens, then he calls it a prodigy. In this case, is it a prodigy when the mule conceives, or when she brings forth? Perhaps the conception may have been contrary to nature, but after that her delivery is almost necessary.

But we have spoken enough on this topic: let us examine the origin of the establishment of soothsayers. For when we are acquainted with it, we shall be better able to judge what degree of credit it is entitled to.

Compare the Latin

Latin: XXII Sed quoniam de extis et de fulgoribus satis est disputatum, ostenta restant, ut tota haruspicina sit pertractata. Mulae partus prolatus est a te. Res mirabilis, propterea quia non saepe fit; sed si fieri non potuisset, facta non esset. Atque hoc contra omnia ostenta valeat: numquam, quod fieri non potuerit, esse factum; sin potuerit, non esse mirandum. Causarum enim ignoratio in re nova mirationem facit; eadem ignoratio si in rebus usitatis est, non miramur. Nam qui mulam peperisse miratur, is quo modo equa pariat, aut omnino quae natura partum animantis faciat, ignorat. Sed quod crebro videt non miratur, etiamsi cur fiat nescit; quod ante non vidit, id si evenit ostentum esse censet. Utrum igitur cum concepit mula an cum peperit, ostentum est? [50] Conceptio contra naturam fortasse, sed partus prope necessarius.

XXIII.

They tell us that as a labourer one day was ploughing in a field in the territory of Tarquinium, and his ploughshare made a deeper furrow than usual, all of a sudden there sprung out of that same furrow a certain Tages, who, as it is recorded in the books of the Etrurians, possessed the visage of a child, but the prudence of a sage. When the labourer was surprised at seeing him, and in his astonishment made a great outcry, a number of people assembled round him, and before long all the Etrurians came together at the spot. Tages then discoursed in the presence of an immense crowd, who treasured up his words with the greatest care, and afterwards committed them to writing. The information they derived from this discourse was the foundation of the science of the soothsayers, and was subsequently improved by the accession of many new facts, all of which confirmed the same principles.

Here is the story that the Etrurians give out to the world. This record is preserved in their sacred books, and from it their augurial discipline is deduced.

Now do you imagine that we need a Carneades or Epicurus to refute such a fable as this? Lives there any one so absurd as to believe that this (shall I say god, or man?) was thus ploughed up out of the earth? If he was a god, why did he conceal himself under the earth against the order of nature, so as not to behold the light till he was ploughed up? Could not that same god have instructed mankind from a station somewhat more elevated? And if this Tages was a man, how could he have lived thus buried and smothered in the earth? and how could he have learnt the wonders he taught to others?

But I am even more foolish than those who believe such nonsense, for thus wasting so much time in refuting them.

Compare the Latin

Latin: XXIII Sed quid plura? Ortum videamus haruspicinae; sic facillume quid habeat auctoritatis iudicabimus. Tages quidam dicitur in agro Tarquiniensi, cum terra araretur et sulcus altius esset impressus, exstitisse repente et eum adfatus esse qui arabat. Is autem Tages, ut in libris est Etruscorum, puerili specie dicitur visus, sed senili fuisse prudentia. Eius adspectu cum obstipuisset bubulcus clamoremque maiorem cum admiratione edidisset, concursum esse factum, totamque brevi tempore in eum locum Etruriam convenisse. Tum illum plura locutum multis audientibus, qui omnia verba eius exceperint litterisque mandarint. Omnem autem orationem fuisse eam qua haruspicinae disciplina contineretur; eam postea crevisse rebus novis cognoscendis et ad eadem illa principia referendis. Haec accepimus ab ipsis, haec scripta conservant, hunc fontem habent disciplinae. [51] Num ergo opus est ad haec refellenda Carneade? Num Epicuro? Estne quisquam ita desipiens, qui credat exaratum esse, deum dicam an hominem? Si deum, cur se contra naturam in terram abdiderat, ut patefactus aratro lucem adspiceret? Quid? Idem nonne poterat deus hominibus disciplinam superiore e loco tradere? Si autem homo ille Tages fuit, quonam modo potuit terra oppressus vivere? Unde porro illa potuit, quae docebat alios, ipse didicisse? Sed ego insipientior quam illi ipsi qui ista credunt, qui quidem contra eos tam diu disputem.

XXIV.

There is an old saying of Cato, familiar enough to everybody, that “he wondered when one soothsayer met another, he could help laughing.” For of all the events predicted by them, how very few happen? And when one of them does take place, where is the proof that it does not take place by mere accident?

When Hannibal fled to king Prusias, and was eager to wage war with the enemy, that monarch replied that he dared not do so, because the entrails of the sacrifice wore an unfavourable aspect. “Would you, then,” said Hannibal, “rather trust a bit of calf’s flesh than a veteran general?” And as to Cæsar, when he was warned by the chief soothsayer not to venture into Africa before the winter, did he not cross? If he had not done so, all the forces of the enemy would have assembled in one place.

Why need I enumerate the responses of the soothsayers, of which I could cite an infinite number, which have either received no accomplishment at all, or an accomplishment exactly the reverse of the prediction? In this last Civil War, for instance—good Heavens! how often were their responses utterly falsified by the result! How many false prophecies were sent to us from Rome into Greece! How many oracles in favour of Pompey! For that general was not a little affected by entrails and prodigies. I have no wish to recount these things to you, nor indeed is it necessary, for you were present. But you see that nearly all the events took place in the manner exactly contrary to the predictions. So much for responses. Let us now say a word or two on prodigies.

Compare the Latin

Latin: XXIV Vetus autem illud Catonis admodum scitum est, qui mirari se aiebat, quod non rideret haruspex, haruspicem cum vidisset. [52] Quota enim quaeque res evenit praedicta ab istis? Aut, si evenit quippiam, quid adferri potest cur non casu id evenerit? Rex Prusias, cum Hannibali apud eum exsulanti depugnari placeret, negabat se audere, quod exta prohiberent. "Ain tu?" inquit, "carunculae vitulinae mavis quam imperatori veteri credere?" Quid? Ipse Caesar cum a summo haruspice moneretur ne in Africam ante brumam tramitteret, nonne tramisit? Quod ni fecisset, uno in loco omnes adversariorum copiae convenissent. Quid ego haruspicum responsa commemorem (possum equidem innumerabilia), quae aut nullos habuerint exitus aut contrarios? [53] Hoc civili bello, di immortales, quam multa luserunt! Quae nobis in Graeciam Roma responsa haruspicum missa sunt! Quae dicta Pompeio! Etenim ille admodum extis et ostentis movebatur. Non lubet commemorare, nec vero necesse est, tibi praesertim qui interfuisti; vides tamen omnia fere contra ac dicta sint evenisse. Sed haec hactenus; nunc ad ostenta veniamus.

XXV.

You have mentioned several things which I wrote during my consulship. You have brought up many of those anecdotes collected by Sisenna before the Marsian War, and many recorded by Callisthenes before the unfortunate battle of the Spartans at Leuctra, of each of which I will speak separately, as far as seems necessary; but at present we must discuss prodigies in general.

For what is the meaning of this kind of divination—this dreadful denouncing of impending calamities—derived from the Gods? In the first place, what is the object of the Gods, in giving us prodigies and signs which we cannot understand without interpreters, and in advertising us of disasters which we cannot avoid? But even honest men do not thus act, giving notice to their friends of impending misfortune which they cannot possibly avoid; and physicians, though they are often aware of the fact, yet never tell their patients that they must needs die of the complaint from which they are suffering. For the prediction of an evil is only beneficial when we can point out some means of avoiding it or mitigating it.

What good, then, did these prodigies, or their interpreters, do to the Spartans, or more recently to the Romans? If they are to be considered as the signs of the Gods, why were they so obscure? For if they were sent in order that we might understand what was about to happen, then it ought to have been declared intelligibly; and if we were not intended to know them, they should not have been given even obscurely.

Compare the Latin

Latin: Multa me consule a me ipso scripta recitasti, multa ante Marsicum bellum a Sisenna collecta attulisti, multa ante Lacedaemoniorum malam pugnam in Leuctris a Callisthene commemorata dixisti. De quibus dicam equidem singulis, quoad videbitur; sed dicendum etiam est de universis. Quae est enim ista a deis profecta significatio et quasi denuntiatio calamitatum? Quid autem volunt di immortales, primum ea significantes quae sine interpretibus non possimus intellegere, deinde ea quae cavere nequeamus? At hoc ne homines quidem probi faciunt, ut amicis impendentes calamitates praedicant, quas illi effugere nullo modo possint; ut medici, quamquam intellegunt saepe, tamen numquam aegris dicunt illo morbo eos esse morituros: omnis enim praedictio mali tum probatur, cum ad praedictionem cautio adiungitur. [55] Quid igitur aut ostenta aut eorum interpretes vel Lacedaemonios olim vel nuper nostros adiuverunt? Quae si signa deorum putanda sunt, cur tam obscura fuerunt? Si enim ut intellegeremus quid esset eventurum, aperte declarari oportebat; aut ne occulte quidem, si ea sciri nolebant.

XXVI.

As for all conjectures on which this kind of divination depends, the opinions of men differ so much from each other that they often make very opposite deductions from the same thing. For as in legal suits, the plea of the plaintiff is contrary to that of the defendant, and yet both are within the limits of credibility,—so in all those affairs which only admit of conjectural interpretation, the reasoning must be extremely uncertain. And as for those things which are caused at times by nature, and at others by chance, (sometimes, too, likeness gives rise to mistakes,) it is very foolish to attribute all these things to the interpositions of the Gods, without examining their proximate causes.

You believe that the Bœotian diviners of Lebadia foreknew by the crowing of the cocks that the victory belonged to the Thebans, because these birds only crow when they are victorious, and hold their peace when they are beaten. Did, then, Jupiter give a signal to so important a city by the means of hens? But do cocks only crow when they are victorious? At that time they were crowing, and they had not conquered. You say that this was a prodigy. It would have been a prodigy, and a very great one, if the crowing had proceeded from fishes instead of birds. But what hour is there of day or night, when cocks do not crow? and if they are sometimes excited to crow by their joy in victory, they may likewise be excited to do the same by some other kind of joy.

Democritus, indeed, states a very good reason why cocks crow before the dawn; for, as the food is then digested, and distributed over their whole body, they utter a crowing, being satiated with rest. But in the silence of the night, says Ennius, “they indulge their throats, which are hoarse with crowing, and give their wings repose.” As, then, this animal is so much inclined to crow of its own accord, what made it occur to Callisthenes to assert that the Gods had given the cocks a signal to crow; since either nature or chance might have done it?

Compare the Latin

Latin: Iam vero coniectura omnis, in qua nititur divinatio, ingeniis hominum in multas aut diversas aut etiam contrarias partis saepe diducitur. Ut enim in causis iudicialibus alia coniectura est accusatoris, alia defensoris et tamen utriusque credibilis, sic in omnibus iis rebus quae coniectura investigari videntur anceps reperitur oratio. Quas autem res tum natura, tum casus adfert (nonnumquam etiam errorem creat similitudo), magna stultitia est earum rerum deos facere effectores, causas rerum non quaerere. [56] Tu vates Boeotios credis Lebadiae vidisse ex gallorum gallinaceorum cantu victoriam esse Thebanorum, quia galli victi silere solerent, canere victores. Hoc igitur per gallinas Iuppiter tantae civitati signum dabat? An illae aves, nisi cum vicerunt, canere non solent? "At tum canebant nec vicerant: id enim est", inquies, "ostentum." Magnum vero, quasi pisces, non galli cecinerint! Quod autem est tempus, quo illi non cantent, vel nocturnum vel diurnum? Quodsi victores alacritate et quasi laetitia ad canendum excitantur, potuit accidisse alia quoque laetitia, qua ad cantum moverentur. [57] Democritus quidem optumis verbis causam explicat cur ante lucem galli canant: depulso enim de pectore et in omne corpus diviso et mitificato cibo, cantus edere quiete satiatos; qui quidem silentio noctis, ut ait Ennius,

"... favent faucibus russiscantu, plausuque premunt alas."

Cum igitur hoc animal tam sit canorum sua sponte, quid in mentem venit Callistheni dicere deos gallis signum dedisse cantandi, cum id vel natura vel casus efficere potuisset?

XXVII.

It was announced to the senate that it had rained blood, that the river had become blackened with blood, and that the statues of the immortal gods were covered with sweat. Do you imagine that Thales or Anaxagoras, or any other natural philosopher, would have given credence to such news? Blood and sweat may only proceed from the animal body; there might have been some discoloration caused by some contagion of earth very like blood, and some moisture may have fallen on the statues from without, resembling perspiration; and in time of war such phenomena appear more numerous and more important than usual, as men are then in a state of alarm, while they are not noticed in peace. Besides, in such periods of fear and peril, such stories are more easily believed, and invented with more impunity.

We are, however, so silly and inconsiderate, that if mice, which are always at that work, happen to gnaw anything, we immediately regard it as a prodigy. So because, a little before the Marsian war, the mice gnawed the shields at Lanuvium, the soothsayers declared it to be a most important prodigy; as if it could make any difference, what mice, who day and night are gnawing something, had gnawed bucklers or sieves. For if we are to be guided by such things, I ought to tremble for the safety of the commonwealth, because the mice lately gnawed Plato’s Republic in my library; and if they had eaten the book of Epicurus on Pleasure, I ought to have expected that corn would rise in the market.

Compare the Latin

Latin: Sanguine pluisse senatui nuntiatum est, Atratum etiam fluvium fluxisse sanguine, deorum sudasse simulacra. Num censes his nuntiis Thalen aut Anaxagoran aut quemquam physicum crediturum fuisse? Nec enim sanguis nec sudor nisi e corpore. Sed et decoloratio quaedam ex aliqua contagione terrena maxume potest sanguini similis esse, et umor adlapsus extrinsecus, ut in tectoriis videmus austro, sudorem videtur imitari. Atque haec in bello plura et maiora videntur timentibus, eadem non tam animadvertuntur in pace; accedit illud etiam, quod in metu et periculo cum creduntur facilius, tum finguntur impunius. [59] Nos autem ita leves atque inconsiderati sumus, ut, si mures corroserint aliquid, quorum est opus hoc unum, monstrum putemus. Ante vero Marsicum bellum quod clipeos Lanuvii, ut a te dictum est, mures rossent, maxumum id portentum haruspices esse dixerunt; quasi vero quicquam intersit, mures diem noctem aliquid rodentes scuta an cribra corroserint! Nam si ista sequimur, quod Platonis Politian nuper apud me mures corroserunt, de re publica debui pertimescere, aut, si Epicuri de voluptate liber rosus esset, putarem annonam in macello cariorem fore.

XXVIII.

Are we, then, alarmed if at any time any unnatural productions are reported as having proceeded from man or beast? One of such occurrences, to be brief, may be accounted for on one principle. Whatever is born, of whatever kind it may be, must have some cause in nature, so that even though it may be contrary to custom, it cannot possibly be contrary to nature. Investigate, if you can, the natural cause of every novel and extraordinary circumstance:—even if you cannot discover the cause, still you may feel sure that nothing can have taken place without a cause; and, by the principles of nature, drive away that terror which the novelty of the thing may have occasioned you. Then neither earthquakes, nor thunderstorms, nor showers of blood and stones, nor shooting stars, nor glancing torches will alarm you any more.

If you ask Chrysippus to explain the laws that govern these phenomena, though he is a great defender of divination, he will never tell you that they have happened by chance, but he will give you a natural explanation of all of them. For, as it has been before stated, nothing can happen without a cause, and nothing happens which is impossible; nor, if that has happened which could happen, ought it to be regarded as a prodigy. Therefore there are no such things as prodigies. For if we place in the rank of prodigies every rare occurrence, it follows that a wise man is one of the greatest prodigies. For I believe there are fewer instances of wise men in the world, than of mules which have brought forth young.

So this principle concludes that that which cannot take place in the nature of things never does take place; and that which can take place in the nature of things, is not a prodigy, and therefore there are no prodigies at all.

Therefore a diviner and interpreter of prodigies being consulted by a man who informed him, as a great prodigy, that he had discovered in his house a serpent coiled around a bar, answered very discreetly, that there was nothing very wonderful in this, but if he had found the bar coiled around the serpent, this would have been a prodigy indeed. By this reply, he plainly indicated that nothing can be a prodigy which is inconsistent with the nature of things.

Compare the Latin

Latin: An vero illa nos terrent, si quando aliqua portentosa aut ex pecude aut ex homine nata dicuntur? Quorum omnium, ne sim longior, una ratio est. Quicquid enim oritur, qualecumque est, causam habeat a natura necesse est, ut, etiamsi praeter consuetudinem exstiterit, praeter naturam tamen non possit exsistere. Causam igitur investigato in re nova atque admirabili, si poteris; si nullam reperies, illud tamen exploratum habeto, nihil fieri potuisse sine causa, eumque terrorem, quem tibi rei novitas adtulerit, naturae ratione depellito. Ita te nec terrae fremitus nec caeli discessus nec lapideus aut sanguineus imber nec traiectio stellae nec faces visae terrebunt. [61] Quarum omnium causas si a Chrysippo quaeram, ipse ille divinationis auctor numquam illa dicet facta fortuito naturalemque rationem omnium reddet; nihil enim fieri sine causa potest; nec quicquam fit, quod fieri non potest; nec, si id factum est quod potuit fieri, portentum debet videri; nulla igitur portenta sunt. Nam si, quod raro fit, id portentum putandum est, sapientem esse portentum est; saepius enim mulam peperisse arbitror quam sapientem fuisse. Illa igitur ratio concluditur: nec id quod non potuerit fieri factum umquam esse, nec, quod potuerit, id portentum esse; ita omnino nullum esse portentum. [62] Quod etiam coniector quidam et interpres portentorum non inscite respondisse dicitur ei qui [cum] ad eum rettulisset quasi ostentum quod anguis domi vectem circumiectus fuisset: "Tum esset" inquit "ostentum, si anguem vectis circumplicavisset". Hoc ille responso satis aperte declaravit nihil habendum esse, quod fieri posset, ostentum.

XXIX.

Caius Gracchus wrote to Marcus Pomponius, that his father having caught two serpents in his house, sent to consult the soothsayers. Why were two serpents entitled to such an honour more than two lizards or two mice? Because these are every day occurrences, you would reply, while serpents are comparatively rare; as if it signified how often a thing which was possible took place. But I marvel, if the release of the female snake caused the death of Tiberius Gracchus, and that of the male was to be fatal to Cornelia, why he let either of them escape. For he does not record that the soothsayers had told him what would happen if he let neither of the snakes escape. But it seems T. Gracchus died soon after, doubtless of some natural malady which destroyed his constitution, and not because he had saved the life of a viper.

Not that the infidelity of the haruspices is so great that their predictions are never fulfilled by any chance whatever. And, I must confess, if I could but believe it, I should exceedingly wonder at the story which you have cited from Homer respecting the prediction of Calchas, who, from observing the number of a flock of sparrows, foretold the number of years that would be expended in the siege of Troy.

