DRAFT - WORK IN PROGRESS: Cicero As The Rosetta Stone To Understanding Epicurus: What We Can Learn About Epicurean Philosophy Through On Ends And Other Key Works Of Cicero
Why Cicero Is The Rosetta Stone
Section titled “Why Cicero Is The Rosetta Stone”The Rosetta Stone carries one decree written three times: in Egyptian hieroglyphs, in a later Egyptian script, and in Greek. Scholars who could read the Greek used it to work out the hieroglyphs, and a whole lost language opened up. The stone did not explain the hieroglyphs. It set them beside something that could be read, and the comparison did the rest.
Cicero does the same for Epicurus. Nearly all of Epicurus’ own books are lost. Diogenes Laertius preserved three of his letters, the Principal Doctrines and a summary of the school’s opinions, and these give us Epicurus’ conclusions. What they seldom give us is the argument around those conclusions: the questions the schools of the day were expected to answer, the answers the other schools gave, and the objections Epicurus had to meet. Cicero gives us exactly that. In On Ends the same questions about the goal of life are argued in turn by an Epicurean, by a Stoic, and by a spokesman for the Platonists and Aristotelians, with Cicero himself cross-examining each one. Set beside one another, the answers explain each other. A sentence of Epicurus that looks strange by itself becomes plain once we see which rival sentence it was written to deny.
Cicero was well placed to write this record. He heard the Epicurean teachers of his day lecture and discussed their lectures every evening with his friend Atticus: “I know the whole of Epicurus’s opinions well enough,—unless you think that Phaedrus or Zeno did not tell me the truth. I have heard both of them lecture, though to be sure they convinced me of nothing but their own devotion to the system” (On Ends I.16). He names the leading Epicureans of Italy, “Siro and Philodemus” (II.119). And he states his aim in setting out Epicurus first: “our exposition of it as you shall see, will be as accurate as any usually given even by the professed adherents of his school. For our object is to discover the truth, not to refute an opponent” (I.13).
But Cicero was an opponent, and he must be read as one. In method he belonged to the New Academy, the Skeptical school of Arcesilas and Carneades, which “affirm nothing positively, and despairing of a knowledge of certain truth, make up their minds to take apparent probability as their guide” (II.43). In ethics his sympathies ran with the Platonists and Aristotelians, and he attacks Epicurus at length in Book II. He separates the man from the doctrine: “Who pray denies that Epicurus was a good man, and a kind and humane man? In these discussions it is his intellect and not his character that is in question” (II.80). That opposition is what makes his record valuable. A Rosetta Stone with only one script on it would teach nothing. Because Cicero states the rival positions fully and argues against Epicurus with all the skill he had, we can see what Epicurus was answering and where the real disagreements lay.
The Works
Section titled “The Works”- On Ends (De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, 45 BC) is the center of this study. In Book I the Epicurean Lucius Torquatus explains Epicurus’ ethics, and in Book II Cicero replies. In Book III the Stoic Marcus Cato gives the fullest account of Stoic ethics that survives from the ancient world, and in Book IV Cicero replies to him. In Book V Marcus Piso sets out the system of Antiochus of Ascalon, who taught that Plato’s Academy and Aristotle’s school held one common doctrine, and Cicero raises his objections. Books III and IV have received little attention from students of Epicurus, but they show in detail the system Epicurus spent much of his life opposing.
- On the Nature of the Gods gives the Epicurean Velleius’ account of divine nature and his attack on the creator of Plato’s Timaeus and the providence of the Stoics, followed by the Academic Cotta’s reply.
- Tusculan Disputations takes up death, pain, grief, the emotions, and whether virtue alone makes a happy life, and quotes and criticizes Epicurus on each.
- Academic Questions is Cicero’s debate over the standard of truth: whether the senses can be trusted and whether anything can be known.
- On Fate sets Epicurus’ swerve of the atoms against the fate of the Stoic Chrysippus.
The Schools In The Columns
Section titled “The Schools In The Columns”Each section below follows the same order: a short statement of the question and of the direction Epicurus takes; then the answers of the Platonists, the Aristotelians, the Stoics and the Skeptics; then Epicurus’ answer to them all.