Of which conjecture Homer makes Agamemnon speak thus, if I may repeat you a translation of the passage which I made in a leisure hour:—

Compare the Latin

Latin: C. Gracchus ad M. Pomponium scripsit, duobus anguibus domi comprehensis, haruspices a patre convocatos. Qui magis anguibus quam lacertis, quam muribus? Quia sunt haec cotidiana, angues non item; quasi vero referat, quod fieri potest, quam id saepe fiat. Ego tamen miror, si emissio feminae anguis mortem adferebat Ti. Graccho, emissio autem maris anguis erat mortifera Corneliae, cur alteram utram emiserit; nihil enim scribit respondisse haruspices, si neuter anguis emissus esset, quid esset futurum. "At mors insecuta Gracchum est." Causa quidem, credo, aliqua morbi gravioris, non emissione serpentis; neque enim tanta est infelicitas haruspicum, ut ne casu quidem umquam fiat quod futurum illi esse dixerint.

XXX.

Not for their grief the Grecian host I blame; But vanquish’d? I baffled! oh, eternal shame! Expect the time to Troy’s destruction giv’n, And try the faith of Calchas and of heav’n. What pass’d at Aulis, Greece can witness bear, And all who live to breathe this Phrygian air, Beside a fountain’s sacred brink was raised Our verdant altars, and the victims blazed (‘Twas where the plane-tree spreads its shades around) A mighty dragon shot, of dire portent; From Jove himself the dreadful sign was sent, Straight to the tree his sanguine spires he roll’d, And curl’d around in many a winding fold, The topmost branch a mother-bird possess’d; Eight callow infants fill’d the mossy nest; Herself the ninth: the serpent as he hung, Stretch’d his black jaws, and crush’d the crying young; While hov’ring near, with miserable moan, The drooping mother wail’d her children gone. The mother last, as round the nest she flew, Seized by the beating wing, the monster slew; Nor long survived, to marble turn’d he stands A lasting prodigy on Aulis’ sands. Such was the will of Jove; and hence we dare Trust in his omen and support the war. For while around we gazed with wond’ring eyes, And trembling sought the Pow’rs with sacrifice, Full of his god, the rev’rend Calchas cried: Ye Grecian warriors, lay your fears aside, This wondrous signal Jove himself displays, Of long, long labours, but eternal praise. As many birds as by the snake were slain, So many years the toils of Greece remain; But wait the tenth, for Ilion’s fall decreed. Thus spoke the prophet, and the fates succeed.

Now is not this a curious mode of augury?—to conjecture by the number of sparrows eaten by a serpent, the number of years expended in the Trojan war? Why years rather than months or days? And how was it that Calchas selected sparrows, in which there is nothing supernatural, for the signs of his prophecy? while he is silent about the serpent which was changed, as it is said, into stone (an event which is impossible). Lastly, what analogy or relation can subsist between the sparrows seen and the years predicted?

As to what you have said respecting the serpent which appeared to Sylla while he was sacrificing, I recollect the whole circumstance; and remember that just as Sylla was about to attack the enemy at Nola, he made a sacrifice, and that at the moment the victim was offered, a serpent issued from beneath the altar, and that the same day a glorious victory was gained,—not owing to the advice of the soothsayers, but to the skill of the general.

Compare the Latin

Latin: Nam illud mirarer, si crederem, quod apud Homerum Calchantem dixisti ex passerum numero belli Troiani annos auguratum; de quoius coniectura sic apud Homerum, ut nos otiosi convertimus, loquitur Agamemnon:

"Ferte, viri, et duros animo tolerate labores,auguris ut nostri Calchantis fata queamusscire ratosne habeant an vanos pectoris orsus.Namque omnes memori portentum mente retentant,qui non funestis liquerunt lumina fatis.Argolicis primum ut vestita est classibus Aulisquae Priamo cladem et Troiae pestemque ferebant,nos circum latices gelidos, fumantibus aris,aurigeris divom placantes numina taurissub platano umbrifera, fons unde emanat aquai,vidimus immani specie tortuque draconemterribilem, Iovis ut pulsu penetraret ab ara;qui platani in ramo foliorum tegmine saeptoscorripuit pullos; quos cum consumeret octo,nona super tremulo genetrix clangore volabat;cui ferus immani laniavit viscera morsu.[64] Hunc, ubi tam teneros volucris matremque peremit,qui luci ediderat, genitor Saturnius idemabdidit et duro formavit tegmine saxi.Nos autem timidi stantes mirabile monstrumvidimus in mediis divom versarier aris.Tum Calchas haec est fidenti voce locutus:'Quidnam torpentes subito obstipuistis, Achivi?Nobis haec portenta deum dedit ipse creatortarda et sera nimis, sed fama ac laude perenni.Nam quot avis taetro mactatas dente videtis,tot nos ad Troiam belli exanclabimus annos;quae decumo cadet et poena satiabit Achivos.'Edidit haec Calchas; quae iam matura videtis."

[65] Quae tandem ista auguratio est ex passeribus annorum potius quam aut mensuum aut dierum? Cur autem de passerculis coniecturam facit, in quibus nullum erat monstrum, de dracone silet, qui, id quod fieri non potuit, lapideus dicitur factus? Postremo quid simile habet passer annis? Nam de angue illo, qui Sullae apparuit immolanti, utrumque memini, et Sullam, cum in expeditionem educturus esset, immolavisse, et anguem ab ara exstitisse, eoque die rem praeclare esse gestam non haruspicis consilio, sed imperatoris.

XXXI.

And prodigies of this kind have nothing miraculous in them; which, when they have taken place, are brought under conjecture by some particular interpretation, as in the case of the grain of wheat found in the mouth of Midas while an infant, or that of the bees which are said to have settled on the lips of the infant Plato. Such things are less admirable for themselves than for the conjectures they gave rise to; for they may either not have taken place at the time specified, or have been fulfilled by mere accident.

I likewise suspect the truth of the report which you have related respecting Roscius—namely, that a serpent was found coiled round him when he was in his cradle. But even if it be a fact that a serpent was thus in the cradle, it is not very wonderful, especially in Solonium, where snakes are in the habit of basking before the fire. As to the interpretation which the soothsayers gave of the circumstance, that the child would become most illustrious and celebrated, I am astonished that the immortal Gods should have preserved such an obstinate silence respecting Scipio Africanus.

You have related several prodigies which happened to Flaminius; for instance, that his horse suddenly fell with him,—there is surely nothing very astonishing in that. Also, that the standard of the first centurion could not easily be pulled out of the earth. Perhaps the standard-bearer was pulling but timidly at the stick which he had fixed in the ground with confident resolution. What is the wonder in the horse of Dionysius having escaped out of the river, and in his afterwards having had a swarm of bees cluster on his mane? But because Dionysius happened to ascend the throne of Syracuse soon after this event, what had happened by chance was regarded as an extraordinary prodigy and prognostic.

You go on to say that, at Lacedæmon, the armour in the temple of Hercules rattled. At Thebes the closed gates of the same God suddenly burst open of their own accord, and the bucklers which had been suspended on the walls fell to the ground. Certainly nothing of this kind could have happened without some motion or impulse; but why need we impute such motion to the Gods rather than call it an accident?

Compare the Latin

Latin: Atque haec ostentorum genera mirabile nihil habent; quae cum facta sunt, tum ad coniecturam aliqua interpretatione revocantur, ut illa tritici grana in os pueri Midae congesta, aut apes, quas dixisti in labris Platonis consedisse pueri, non tam mirabilia sint quam coniecta belle; quae tamen vel ipsa falsa esse vel ea, quae praedicta sunt, fortuito cecidisse potuerunt. De ipso Roscio potest illud quidem esse falsum ut circumligatus fuerit angui, sed ut in cunis fuerit anguis non tam est mirum, in Solonio praesertim, ubi ad focum angues nundinari solent. Nam quod haruspices responderint nihil illo clarius, nihil nobilius fore, miror deos immortales histrioni futuro claritatem ostendisse, nullam ostendisse Africano. [67] Atque etiam a te Flaminiana ostenta collecta sunt. Quod ipse et equus eius repente conciderit, non sane mirabile hoc quidem. Quod evelli primi hastati signum non potuerit, timide fortasse signifer evellebat, quod fidenter infixerat. Nam Dionysi equus quid attulit admirationis, quod emersit e flumine quodque habuit apes in iuba? Sed quia brevi tempore regnare coepit, quod acciderat casu vim habuit ostenti. "At Lacedaemoniis in Herculis fano arma sonuerunt eiusdemque dei Thebis valvae clausae subito se aperuerunt, eaque scuta, quae fuerant sublime fixa, sunt humi inventa." Eorum cum fieri nihil potuerit sine aliquo motu, quid est, cur divinitus ea potius quam casu facta esse dicamus?

XXXII [68] "

XXXII.

At Delphi, you say, that a chaplet of wild herbs suddenly appeared growing on the head of Lysander’s statue. Do you think then that these seeds were probably carried there by birds, not by human agency, and whatever is on a head may seem to resemble a crown? And as to the circumstance which you add, that about the same time the golden stars of Castor and Pollux, placed in the temple of Delphi, suddenly vanished, and could nowhere be discovered; this seems to me not so much the work of the Gods, as the sacrilege of thieves.

I certainly do wonder at the roguery of the Ape of Dodona being recorded in the Greek histories. For what is less strange than that a mischievous animal should have upset the turn, and scattered the oracular lots? The historians, however, deny that this prodigy was followed by any disastrous event occurring among the Lacedæmonians.

Now to come to what you have reported respecting the citizen of Veii, who declared to the Senate that if the Lake Albanus overflowed, and ran into the sea, Rome would perish, and that if its course were diverted elsewhere, Veii must fall. Accordingly the water of the Alban lake was subsequently drained away by new channels, not for the safety of the citadel and the city, but solely for the benefit of the suburban district.

A short time afterwards, a voice was heard, warning certain individuals to beware lest Rome should be taken by the Gauls; and upon this they consecrated an altar on the New Road, to Aius the Speaker. What, then, did this Aius Speaker speak and talk, and derive his name from that circumstance, when no one knew him; and has he been silent ever since he has had a habitation, an altar, and a name? And the same remark will apply to Juno the Admonitress; for what warning has she ever given us, except the one respecting the full sow?

Compare the Latin

Latin: At in Lysandri statuae capite Delphis exstitit corona ex asperis herbis, et quidem subito." Itane? Censes ante coronam herbae exstitisse quam conceptum esse semen? Herbam autem asperam credo avium congestu, non humano satu; iam quicquid in capite est, id coronae simile videri potest. Nam quod eodem tempore stellas aureas Castoris et Pollucis Delphis positas decidisse neque eas usquam repertas esse dixisti, furum id magis factum quam deorum videtur. Simiae vero Dodonaeae improbitatem historiis Graecis mandatam esse demiror. [69] Quid minus mirum quam illam monstruosissumam bestiam urnam evertisse, sortes dissupavisse? Et negant historici Lacedaemoniis ullum ostentum hoc tristius accidisse! Nam illa praedicta Veientium, si lacus Albanus redundasset isque in mare fluxisset, Romam perituram; si repressus esset, Veios ***, ita aqua Albana deducta ad utilitatem agri suburbani, non ad arcem urbemque retinendam. "At paulo post audita vox est monentis ut providerent ne a Gallis Roma caperetur; ex eo Aio Loquenti aram in nova via consecratam". Quid ergo? Aius iste Loquens, quom eum nemo norat, et aiebat et loquebatur et ex eo nomen invenit; posteaquam et sedem et aram et nomen invenit, obmutuit! Quod idem dici de Moneta potest; a qua praeterquam de sue plena quid umquam moniti sumus?

XXXIII.

This is enough to say about prodigies. Let me now speak of auspices and of lots—those, I mean, which are thrown at hazard; those which we more properly call vaticination, and which we shall discuss when we investigate divination of the natural order; and after this we will consider the astrology of the Chaldeans.

But first let us consider the question of auspices. It is a very delicate matter for an augur to speak against them. For we are not like those who attempt to predict the future by the flight of birds, and the observation of other signs; and yet I believe that Romulus, who founded our city by the auspices, considered the augural science of great utility in foreseeing matters. For antiquity was deceived in many things, which time, custom, and enlarged experience have corrected. And the custom of reverence for, and discipline of, the augurs, and the authority of the college, are still retained for the sake of their influence on the minds of the common people.

And certainly the consuls P. Claudius and L. Junius deserved severe punishment, who set sail in defiance of the established religion, and ought not to have rejected so obstinately the national ceremonials; for they ought to have been obedient to the auspices, and not to have rejected them so obstinately; therefore, justly, one of them was condemned by the judgment of the people, while the other perished by his own hand. Flaminius, likewise, was not duly submissive to the auspices; and that was the reason, you say, why he was defeated. But, the year afterwards, Paullus was guided by them. Did he the less for that perish with his army in the battle of Cannæ?

Even allowing the existence of auspices, which I do not, certainly those at present in use, whether by means of birds or celestial signs, are but mere semblances of auspices, and not real ones.

Compare the Latin

Latin: Satis multa de ostentis; auspicia restant et sortes, eae quae ducuntur, non illae quae vaticinatione funduntur, quae oracla verius dicimus; de quibus tum dicemus, cum ad naturalem divinationem venerimus. Restat etiam de Chaldaeis; sed primum auspicia videamus. "Difficilis auguri locus ad contra dicendum." Marso fortasse, sed Romano facillumus. Non enim sumus ii nos augures, qui avium reliquorumve signorum observatione futura dicamus. Et tamen credo Romulum, qui urbem auspicato condidit, habuisse opinionem esse in providendis rebus augurando scientiam (errabat enim multis in rebus antiquitas), quam vel usu iam vel doctrina vel vetustate immutatam videmus; retinetur autem et ad opinionem vulgi et ad magnas utilitates rei publicae mos, religio, disciplina, ius augurium, collegio auctoritas. [71] Nec vero non omni supplicio digni P. Claudius L. Iunius consules, qui contra auspicia navigaverunt; parendum enim religioni fuit nec patrius mos tam contumaciter repudiandus. Iure igitur alter populi iudicio damnatus est, alter mortem sibi ipse conscivit. "Flaminius non paruit auspiciis, itaque periit cum exercitu." At anno post Paulus paruit; num minus cecidit in Cannensi pugna cum exercitu?Etenim, ut sint auspicia, quae nulla sunt, haec certe, quibus utimur, sive tripudio sive de caelo, simulacra sunt auspiciorum, auspicia nullo modo.

XXXIV.

“Quintus Fabius, I pray thee, assist me in the auspices.” He answers, “I have heard.” The augurial officer among our forefathers was a skilful and learned man; now they take the first that offers. For a man must needs be skilful and learned who understands the meaning of silence. For in auspices we call that silence which is free from all irregularity. To understand this, belongs to a perfect augur.

It sometimes happens, however, that when he who wishes to consult the auspices has said to the augur whom he has chosen to assist him, “Say, if silence is observed,” the augur, without looking above or around him, answers immediately, “Silence appears to be observed.” On this the consulter rejoins, “Tell me whether the chickens are eating.” The augur replies, “They are eating.” But when the consulter further demands, “What kind of fowls are they, and whence do they come?” the augur answers, “The chickens were brought in a cage by a person who is termed a pullarius.”

Such, then, are the illustrious birds whom we call, forsooth, the messengers of Jupiter; and whether they eat or not, what does it signify? Certainly nothing to the auspices. But since, if they eat at all, some portion of food must inevitably fall on the ground and strike (pavire) the earth, this was at first called terripavium, then terripudium, and is now called tripudium. When, therefore, the chicken lets fall from its beak a particle of its food, the augur declares that the tripudium solistimum is consummated.

Compare the Latin

Latin: "Q. Fabi, te mihi in auspicio esse volo." Respondet: "Audivi." Hic apud maiores adhibebatur peritus, nunc quilubet. Peritum autem esse necesse est eum qui, silentium quid sit, intellegat; id enim silentium dicimus in auspiciis, quod omni vitio caret. [72] Hoc intellegere perfecti auguris est; illi autem qui in auspicium adhibetur, cum ita imperavit is, qui auspicatur: "Dicito, si silentium esse videbitur", nec suspicit nec circumspicit; statim respondet silentium esse videri. Tum ille: "Dicito, si pascentur." "Pascuntur". Quae aves? Aut ubi? Attulit, inquit, in cavea pullos is, qui ex eo ipso nominatur pullarius. Haec sunt igitur aves internuntiae Iovis! Quae pascantur necne, quid refert? Nihil ad auspicia; sed quia, cum pascuntur, necesse est aliquid ex ore cadere et terram pavire (terripavium primo, post terripudium dictum est; hoc quidem iam tripudium dicitur) - cum igitur offa cecidit ex ore pulli, tum auspicanti tripudium solistimum nuntiatur.

XXXV.

What true divination can there be in an auspice of this nature, so artificially forced and tortured? which, we have a proof, was not used among the most ancient augurs; for we have an ancient decree of the college of augurs, that any bird might be an auspice. So that, then, there might be an auspice if the bird was free to show itself, and the bird might appear to be the messenger and interpreter of Jupiter. But when a miserable bird is kept in a cage, and ready to die of hunger,—if such an one, when pecking up its food, happens to let some particle fall, can you think this an auspice, or do you believe that Romulus consulted the gods in this manner?

Do you imagine that those who pretend to augury apply themselves at the present day to discern the signs of heaven? No; they give their orders to the poulterer. He makes his report.

It has been reckoned an excellent auspice on all occasions, among the Romans, when it thunders on the left hand, and this exception was doubtless contrived for the benefit of the commonwealth, in order that the chiefs of the state might be the interpreters concerning the judgments of the people, the rights of the laws, and the creation of the magistrates.

“But,” you argue, “in consequence of the letters of Tiberius Gracchus, Scipio Nasica and Caius Martius Figulus resigned the consulship, because they had been irregularly created.” Well, what I deny is, that there is any such thing as divination.

“But the soothsayers are diviners; and after Tiberius Gracchus had introduced them into the senate, on account of the sudden death of the individual whose office it was to report the order of the elections, they said that the Comitia had not been legally constituted.”

Now, in reference to this case, observe that they could not speak by authority of the summoner of the president of the centuries, for he was dead; and conjecture without divination could say that. Or perhaps that what they said was no better than the result of chance, which prevails to a considerable extent in all affairs of this nature. For what could the soothsayers of Etruria know as to whether the tent they observed was as it should be, and whether the regulations of the pomœrium, or circumvallation, were exactly obeyed?

For myself, I agree with the sentiments of Caius Marcellus rather than with those of Appius Claudius, who were both of them my colleagues; and I think that, although the college and law of augurs were first instituted on account of the reverence entertained for divination in ancient times, they were afterwards maintained and preserved for the sake of the state.

Compare the Latin

Latin: Ergo hoc auspicium divini quicquam habere potest, quod tam sit coactum et expressum? Quo antiquissumos augures non esse usos argumento est, quod decretum collegii vetus habemus omnem avem tripudium facere posse. Tum igitur esset auspicium, si modo esset ei liberum se ostendisse; tum avis illa videri posset interpres et satelles Iovis; nunc vero inclusa in cavea et fame enecta si in offam pultis invadit, et si aliquid ex eius ore cecidit, hoc tu auspicium aut hoc modo Romulum auspicari solitum putas? [74] Iam de caelo servare non ipsos censes solitos qui auspicabantur? Nunc imperant pullario; ille renuntiat fulmen sinistrum, auspicium optumum quod habemus ad omnis res praeterquam ad comitia; quod quidem institutum rei publicae causa est, ut comitiorum vel in iudiciis populi vel in iure legum vel in creandis magistratibus principes civitatis essent interpretes."At Ti. Gracchi litteris Scipio et Figulus consules, cum augures iudicassent eos vitio creatos esse, magistratu se abdicaverunt." Quis negat augurum disciplinam esse? Divinationem nego. "At haruspices divini; quos cum Ti. Gracchus, propter mortem repentinam eius qui in praerogativa referenda subito concidisset, in senatum introduxisset, non iustum rogatorem fuisse dixerunt." [75] Primum vide, ne in eum dixerint, qui rogator centuriae fuisset; is enim erat mortuus: id autem sine divinatione coniectura poterant dicere. Deinde fortasse casu qui nullo modo est ex hoc genere tollendus. Quid enim scire Etrusci haruspices aut de tabernaculo recte capto aut de pomerii iure potuerunt? Equidem adsentior C. Marcello potius quam App. Claudio, qui ambo mei collegae fuerunt, existimoque ius augurum, etsi divinationis opinione principio constitutum sit, tamen postea rei publicae causa conservatum ac retentum.

XXXVI.

Of this, however, more elsewhere. At present, let us examine the auguries of other nations who have evinced therein more superstition than art. They make use of all kinds of birds for their auspices; and one set of omens are reckoned unfavourable by them, and a different set by us.

King Deiotarus often asked me for an account of his discipline and system of divination, and I asked him for information about his. Good heavens! how different were the two methods, in some instances, so much so as to be downright contradictory to one another. And he had recourse to augurs on all occasions; but how very seldom do we apply to them unless the auspices are required by the people!

Our ancestors were unwilling to wage any war without consulting the auspices. But how many years have elapsed since this ceremony has been neglected by our proconsuls and praetors? They never take auspices; they do not pass over rivers by the encouragement of omens; nor do they wait for the intimation of the sacred chickens.

As to that divination which consists in observing the flight of birds from some elevated spot — once considered of so much consequence in military expeditions, — Marcus Marcellus, who was consul five times, as well as imperator and chief augur too, omitted it altogether. What is become, then, of divination by birds when wars are carried on by people who take no care about any auspices? It seems to be retained by the city magistrates, while it is renounced by our military commanders. So much did Marcellus despise auspices, that when he was proceeding on any enterprise, he was accustomed to travel in a closed litter, that he might not be liable to be hindered by them. And we augurs now-a-days act much in the same way, when, for fear of what is called a joint auspice, we order the sacrificial cattle to be separated from each other. Not that I commend conduct like this; for to make such contrivances, either that an auspice should not happen at all, or that if it happens it should not be seen, — what is it but an attempt to avoid the admonitions of Jupiter?

Compare the Latin

Latin: Sed de hoc loco plura in aliis, nunc hactenus. Externa enim auguria, quae sunt non tam artificiosa quam superstitiosa, videamus. Omnibus fere avibus utuntur, nos admodum paucis; alia illis sinistra sunt, alia nostris. Solebat ex me Deiotarus percontari nostri augurii disciplinam, ego ex illo sui. Di immortales, quantum differebat!, ut quaedam essent etiam contraria. Atque ille iis semper utebatur, nos, nisi dum a populo auspicia accepta habemus, quam multum iis utimur? Bellicam rem administrari maiores nostri nisi auspicato noluerunt; quam multi anni sunt, cum bella a proconsulibus et a propraetoribus administrantur, qui auspicia non habent?[77] Itaque nec amnis transeunt auspicato, nec tripudio auspicantur. Ubi ergo avium divinatio? Quae, quoniam ab iis qui auspicia nulla habent bella administrantur, ab urbanis retenta videtur, a bellicis esse sublata. Nam ex acuminibus quidem, quod totum auspicium militare est, iam M. Marcellus ille quinquiens consul totum omisit, idem imperator idem augur optumus. Et quidem ille dicebat, si quando rem agere vellet, ne impediretur auspiciis, lectica operta facere iter se solere. Huic simile est, quod nos augures praecipimus, ne iuges auspicium obveniat, ut iumenta iubeant diiungere. [78] Quid est aliud, nolle moneri a Iove, nisi efficere ut aut ne fieri possit auspicium aut, si fiat, videri?

XXXVII.

It is ridiculous enough for you to assert that this king Deiotarus did not repent of having believed the auspices which he experienced when he went in search of Pompey, because he had, by doing his duty, thus secured the fidelity and friendship of the Romans; for that praise and glory were dearer to him than his kingdom and possessions. I dare say this; but this has nothing to do with the auspices. Surely no crow could inform him that it was a piece of magnanimity to defend the liberty of the Roman people. It was he himself who felt spontaneously what he did feel; and birds can do no more than signify bare events, be they fortunate or disastrous.

Thus, I conceive that Deiotarus in this affair followed no other auspices than those of conscience, which taught him to prefer his duty to his interest. But if the birds showed him that the result would be prosperous, they certainly deceived him; for he fled from the battle, together with Pompey, and a grievous time it was for him. From this general he was compelled to separate — another affliction; and, to crown his troubles, he soon had Caesar quartered upon him, both as a guest and an enemy. What could be more painful than this? Lastly, Caesar, after having deprived him of the tetrarchy of the Trogini, and bestowed it on a certain Pergamenian of his train, — after having likewise deprived him of Armenia, which had been granted him by the senate, — after having been entertained by him with most princely hospitality, left his entertainer the king wholly stripped of his possessions.

It is needless to add more. I will return to my original subject. If we seek to know events by those auspices which are sought from birds, it appears by this argument that no birds could truly have predicted prosperity to king Deiotarus. If we want to know our duty, that is not to be sought from augury, but from virtue.

Compare the Latin

Latin: Nam illud admodum ridiculum, quod negas Deiotarum auspiciorum, quae sibi ad Pompeium proficiscenti facta sint, paenitere, quod fidem secutus amicitiamque populi Romani functus sit officio; antiquiorem enim sibi fuisse laudem et gloriam quam regnum et possessiones suas. Credo id quidem, sed hoc nihil ad auspicia; nec enim ei cornix canere potuit recte eum facere, quod populi Romani libertatem defendere pararet; ipse hoc sentiebat, sicuti sensit. [79] Aves eventus significant aut adversos aut secundos; virtutis auspiciis video esse usum Deiotarum, quae vetat spectare fortunam, dum praestetur fides. Aves vero prosperos eventus ostenderunt, certe fefellerunt. Fugit e proelio cum Pompeio: grave tempus! Discessit ab eo: luctuosa res! Caesarem eodem tempore hostem et hospitem vidit: quid hoc tristius? Is cum ei Trocmorum tetrarchian eripuisset et adseculae suo Pergameno nescio cui dedisset eidemque detraxisset Armeniam a senatu datam, cumque ab eo magnificentissumo hospitio acceptus esset, spoliatum reliquit et hospitem et regem. Sed labor longius; ad propositum revertar. Si eventa quaerimus quae exquiruntur avibus, nullo modo prospera Deiotaro; sin officia, a virtute ipsius, non ab auspiciis petita sunt.

XXXVIII.

I say nothing, then, of the augural staff of Romulus, which you declare to have remained unconsumed by fire in the midst of a general conflagration; and pass over the razor of Attius Navius, which is reported to have cut through a whetstone. Such fables as these should not be admitted into philosophical discussions.

What a philosopher has to do is, first, to examine the nature of the augural science, to investigate its origin, and pursue its history. But how pitiful is the nature of a science which pretends that the eccentric motions of birds are full of ominous import, and that all manner of things must be done, or left undone, as their flights and songs may indicate! How can their inclinations to the right or left determine the power of auspices? and how, when, and by whom were such absurd regulations as these invented?

The Etrurian soothsayers hold as the author of their discipline a child whom a ploughshare suddenly dug up from a clod of the earth. Whom do we Romans look upon as the author of ours? Is it Attius Navius? But Romulus and Remus lived several years before him, and they were both augurs, as we are informed. Shall we call our system the invention of the Pisidians, the Cilicians, or the Phrygians? Shall we, by speaking thus, call men devoid of all civilization the authors of divination?

Compare the Latin

Latin: Omitte igitur lituum Romuli, quem in maximo incendio negas potuisse comburi; contemne cotem Atti Navi. Nihil debet esse in philosophia commenticiis fabellis loci; illud erat philosophi potius, totius augurii primum naturam ipsam videre, deinde inventionem, deinde constantiam. Quae est igitur natura, quae volucris huc et illuc passim vagantis efficiat ut significent aliquid et tum vetent agere, tum iubeant aut cantu aut volatu? Cur autem aliis a laeva, aliis a dextra datum est avibus ut ratum auspicium facere possint? Quo modo autem haec aut quando aut a quibus inventa dicemus? Etrusci tamen habent exaratum puerum auctorem disciplinae suae; nos quem? Attumne Navium? At aliquot annis antiquior Romulus et Remus, ambo augures, ut accepimus. An Pisidarum aut Cilicum aut Phrygum ista inventa dicemus? Placet igitur humanitatis expertes habere divinitatis auctores?

XXXIX.

“But,” you say, “all kings, people, and nations use auspices;” as if there was anything in the world so very common as error is, or as if you yourself, in judging, were guided by the opinion of the multitude.

How few, for instance, are there who deny that pleasure is a good? most people even think it the chief good. But is the Stoic frightened from his creed by their numbers? or does the multitude follow their authority in many things? What wonder is there, then, if in respect of auspices, and all kinds of divinations, weak spirits are affected by those popular superstitions, though they cannot overturn the truth?

And what uniformity or settled agreement exists between augurs? The poet Ennius, referring to our Roman augurs, says —

When on the left it thunders, all goes well.

In Homer, on the contrary, Ajax, making some complaint or other to Achilles about the ferocity of the Trojans, speaks in this manner —

For them the father of the Gods declares, His omens on the right, his thunder theirs.

So that omens on the left appear fortunate to us, while the Greeks and barbarians prefer those on the right. Although I am not unaware that our Romans call prosperous signs sinistra, even if they are in fact dextra. But certainly our countrymen used the term sinistra, and foreigners the word dextra, because that usually appeared the best. How great, however, is this contrariety! Why need I stop to mention that they use different birds and different signs from ourselves? they take their observations in a different way, and give answers in a different way; and it is superfluous to admit that some of these modes are adopted through error, some through superstition, and that they often mislead.

Compare the Latin

Latin: "At omnes reges, populi, nationes utuntur auspiciis." Quasi vero quicquam sit tam valde quam nihil sapere vulgare, aut quasi tibi ipsi in iudicando placeat multitudo! Quotus quisque est, qui voluptatem neget esse bonum? plerique etiam summum bonum dicunt. Num igitur eorum frequentia Stoici de sententia deterrentur? Aut num plerisque in rebus sequitur eorum auctoritatem multitudo? Quid mirum igitur si in auspiciis et in omni divinatione imbecilli animi superstitiosa ista concipiant, verum dispicere non possint? [82] Quae autem est inter augures conveniens et coniuncta constantia? Ad nostri augurii consuetudinem dixit Ennius:

"tum tonuit laevum bene tempestate serena."

At Homericus Aiax apud Achillem querens de ferocitate Troianorum nescio quid hoc modo nuntiat:

"prospera Iuppiter his dextris fulgoribus edit."

Ita nobis sinistra videntur, Graiis et barbaris dextra meliora; quamquam haud ignoro, quae bona sint, sinistra nos dicere, etiamsi dextra sint; sed certe nostri sinistrum nominaverunt externique dextrum, quia plerumque id melius videbatur. Haec quanta dissensio est! [83] Quid quod aliis avibus utuntur, aliis signis, aliter observant, alia respondent? Non necesse est fateri partim horum errore susceptum esse, partim superstitione, multa fallendo?

XL.

To this catalogue of superstitions you have not hesitated to add a number of omens and presages. For instance, you have quoted the words which Aemilia addressed to Paulus, that Perses had perished; which Paulus received as an omen of success. You quote likewise the speech that Cecilia made to her sister’s daughter — “I yield my place to you.” Nor is this all: you cite the phrase, favete linguis (keep silence); and you extol the prerogative presage derived from the name of the person who takes precedence in the elections of the comitia. I call this being ingenious and eloquent against yourself; for how, if you attend to things like these, can your mind be free and calm enough to follow, not superstition, but reason, as your guide in action? Is it not so? If any one, while speaking on his own affairs, in the course of his common conversation, drops a word that may seem to you to bear on anything which you are thinking or doing, should that circumstance inspire you with either fear or energy?

When Marcus Crassus was embarking his army at Brundusium, a certain itinerant vender of figs from Caunus cried out in the harbour, “Will you buy any cauneas!” Let us say, if you please, that this was an omen against Crassus’s expedition; for it was as much as to say, Cave ne eas (Beware how you go); and that if Crassus had obeyed the omen he would not have perished. But if we regard such omens as these, we shall have to take notice of sneezes, the breaking of a shoe-tie, or the tripping over a pebble in walking.

It now remains for us to speak of the lots, and the Chaldean astrologers, vaticinations, and dreams. And first let us speak of lots.

Compare the Latin

Latin: Atque his superstitionibus non dubitasti etiam omina adiungere: Aemilia Paulo Persam perisse, quod pater omen accepit; Caecilia se sororis filiae sedes suas tradere. Iam illa:. "Favete linguis" et "praerogativam, omen comitiorum". Hoc est ipsum esse contra se copiosum et disertum, Quando enim ista observans quieto et libero animo esse poteris, ut ad rem gerendam non superstitionem habeas, sed rationem ducem? Itane, si quis aliquid ex sua re atque ex suo sermone dixerit et eius verbum aliquod apte ceciderit ad id, quod ages aut cogitabis, ea res tibi aut timorem adferet aut alacritatem? [84] Cum M. Crassus exercitum Brundisii imponeret, quidam in portu caricas Cauno advectas vendens "Cauneýs" clamitabat. Dicamus, si placet, monitum ab eo Crassum, caveret ne iret; non fuisse periturum, si omini paruisset. Quae si suscipiamus, pedis offensio nobis et abruptio corrigiae et sternumenta erunt observanda.

XLI.

What, now, is a lot? Much the same as the game of mora, or dice, and other games of chance, in which luck and fortune are all in all, and reason and skill avail nothing. These games are full of trick and deceit, invented for the object of gain, superstition, or error.

But let us examine the imputed origin of the lots, as we did that of the system of soothsayers.

We read in the records of the Praenestines, that Numerius Suffucius, a man of high reputation and rank, had often been commanded by dreams (which had at last become very threatening) to cut a flint-stone in two, at a particular spot. Being extremely alarmed at the vision, he began to act in obedience to it, in spite of the derision of his fellow-citizens; and he had no sooner divided the stone, than he found therein certain lots, engraved in ancient characters on oak. The spot in which this discovery took place is now religiously guarded, being consecrated to the infant Jupiter, who is represented with Juno as sitting in the lap of Fortune, and sucking her breasts, and is most chastely worshipped by all mothers.

At the same time and place in which the Temple of Fortune is now situated, they report that honey flowed out of an olive. Upon this the augurs declared that the lots there instituted should be held in the highest honour; and, at their command, a chest was forthwith made out of that same olive-tree, and therein those lots are kept by which the oracles of Fortune are still delivered. But how can there be the least degree of sure and certain information in lots like these, which, under Fortune’s direction, are shuffled and drawn by the hands of a child? How were the lots conveyed to this particular spot, and who cut and carved the oak of which they are composed?

“Oh,” say they, “there is nothing which God cannot do.” I wish that he had made these Stoical sages a little less inclined to believe every idle tale, instead of being inclined to a superstitious and miserable solicitude.

The common sense of men in real life has happily succeeded in exploding this kind of divination. It is only the antiquity and beauty of the Temple of Fortune that any longer preserves it from contempt even among the vulgar. For what magistrate, or man of any reputation, ever resorts to them now? And in all other places they are wholly disregarded; so that Clitomachus informs us, that with reference to this, Carneades was wont to say that he had never been so fortunate as when he saw Fortune at Praeneste. So we will say no more on this topic.

Compare the Latin

Latin: Sortes restant et Chaldaei, ut ad vates veniamus et ad somnia. Dicendum igitur putas de sortibus? Quid enim sors est? Idem prope modum quod micare, quod talos iacere, quod tesseras, quibus in rebus temeritas et casus, non ratio nec consilium valet. Tota res est inventa fallaciis aut ad quaestum aut ad superstitionem aut ad errorem. Atque ut in haruspicina fecimus, sic videamus clarissumarum sortium quae tradatur inventio. Numerium Suffustium Praenestinorum monumenta declarant, honestum hominem et nobilem, somniis crebris, ad extremum etiam minacibus cum iuberetur certo in loco silicem caedere, perterritum visis, inridentibus suis civibus id agere coepisse; itaque perfracto saxo sortis erupisse in robore insculptas priscarum litterarum notis. Is est hodie locus saeptus religiose propter Iovis pueri, qui lactens, cum Iunone Fortunae in gremio sedens, mammam adpetens, castissime colitur a matribus. [86] Eodemque tempore in eo loco, ubi Fortunae nunc sita est aedes, mel ex olea fluxisse dicunt, haruspicesque dixisse summa nobilitate illas sortis futuras, eorumque iussu ex illa olea arcam esse factam, eoque conditas sortis, quae hodie Fortunae monitu tolluntur. Quid igitur in his potest esse certi, quae Fortunae monitu pueri manu miscentur atque ducuntur? Quo modo autem istae positae in illo loco? Quis robur illud cecidit, dolavit, inscripsit? "Nihil est," inquiunt, "quod deus efficere non possit." Utinam sapientis Stoicos effecisset, ne omnia cum superstitiosa sollicitudine et miseria crederent! Sed hoc quidem genus divinationis vita iam communis explosit; fani pulchritudo et vetustas Praenestinarum etiam nunc retinet sortium nomen, atque id in volgus. [87] Quis enim magistratus aut quis vir inlustrior utitur sortibus? Ceteris vero in locis sortes plane refrixerunt: quod Carneadem Clitomachus scribit dicere solitum, nusquam se fortunatiorem quam Praeneste vidisse Fortunam.

Ergo hoc divinationis genus omittamus,

XLII.

Let us now consider the prodigies of the Chaldeans. Eudoxus, who was a disciple of Plato, and, in the judgment of the greatest men, the first astronomer of his time, formed and committed it to writing, the opinion that no credence should be given to the predictions of the Chaldeans in their calculation of a man’s life from the day of his nativity.

Panaetius, who is almost the only Stoic who rejects astrological prophecies, says that Archelaus and Cassander, the two principal astronomers of the age in which he himself lived, set no value on judicial astrology, though they were very celebrated for their learning in other parts of astronomy. Scylax of Halicarnassus, a great friend of Panaetius, and a first-rate astronomer, and chief magistrate of his own city, likewise rejected all the predictions of the Chaldeans.