Two cautions about the columns. First, Cicero’s spokesman for the Platonists and Aristotelians, Piso, follows Antiochus, who treated the two schools as one. Cicero’s Varro states that view directly: “by the influence of Plato, a man of vast and varied and eloquent genius, a system of philosophy was established which was one and identical, though under two names; the system namely of the Academics and Peripatetics” (Academic Questions I, chapter 4). Where Cicero’s text blends the two, this article says so, and where Plato’s own dialogues or Aristotle’s own position as Cicero reports it stand apart, they are given separately. Second, “Skeptics” covers two different groups. The Academic Skeptics, Arcesilas, Carneades and Cicero himself, argued that nothing can be known for certain and that we must act on probability. Pyrrho, whom Cicero usually groups with the Stoic dissenter Aristo, held in ethics that nothing is to be preferred to anything else. Cicero treats Pyrrho’s ethics as long abandoned, but he keeps citing it, and so it appears below.
The Same Questions Diogenes Laertius Asks
Section titled “The Same Questions Diogenes Laertius Asks”Diogenes Laertius closes his account of nearly every school with a list of its answers to a fixed set of questions: what the end of life is, what the standard of truth is, whether virtue is enough for happiness, whether all faults are equal, how the wise man will live, what gods are. Cicero’s dialogues are organized around the same questions. The table below lists the issues treated in this article and where each is found.
| Issue | On Ends | Other works of Cicero | Diogenes Laertius X |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. The end, and why it settles everything | I.11, I.29-30, I.42, II.86, III.26, III.31, V.15-21 | Academic Questions II.42 | X.128-129 |
| 2. How we know: definitions, logic and the standard of truth | I.22, I.63-64, II.4-6, II.18, III.3, III.33, III.40, III.72, IV.8-10, V.76 | Academic Questions I.8, II.7, II.25-33, II.46; Nature of the Gods I.44 | X.31-34, X.38 |
| 3. Where nature points first | I.30, I.71, II.31-34, III.16-17, IV.25, V.17-18, V.24-30, V.45 | X.137 | |
| 4. What pleasure is | I.37-39, II.6-20, II.28-32, II.75-77, III.35, V.14, V.45 | Tusculan Disputations III.18-19 | X.128-131, X.136 |
| 5. Whether the good admits of more and less | I.63, II.87-88, III.34, III.45-48, IV.29-31, V.80-85, V.95 | X.121-122 | |
| 6. Virtue: the goal, or the means to it | I.42-54, I.57, II.44-50, II.69, II.80-81, III.11-13, III.26-39, IV.43-48, V.58-74 | X.132, X.138 | |
| 7. Body, mind and external goods | I.55-56, II.107, III.41-44, III.50-57, IV.20-43, IV.56-60, V.34-47, V.68-72 | Tusculan Disputations I.31, V.30, V.41 | X.137 |
| 8. Desires and emotions | I.43-47, II.21-30, III.35 | Tusculan Disputations III.15, IV.19-21, V.33 | X.117, X.127 |
| 9. Justice and society | I.50-53, II.45, II.51-59, II.71, III.62-71, V.65-66 | X.150-151 | |
| 10. Friendship | I.65-70, II.78-85, II.96, III.70-71, V.65-68 | X.120, X.148 | |
| 11. Pain, the rack, and whether the wise man is always happy | I.40-41, I.49, I.62-63, II.86-98, II.104, III.29, III.42, IV.52-53, V.77-95 | Tusculan Disputations V.26, V.31 | X.22, X.118 |
| 12. Death, time and memory | I.49, I.57, II.87-88, II.100-106, III.60-61, III.76, V.31-32 | Tusculan Disputations I.31 | X.124-127 |
| 13. Gods, providence and the making of the world | II.88, II.115, III.64, III.67, III.73, IV.11-12, V.33 | Nature of the Gods I.18-56, I.115-123 | X.123-124 |
| 14. Fate, chance and free choice | I.19-20 | On Fate 18, 22-23, 46-48 | X.133-134 |
| 15. The study of nature and the love of knowledge | I.17-21, I.26, I.32, I.63-64, I.71-72, IV.11-13, V.9-11, V.48-57 | Academic Questions II.26 | X.2, X.37 |
| 16. Is pleasure a life of idleness? | II.40, II.65, II.112-119, III.65, III.68, V.55-58, V.70 | X.120-121 | |
| 17. Names and things | II.12-15, II.28, II.77, III.5, III.41, IV.21-23, IV.56-60, IV.72-73, V.74, V.88-89 | X.37-38 |
Section numbers in On Ends and On the Nature of the Gods are the standard ones (I.30 is Book I, section 30) and link to the Rackham translations on this site. The Yonge translations of the Tusculan Disputations and Academic Questions on this site are divided by chapter, and those works are cited here by book and chapter. Passages from Diogenes Laertius Book X are quoted from Cyril Bailey’s translation.