But to proceed merely on reason, omitting for the present the testimony of these witnesses. Those who put faith in the Chaldeans, and their calculations of nativities, and their various predictions, argue in this manner: they affirm that in that circle of constellations which the Greeks term the Zodiac there resides a certain energy, of such a character that each portion of its circumference influences and modifies the surrounding heavens according to what stars are in it and the neighbouring parts at each season; and that this energy is variously affected by those wandering stars which we call planets. But when they come into that portion of the circle in which the rise of that star which appears anew, or into that which has anything in conjunction or harmony with it, they term the true or quadrate aspect.

And moreover, as there happen at every season of the year several astronomical revolutions, owing to approximations and retirements of the stars which we see, which are affected by the power of the sun, — they think it not merely probable, but true, that according to the temperature of the atmosphere at the time must be the animation and formation of children from their mother’s womb; and that their genius, disposition, temper, constitution, behaviour, fortune, and destiny through life depend upon that.

Compare the Latin

Latin: ad Chaldaeorum monstra veniamus; de quibus Eudoxus, Platonis auditor in astrologia iudicio doctissimorum hominum facile princeps, sic opinatur, id quod scriptum reliquit, Chaldaeis in praedictione et in notatione cuiusque vitae ex natali die minime esse credendum. [88] Nominat etiam Panaetius, qui unus e Stoicis astrologorum praedicta reiecit, Anchialum et Cassandrum, summos astrologos illius aetatis, qua erat ipse, cum in ceteris astrologiae partibus excellerent, hoc praedictionis genere non usos. Scylax Halicarnassius, familiaris Panaeti, excellens in astrologia idemque in regenda sua civitate princeps, totum hoc Chaldaeicum praedicendi genus repudiavit. [89] Sed, ut ratione utamur omissis testibus, sic isti disputant qui haec Chaldaeorum natalicia praedicta defendunt: vim quandam esse aiunt signifero in orbe, qui Graece ζωδιακός dicitur, talem ut eius orbis una quaeque pars alia alio modo moveat immutetque caelum, perinde ut quaeque stellae in his finitumisque partibus sint quoque tempore, eamque vim varie moveri ab iis sideribus quae vocentur errantia; cum autem in eam ipsam partem orbis venerint, in qua sit ortus eius qui nascatur, aut in eam quae coniunctum aliquid habeat aut consentiens, ea triangula illi et quadrata nominant. Etenim cum tempore anni tempestatumque caeli conversiones commutationesque tantae fiant accessu stellarum et recessu, cumque ea vi solis efficiantur quae videmus, non veri simile solum, sed etiam verum esse censent, perinde utcumque temperatus sit aÎr, ita pueros orientis animari atque formari, ex eoque ingenia, mores, animum, corpus, actionem vitae, casus cuiusque eventusque fingi.

XLIII [90] 0

XLIII.

What an incredible insanity is this! The Stoic Diogenes grants, that the Chaldeans possess the power of foreseeing certain events; to the limit, that is, of predicting what a child’s disposition and particular talent and ability are likely to be. But he denies that the other things which they profess can possibly be known. For instance, twins may resemble each other in appearance, and yet their lives and fortunes be entirely dissimilar.

Procles and Eurysthenes, kings of the Lacedaemonians, were twin-brethren. But they did not live the same number of years; for Procles died a year before his brother, and much excelled him in the glory of his actions.

But I question whether even that portion of prophetic power which the worthy Diogenes concedes to the Chaldeans, by a sort of prevarication in argument, can be fairly ascribed to them.

For, as according to them the birth of infants is regulated by the moon, and as the Chaldeans observe and take notice of the natal stars with which the moon happens to be in conjunction at the moment of a nativity, — they are founding their judgment on the most fallacious evidence of their eyes, as to matters which ought to be beheld by reason and intellect. For the science of Mathematics, with which they ought to be acquainted, should teach them the comparative proximity of the moon to the earth, and its relative remoteness from the planets Venus and Mercury, and especially from the sun, whose light it is supposed to borrow. And the other two intervals, those, namely, which separate the sun from Mars and from Jupiter and from Saturn, and the distance also between that and the heaven, which is the bound and limit of our universe, are infinite and immense. What influence, then, can such distant orbs transmit to the moon, or rather to the earth?

Compare the Latin

Latin: delirationem incredibilem! (non enim omnis error stultitia dicenda est). Quibus etiam Diogenes Stoicus concedit aliquid, ut praedicere possint dumtaxat qualis quisque natura et ad quam quisque maxume rem aptus futurus sit; cetera quae profiteantur negat ullo modo posse sciri; etenim geminorum formas esse similis, vitam atque fortunam plerumque disparem. Procles et Eurysthenes, Lacedaemoniorum reges, gemini fratres fuerunt; at ii nec totidem annos vixerunt (anno enim Procli vita brevior fuit), multumque is fratri rerum gestarum gloria praestitit. [91] At ego id ipsum, quod vir optumus Diogenes Chaldaeis quasi quadam praevaricatione concedit, nego posse intellegi. Etenim cum, ut ipsi dicunt, Ortus nascentium luna moderetur, eaque animadvertant et notent sidera natalicia Chaldaei, quaecumque lunae iuncta videantur, oculorum fallacissimo sensu iudicant ea quae ratione atque animo videre debebant. Docet enim ratio mathematicorum, quam istis notam esse oportebat, quanta humilitate luna feratur terram paene contingens, quantum absit a proxuma Mercuri stella, multo autem longius a Veneris, deinde alio intervallo distet a sole, cuius lumine conlustrari putatur; reliqua vero tria intervalla infinita et immensa, a sole ad Martis, inde ad Iovis, ab eo ad Saturni stellam; inde ad caelum ipsum, quod extremum atque ultumum mundi est. [92] Quae potest igitur contagio ex infinito paene intervallo pertinere ad lunam vel potius ad terram?

XLIV Quid?

XLIV.

Moreover, as these astrologers maintain, as they are bound to maintain, that all children that are born on the earth under the same planet and constellation must experience the same destinies, having the same signs of nativity, they make an assertion which evinces the greatest ignorance of astronomy. For those circles which divide the heaven into hemispheres — circles which the Greeks call horizons, and the Latins finientes — perpetually vary according to the spot from which they are drawn; and, therefore, the risings and settings of the stars appear to take place at different seasons to different races of men.

If, then, the condition of the atmosphere is affected by the energy and virtue of the stars, sometimes in one way and sometimes in another, how can those children who are born at the same time in different climates be subject to the same starry influences in various quarters of the globe? For instance, in the country which we Romans inhabit, the dog-star rises some days after the summer solstice, while among the Troglodytae, a people of Africa, it is said to rise before it. So that if I were to grant that the heavenly influences have an effect upon all the children who are born upon the earth, it would follow, that all who are born at the same time in different regions of the earth, must be born not with the same but with different inclinations according to the different conditions of climate; which, however, they by no means admit. For they persist in maintaining that all children who are born at the same period, have at their nativity the same astrological destinies allotted to them, whatever their native country may be.

Compare the Latin

Latin: Cum dicunt, id quod iis dicere necesse est, omnis omnium ortus quicumque gignantur in omni terra quae incolatur, eosdem esse, eademque omnibus qui eodem statu caeli et stellarum nati sint accidere necesse esse, nonne eius modi sunt, ut ne caeli quidem naturam interpretes istos caeli nosse appareat? Cum enim illi orbes, qui caelum quasi medium dividunt et aspectum nostrum definiunt (qui a Graecis ὁρίζοντες nominantur, a nobis " finientes" rectissume nominari possunt) varietatem maxumam habeant aliique in aliis locis sint, necesse est ortus occasusque siderum non fieri eodem tempore apud omnis. [93] Quodsi eorum vi caelum modo hoc, modo illo modo temperatur, qui potest eadem vis esse nascentium, cum caeli tanta sit dissimilitudo? In his locis quae nos incolimus post solstitium Canicula exoritur, et quidem aliquot diebus; at apud Troglodytas, ut scribitur, ante solstitium; ut, si iam concedamus aliquid vim caelestem ad eos qui in terra gignuntur pertinere, confitendum sit illis eos qui nascuntur eodem tempore posse in dissimilis incidere naturas propter caeli dissimilitudinem; quod minime illis placet; volunt enim illi omnis eodem tempore ortos, qui ubique sint nati, eadem condicione nasci.

XLV.

But what folly is it to imagine, that while attending to the swift motions and revolutions of heaven, we should take no notice of the changes of the atmosphere immediately around us — its weather, its winds, and rains — when weather differs so much even in places which are nearest to one another, that there is often one weather at Tusculum, and another at Rome; as is especially remarked by sailors, who, after having doubled a cape, often find the greatest possible change in the wind.

When the calmness or disturbed state of the weather is so variable, is it the part of a man in his senses to say that these circumstances have no effect on the births of children happening at that moment, (as, indeed, they have not,) and yet to affirm, that that subtle and indefinable thing, which cannot be felt at all, and can scarcely be comprehended — namely, the conjuncture which arises from the moon and other stars — does affect the birth of children? What! is it a slight error, not to understand that by this system that energy of seminal principles which is of so much influence in begetting and procreating the child is utterly out of sight! — for who can help observing that the parents impress on their children, to a great extent, their own form, manners, features, and gestures? Now this could hardly happen if it were not the power and nature of the parents which was the efficient cause, and the condition of the moon and the temperature of the heavens.

Why need I press the argument that those who are born at one and the same moment, are dissimilar in their nature, their lives, and their circumstances?

Compare the Latin

Latin: Sed quae tanta dementia est, ut in maxumis motibus mutationibusque caeli nihil intersit qui ventus, qui imber, quae tempestas ubique sit? Quarum rerum in proxumis locis tantae dissimilitudines saepe sunt, ut alia Tusculi, alia Romae eveniat saepe tempestas; quod qui navigant maxume animadvertunt, cum in flectendis promunturiis ventorum mutationes maxumas saepe sentiunt. Haec igitur cum sit tum serenitas, tum perturbatio caeli, estne sanorum hominum hoc ad nascentium ortus pertinere non dicere (quod non certe pertinet), illud nescio quid tenue, quod sentiri nullo modo, intellegi autem vix potest, quae a luna ceterisque sideribus caeli temperatio fiat, dicere ad puerorum ortus pertinere? Quid? quod non intellegunt seminum vim, quae ad gignendum procreandumque plurimum valeat, funditus tolli, mediocris erroris est? Quis enim non videt et formas et mores et plerosque status ac motus effingere a parentibus liberos? Quod non contingeret, si haec non vis et natura gignentium efficeret, sed temperatio lunae caelique moderatio. [95] Quid? quod uno et eodem temporis puncto nati dissimilis et naturas et vitas et casus habent, parumne declarat nihil ad agendam vitam nascendi tempus pertinere? Nisi forte putamus neminem eodem tempore ipso et conceptum et natum, quo Africanum. Num quis igitur talis fuit?

XLVI [96] Quid?

XLVI.

Besides, is there any doubt that many persons, though they were born with great bodily defects, are nevertheless afterwards cured of them, and set right by the self-corrective power of their nature, or by the attention of their nurses, or the skill of their physicians? or that many children have been born so tongue-tied that they could not speak, and yet have been cured by the application of the knife? Many likewise by meditation or exercise have removed their natural infirmities. Thus Phalereus records that Demosthenes when young could not pronounce the letter R; but afterwards by constant practice he learnt to articulate it perfectly. Now, if such defects had been occasioned by the influence of the stars, nothing could have altered them.

Need I say more? Does not difference of situation make races of men different? and it is easy enough to give a list of such instances; and to point out what differences exist between the Indians and Persians, the Aethiopians and Syrians, in respect both of their persons and their characters, so as to present an incredible variety and dissimilarity. And this fact proves, that the climate influences the natures of men far more than the aspect of the moon and stars. For though some pretend that the Chaldean astrologers have verified the nativities of children by calculations and experiments in the cases of all the children who have been born for 470,000 years, this is a mistake. For had they been in the habit of doing so, they would never have given up the practice. But, as it is, no author remains who knows of such a thing being done now, or ever having been done.

Compare the Latin

Latin: Illudne dubium est quin multi, cum ita nati essent ut quaedam contra naturam depravata haberent, restituerentur et corrigerentur ab Natura, cum se ipsa revocasset, aut arte atque medicina? Ut, quorum linguae sic inhaererent, ut loqui non possent, eae scalpello resectae liberarentur. Multi etiam naturae vitium meditatione atque exercitatione sustulerunt, ut Demosthenem scribit Phalereus, cum "rho" dicere nequiret, exercitatione fecisse ut planissume diceret. Quodsi haec astro ingenerata et tradita essent, nulla res ea mutare posset. Quid? Dissimilitudo locorum nonne dissimiles hominum procreationes habet? Quas quidem percurrere oratione facile est, quid inter Indos et Persas, Aethiopas et Syros differat corporibus, animis, ut incredibilis varietas dissimilitudoque sit. [97] Ex quo intellegitur plus terrarum situs quam lunae tactus ad nascendum valere. Nam quod aiunt quadringenta septuaginta milia annorum in periclitandis experiundisque pueris, quicumque essent nati, Babylonios posuisse, fallunt: si enim esset factitatum, non esset desitum; neminem autem habemus auctorem, qui id aut fieri dicat aut factum sciat.

XLVII.

You see that I am not using the arguments of Carneades, but rather those of Panaetius, the chief of the Stoics. But answer me now this question. Were all those persons who were slain in the battle of Cannae born under the same constellation? Yet all these men met with one and the same end. Again, have those men who are singular in their genius and courage, a separate, some peculiar star of their own too? For what moment is there in which a multitude of persons are not born? and yet no one has ever been like Homer.

And if the aspect of the stars and the state of the firmament influenced the birth of every being, it should, by parity of reasoning, influence inanimate substances; yet what can be more absurd than such an idea?

I grant, indeed, that Lucius Tarutius of Firma, my own personal friend, and a man particularly well acquainted with the Chaldean astrology, traced back the nativity of our own city, Rome, to those equinoctial days of the feast of Pales in which Romulus is reported to have begun its foundations, and asserted that the moon was at that period in Libra, and, on this discovery, he hesitated not to pronounce the destinies of Rome.

Oh, the mighty power of delusion! Is even the birth-day of a city subject to the influence of the stars and moon? Granting even that the condition of the heavens, when he draws his first breath, may influence the life of a child, does it follow that it can have any effect on brick or cement, of which a city is composed?

Why need I say more? Such ideas as these are refuted every day. How many of these Chaldean prophecies do I remember being repeated to Pompey, Crassus, and to Caesar himself! according to which, not one of these heroes was to die except in old age, in domestic felicity, and perfect renown; so that I wonder that any living man can yet believe in these impostors, whose predictions they see falsified daily by facts and results.

Compare the Latin

Latin: Videsne, me non ea dicere, quae Carneades, sed ea, quae princeps Stoicorum Panaetius dixerit? Ego autem etiam haec requiro, omnesne, qui Cannensi pugna ceciderint, uno astro fuerint; exitus quidem omnium unus et idem fit. Quid? Qui ingenio atque animo singulares, num astro quoque uno? Quod enim tempus quo non innumerabiles nascuntur? At certe similis nemo Homeri. [98] Et, si ad rem pertinet quo modo caelo adfecto compositisque sideribus quodque animal oriatur, valeat id necesse est non in hominibus solum, verum in bestiis etiam; quo quid potest dici absurdius? L. quidem Tarutius Firmanus, familiaris noster, in primis Chaldaicis rationibus eruditus, urbis etiam nostrae natalem diem repetebat ab iis Parilibus, quibus eam a Romulo conditam accepimus, Romamque, in iugo cum esset Luna, natam esse dicebat, nec eius fata canere dubitabat. [99] O vim maxumam erroris! Etiamne urbis natalis dies ad vim stellarum et lunae pertinebat? Fac in puero referre ex qua adfectione caeli primum spiritum duxerit; num hoc in latere aut in caemento, ex quibus urbs effecta est, potuit valere? Sed quid plura? Cotidie refelluntur. Quam multa ego Pompeio, quam multa Crasso, quam multa huic ipsi Caesari a Chaldaeis dicta memini, neminem eorum nisi senectute, nisi domi, nisi cum claritate esse moriturum! Ut mihi permirum videatur quemquam exstare qui etiam nunc credat iis quorum praedicta cotidie videat re et eventis refelli.

XLVIII.

It only remains for us to examine those two sorts of divination which we term natural, as distinguished from artificial — namely, vaticinations and dreams. With your permission, brother Quintus, we will now treat of these.

I shall be very well pleased to hear you, (answered Quintus,) for I entirely agree with all you have hitherto advanced, and, to tell you the truth, although I have had my feelings on the subject strengthened by your arguments, yet of my own accord I looked upon the opinion of the Stoics respecting divination as rather too superstitious, and was more inclined to favour the arguments which have been adduced by the Peripatetics, and the ancient Dicaearchus and Cratippus, who now flourish, who all maintain that there exists in the minds of men a certain oracular and prophetic power of presentiment, whereby they anticipate future events, whether they are inspired with a divine ecstasy, or are as it were disengaged from the body, and act freely and easily during sleep. I wish therefore to know what is your opinion respecting these vaticinations and dreams, and by what ingenious devices you mean to invalidate them.

When Quintus had thus spoken, I proceeded to speak again, starting afresh, as it were, from a new beginning.

I am very well aware, brother Quintus, I replied, that you have always entertained doubts respecting the other kinds of divination; but that you are very favourable to the two natural kinds — namely, ecstasy and dreams, which appear to proceed from the mind when at liberty.

Compare the Latin

Latin: Restant duo divinandi genera, quae habere dicimur a natura, non ab arte, vaticinandi et somniandi; de quibus, Quinte," inquam, "si placet, disseramus." "Mihi vero," inquit, "placet; his enim quae adhuc disputasti prorsus adsentior, et, vere ut loquar, quamquam tua me oratio confirmavit, tamen etiam mea sponte nimis superstitiosam de divinatione Stoicorum sententiam iudicabam; haec me Peripateticorum ratio magis movebat, et veteris Dicaearchi et eius, qui nunc floret, Cratippi, qui censent esse in mentibus hominum tamquam oraclum aliquod, ex quo futura praesentiant, si aut furore divino incitatus animus aut somno relaxatus solute moveatur ac libere. His de generibus quid sentias et quibus ea rationibus infirmes, audire sane velim."

XLIX.

I will therefore tell you my idea very candidly respecting these two species of divination, after I have examined a little the sentiment of the Stoics, and especially of our friend Cratippus, on this subject. For you said that Cratippus, Diogenes, and Antipater summed up the question in this manner: — “If there are Gods, and they do not inform men beforehand respecting future events, either they do not love men, or do not know what is going to happen; or they think that the knowledge of the future would be of no service to mankind; or they believe it inconsistent with the majesty of the Gods to reveal to men the things that must come to pass; or, lastly, we must believe that even the Gods themselves are incapable of declaring them. But we cannot say that the Gods do not love men, for they are essentially benevolent and philanthropic. And they cannot be ignorant of those things which they themselves have appointed and designed: neither can it be uninteresting or unimportant to us to know what must happen to us, for we should be more prudent if we did know. Nor can the Gods think it inconsistent with their dignity to advertise men of future events, for nothing can be more sublime than doing good. Nor are they unable to perceive the future beforehand. If, therefore, there are no Gods, they do not declare the future to us; but there are Gods, therefore they do declare it. And if the Gods declare future events to us, they must have furnished us with means whereby we may apprehend them, otherwise they would declare them in vain; and if they have given us the means of apprehending divination, then there is a divination for us to apprehend — therefore there is a divination.”

O acutest of men, in what concise terms do they think that they have settled the question for ever! They assume premises to draw their conclusion from, not one of which is granted to them. But the only conclusion of an argument which can be approved, is one in which the point doubted of is established by facts which are not doubtful.

Now this is just what you dialecticians have not yet done in favour of divination; and not only bring forward as your premises, propositions as to be universally admitted; but you assume such premises, even if they be granted, your desired conclusion would be as far as ever from following. For instance, your first proposition is this: If there are Gods they must needs be benevolent. Who will grant you this? Will Epicurus, who asserts that the Gods do not care about any business of their own or of others? or will our own countryman Ennius, who was applauded by all the Romans, when he said —

I’ve always argued that the Gods exist, But that they care for mortals I deny;

and then gives reasons for his opinion; but it is not necessary to quote him further. I have said enough to show that your friends assume as certain, propositions which are matters of doubt and controversy.

Compare the Latin

Latin: [101] Quae cum ille dixisset, tum ego rursus quasi ab alio principio sum exorsus dicere. "Non ignoro," inquam, "Quinte, te semper ita sensisse, ut de ceteris divinandi generibus dubitares, ista duo, furoris et somnii, quae a libera mente fluere viderentur, probares. Dicam igitur de istis ipsis duobus generibus mihi quid videatur, si prius et Stoicorum conclusio rationis et Cratippi nostri quid valeat videro. Dixisti enim et Chrysippum et Diogenem et Antipatrum concludere hoc modo: "Si sunt di neque ante declarant hominibus quae futura sint, aut non diligunt homines, aut quid eventurum sit ignorant, aut existumant nihil interesse hominum scire quid sit futurum, aut non censent esse suae maiestatis praesignificare hominibus quae sint futura, aut ea ne ipsi quidem di significare possunt. [102] At neque non diligunt nos (sunt enim benefici generique hominum amici), neque ignorant ea quae ab ipsis constituta et designata sunt, neque nostra nihil interest scire ea quae futura sunt (erimus enim cautiores, si sciemus), neque hoc alienum ducunt maiestate sua (nihil est enim beneficentia praestantius), neque non possunt futura praenoscere. Non igitur di sunt nec significant nobis futura. Sunt autem di; significant ergo. Et non, si significant futura, nullas dant vias nobis ad significationum scientiam (frustra enim significarent), nec, si dant vias, non est divinatio: est igitur divinatio." [103] O acutos homines! Quam paucis verbis confectum negotium putant! Ea sumunt ad concludendum, quorum iis nihil conceditur. Conclusio autem rationis ea probanda est, in qua ex rebus non dubiis id quod dubitatur efficitur.

L.

Do you not see how Epicurus, whom the Stoics forsooth term a blunderer, reasons in order to prove that the universe is infinite in the very nature of things? That which is finite, says he, has an end. Every one will concede this. Whatever has an end, may be seen externally from something else. This also may be granted him. Now that which includes all, cannot be discerned externally from anything else. This proposition likewise appears undeniable. Therefore that which includes all, having no end, is necessarily infinite. Thus by the proposition which we are compelled to admit, he clearly proves the point in question.

Compare the Latin

Latin: [104] Videsne Epicurum, quem hebetem et rudem dicere solent Stoici, quem ad modum quod in natura rerum omne esse dicimus id infinitum esse concluserit? "Quod finitum est" inquit "habet extremum." Quis hoc non dederit? "Quod autem habet extremum, id cernitur ex alio extrinsecus." Hoc quoque est concedendum. "At, quod omne est, id non cernitur ex alio extrinsecus." Ne hoc quidem negari potest. "Nihil igitur cum habeat extremum, infinitum sit necesse est." Videsne, ut ad rem dubiam concessis rebus pervenerit? Hoc vos dialectici non facitis, nec solum ea non sumitis ad concludendum quae ab omnibus concedantur, sed ea sumitis quibus concessis nihilo magis efficiatur quod velitis. Primum enim hoc sumitis: "Si sunt di, benefici in homines sunt." Quis hoc vobis dabit? Epicurusne? qui negat quicquam deos nec alieni curare nec sui; an noster Ennius? qui magno plausu loquitur adsentiente populo: "Ego deum genus esse semper dixi et dicam caelitum, sed eos non curare opinor quid agat humanum genus." Et quidem, cur sic opinetur, rationem subicit; sed nihil est necesse dicere quae sequuntur; tantum sat est intellegi, id sumere istos pro certo, quod dubium controversumque sit.

LI.

The next proposition is this, That the Gods must needs know all things, because they have made all things. But how great a dispute is there as to this fact among the most learned men, several of whom deny that all things were created by the immortal Gods!

Again, they assert, that it is the interest of man to know those things which are about to come to pass. But Dicaearchus has written a great book to prove that ignorance of futurity is better than knowledge of it.

They deny that it is inconsistent with the majesty of the Gods to look into every man’s house, forsooth, so as to see what is expedient for each individual. Nor is it possible, they say, for them to be ignorant of the future. This is denied by those who will not allow that what is future can be certain. Do you not see, therefore, that they have assumed as certain and admitted axioms, things which are doubtful?

After which, they twist the argument about and sum it up thus: “Therefore, there are no Gods; and they do not grant men intimations of the future.” And, having settled the question thus, to their own satisfaction, they add, “But there are Gods;” a fact which is not admitted by all men; “therefore, they do grant intimations.” Even that consequence I cannot see; for they may grant no intimations of the future and yet exist as Gods.

Again, it is asserted: If the Gods grant intimations to men respecting future events, they must give some means of explaining these intimations. But surely the contrary may be the case; for the Gods may keep to themselves the meaning of the signs which they impart to men; for else why should they teach it to the Etrurians rather than to the Romans?

Again, they argue, that if the Gods have given men the means of understanding the signs they impart, then the existence of divination is manifest. But grant that the Gods do give such means, what does it avail them, if we happen to be incapable of receiving them?

Last of all, their conclusion is: Therefore there certainly is such a thing as divination. It may be their conclusion, but it is not proved; for, as they themselves have taught us, “false premises cannot produce a true result.” Therefore, the whole of their argument falls to the ground.

Compare the Latin

Latin: [105] Sequitur porro, nihil deos ignorare quod omnia sint ab iis constituta. Hic vero quanta pugna est doctissumorum hominum negantium esse haec a dis immortalibus constituta! "At nostra interest scire ea quae eventura sint." Magnus Dicaearchi liber est nescire ea melius esse quam scire. Negant id esse alienum maiestate deorum: scilicet casas omnium introspicere, ut videant quid cuique conducat. [106] "Neque non possunt futura praenoscere." Negant posse ii, quibus non placet esse certum quid futurum sit. Videsne igitur quae dubia sint, ea sumi pro certis atque concessis? Deinde contorquent et ita concludunt: "Non igitur et sunt di nec significant futura"; id enim iam perfectum arbitrantur. Deinde adsumunt: "Sunt autem di", quod ipsum non ab omnibus conceditur. "Significant ergo." Ne id quidem sequitur; possunt enim non significare et tamen esse di. Nec, si significent, non dare vias aliquas ad scientiam significationis. At id quoque potest, ut non dent homini, ipsi habeant; cur enim Tuscis potius quam Romanis darent? "Nec, si dant vias, nulla est divinatio." Fac dare deos, quod absurdum est; quid refert, si accipere non possumus? Extremum est: "Est igitur divinatio." Sit extremum, effectum tamen non est; ex falsis enim, ut ab ipsis didicimus, verum effici non potest. Iacet igitur tota conclusio.

LII.

Let us now consider the arguments of that most excellent man, our friend Cratippus. As says he, the use and function of sight cannot exist without the eyes — and yet the eyes do not always perform their office, — and as he who has once enjoyed correct sight, so as to see what truly exists, is conscious of the reality of vision; — so, if the practice of divination cannot exist without the power of divination — and though in the exercise of this power of divination some errors may occur, and the diviner may be misled so as not to foresee the truth; yet the existence of divination is sufficiently attested by the fact that some true divinations have been made, containing such exact predictions of all the particulars of future events, that they can never have been made by chance, — of which numerous instances might be cited. The existence of divination must therefore be admitted.

The argument is neatly and concisely stated. But Cratippus twice assumes what he wishes to prove; and even if we were willing to grant him very large concessions, we could not possibly agree with his conclusions.

His argument is this: Though the eyes should sometimes possess very imperfect sight, yet, provided they sometimes see clearly, it is evident that the power of vision is in them. On the same principle, if any one has ever once uttered a true divination, he must always be considered as possessing the faculty of divining, even when he blunders.

Compare the Latin

Latin: [107] Veniamus nunc ad optumum virum, familiarem nostrum, Cratippum. "Si sine oculis" inquit "non potest exstare officium et munus oculorum, possunt autem aliquando oculi non fungi suo munere, qui vel semel ita est usus oculis ut vera cerneret, is habet sensum oculorum vera cernentium. Item igitur, si sine divinatione non potest officium et munus divinationis exstare, potest autem, cum quis divinationem habeat, errare aliquando nec vera cernere, satis est ad confirmandam divinationem semel aliquid ita esse divinatum nihil ut fortuito cecidisse videatur. Sunt autem eius generis innumerabilia; esse igitur divinationem confitendum est." Festive et breviter; sed cum bis sumpsit quod voluit, etiamsi faciles nos ad concedendum habuerit, id tamen quod adsumit concedi nullo modo potest. [108] "Si" inquit "aliquando oculi peccent, tamen, quia recte aliquando viderunt, inest in iis vis videndi; item, si quis semel aliquid in divinatione dixerit, is, etiam cum peccet, tamen existumandus sit habere vim divinandi."

LIII.

Now I entreat you, my dear Cratippus, to consider how little the resemblance is between these two cases. To me there is none at all. The eyes which see clearly exert no more than their natural faculty of sight. But minds, if they have sometimes truly foreseen future events, either in ecstasies or in dreams, have done so by fortune or accident; unless, indeed, you imagine those who believe that dreams are but dreams, will grant you that when they happen to say anything that is true, it is no longer the effect of chance.

But we may concede for the present these two assumptions of Cratippus, which the Greek dialecticians would call lemmata. But we prefer speaking in Latin; still the presumption, which they term prolepsis, cannot be granted.

Cratippus goes on assuming premises in this manner: There are, says he, presentiments innumerable which are not fortuitous. Now this we absolutely deny. See how great is the magnitude of the difference between us. Not being able to agree with his premises, I assert that he has drawn no conclusion. Oh, but perhaps it is very impudent of us not to concede a point which is so clear! But what is that? “Why,” he replies, “that many predictions are fulfilled.” Yes; but are there not many more which are not fulfilled? Does not this very variation, which is the peculiar property of fortune, teach us that fortune, not nature, regulates such predictions?

Compare the Latin

Latin: Vide, quaeso, Cratippe noster, quam sint ista similia; nam mihi non videntur. Oculi enim vera cernentes utuntur natura atque sensu; animi, si quando vel vaticinando vel somniando vera viderunt, usi sunt fortuna atque casu; nisi forte concessuros tibi existumas eos, qui somnia pro somniis habent, si quando aliquod somnium verum evaserit, non id fortuito accidisse. Sed demus tibi istas duas sumptiones (ea quae λήμματα appellant dialectici, sed nos latine loqui malumus), adsumptio tamen (quam πρόσληψις idem vocant) non dabitur. [109] Adsumit autem Cratippus hoc modo: "Sunt autem innumerabiles praesensiones non fortuitae." At ego dico nullam: vide, quanta sit controversia; iam adsumptione non concessa nulla conclusio est. "At impudentes sumus, qui, cum tam perspicuum sit, non concedamus." Quid est perspicuum? "Multa vera" inquit "evadere." Quid quod multo plura falsa? Nonne ipsa varietas, quae est propria fortunae, fortunam esse causam, non naturam esse docet? Deinde, si tua ista conclusio, Cratippe, vera est (tecum enim mihi res est), nonne intellegis eadem uti posse et haruspices et fulguratores et interpretes ostentorum et augures et sortilegos et Chaldaeos? Quorum generum nullum est, ex quo non aliquid, sicut praedictum sit, evaserit. Ergo aut ea quoque genera divinandi sunt quae tu rectissume improbas, aut, si ea non sunt, non intellego cur haec duo sint quae relinquis. Qua ergo ratione haec inducis, eadem illa possunt esse quae tollis.

LIV.

Moreover, if your conclusion is true, O renowned Cratippus! — for to you I address myself — do not you perceive that you predict for his own favour? Not one of these men has been so unfortunate as never on any occasion to find his predictions verified. This being the case, you must either admit all the other kinds of divination which you most properly reject; or, if you absolutely condemn them, I do not see how you will be able to defend those two which you retain as favourable exceptions. For on the same principle that you maintain these, the others also may be true which you discard.

But what authority has this same ecstasy, which you choose to call divine, that enables the madman to foresee things inscrutable to the sage, and which invests with divine senses a man who has lost all his human ones?

We Romans preserve with solicitude the verses which the Sibyl is reported to have uttered when in an ecstasy, — the interpreter of which is by common report believed to the effect that he whom we did really treat as king should also be called king, if we would be safe. If such a prediction is indeed contained in the books of the Sibyl, to what particular person or period does it refer? For, whoever is the author of these ingeniously composed Sibylline oracles, since, as all specific definition of person or period is omitted, they in some way or other appear to predict everything that happens. Besides this, the Sibylline oracles are involved in such profound obscurity, that the same verses might seem at different times to refer to different subjects.

It is evident, however, that they are not composed by any one in a prophetic ecstasy, as the poem itself evinces, being far less remarkable for enthusiasm and inspiration than for technicality and labour; and as is especially proved by that arrangement which the Greeks call acrostics — where, from the first letter of each verse in order, words are formed which express some particular meaning; as is the case with some of Ennius’s verses, the initial letters of which make, “Which Ennius wrote.” But such verses indicate rather attention than ecstasy in those who write them.

Now, in the verses of the Sibyl, the whole of the paragraph on every subject is contained in the initial letters of every verse of that same paragraph. This is evidently the artifice of a practised writer, not of one in a frenzy; and rather of a diligent mind than an insane one. Therefore, let us consider the Sibyl as so distinct and isolated a character, that, according to the ordinance of our ancestors, the Sibylline books shall not even be read except by decree of the senate, and be used rather for the putting down than the taking up of religious fancies. And let us arrange matters with the priests under whose custody they remain, that they may prophesy anything rather than a king from these mysterious volumes; for neither Gods nor men any longer tolerate the notion of restoring kingly government at Rome.

Compare the Latin

Latin: [110] Quid vero habet auctoritatis furor iste, quem divinum vocatis, ut, quae sapiens non videat, ea videat insanus, et is, qui humanos sensus amiserit, divinos adsecutus sit? Sibyllae versus observamus, quos illa furens fudisse dicitur. Quorum interpres nuper falsa quadam hominum fama dicturus in senatu putabatur eum, quem re vera regem habebamus, appellandum quoque esse regem, si salvi esse vellemus. Hoc si est in libris, in quem hominem et in quod tempus est? Callide enim, qui illa composuit, perfecit ut, quodcumque accidisset, praedictum videretur, hominum et temporum definitione sublata. [111] Adhibuit etiam latebram obscuritatis, ut iidem versus alias in aliam rem posse accommodari viderentur. Non esse autem illud carmen furentis cum ipsum poima declarat (est enim magis artis et diligentiae quam incitationis et motus), tum vero ea, quae acrostichis dicitur, cum deinceps ex primis cuiusque versus litteris aliquid conectitur, ut in quibusdam Ennianis: "Q. ENNIUS FECIT". Id certe magis est attenti animi quam furentis. [112] Atque in Sibyllinis ex primo versu cuiusque sententiae primis litteris illius sententiae carmen omne praetexitur. Hoc scriptoris est, non furentis, adhibentis diligentiam, non insani. Quam ob rem Sibyllam quidem sepositam et conditam habeamus, ut, id quod proditum est a maioribus, iniussu senatus ne legantur quidem libri valeantque ad deponendas potius quam ad suscipiendas religiones; cum antistitibus agamus, ut quidvis potius ex illis libris quam regem proferant, quem Romae posthac nec di nec homines esse patientur.

LV.

But many people, you say, have in repeated instances uttered true predictions; as, for example, Cassandra, when she said, “Already is the fleet,” &c., and in a subsequent prophecy, “Ah! see you not?” &c. Do you then expect me to give credence to these fables? I will grant that they are as delightful as you please to call them, — that they are polished up with every conceivable beauty of language, sentiment, music, and rhythm. But we are not bound to invest fictions of this kind with any authority, or to give them any belief.

And, on the same principle, I do not think any one bound to pay attention to such diviners as Publicius (whoever he may be), or Martius, or the secret oracles of Apollo; of which some are notoriously false, and others uttered at random, so that they command little respect, I will not say from learned men, but even from any person of plain common sense.

“What!” you will say, “did not that old sailor of the fleet of Coponius predict truly the events which took place?” No doubt he did; but they happened to be those very things which at the time everybody thought most likely to ensue. For we were daily hearing that the two armies were situated near each other in Thessaly; and it appeared to us that Caesar’s army had the greater audacity, inasmuch as it was waging war against its own country, and the greater strength, being composed of veteran soldiers. And as to the battle, there was not one of us who did not dread the result, though, as brave men should, we kept our anxiety to ourselves, and expressed no alarm.

What wonder, however, was it that this Greek sailor was forced from all self-possession and constancy, as is very common, by the greatness of his terror and affright; and that, being driven to distraction by his own cowardice, he uttered those convictions which he had cherished when yet sane? Which, in the name of Gods and men, is most likely; that a mad sailor should have attained a knowledge of the counsels of the immortal Gods, or that some of us who were on the spot at the time — myself, for instance, or Cato, or Varro — could have done so?

Compare the Latin

Latin: "At multi saepe vera vaticinati, ut Cassandra: 'iamque mari magno...' eademque paulo post: 'eheu videte!' [113] Num igitur me cogis etiam fabulis credere? Quae delectationis habeant quantum voles, verbis sententiis numeris cantibus adiuventur; auctoritatem quidem nullam debemus nec fidem commenticiis rebus adiungere. Eodemque modo nec ego Publicio nescio cui nec Marciis vatibus nec Apollinis opertis credendum existimo; quorum partim ficta aperte, partim effutita temere numquam ne mediocri quidem cuiquam, non modo prudenti probata sunt. [114] "Quid?" inquies, "remex ille de classe Coponi nonne ea praedixit quae facta sunt?" Ille vero, et ea quidem quae omnes eo tempore ne acciderent timebamus. Castra enim in Thessalia castris conlata audiebamus, videbaturque nobis exercitus Caesaris et audaciae plus habere, quippe qui patriae bellum intulisset, et roboris propter vetustatem; casum autem proeli nemo nostrum erat quin timeret, sed, ita ut constantibus hominibus par erat, non aperte. Ille autem Graecus, quid mirum si magnitudine timoris, ut plerumque fit, a constantia atque a mente atque a se ipse discessit? Qua perturbatione animi, quae, sanus cum esset, timebat ne evenirent, ea demens eventura esse dicebat. Utrum tandem, per deos atque homines, magis veri simile est vesanum remigem an aliquem nostrum, qui ibi tum eramus, me, Catonem, Varronem, Coponium ipsum, consilia deorum immortalium perspicere potuisse?