1. The End: The Question That Settles Everything
Section titled “1. The End: The Question That Settles Everything”The first question Diogenes Laertius asks of nearly every school is what it takes to be the end of life. Cicero puts it first too, and gives it the title of the whole book. He states it in his preface: “What is the End, the final and ultimate aim, which gives the standard for all principles of right living and of good conduct? What does Nature pursue as the thing supremely desirable, what does she avoid as the ultimate evil?” (On Ends I.11). The schools largely agreed on what an end is. Torquatus gives the definition they shared: “the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else” (I.29). They disagreed about what fills that place. Epicurus’ answer is the shortest of them all: the end is pleasure, which every living creature feels and which needs no proof.
Piso explains why so much hangs on this one question:
On any other topic, some degree of incompleteness or uncertainty causes no more mischief than is proportionate to the importance of the particular topic on which the neglect has occurred; but uncertainty as to the Chief Good necessarily involves uncertainty as to the principles of conduct, and this must carry men so far out of their course that they cannot know what harbour to steer for. On the other hand when we have ascertained the Ends of things, knowing the ultimate Good and ultimate Evil, we have discovered a map of life, a chart of all the duties; and therefore have discovered a standard to which each action may be referred.
Cicero, On Ends V.15-16 (tr. Rackham)
The Platonists
Section titled “The Platonists”Cicero reports the end of the “Old Academy,” Plato’s successors, as virtue combined with the things nature gives us: “To live honorably, enjoying those things which nature makes most dear to man, was the definition both of the Old Academy, (as we may learn from the writings of Polemo, who is highly approved of by Antiochus,) and of Aristotle” (Academic Questions II, chapter 42). Piso calls this “the view of the ancients, as we entitle both the Academics and the Peripatetics”: the combination of moral worth “with the primary objects of nature” (On Ends V.21). Plato’s own test of the good, set out in the Philebus, was that the good must have a limit and must not belong to the class of things that “admit of more and less” (Philebus 27e-28a). Section 5 below returns to that test.
The Aristotelians
Section titled “The Aristotelians”Cicero reports that “Aristotle combined the exercise of virtue with well-being lasting throughout a complete lifetime” (On Ends II.19). Piso’s version, which he presents as the common doctrine of Aristotle and the Academy, is that “the ultimate Good of man is life in accordance with nature, which we may interpret as meaning life in accordance with human nature developed to its full perfection and supplied with all its needs” (V.26).
The Stoics
Section titled “The Stoics”Cato states the Stoic end: “the final aim is to live in agreement and harmony with nature” (III.26), which the Stoics took to mean living by virtue alone. He makes the whole system hang on it: “Either this point must be firmly maintained, that Moral Worth is the sole good, or it is absolutely impossible to prove that virtue constitutes happiness” (III.12).
The Skeptics
Section titled “The Skeptics”The Academic Skeptic Carneades drew up a map of every possible end, “not only that actually had been held by philosophers hitherto, but that it was possible to hold” (V.16). He sorted them by what each school thinks nature first moves us toward: pleasure, freedom from pain, or the “primary objects in accordance with nature” such as health and soundness of body (V.18). He then defended the third of these himself, “not because he approved of it himself, but for the sake of opposition to the Stoics” (Academic Questions II, chapter 42). That is the Skeptic method: to take up a position in order to show that its rival cannot be proved. Pyrrho stood at the far end of the map. Cicero groups him with Aristo as philosophers “who make all things equal in value” (On Ends III.11), and says their views “have long ago been exploded” (II.35).
Epicurus’ Answer
Section titled “Epicurus’ Answer”Torquatus gives Epicurus’ answer in a single step: “This Epicurus finds in pleasure; pleasure he holds to be the Chief Good, pain the Chief Evil” (I.30). Then he draws the conclusion: “Pleasure and pain moreover supply the motives of desire and of avoidance, and the springs of conduct generally. … It must therefore be admitted that the Chief Good is to live agreeably” (I.42). Epicurus’ own words in the Letter to Menoeceus say the same:
And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good.
Diogenes Laertius X.129 (tr. Bailey)
Set this beside the other columns and the difference stands out. Every other school names as its end something that must be explained by argument: moral worth, harmony with nature, the perfection of human nature. Epicurus names something that every person already knows by feeling. That is why his end could serve as the “map of life” Piso asked for, and Cicero admits as much in the course of attacking the Stoics: “In the case of those whose Chief Good consists in pleasure, notice how clear it is what things they are to do or not to do; no one can be in doubt as to the proper scope of all their duties, what these must aim at and what avoid” (IV.46). Cicero meant this as a point against Cato, whose abstract moral worth gave no clear starting point for action. But it is also a fair description of what Epicurus achieved. An end that is felt, and not merely defined, tells a man at every step which way to go.
Carneades’ map also shows something Cicero treats as a weakness and Epicurus treated as the heart of his teaching. Carneades listed pleasure, which he assigned to Aristippus, and freedom from pain, which he assigned to the Peripatetic Hieronymus, as two separate ends. Epicurus would not separate them. Cicero complains that “all of these but Epicurus were consistent” (II.35). Section 4 below takes up why Epicurus refused to treat them as two.
2. How We Know: Definitions, Logic And The Standard Of Truth
Section titled “2. How We Know: Definitions, Logic And The Standard Of Truth”Before any school could argue about the end, it had to say how anything can be known at all. Diogenes Laertius records each school’s “criterion,” its standard of truth, and Cicero gives the whole debate in the Academic Questions and touches it again and again in On Ends. Epicurus goes in the direction no other school took. He placed the standard in the senses, the anticipations and the feelings, and he set aside the definitions and the formal logic that every other school treated as the tools of philosophy.
The Platonists
Section titled “The Platonists”Varro, speaking for the Academy and the Peripatetics together, states their doctrine of knowledge: “They said that, although it originated in the senses, still the power of judging of the truth was not in the senses. They insisted upon it that intellect was the judge of things” (Academic Questions I, chapter 8). Cicero states Plato’s own position more sharply still: “Plato considered that the whole judgment of truth, and that truth itself, being abstracted from opinions and from the senses, belonged to the province of thought and of the intellect” (Academic Questions II, chapter 46). Behind this lies Plato’s division in the Timaeus between “that which always is and has no becoming,” grasped by reason, and “that which is always becoming and never is,” which is “conceived by opinion with the help of sensation” (Timaeus 27d-28a).
The Aristotelians
Section titled “The Aristotelians”Cicero credits the older schools with building the whole apparatus of logic: “They defined a multitude of terms, and left treatises on Definition; of the kindred art of the Division of a thing into its parts they give practical examples, and lay down rules for the process” (On Ends IV.8). He also credits them with a balance between sense and reason: “Think how earnestly they reiterate the warning, that we must not expect to find truth in sensation unaided by reason, nor in reason without sensation, and that we are not to divorce the one from the other!” (IV.9).