LVI.

I now come to you,

Apollo, monarch of the sacred centre Of the great world, full of thy inspiration, The Pythian priestesses proclaim thy prophecies.

For Chrysippus has filled an entire volume with your oracles, of which, as I said before, many are utterly false, and others only true by accident, as happens in any common conversation. Others, again, are so obscure and involved, that their very interpreters have need of other interpreters; and the decisions of one lot have to be referred to other lots. Another portion of them are so ambiguous, that they require to be analysed by the logic of dialecticians. Thus, when Fortune uttered the following oracle respecting Croesus, the richest king of Asia —

When Croesus has the Halys cross’d, A mighty kingdom will be lost;

that monarch expected he should ruin the power of his enemies; but the empire that he ruined was his own. And whichever result had ensued the oracle would have been true.

But, in truth, what reason have I to believe that such an oracle was ever uttered respecting Croesus? or why should I think Herodotus more veracious than Ennius? Is the one less full of fictions respecting Croesus than the other is respecting Pyrrhus? For who now believes that the following answer was given to Pyrrhus by the oracle of Apollo? —

You ask your fate; O king, I answer you, Aeacides the Romans will subdue!

Compare the Latin

Latin: [115] Sed iam ad te venio, "o sancte Apollo, qui umbilicum certum terrarum obsides, unde superstitiosa primum saeva evasit vox fera." Tuis enim oraclis Chrysippus totum volumen implevit partim falsis, ut ego opinor, partim casu veris, ut fit in omni oratione saepissime, partim flexiloquis et obscuris, ut interpres egeat interprete et sors ipsa ad sortes referenda sit, partim ambiguis et quae ad dialecticum deferenda sint. Nam cum illa sors edita est opulentissumo regi Asiae: "Croesus Halyn penetrans magnam pervertet opum vim" hostium vim se perversurum putavit, pervertit autem suam: [116] utrum igitur eorum accidisset, verum oraclum fuisset. Cur autem hoc credam umquam editum Croeso? Aut Herodotum cur veraciorem ducam Ennio? Num minus ille potuit de Croeso quam de Pyrrho fingere Ennius? Quis enim est, qui credat Apollinis ex oraclo Pyrrho esse responsum: "aio te, Aeacida, Romanos vincere posse"?

LVII.

For, in the first place, Apollo never uttered an oracle in Latin; secondly, this oracle is altogether unknown to the Greeks. Besides, in the days of Pyrrhus, Apollo had already left off composing verses. Lastly, although it was always the case, as is said in these lines of Ennius —

The Aeacids were but a stupid race, More warlike than sagacious —

yet even Pyrrhus might without much difficulty have perceived the ambiguity of the phrase —

Aeacides the Romans will subdue;

and might have seen that it did not apply more to himself than it did to the Romans.

As to that ambiguity which deceived Croesus, it might even have deceived Chrysippus. This one could not have deluded even Epicurus.

But the chief argument is, why are the Delphic oracles altered in such a way that — I do not mean only lately, but for a long time — nothing can have been more contemptible?

When we press our antagonists for a reason for this, they say that the peculiar virtue of the spot from which those exhalations of the earth arose, under the influence and excitement of which the Pythian priestess uttered her oracles, has disappeared by the lapse of time. You might suppose they were speaking of wine or salt, which do lose their flavour by lapse of time; but they are talking thus of a virtue which is not merely natural, but a divine virtue; and how is that to have disappeared? What age can possibly destroy a divine virtue? and what virtue can be so divine as an exhalation of the earth which has the power of inspiring the mind, and rendering it so prophetic of things to come, that it can not only discern them long before they happen, but even declare them in verse and rhythm? And when did this magical virtue disappear? Was it not precisely at the time when men began to be less credulous?

Demosthenes, who lived nearly three hundred years ago, said that even in his time the Pythia Philippized — that is to say, supported Philip’s influence; and his expression was meant to convey the imputation that she had been bribed by Philip. From which we may infer that other oracles besides those of Delphi were not quite immaculate. Somehow or other, certain philosophers who are very superstitious — not to say fanatical — appear to prefer anything to behaving with common sense themselves; and so you prefer asserting that what has vanished and become extinct, which, if it ever existed, must certainly have been eternal, rather than believe what is wholly incredible.

Compare the Latin

Latin: Primum latine Apollo numquam locutus est; deinde ista sors inaudita Graecis est; praeterea Pyrrhi temporibus iam Apollo versus facere desierat; postremo, quamquam semper fuit, ut apud Ennium est, "stolidum genus Aeacidarum -- bellipotentes sunt magis quam sapientipotentes --", tamen hanc amphiboliam versus intellegere potuisset, "vincere te Romanos" nihilo magis in se quam in Romanos valere; nam illa amphibolia, quae Croesum decepit, vel Chrysippum potuisset fallere, haec vero ne Epicurum quidem. [117] Sed, quod caput est, cur isto modo iam oracla Delphis non eduntur non modo nostra aetate, sed iam diu, iam ut nihil possit esse contemptius? Hoc loco cum urguentur evanuisse aiunt vetustate vim loci eius, unde anhelitus ille terrae fieret, quo Pythia mente incitata oracla ederet. De vino aut salsamento putes loqui, quae evanescunt vetustate; de vi loci agitur, neque solum naturali, sed etiam divina; quae quo tandem modo evanuit? "Vetustate," inquies. Quae vetustas est, quae vim divinam conficere possit? Quid tam divinum autem quam adflatus e terra mentem ita movens ut eam providam rerum futurarum efficiat, ut ea non modo cernat multo ante, sed etiam numero versuque pronuntiet? Quando ista vis autem evanuit? An postquam homines minus creduli esse coeperunt? [118] Demosthenes quidem, qui abhinc annos prope trecentos fuit, iam tum filippizein Pythiam dicebat, id est quasi cum Philippo facere. Hoc autem eo spectabat, ut eam a Philippo corruptam diceret; quo licet existumare in aliis quoque oraclis Delphicis aliquid non sinceri fuisse. Sed nescio quo modo isti philosophi superstitiosi et paene fanatici quidvis malle videntur quam se non ineptos. Evanuisse mavultis et extinctum esse id quod, si umquam fuisset, certe aeternum esset, quam ea, quae non sunt credenda, non credere.

LVIII.

The error with regard to the divination of dreams is another of the same kind; their arguments for which are extremely far-fetched and obscure. They affirm that the minds of men are divine, that they came from God, and that the universe is full of these consenting intelligences. That, therefore, by this inherent divinity of the mind, and by its conjunction with other spirits, it may foresee future events.

But Zeno and the Stoics supposed the mind to contract, to subside, to yield, and even to sleep, itself. And Pythagoras and Plato, authors of the greatest weight, advise men, with a view of seeing things more clearly in sleep, to go to bed after having gone through a certain preparatory course of food and conduct. Pythagoras, for this reason, counselled his disciples to abstain from beans; with the idea that this species of food excited the mind, not the stomach. In short, somehow or other, I know nothing so absurd as not to have found an advocate in one of the philosophers.

Do we then think that the minds of men during sleep move by an intrinsic internal energy, or that, as Democritus pretends, they are affected with external and adventitious visions? On either supposition we may mistake in our dreams many false things for true.

For to people sailing, those things appear to be in motion which are stationary; and by a certain ocular deception, the light of a candle sometimes seems double. Why need I instance the number of false appearances which are presented to the eyes of men, among those who labour under drunkenness, or maniacs?

Now, if we cannot trust such appearances as those, I know not why we are to place any absolute reliance on the visions of dreams; for you might as well, if you pleased, argue from these errors as from dreams. For instance, if that stationary objects appear to move indicated the approach of an earthquake, or some sudden flight; and that lights seen double presage wars, and discords, and seditions.

Compare the Latin

Latin: [119] Similis est error in somniis; quorum quidem defensio repetita quam longe est! Divinos animos censent esse nostros, eosque esse tractos extrinsecus, animorumque consentientium multitudine completum esse mundum; hac igitur mentis et ipsius divinitate, et coniunctione cum externis mentibus cerni quae sint futura. Contrahi autem animum Zeno et quasi labi putat atque concidere, et id ipsum esse dormire. Iam Pythagoras et Plato, locupletissimi auctores, quo in somnis certiora videamus, praeparatos quodam cultu atque victu proficisci ad dormiendum iubent; faba quidem Pythagorei utique abstinere, quasi vero eo cibo mens, non venter infletur. Sed nescio quo modo nihil tam absurde dici potest quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum. [120] Utrum igitur censemus dormientium animos per sese ipsos in somniando moveri an, ut Democritus censet, externa et adventicia visione pulsari? Sive enim sic est sive illo modo, videri possunt permulta somniantibus falsa pro veris. Nam et navigantibus moveri videntur ea quae stant, et quodam obtutu oculorum duo pro uno lucernae lumina. Quid dicam insanis, quid ebriis quam multa falsa videantur? Quodsi eius modi visis credendum non est, cur somniis credatur nescio. Nam tam licet de his erroribus, si velis, quam de somniis disputare, ut ea, quae stant, si moveri videantur, terrae motum significare dicas aut repentinam aliquam fugam, gemino autem lucernae lumine declarari dissensionem ac seditionem moveri.

LIX.

From the visions of drunkards and madmen one might, doubtless, deduce innumerable consequences by conjecture, which might seem to be presages of future events. For what person who aims at a mark all day long will not sometimes hit it? We sleep every night; and there are very few on which we do not dream; can we wonder then that what we dream sometimes comes to pass?

What is so uncertain as the cast of dice? and yet there are none who play at dice often without at times casting the point of Venus, and sometimes even twice or thrice in succession. Shall we, then, be so absurd as to attribute such an event to the impulse of Venus, rather than to the doctrine of chances? If then, on ordinary occasions, we are not bound to give credit to false appearances, I do not see why sleep should enjoy this special privilege, that its false seemings should be honoured as true realities.

If it were an institution of nature that men when they sleep really did the things which they dream about, it would be necessary to bind all persons going to bed both hand and foot, for they would otherwise while dreaming perpetrate more outrages than maniacs. Now since we place no confidence in the visions of madmen, simply because they are delusions, I do not see why we should rely on those of dreamers, which are often the wilder of the two. Is it because madmen do not think it worth while to relate their visions to diviners, but those who do do?

Once more I put this question. If I feel inclined to read or write anything, or to sing or play on an instrument, or to pursue the sciences of geometry, physics, or dialectics, am I to wait for information in these sciences from a dream, or shall I have recourse to study, without which none of those things can be either done or explained? Again, if I were to wish to take a voyage, I should never regulate my steering by my dreams. For such conduct would bring its own immediate punishment.

How, then, can it be reasonable for an invalid to apply for relief to an interpreter of dreams rather than to a physician? Can Esculapius or Serapis, by a dream, best prescribe to us the way to obtain a cure for weak health? And cannot Neptune do the same for a pilot in his art? Or will Minerva give us medicine without troubling the doctor? And still will the Muses refuse to impart to dreamers the art of writing, reading, and the other sciences? But if the blessing of health were conveyed to us in dreams, these other good things would certainly be so also. But unfortunately the science of medicine cannot be learnt in dreams, and the other arts are in a similar predicament. And if that be the case, then all the authority of dreams is at an end.

Compare the Latin

Latin: [121] Iam ex insanorum aut ebriorum visis innumerabilia coniectura trahi possunt, quae futura videantur. Quis est enim, qui totum diem iaculans non aliquando conliniet? Totas noctes somniamus, neque ulla est fere, qua non dormiamus; et miramur aliquando id quod somniarimus evadere? Quid est tam incertum quam talorum iactus? Tamen nemo est quin saepe iactans Venerium iaciat aliquando, non numquam etiam iterum ac tertium. Num igitur, ut inepti, Veneris id impulsu fieri malumus quam casu dicere? Quodsi ceteris temporibus falsis visis credendum non est, non video, quid praecipui somnus habeat, in quo valeant falsa pro veris. [122] Quodsi ita natura paratum esset ut ea dormientes agerent quae somniarent, adligandi omnes essent, qui cubitum irent; maiores enim quam ulli insani efficerent motus somniantes. Quodsi insanorum visis fides non est habenda, quia falsa sunt, cur credatur somniantium visis, quae multo etiam perturbatiora sunt, non intellego; an quod insani sua visa coniectori non narrant, narrant qui somniaverunt? Quaero etiam, si velim scribere quid aut legere aut canere vel voce vel fidibus aut geometricum quiddam aut physicum aut dialecticum explicare, somniumne exspectandum sit, an ars adhibenda, sine qua nihil earum rerum nec fieri nec expediri potest. Atqui, ne si navigare quidem velim, ita gubernem, ut somniaverim; praesens enim poena sit. [123] Qui igitur convenit aegros a coniectore somniorum potius quam a medico petere medicinam? An Aesculapius, an Serapis potest nobis praescribere per somnum curationem valetudinis, Neptunus gubernantibus non potest? Et si sine medico medicinam dabit Minerva, Musae scribendi, legendi, ceterarum artium scientiam somniantibus non dabunt? At si curatio daretur valetudinis, haec quoque quae dixi darentur; quae quoniam non dantur, medicina non datur; qua sublata tollitur omnis auctoritas somniorum.

LX.

But this is only a superficial argument. Let us now penetrate the heart of this question. For either some divine energy which takes care of us, gives us presentiments in our dreams; or those who explain them by a certain harmony and conjunction of nature which they call sympatheia (sympathy), understand by means of dreams what is suitable to everything, and what is the consequence of everything; or, neither of these two things is true, but there is a constant system of observation of long standing, by which it had been remarked, that after certain dreams certain events usually follow.

The first thing then for us to understand is, that there is no divine energy which inspires dreams; and this being granted, you must also grant that no visions of dreamers proceed from the agency of the Gods. For the Gods have for our own sake given us intellect sufficiently to provide for our future welfare. How few people then attend to dreams, or understand them, or remember them! How many, on the other hand, despise them, and think any superstitious observation of them a sign of a weak and imbecile mind!

Why then should God take the trouble to consult the interest of this man, or to warn him by dreams, when he knows that they not only do not think worth attending to, but do not even condescend to remember them. For a God cannot be ignorant of the sentiments of every man, and it is unworthy of a God to do anything in vain, or without a cause; nay, that would be unworthy of even a wise man. If, therefore, dreams are for the most part disregarded, or despised, either God is ignorant of that being the fact, or employs the intimation by dreams in vain, and therefore it must be confessed, that God gives men no intimations by means of dreams.

Compare the Latin

Latin: [124] Sed haec quoque in promptu fuerint; nunc interiora videamus. Aut enim divina vis quaedam consulens nobis somniorum significationes facit, aut coniectores ex quadam conveniente et coniunctione naturae, quam vocant συμπάθεια, quid cuique rei conveniat ex somniis, et quid quamque rem sequatur, intellegunt, aut eorum neutrum est, sed quaedam observatio constans atque diuturna est, cum quid visum secundum quietem sit, quid evenire et quid sequi soleat. Primum igitur intellegendum est nullam vim esse divinam effectricem somniorum. Atque illud quidem perspicuum est, nulla visa somniorum proficisci a numine deorum. Nostra enim causa di id facerent, ut providere futura possemus. [125] Quotus igitur est quisque qui somniis pareat, qui intellegat, qui meminerit? Quam multi vero qui contemnant eamque superstitionem imbecilli animi atque anilis putent? Quid est igitur, cur his hominibus consulens deus somniis moneat eos, qui illa non modo cura, sed ne memoria quidem digna ducant? Nec enim ignorare deus potest, qua mente quisque sit, nec frustra ac sine causa quid facere dignum deo est quod abhorret etiam ab hominis constantia. Ita, si pleraque somnia aut ignorantur aut negleguntur, aut nescit hoc deus aut frustra somniorum significatione utitur; at horum neutrum in deum cadit; nihil igitur a deo somniis significari fatendum est.

LXI.

Again, let me ask you, if God gives us visions of a prophetic nature, in order to apprise us of future events, should we not rather expect them when we are awake than when we are asleep? For, whether it be some external and adventitious impulse which affects the minds of those who are asleep, or whether those minds are affected voluntarily by their own agency, or whether there is any other cause why we seem to see and hear or do anything in vain during sleep, the same impulses might surely operate on them when awake. And if for our sakes the Gods effect this during sleep, they might do it for us while awake.

Especially as Chrysippus, wishing to refute the Academicians, makes this remark — “That those inspirations, visions, and presentiments which occur to us awake, are much more distinct and certain than those which present themselves to dreamers.”

It would, therefore, have been more worthy of the divine beneficence while exerting its care for us, rather to favour us with clear visions when we are awake, than with the perplexed phantasms of dreams; and since that is not done, we must believe that these phantasms are not divine at all. Moreover, what is the use of such round-about and circuitous proceedings, as for it to be necessary to employ interpreters of dreams, rather than to proceed by a straightforward course? If God were indeed anxious for our interests, he would say, “Do this — do not that,” and give such intimations to a waking man rather than to a sleeping man; but as it is, who would venture to assert that all dreams are true? Ennius says that some dreams are prophetical; he adds also, that it does not follow that all are so.

Compare the Latin

Latin: [126] Illud etiam requiro, cur, si deus ista visa nobis providendi causa dat, non vigilantibus potius det quam dormientibus. Sive enim externus et adventicius pulsus animos dormientium commovet, sive per se ipsi animi moventur, sive quae causa alia est cur secundum quietem aliquid videre, audire, agere videamur, eadem causa vigilantibus esse poterat; idque si nostra causa di secundum quietem facerent, vigilantibus idem facerent, praesertim cum Chrysippus Academicos refellens permulto clariora et certiora esse dicat quae vigilantibus videantur quam quae somniantibus. Fuit igitur divina beneficentia dignius, cum consulerent nobis, clariora visa dare vigilanti quam obscuriora per somnum. Quod quoniam non fit, somnia divina putanda non sunt. [127] Iam vero quid opus est circumitione et anfractu, ut sit utendum interpretibus, somniorum, potius quam directo deus, siquidem nobis consulebat, "hoc facito, hoc ne feceris" diceret idque visum vigilanti potius quam dormienti daret?

LXII.

Now whence arises this distinction between true dreams and false ones? and if true dreams come from God, from whence come the false ones? For if these last do likewise come from God, what can be more inconsistent than that? And what can be more ignorant conduct than to excite the minds of mortals by false and deceitful visions? But if only true dreams come from God, and the false and groundless ones are merely human delusions, what authority have you for making such a distinction as is implied in saying, God did this, and nature that? Why not rather say either that all dreams come from God (which you deny), or all from nature, since you deny that they proceed from God.

By nature I mean that essential activity of the mind to which it never stands still, and is never free from some agitation or motion or other. When in consequence of the weakness of the limbs and the senses, it is still affected by various and uncertain visions arising (as Aristotle observes) from the relics of the affairs and labours during our waking hours; owing to the disturbances of which, marvellous varieties of dreams and visions at times arise. If some of these are false, and others true, I shall be glad to be informed by what definite art we are to distinguish the true from the false. If there be no such art, why do we consult the interpreters? If there be any such art, then I wish to know what it is.

Compare the Latin

Latin: Iam vero quis dicere audeat vera omnia esse somnia? "Aliquot somnia vera," inquit Ennius, "sed omnia non necesse est." Quae est tandem ista distinctio? Quae vera, quae falsa habet? Et si vera a deo mittuntur, falsa unde nascuntur? Nam si ea quoque divina, quid inconstantius deo? Quid inscitius autem est quam mentes mortalium falsis et mendacibus visis concitare? Sin vera visa divina sunt, falsa autem et inania humana, quae est ista designandi licentia, ut hoc deus, hoc natura fecerit potius quam aut omnia deus, quod negatis, aut omnia natura? Quod quoniam illud negatis, hoc necessario confitendum est. [128] Naturam autem eam dico, qua numquam animus insistens agitatione et motu esse vacuus potest. Is cum languore corporis nec membris uti nec sensibus potest, incidit in visa varia et incerta ex reliquiis, ut ait Aristoteles, inhaerentibus earum rerum quas vigilans gesserit aut cogitaverit; quarum perturbatione mirabiles interdum exsistunt species somniorum; quae si alia falsa, alia vera, qua nota internoscantur scire sane velim. Si nulla est, quid istos interpretes audiamus? Sin quaepiam est, aveo audire quae sit; sed haerebunt.

LXIII.

But they will hesitate. For it is a matter of question, which is more probable; that the supreme and immortal Gods, who excel in every kind of superiority, employ themselves in visiting all night long not merely the beds, but the very pallets of men, and as soon as they find any person fairly snoring, entertain his imagination with perplexed and obscure visions, which sends him in great alarm as soon as daylight dawns to consult the seer and interpreter; or whether these dreams are the result of natural causes, and the ever-active mind having seen things when awake, seems to see them again when asleep. Which is the more philosophical course, to interpret these phenomena according to the superstitions of old women, or by natural explanations?

So that even if a true interpretation of dreams could exist, it is certainly not in the possession of those who profess it, for these people are the lowest and most ignorant of the people. And it is not without reason that your friends the Stoics affirm, that no one can ever be a diviner but a wise man.

Chrysippus, indeed, defines divination in these words: “It is,” says he, “a power of apprehending, discerning, and explaining those signs which are given by the Gods to men as portents;” and he adds, that the proper office of a soothsayer is to know beforehand the disposition of the Gods in regard to men, and to declare what intimations they give, and by what means these prodigies are to be propitiated or averted.

Compare the Latin

Latin: [129] Venit enim iam in contentionem, utrum sit probabilius, deosne inmortalis, rerum omnium praestantia excellentis, concursare omnium mortalium, qui ubique sunt, non modo lectos, verum etiam grabatos, et, cum stertentem aliquem viderint, obicere iis visa quaedam tortuosa et obscura, quae illi exterriti somno ad coniectorem mane deferant, an natura fieri ut mobiliter animus agitatus, quod vigilans viderit, dormiens videre videatur. Utrum philosophia dignius, sagarum superstitione ista interpretari an explicatione naturae? Ut, si iam fieri possit vera coniectura somniorum, tamen isti, qui profitentur, eam facere non possint: ex levissimo enim et indoctissimo genere constant. Stoici autem tui negant quemquam nisi sapientem divinum esse posse. [130] Chrysippus quidem divinationem definit his verbis: "vim cognoscentem et videntem et explicantem signa, quae a dis hominibus portendantur"; officium autem esse eius praenoscere, dei erga homines mente qua sint quidque significent, quemadmodumque ea procurentur atque expientur. Idemque somniorum coniectionem definit hoc modo: esse vim cernentem et explanantem quae a dis hominibus significentur in somnis. Quid ergo? ad haec mediocri opus est prudentia an et ingenio praestanti et eruditione perfecta? Talem autem cognovimus neminem.

LXIV.

Consider, therefore, whether even if I were to concede to you that there is such a thing as divination — which I never will concede — it would still not follow that a diviner could be found to exercise it truly. But what strange ideas must the Gods have, if the intimations which they give us in dreams are such as we cannot understand of ourselves, and such, too, as we cannot find interpreters of: acting almost as wisely as if we Carthaginians and Spaniards would do if they were to harangue in their native languages in our Roman senate without an interpreter.

What is the object of these enigmas and obscurities of dreamers? For the Gods ought to wish us to understand those things which they reveal to us for our own sake and benefit. What! is no poet, no natural philosopher obscure? Homer certainly is not; which, then, is the best? Heraclitus is very puzzling; Democritus is very lucid; are they to be compared? You, for my own sake, give me advice that I do not understand! What is it, then, that you are advising me to do? Suppose a medical man were to prescribe to a sick man an earth-born, grass-walking, house-carrying, unsanguineous animal, instead of simply saying a snail; so Amphion in Pacuvius speaks of —

A four-footed and slow-going beast, Rugged, debased, and harsh; his head is short, His neck is serpentine, his aspect stern; He has no blood, but is an animal Inanimate, not voiceless.

When these obscure verses had been duly recited, the Greeks cried out, We do not understand you unless you tell us plainly what animal you mean. I mean, said Pacuvius, a tortoise. Could you not, then, said the questioner, have told us so at first?

Compare the Latin

Latin: [131] Vide igitur, ne, etiamsi divinationem tibi esse concessero, quod numquam faciam, neminem tamen divinum reperire possimus. Qualis autem ista mens est deorum, si neque ea nobis significant in somnis quae ipsi per nos intellegamus, neque ea quorum interpretes habere possimus? Similes enim sunt dei, si ea nobis obiciunt, quorum nec scientiam neque explanatorem habeamus, tamquam si Poeni aut Hispani in senatu nostro loquerentur sine interprete. [132] Iam vero quo pertinent obscuritates et aenigmata somniorum? Intellegi enim a nobis di velle debebant ea quae nostra causa nos monerent. "Quid? poeta nemone, physicus obscurus?" [133] Ille vero nimis etiam obscurus Euphorion; at non Homerus; uter igitur melior? Valde Heraclitus obscurus, minime Democritus; num igitur conferendi? Mea causa me mones quod non intellegam: quid me igitur mones? Ut si quis medicus aegroto imperet ut sumat "terrigenam, herbigradam, domiportam, sanguine cassam", potius quam hominum more "cocleam" diceret. Nam Pacuvianus Amphio "quadrupes, tardigrada, agrestis, humilis, aspera, capite brevi, cervice anguina, aspectu truci, viscerata, inanima cum animali sono" cum dixisset obscurius, tum Attici respondent: "non intellegimus, nisi si aperte dixeris." At ille uno verbo: "testudo". Non potueras hoc igitur a principio, citharista, dicere?

LXV.

We read in that volume which Chrysippus has written concerning dreams, that some having dreamed in the night that he saw an egg hanging on his bed-post, went to consult about it. The interpreter informed him that the dream signified that a sum of money was concealed under his bed. He dug, and found a little gold surrounded with silver by a heap of silver. Upon this, he sent the interpreter as much of the silver as he thought a fair reward. Then said the interpreter, “What! none of the yolk?” For that part of the egg appeared to have intimated gold, while the rest meant silver.

But did no one else ever dream of eggs; if others have, why is this man the only one who ever found a treasure in consequence? How many poor people there are worthy of the help of the Gods, to whom you vouchsafe no such fortunate intimations! And, again, why did this individual receive an obscure sign of a treasure as could be afforded by the resemblance of an egg, instead of being distinctly commanded at once to look for a treasure, in the same way as Simonides was expressly forbidden to put to sea? Therefore, obscure dreams are not at all consistent with the majesty of the Gods.

Compare the Latin

Latin: [134] Defert ad coniectorem quidam somniasse se ovum pendere ex fascea lecti sui cubicularis (est hoc in Chrysippi libro somnium); respondit coniector thesaurum defossum esse sub lecto. Fodit, invenit auri aliquantum, idque circumdatum argento; misit coniectori quantulum visum est de argento. Tum ille "Nihilne" inquit "de vitello?" Id enim ei ex ovo videbatur aurum declarasse, reliquum argentum. Nemone igitur umquam alius ovum somniavit? Cur ergo hic nescio qui thesaurum solus invenit? Quam multi inopes digni praesidio deorum nullo somnio ad thesaurum reperiendum admonentur! Quam autem ob causam tam est obscure admonitus, ut ex ovo nasceretur thesauri similitudo, potius quam aperte thesaurum quaerere iuberetur, sicut aperte Simonides vetitus est navigare? [135] Ergo obscura somnia minime consentanea maiestati deorum.

LXVI.

But let us now treat of those dreams which you term clear and definite, such as that of the Arcadian whose friend was killed by the inn-keeper at Megara, or of Simonides, who was warned not to set sail by an apparition of a man whose interment he had kindly superintended.

The history of Alexander presents us with another instance of this kind, which I wonder you did not cite, who, after his friend Ptolemy had been wounded in battle by a poisoned arrow, and when he appeared to be dying of the wound, and was in great agony, fell asleep while sitting by his bed, and in his slumber is said to have seen a vision of the serpent which his mother Olympias cherished, bringing a root in his mouth, and telling him that it grew in a spot very near at hand, and that it possessed such medicinal virtue, that it would easily cure Ptolemy if applied to his wound. On awaking, Alexander related his dream, and messengers were sent to look for that plant, which when it was found, not only cured Ptolemy, but likewise several other soldiers, who during the engagement had been wounded by similar arrows.

You have related a number of dreams of this nature borrowed from history. For instance, that of the mother of Phalaris — that of the mother of Dionysius — that of Hamilcar the Carthaginian — that of Hannibal — that of Publius Decius, that notorious one on the president — that of Caius Gracchus — and the recent one of Caecilia, the daughter of Metellus Balearicus. But the main part of them occurred to strangers, and on that account we know little of their particular circumstances — are they vouched for by any? or are they mere fictions — for who are they vouched for by?

As to those dreams that have occurred in our personal experience, what can we say about them — about myself and my horse being submerged close to the bank; or mine, that Marius with the laurelled fasces ordered me to be conducted into his monument?

Compare the Latin

Latin: Ad aperta et clara veniamus, quale est de illo interfecto a copone Megaris, quale de Simonide, qui ab eo, quem humarat, vetitus est navigare, quale etiam de Alexandro, quod a te praeteritum esse miror. Qui, cum Ptolomaeus, familiaris eius, in proelio telo venenato ictus esset eoque vulnere summo cum dolore moreretur, Alexander adsidens somno est consopitus. Tum secundum quietem visus ei dicitur draco is, quem mater Olympias alebat, radiculam ore ferre et simul dicere, quo illa loci nasceretur (neque is longe aberat ab eo loco); eius autem esse vim tantam ut Ptolomaeum facile sanaret. Cum Alexander experrectus narrasset amicis somnium, emissi sunt qui illam radiculam quaererent; qua inventa et Ptolomaeus sanatus dicitur et multi milites, qui erant eodem genere teli vulnerati. [136] Multa etiam sunt a te ex historiis prolata somnia, matris Phalaridis, Cyri superioris, matris Dionysi, Poeni Hamilcaris, Hannibalis, P. Deci; pervulgatum iam illud de praesule, C. Gracchi etiam et recens Caeciliae, Baliarici filiae, somnium. Sed haec externa ob eamque causam ignota nobis sunt, nonnulla etiam ficta fortasse: quis enim auctor istorum? De nostris somniis quid habemus dicere? Tu de emerso me et equo ad ripam, ego de Mario cum fascibus laureatis me in suum deduci iubente monumentum.

LXVII.

All these dreams, my brother, are of the same character, and, by the immortal Gods, let us not make so poor a use of our reason, as to subject it to superstition and delusions. For what do you suppose that Marius was that appeared to me? His ghost or image, I suppose, as Democritus would call it. Whence, then, did his image come from? For images, according to him, flow from solid bodies and palpable forms. What body then of Marius was in existence? It came, he would say, from that body which had existed; for all things are full of images. It was, then, the image of Marius that haunted me on the Atinian territory, for no forms can be imagined except through the impulsion of images.

What are we to think then? Are those images so obedient to our word that they come before us at our bidding? and even images of things which have no reality whatsoever? For what form is there so preposterous and absurd that the mind cannot form to itself a picture of it? so much so indeed that we can bring our minds before even things which we have never seen; as, for instance, the situations of towns and the figures of men.

Compare the Latin

Latin: Omnium somniorum, Quinte, una ratio est; quae, per deos immortalis, videamus ne nostra superstitione et depravatione superetur. [137] Quem enim tu Marium visum a me putas? Speciem, credo, eius et imaginem, ut Democrito videtur. Unde profectam imaginem? A corporibus enim solidis et a certis figuris vult fluere imagines; quod igitur Mari corpus erat? "Ex eo," inquit, "quod fuerat." Ista igitur me imago Mari in campum Atinatem persequebatur? "Plena sunt imaginum omnia; nulla enim species cogitari potest nisi pulsu imaginum." [138] Quid ergo? istae imagines ita nobis dicto audientes sunt, ut, simul atque velimus, accurrant? Etiamne earum rerum quae nullae sunt? Quae est enim forma tam invisitata, tam nulla, quam non sibi ipse fingere animus possit, ut, quae numquam vidimus, ea tamen informata habeamus, oppidorum situs, hominum figuras? [139] Num igitur, cum aut muros Babylonis aut Homeri faciem cogito, imago illorum me aliqua pellit? Omnia igitur quae volumus nota nobis esse possunt: nihil est enim de quo cogitare nequeamus; nullae ergo imagines obrepunt in animos dormientium extrinsecus, nec omnino fluunt ullae; nec cognovi quemquam qui maiore auctoritate nihil diceret. Animorum est ea vis eaque natura, ut vigeant vigilantes nullo adventicio pulsu, sed suo motu incredibili quadam celeritate. Hi cum sustinentur membris et corpore et sensibus, omnia certiora cernunt, cogitant, sentiunt. Cum autem haec subtracta sunt desertusque animus languore corporis, tum agitatur ipse per sese. Itaque in eo et formae versantur et actiones, et multa audiri, multa dici videntur. [140] Haec scilicet in imbecillo remissoque animo multa omnibus modis confusa et variata versantur, maxumeque reliquiae rerum earum moventur in animis et agitantur, de quibus vigilantes aut cogitavimus aut egimus; ut mihi temporibus illis multum in animo Marius versabatur recordanti quam ille gravem suum casum magno animo, quam constanti tulisset. Hanc credo causam de illo somniandi fuisse.

LXVIII.

When, then, I dream of the walls of Babylon, or the countenance of Homer, is it because some physical image of them strikes my mind? All things, then, which we desire to be so, can be known to us, for there is nothing of which we cannot think. Therefore, no images steal upon the mind of the sleeper from without; nor indeed are such external images flowing about at all; and I never knew any one who talked such nonsense with greater authority.

The energy and nature of human minds is so vigorous that they go on exerting themselves while awake by no adventitious impulse, but by a motion of their own, with a most incredible celerity. When these minds are duly supported by the physical organs and senses of the body, they see and conceive and discern all things with precision and certainty. But when this support is withdrawn, and the mind is deserted by the languor of the body, then it is put in motion by its own force. Therefore, forms and actions belong to it; and many things appear to be heard by, and said to, it.

Then, when the mind is in a weak and relaxed state, many things present themselves to it commingled and varied in every kind of manner; and most especially do the reminiscences of those things flit before the mind and move about, which excited their interest or employed its active energies when awake. As, for instance, Marius was often present to my mind while I recollected with what magnanimity and constancy he had borne his sad misfortunes; and this, I imagine, is the reason why I dreamed of him.

You were also thinking of me with great anxiety, when suddenly I appeared to you as if just escaped out of the river. For there were in both of our minds the traces of our waking thoughts. However, there were certain additional circumstances, however, as, in mine, the visit to the temple of Marius; and in yours, the reappearance of the horse on which I was riding, and who sunk at the same time with me. Do you think, then, you would so dote as to believe dreams if they did not sometimes at random turn out true?

A dragon appeared to address Alexander. Doubtless this might be false; but whichever the case may have been, there is surely nothing very wonderful about it; for he did not hear this serpent speaking — he only dreamed that he heard him; and to make the story more remarkable, the serpent appeared with a branch in its mouth, and yet spoke: still nothing is difficult or impossible in a dream.

Compare the Latin

Latin: Tibi autem de me cum sollicitudine cogitanti subito sum visus emersus e flumine. Inerant enim in utriusque nostrum animis vigilantium cogitationum vestigia. At quaedam adiuncta sunt, ut mihi de monumento Mari, tibi, quod equus in quo ego vehebar, mecum una demersus rursus apparuit. [141] An tu censes ullam anum tam deliram futuram fuisse ut somniis crederet, nisi ista casu non numquam forte temere concurrerent? Alexandro draco loqui visus est. Potest omnino hoc esse falsum, potest verum; sed utrum est, non est mirabile; non enim audivit ille draconem loquentem, sed est visus audire, et quidem, quo maius sit, cum radicem ore teneret, locutus est; sed nihil est magnum somnianti. Quaero autem cur Alexandro tam inlustre somnium, tam certum, nec huic eidem alias, nec multa ceteris; mihi quidem praeter hoc Marianum nihil sane quod meminerim. Frustra igitur consumptae tot noctes tam longa in aetate. [142] Nunc quidem propter intermissionem forensis operae et lucubrationes detraxi et meridiationes addidi, quibus uti antea non solebam, nec tam multum dormiens ullo somnio sum admonitus, tantis praesertim de rebus, nec mihi magis umquam videor quam cum aut in foro magistratus aut in curia senatum video, somniare.

LXIX.

In truth, (and this is the second branch of your division,) what connexion and conjunction of nature (which, as I have said, the Greeks term sympatheia,) is there of such a character, that a treasure is to be understood by an egg? Physicians, indeed, know of certain facts by which they perceive the approaches and increase of diseases; there are also some indications of a return to health; so that the very fact we have plenty to eat or hunger, is said to be indicated by some kinds of dreams. But what rational connexion are treasures, and honours, and victories, and things of that kind, joined to?

They tell us, too, that a certain individual dreaming of sexual coition, ejected calculi: I grant that sympathy may have had something to do in a case like this, — because, in sleeping, his imagination might have been affected by sensual images, that such an emission took place by the force of nature, rather than by supernatural phantasms. But what sympathy could have presented to the image of the person, who, in a dream, warned him not to put to sea? Or what sympathy could have occasioned the vision of Alcibiades, who, a little before his death, is said to have dreamed that he was arrayed in the robes of Timandra his mistress? What relation could this have with the event which afterwards happened to him; when, being slain and cast naked in the street, and abandoned by all the world, his mistress took off her mantle and covered his dead body with it? Was this then fixed as a piece of futurity, and had it natural causes, or was it mere accident that the event was seen, and came true?