The Stoics
Section titled “The Stoics”The Stoics made logic itself a virtue. Cato says they call dialectic a virtue “because it conveys a method that guards us from giving assent to any falsehood or ever being deceived by specious probability” (III.72). They proved their ethics by syllogisms: “Whatever is good is praiseworthy: but whatever is praiseworthy is morally honourable: therefore that which is good is morally honourable” (III.27). And they reached their idea of the good not through feeling but through reasoning by analogy: “Now notions of things are produced in the mind when something has become known either by experience or by combination of ideas or by likeness or by analogy. The fourth and last method in this list is the one that has given us the conception of the Good. The mind ascends by analogy from the things in accordance with nature till finally it arrives at the notion of Good” (III.33). Their standard of truth was the “comprehensive” impression, which Cicero describes this way: “they maintain that nothing can be perceived except a true presentation having such a character as no false presentation can possess” (V.76).
The Skeptics
Section titled “The Skeptics”The Academic Skeptics answered both the Stoics and Epicurus with one argument. Cicero sets it out against Antiochus:
What is Epicurus’s maxim? — If anything that appears to the senses be false, then nothing can be perceived. What is yours? — The appearances presented to the senses are false. — What is the conclusion? Even if I hold my tongue, it speaks for itself, that nothing can be perceived.
Cicero, Academic Questions II, chapter 32 (tr. Yonge)
Cicero’s own position was that some impressions are more probable than others, though none is beyond all doubt, and that this is enough to live by. He tells Piso that he denies perception only because of the Stoic definition of it: “The only thing that makes me deny the possibility of perception is the Stoics’ definition of that term” (On Ends V.76).
Epicurus’ Answer
Section titled “Epicurus’ Answer”Cicero’s charge sheet against Epicurus on this subject is short:
Of the whole armour of Logic your founder, as it seems to me, is absolutely destitute. He does away with Definition: he has no doctrine of Division or Partition; he gives no rules for Deduction or Syllogistic Inference, and imparts no method for resolving Dilemmas or for detecting Fallacies of Equivocation. The Criteria of reality he places in sensation; once let the senses accept as true something that is false, and every possible criterion of truth and falsehood seems to him to be immediately destroyed.
Cicero, On Ends I.22 (tr. Rackham)
Every point in this charge is accurate as a description, and every one was deliberate. Cicero reports elsewhere that Epicurus placed “all judgment in the senses, and in our notions of things, and in pleasure” (Academic Questions II, chapter 46): the senses, the anticipations, and the feelings. Velleius says that Epicurus used the word prolepsis (preconception) for the anticipations “in a sense in which no one had ever used it before” (Nature of the Gods I.44). Torquatus explains why this standard comes first: “every mental presentation has its origin in sensation; so that no knowledge or perception is possible, unless all sensations are true, as the theory of Epicurus teaches that they are. Those who deny the validity of sensation and say that nothing can be perceived, having excluded the evidence of the senses, are unable even to expound their own argument” (On Ends I.64). That last sentence is Epicurus’ answer to the Skeptic. A man who says nothing can be known has already relied on what he heard, read and saw in order to say it.
The Skeptic’s favorite examples, the oar that looks bent in water and the tower that looks round from far off, do not trouble Epicurus, because he never said that every judgment is true. He said that every sensation is a true report of what reaches the senses, and that error lies in the opinion we add. Cicero records the Epicurean Timagoras making exactly this point: when he pressed his eye and seemed to see two flames from one candle, “the error was one of opinion, and not one of his eyes” (Academic Questions II, chapter 25). The Epicurean summary in Diogenes Laertius says that opinion “may be true or false: if it is confirmed or not contradicted, it is true; if it is not confirmed or is contradicted, it is false,” and gives the example of “waiting to come near the tower and see how it looks to the near view” (X.34).
As for definitions, Epicurus held that we already know what our words mean from the examples we have met. When Cicero asked for a definition of pleasure, Torquatus answered: “who is there who does not know what pleasure is? Who needs a definition to assist him to understand it?” (On Ends II.5-6). Cicero himself describes the Epicureans as philosophers who “ignore Division and Definition altogether, and themselves profess that they seek to commend only those principles which receive the tacit assent of nature” (III.40), and he reports Epicurus’ view that “there is no occasion to argue about pleasure at all: its criterion resides in the senses, so that proof is entirely superfluous; a reminder of the facts is all that is needed” (III.3). Epicurus’ rule was that “the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there should be no need of explanation” (Diogenes Laertius X.38). Meaning comes from examples perceived by the senses, the anticipations and the feelings and contrasted against each other, not from definitions. The article One Wise Man Is Not Wiser Than Another develops this point.
Compare the Stoic method. The Stoics reached the good by reasoning away from the things the senses report: “The mind ascends by analogy from the things in accordance with nature till finally it arrives at the notion of Good.” Plato placed truth itself “abstracted from opinions and from the senses.” Epicurus kept the standard in this world, in what every man can see and feel for himself, and that is the root of every other difference that follows.
3. Where Nature Points First: The Cradle Argument
Section titled “3. Where Nature Points First: The Cradle Argument”Carneades saw that every theory of the end depends on what nature moves us toward at the very start of life: “the fountain-head is to be found in the earliest instincts of nature; discover these and you have the source of the stream, the starting-point of the debate as to the Chief Good and Evil” (On Ends V.17). Nearly every school therefore went, in Piso’s phrase, “to the nursery, because they believe that Nature reveals her plan to them most clearly in childhood” (V.55). Epicurus looked at the newborn and saw it seek pleasure and flee pain. The other schools looked at the same infant and saw something else.
The Platonists And The Aristotelians
Section titled “The Platonists And The Aristotelians”Piso, speaking for Antiochus’ combined school, says the first impulse is self-love: “Every living creature loves itself, and from the moment of birth strives to secure its own preservation” (V.24). He turns this directly against Epicurus: “Clearly we do not love ourselves for the sake of pleasure, but pleasure for the sake of ourselves” (V.30). Whether pleasure even belongs among the first objects of nature he leaves open, and he says it would make no difference: “If, as I hold, pleasure adds nothing to the sum-total of nature’s goods, it has rightly been omitted” (V.45). Cicero, replying to Torquatus in the same spirit, dismisses the evidence of animals and says of the infant: “in the infant the natural instinct is not to seek pleasure; its instinct is merely towards self-regard, self-preservation and protection from injury” (II.33).
The Stoics
Section titled “The Stoics”Cato also begins with self-preservation: “immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution” (III.16). Then he gives his reason for leaving pleasure out:
Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire.
Cicero, On Ends III.17 (tr. Rackham)
Diogenes Laertius records the same Stoic doctrine from Chrysippus, who held that “the first inclination which an animal has is to protect itself,” and that pleasure, “if there be any such thing at all, is an accessory only” (Diogenes Laertius VII.85-86, tr. Yonge).
The Skeptics
Section titled “The Skeptics”Carneades stated the question without settling it: “But what it is that at the first moment of our existence excites in our nature this impulse of desire,—as to this there is no agreement. It is at this point that all the difference of opinion among students of the ethical problem arises” (V.17). He then laid out the three candidates, pleasure, freedom from pain, and the primary natural objects, and showed how each would produce its own system (V.18-20).
Epicurus’ Answer
Section titled “Epicurus’ Answer”Torquatus gives the Epicurean observation:
Every animal, as soon as it is born, seeks for pleasure, and delights in it as the Chief Good, while it recoils from pain as the Chief Evil, and so far as possible avoids it. This it does as long as it remains unperverted, at the prompting of Nature’s own unbiased and honest verdict. Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, he thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them.
Cicero, On Ends I.30 (tr. Rackham)
The Epicurean summary in Diogenes Laertius agrees: “As proof that pleasure is the end, he points out that all living creatures as soon as they are born take delight in pleasure, but resist pain by a natural impulse apart from reason” (X.137). And Torquatus ends his speech by returning to it: “if lisping infants, nay even dumb animals, prompted by Nature’s teaching, almost find voice to proclaim that there is no welfare but pleasure, no hardship but pain—and their judgment in these matters is neither sophisticated nor biased—ought we not to feel the greatest gratitude to him who listened to this utterance of Nature’s voice” (I.71).
Set side by side, the columns show what kind of disagreement this was. Epicurus reported what can be seen in any nursery. Cato admitted that he chose his starting point “for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow” from the other one. That is a choice made to protect a conclusion already reached, not an observation. Cicero, for his part, had to set aside the evidence of animals altogether, saying that the nature of wild animals “is corrupt of its own nature” (II.33). Epicurus took the evidence as it comes.