Compare the Latin

Latin: Etenim (ex divisione hoc secundum est) quae est continuatio coniunctioque naturae, quam, ut dixi, vocant συμπάθεια, eius modi, ut thesaurus ex ovo intellegi debeat? Nam medici ex quibusdam rebus et advenientis et crescentis morbos intellegunt, nonnullas etiam valetudinis significationes, ut hoc ipsum, pleni enectine simus, ex quodam genere somniorum intellegi posse dicunt. Thesaurus vero et hereditas et honos et victoria et multa generis eiusdem qua cum somniis naturali cognatione iunguntur? [143] Dicitur quidam, cum in somnis complexu Venerio iungeretur, calculos eiecisse. Video sympathian: visum est enim tale obiectum dormienti, ut id, quod evenit, naturae vis, non opinio erroris effecerit. Quae igitur natura obtulit illam speciem Simonidi, a qua vetaretur navigare? Aut quid naturae copulatum habuit Alcibiadis quod scribitur somnium? qui paulo ante interitum visus est in somnis amicae esse amictus amiculo. Is cum esset proiectus inhumatus ab omnibusque desertus iaceret, amica corpus eius texit suo pallio. Ergo hoc inerat in rebus futuris et causas naturalis habebat, an, et ut videretur et ut eveniret, casus effecit?

LXX.

Do not the conjectures of the interpreters of dreams rather indicate the subtlety of their own talents, than any natural sympathy and correspondence of things?

A runner, who intended to run in the Olympic games, dreamed during the night that he was being driven in a chariot drawn by four horses. In the morning he applied for an interpreter. He replied to him, You will win: that is what is intimated by the strength and swiftness of the horses. He then applied to Antiphon, who said to him, By your dream it appears that you must lose the race; for do you not see that four ran before you before you reached the goal?

Here is another story respecting an athlete. However, I will return to the runner. He then went to a soothsayer, and informed him that he had just dreamed that he changed into an eagle. He also went to Antiphon, who said to him, You will certainly be conquered; for the eagle chases and drives other birds which fly before it, and consequently is always behind the rest.

A certain matron, who was very anxious to have children, and who doubted whether she had conceived, not dreamed one night that her womb was sealed up; she, therefore, asked a soothsayer whether her dream signified her pregnancy? He said, No; for the sealing implied, that there could be no conception. But another whom she consulted said, that her dream plainly proved her pregnancy; for vessels that have nothing in them are never sealed up. How delusive, then, is this conjectural art of these interpreters! Or do these stories that I have recited, and a host of similar ones that the Stoics have collected, prove anything else but the subtlety of men, who, from certain imaginary analogies of things, arrive at all sorts of opposite conclusions?

Physicians derive certain indications from the veins and

Compare the Latin

Latin: [144] Quid? ipsorum interpretum coniecturae nonne magis ingenia declarant eorum quam vim consensumque naturae? Cursor ad Olympia proficisci cogitans visus est in somnis curru quadrigarum vehi. Mane ad coniectorem. At ille "Vinces" inquit; "id enim celeritas significat et vis equorum." Post idem ad Antiphontem. Is autem "Vincare" inquit "necesse est; an non intellegis quattuor ante te cucurrisse?" Ecce alius cursor (atque horum somniorum et talium plenus est Chrysippi liber, plenus Antipatri; sed ad cursorem redeo): ad interpretem detulit aquilam se in somnis visum esse factum. At ille: "Vicisti; ista enim avi volat nulla vehementius." Huic eidem Antipho "Baro," inquit, "victum te esse non vides? Ista enim avis insectans alias avis et agitans semper ipsa postrema est." [145] Parere quaedam matrona cupiens, dubitans essetne praegnans, visa est in quiete obsignatam habere naturam. Rettulit. Negavit eam, quoniam obsignata fuisset, concipere potuisse. At alter praegnantem esse dixit; nam inane obsignari nihil solere. Quae est ars coniectoris eludentis ingenio? An ea quae dixi et innumerabilia quae conlecta habent Stoici quicquam significant nisi acumen hominum ex similitudine aliqua coniecturam modo huc, modo illuc ducentium? Medici signa quaedam habent ex venis et ex spiritu aegroti multisque ex aliis futura praesentiunt; gubernatores, cum exsultantis lolligines viderunt aut delphinos se in portum conicientes, tempestatem significari putant. Haec ratione explicari et ad naturam revocari facile possunt, ea vero, quae paulo ante dixi, nullo modo.

LXXI.

But the defenders of divination reply, (and this is the last objection I shall answer,) that a long continuance of observations has created an art. Can, then, dreams be experimented on? And if so, how? for the varieties of them are innumerable. Nothing can be imagined so preposterous, so incredible, or so monstrous, as to be beyond our power of dreaming. And by what method can this infinite variety be either fixed in memory or analysed by reason?

Astrologers have observed the motion of the planets, for a certain order and regularity in the course of these stars has been discovered which was not suspected. But tell me, what order or regularity can be discerned in dreams? How can true dreams be distinguished from false ones; since the same dreams are followed by different results to different people, and, indeed, are not always attended by the same events in the case of the same persons?

For this reason I am extremely surprised that, though people have wit enough to give no credit to a notorious liar, even when he speaks the truth, they still, if one single dream has turned out true, do not so much distrust the numbers of instances in which they have been found false, as think multitudes of dreams established because of the ascertained truth of this one.

If, then, dreams do not come from God, and if there are no objects in nature with which they have any necessary sympathy and connexion, and if it is impossible by experiments and observations to arrive at a sure interpretation of them, the consequence is, that dreams are not entitled to any credit or respect whatever.

And this I say with the greater confidence, since those very persons who experience these dreams cannot by any means understand them, and those persons who pretend to interpret them, do so by conjecture, not by demonstration. And in the infinite series of ages, chance has produced many more extraordinary results in every kind of thing than it has in dreams; nor can anything be more uncertain than that conjectural interpretation of diviners, which admits not only of several, but often of absolutely contrary senses.

Compare the Latin

Latin: [146] "At enim observatio diuturna (haec enim pars una restat) notandis rebus fecit artem." Ain tandem? Somnia observari possunt? Quonam modo? Sunt enim innumerabiles varietates. Nihil tam praepostere, tam incondite, tam monstruose cogitari potest, quod non possimus somniare; quo modo igitur haec infinita et semper nova aut memoria complecti aut observando notare possumus? Astrologi motus errantium stellarum notaverunt: inventus est enim ordo in iis stellis, qui non putabatur. Cedo tandem qui sit ordo aut quae concursatio somniorum; quo modo autem distingui possunt vera somnia a falsis, cum eadem et aliis aliter evadant et isdem non semper eodem modo? Ut mihi mirum videatur, cum mendaci homini ne verum quidem dicenti credere soleamus, quo modo isti, si somnium verum evasit aliquod, non ex multis potius uni fidem derogent quam ex uno innumerabilia confirment. [147] Si igitur neque deus est effector somniorum neque naturae societas ulla cum somniis, neque observatione inveniri potuit scientia, effectum est ut nihil prorsus somniis tribuendum sit, praesertim cum illi ipsi, qui ea vident, nihil divinent, ii qui interpretantur coniecturam adhibeant, non naturam, casus autem innumerabilibus paene saeculis in omnibus plura mirabilia quam in somniorum visis effecerit, neque coniectura, quae in varias partis duci possit, non numquam etiam in contrarias, quicquam sit incertius.

LXXII.

Let us reject, therefore, this divination of dreams, as well as all other kinds. For, to speak truly, this superstition has extended itself through almost all nations, and has oppressed the intellectual energies of almost all men, and has betrayed them into endless imbecilities: as I argued in my treatise on the Nature of the Gods, and as I have especially laboured to prove in this dialogue on Divination. For I thought that I should be doing an immense benefit both to myself and my countrymen if I could eradicate all those superstitious errors.

Nor is there any fear that true religion can be endangered by the demolition of this superstition; for it is the part of a wise man to uphold the religious institutions of our ancestors, by the maintenance of their rites and ceremonies. And the beauty of the world and the order of all celestial things compels us to confess that there is an excellent and eternal nature which deserves to be worshipped and admired by all mankind.

Wherefore, as religion which is united with the knowledge of nature is to be propagated, so also are the roots of superstition to be destroyed. For it presses upon, and pursues, and persecutes you wherever you turn yourself — whether you consult a diviner, or have heard an omen, or have immolated a victim, or beheld a flight of birds; whether you have seen a Chaldean or a soothsayer; if it lightens or thunders; if any kind of prodigy occurs; some of which events must frequently be coming to pass; so that you can never rest with a tranquil mind.

Sleep seems to be the universal refuge from all labours and anxieties. And yet even from this many cares and perturbations spring forth which, indeed, would of themselves have no influence, and would rather be despised, if certain philosophers had not taken dreams under their special patronage; and those, too, not philosophers of the lowest order, but men of vast learning, and remarkable penetration into the consequences and inconsistencies of things, men who are looked upon as absolute and perfect masters of all science. Nay, if Carneades had not resisted their extravagances, I hardly know whether they would not by this time have been reckoned the only philosophers worthy of the name. And it is with those men that nearly all our controversy and dispute respecting divination is mainly waged; not because we think meanly of their wisdom, but because they appear to defend their theories with the greatest acuteness and cautiousness.

But, as it is the peculiar property of the Academy to interpose no judgment of its own, but to admit those opinions which appear most probable, to compare arguments, and to set forth all that may be reasonably stated in favour of each proposition; and so, without putting forth any authority of its own, to leave the judgment of the hearers free and unprejudiced, we will retain this custom, which has been handed down from Socrates; and this method, dear brother Quintus, if you please, we will adopt as often as possible in all our dialogues together.

Indeed, said he, nothing can be more agreeable to me.

Having held these conversations we went away.

Compare the Latin

Latin: [148] Explodatur igitur haec quoque somniorum divinatio pariter cum ceteris. Nam, ut vere loquamur, superstitio fusa per gentis oppressit omnium fere animos atque hominum imbecillitatem occupavit. Quod et in iis libris dictum est, qui sunt de natura deorum, et hac disputatione id maxume egimus. Multum enim et nobismet ipsis et nostris profuturi videbamur si eam funditus sustulissemus. Nec vero (id enim diligenter intellegi volo) superstitione tollenda religio tollitur. Nam et maiorum instituta tueri sacris caerimoniisque retinendis sapientis est, et esse praestantem aliquam aeternamque naturam, et eam suspiciendam admirandamque hominum generi pulchritudo mundi ordoque rerum caelestium cogit confiteri. [149] Quam ob rem, ut religio propaganda etiam est quae est iuncta cum cognitione naturae, sic superstitionis stirpes omnes eligendae. Instat enim et urget et, quo te cumque verteris, persequitur, sive tu vatem sive tu omen audieris, sive immolaris sive avem adspexeris, si Chaldaeum, si haruspicem videris, si fulserit, si tonuerit, si tactum aliquid erit de caelo, si ostenti simile natum factumve quippiam; quorum necesse est plerumque aliquid eveniat, ut numquam liceat quieta mente consistere. [150] Perfugium videtur omnium laborum et sollicitudinum esse somnus. At ex eo ipso plurumae curae metusque nascuntur; qui quidem ipsi per se minus valerent et magis contemnerentur, nisi somniorum patrocinium philosophi suscepissent, nec ii quidem contemptissimi, sed in primis acuti et consequentia et repugnantia videntes, qui prope iam absoluti et perfecti putantur. Quorum licentiae nisi Carneades restitisset, haud scio an soli iam philosophi iudicarentur. Cum quibus omnis fere nobis disceptatio contentioque est, non quod eos maxume contemnamus, sed quod videntur acutissime sententias suas prudentissimeque defendere. Cum autem proprium sit Academiae iudicium suum nullum interponere, ea probare quae simillima veri videantur, conferre causas et quid in quamque sententiam dici possit expromere, nulla adhibita sua auctoritate iudicium audientium relinquere integrum ac liberum, tenebimus hanc consuetudinem a Socrate traditam eaque inter nos, si tibi, Quinte frater, placebit, quam saepissime utemur. Mihi vero, inquit ille, nihil potest esse iucundius.

Previous
Tusculan Disputations Next
On Fate

Cicero - On Divination

References to Epicurus and Democritus:

Outline Of The Argument

Outline - Book One

1. Quintus Introduces Divination as Universally Believed, Named for the Gods (1:I)

2. Rome’s Own Long History of Augury and Sanctioned Frenzy (1:II)

3. Which Philosophers Endorsed Divination — and Epicurus’s Lone, Childish Dissent (1:III)

4. Cicero States His Method: Weighing Both Sides as in the Nature of the Gods (1:IV)

5. Quintus Proposes the Topic: If Divination Is Real, the Gods Exist (1:V)

6. Cicero Questions the Circularity of Quintus’s Two Claims (1:VI)

7. Judge by Results, Not Causes: The Analogy From Medicine (1:VII)

8. More Natural Weather-Signs, and the Limits of Boëthus’s Explanations (1:VIII)

9. Frogs, Oxen, and the Mastic Tree: Signs Without Explained Causes (1:IX)

10. From Medicinal Herbs to Entrails and Lightning: The Same Principle (1:X)

11. Cicero’s Own Consular Poem Quoted as a Witness for Astral Omens (1:XI)

12. The Poem Continues: Lightning-Struck Statues and Etruscan Prophecy (1:XII)

13. The Poem’s Close, and Cicero’s Challenge: These Things Happened (1:XIII)

14. Predictions Sometimes Fail — But So Does Medicine and Navigation (1:XIV)

15. King Deiotarus’s Devotion to Auspices, Vindicated Even in Defeat (1:XV)

16. Roman Losses From Ignoring the Auspices: Claudius, Junius, Crassus (1:XVI)

17. Omens Warn, They Do Not Cause: The Staff of Romulus and Attius Navius (1:XVII)

18. Attius Navius Cuts a Whetstone With a Razor; the Gracchus Auspice Story (1:XVIII)

19. Two Kinds of Divination Restated; Oracles, Frenzy, and Sanctioned Lots (1:XIX)

20. Delphi’s Long Record of True Oracles, and Early Dream-Prophecies (1:XX)

21. Poetic and Legendary Dreams: Ilia, Hecuba, and Aeneas (1:XXI)

22. Tarquin the Proud’s Dream of the Rams and the Reversed Sun (1:XXII)

23. Persian and Indian Dream-Prophecies: Cyrus, Calanus, Alexander (1:XXIII)

24. Hannibal’s Warning Dreams From Juno and Jupiter (1:XXIV)

25. Philosophers’ Own Dreams: Socrates, Xenophon, Aristotle, Sophocles (1:XXV)

26. Roman Dream-Prodigies: the Beaten Slave and the Two Gracchi (1:XXVI)

27. Two Famous Stoic Dream-Stories: Simonides and the Murdered Traveller (1:XXVII)

28. Cicero and Quintus’s Own Dreams: the River-Crossing and Marius at Atina (1:XXVIII)

29. Answering the Objection From False Dreams, via Plato’s Republic (1:XXIX)

30. The Soul’s Power Grows Nearest Death; Posidonius’s Dying Rhodian (1:XXX)

31. Frenzy as Divine Presentiment: Cassandra’s Prophetic Fury (1:XXXI)

32. A Sailor’s Fulfilled Prophecy at Dyrrhachium; Cratippus’s Summary Argument (1:XXXII)

33. Conjectural Divination: Calchas’s Sparrows, Sulla’s Serpent, Dionysius’s Horse (1:XXXIII)

34. Portents Before Leuctra: Sweating Statues and the Spilled Lots at Dodona (1:XXXIV)

35. Flaminius’s Fatal Contempt for the Chickens Before Lake Trasimene (1:XXXV)

36. Infant Omens of Greatness: Midas, Plato, and Roscius (1:XXXVI)

37. Poetic and Prophetic Frenzy as Evidence of Divine Inspiration in the Soul (1:XXXVII)

38. The Stoic Syllogism for Divination, From the Gods’ Benevolence (1:XXXVIII)

39. The Argument From Universal Consent, and Epicurus’s Lone, Shameless Dissent (1:XXXIX)

40. Legendary and Royal Augurs: Calchas, Amphiaraus, Tiresias, Priam’s Children (1:XL)

41. Divination Among Foreign Peoples: Druids, Magi, and Whole Prophetic Nations (1:XLI)

42. Divination Shaped by Local Geography: Plains, Climate, and Herding Life (1:XLII)

43. State-Sanctioned Divination Among the Greeks, and Rome’s Sibylline Books (1:XLIII)

44. Rome’s Recorded Prodigies: Caecilia’s Dream and the Draining of the Alban Lake (1:XLIV)

45. Disembodied Warning Voices, and the Power Believed to Reside in Words (1:XLV)

46. Chance Utterances as Omens: Paulus’s Daughter and Caecilia’s Seat (1:XLVI)

47. Auguries Belong to Quintus’s Own Office; the Eagle-Omen in Cicero’s Marius (1:XLVII)

48. Romulus and Remus Contend for Rome by Augury (1:XLVIII)

49. Returning to the Argument: Long Observation Explains Artificial Signs (1:XLIX)

50. Natural Divination and Its Limits: Thales, Anaximander, Pherecydes (1:L)

51. Ecstatic Prophets and Poetic-Style Predictions (1:LI)

52. The Theory of Dream-Divination, and Antipho’s Art of Interpretation (1:LII)

53. How the Gods Shape the Signs: Caesar’s Heartless Victim (1:LIII)

54. Socrates’s Divine Sign (Daemon), and His Serene Acceptance of Death (1:LIV)

55. Divination’s Basis in Fate, Properly Understood as the Chain of Causes (1:LV)

56. Only the Deity Fully Grasps the Chain of Causes; Humans Glimpse It Through Signs (1:LVI)

57. Closing Appeal to Nature and the Soul’s Power in Sleep — The Book Breaks Off (1:LVII)

Outline - Book Two

58. Cicero Reviews His Own Philosophical Works Before Turning to Divination (2:I)

59. Cicero’s Motive: Serving Rome Through Philosophy After Losing Political Power (2:II)

60. Cicero Opens His Reply: Praise for Quintus’s Case, but Not Assent (2:III)

61. Divination Belongs to No Recognized Field of Knowledge (2:IV)

62. Quintus’s Own Definition Turns Out to Be Circular (2:V)

63. If Chance Is Real, It Cannot Be Foreknown; If Fate Is Real, Divination Is Useless (2:VI)

64. No Rational Rule Can Explain the Discovery of Treasure by Divination (2:VII)

65. King Deiotarus’s Averted Death Shows the Stoic Dilemma About Fate (2:VIII)

66. Foreknowledge of Disaster Would Only Have Ruined Great Men’s Lives in Advance (2:IX)

67. Religious Ceremony Cannot Soften a Fate Already Fixed (2:X)

68. Quintus’s Two Kinds of Divination Rest on Unverified, Cherry-Picked Examples (2:XI)

69. Attacking Entrail-Reading: No Two Schools of Haruspices Agree (2:XII)

70. Democritus’s Theory That Entrails Reveal Weather and Harvests (2:XIII)

71. Refuting Democritus: Entrails Vary Even Among Animals Fed Alike (2:XIV)

72. No Cosmic “Sympathy” Could Link a Liver’s Cleft to Personal Gain (2:XV)

73. Caesar’s Heartless Sacrificial Bull: A Case Study in Absurdity (2:XVI)

74. Rival Gods, Rival Entrails: The Incoherence of Multi-God Sacrifice, and Epicurus Named (2:XVII)

75. If Entrails Fail, Lightning-Reading Fails Too: The Etruscan Sixteen Regions (2:XVIII)