Nor is there any real conflict between self-preservation and pleasure. A creature protects itself because damage hurts, and the soundness of its body is felt as pleasure. Cicero’s sharpest objection is that the infant seeks the pleasure of motion, not the pleasure of freedom from pain that Epicurus called the highest (II.31-32). But Epicurus held that there is no neutral state between pleasure and pain, so that every relief from hunger, cold or discomfort is felt as pleasure (section 4 below). The hungry infant who is fed feels both at once: the pleasure of feeding and the pleasure of the hunger’s removal. The cradle shows both, and Epicurus’ account covers both.
4. What Pleasure Is
Section titled “4. What Pleasure Is”If pleasure is the end, the next question is what pleasure is. Here Cicero spends more effort than anywhere else, because here he believed Epicurus most vulnerable. Epicurus’ direction is to treat pleasure and pain as the only two feelings, with no neutral state between them. Pleasure then covers every feeling that is not pain, from the delight of a feast to the steady pleasure of a body and mind free from pain. That use of the word is broader than ordinary speech, and Epicurus justified it: if every experience we find desirable is felt as pleasure, then every such experience deserves to be counted within the term.
The Platonists
Section titled “The Platonists”Plato set the terms of the debate in the Philebus. Socrates asks: “Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less?” Philebus, the champion of pleasure, answers that they belong “to the class which admits of more … for pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity and degree” (Philebus 27e-28a). Socrates concludes that the unlimited cannot be the source of good. Later he asks what makes whiteness pure, and answers that “the purest white, and not the greatest or largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest” (Philebus 53a-b).
The Aristotelians
Section titled “The Aristotelians”The Peripatetic Hieronymus of Rhodes made freedom from pain the end and refused to call it pleasure. Torquatus reports that Hieronymus “thinks that pleasure is not desirable in itself,” and agrees when Cicero asks whether, for Hieronymus, “to feel pleasure is a different thing from not feeling pain” (On Ends II.8-9). Piso disowns him for it: “I know no reason for calling the latter a Peripatetic at all; for he defined the Chief Good as freedom from pain” (V.14). For Piso himself, as we saw, pleasure “adds nothing to the sum-total of nature’s goods” (V.45).
The Stoics
Section titled “The Stoics”The Stoics classed pleasure of the mind among the four disorders of the soul. Cato lists them: “sorrow, fear, lust, and that mental emotion which the Stoics call by a name that also denotes a bodily feeling, hédoné ‘pleasure,’ but which I prefer to style ‘delight,’ meaning the sensuous elation of the mind when in a state of exultation” (III.35). Cicero gives their definition of it: “elation of the mind under an irrational conviction that it is enjoying some great good” (II.13). Chrysippus thought he could disprove pleasure with a single question about a hand at rest. Torquatus reports that there was a statue of Chrysippus in Athens holding out one hand, in memory of this syllogism: “‘Does your hand want anything, while it is in its present condition?’ Answer: ‘No, nothing.’ — ‘But if pleasure were a good, it would want pleasure.’ — ‘Yes, I suppose it would.’ — ‘Therefore pleasure is not a good’” (I.39).
The Skeptics
Section titled “The Skeptics”Cicero’s main attack in Book II is here. He insists that there are three states of feeling, not two:
Who is not aware that the world of experience contains these three states of feeling: first, the enjoyment of pleasure; second, the sensation of pain; and third, which is my own condition and doubtless also yours at the present moment, the absence of both pleasure and pain? Pleasure is the feeling of a man eating a good dinner, pain that of one being broken on the rack; but do you really not see that intermediate between those two extremes lies a vast multitude of persons who are feeling neither gratification nor pain?
Cicero, On Ends II.16 (tr. Rackham)
From this he argues that Epicurus has two ends under one name. Aristippus “calls pleasure the Chief Good” and “does not count absence of pain as pleasure,” while Hieronymus “never employs the name pleasure to denote this negation of pain” (II.19); Epicurus, says Cicero, combines “these quite dissimilar feelings … as actually being a single thing, instead of really two; which is absolutely impossible” (II.20). In the Tusculan Disputations he quotes Epicurus’ own words to make the same charge. Epicurus wrote: “Nor can I form any notion of the chief good, abstracted from those pleasures which are perceived by taste, or from what depends on hearing music, or abstracted from ideas raised by external objects visible to the eye, or by agreeable motions, or from those other pleasures which are perceived by the whole man by means of any of his senses” (Tusculan Disputations III, chapter 18). Yet the same man, Cicero says, “says that pleasure is at its height where pain ceases, and that to be free from all pain is the very greatest pleasure,” and he calls these “three very great mistakes in a very few words” (III, chapter 19).
Epicurus’ Answer
Section titled “Epicurus’ Answer”Torquatus answers from the feelings themselves:
The pleasure we pursue is not that kind alone which affects our physical being with a definite delightful feeling,—a positively agreeable perception of the senses; on the contrary, the greatest pleasure according to us is that which is experienced as a result of the complete removal of pain. When we are released from pain, the mere sensation of complete emancipation and relief from uneasiness is in itself a source of gratification. But everything that causes gratification is a pleasure (just as everything that causes annoyance is a pain). Therefore the complete removal of pain has correctly been termed a pleasure. … Epicurus consequently maintained that there ‘is no such thing as a neutral state of feeling’ intermediate between pleasure and pain; for the state supposed by some thinkers to be neutral, being characterized as it is by entire absence of pain, is itself, he held, a pleasure, and, what is more, a pleasure of the highest order. A man who is conscious of his condition at all must necessarily feel either pleasure or pain. But complete absence of pain Epicurus considers to be the limit and highest point of pleasure; beyond this point pleasure may vary in kind, but it cannot vary in intensity or degree.
Cicero, On Ends I.37-38 (tr. Rackham)
The disagreement comes down to Cicero’s “third state.” Cicero says he himself, sitting and talking, feels “neither gratification nor pain.” Epicurus would ask him to attend to what he actually feels. A man sitting with friends in conversation, free of hunger, cold and fear, is not in a blank state. He is enjoying himself, and if a toothache began he would notice at once what he had lost. The supposedly neutral state is felt as pleasure, and it is known as pleasure by contrast with pain. That is why Epicurus could call it by the same name as the pleasure of a feast without confusing two things. There are two feelings, not three, and every experience falls under one or the other.
Cicero’s charge that Epicurus has two ends under one name dissolves on the same ground. The pleasure of motion and the pleasure of rest are not two goals but one feeling met in two ways. Epicurus named both in his book on choice: “Freedom from trouble in the mind and from pain in the body are static pleasures, but joy and exultation are considered as active pleasures involving motion” (Diogenes Laertius X.136). Torquatus answers Cicero’s thirsty man the same way: drinking is “a ‘kinetic’ pleasure,” having quenched one’s thirst a “‘static’ pleasure,” and once all pain has been removed “pleasure may vary in kind but cannot be increased in degree” (On Ends II.9-10). The quotation Cicero holds up as a contradiction, Epicurus saying he cannot conceive the good apart from the pleasures of taste, music, sight and motion, is no contradiction. It shows that Epicurus never dismissed the vivid pleasures in favor of a bare absence of pain. He named them first. What he denied is that there is a gap between them and the steady pleasure of a life free from pain, or that pleasure grows without limit past the point where pain is gone.
Chrysippus’ hand fails for the same reason. Torquatus’ father answered it: “though it is cogent enough as an objection to the Cyrenaics, it does not touch Epicurus. … the reason why it would not have wanted pleasure is, that to be without pain is to be in a state of pleasure” (I.39). And Plato’s whiteness, offered in the Philebus against pleasure, supports Epicurus. The highest pleasure is not the largest quantity of pleasure but pleasure without admixture of pain, just as the purest white is white without admixture of other colors. Pleasure has a limit, the removal of all pain, and the article One Wise Man Is Not Wiser Than Another explains what that limit means and why it is a concept drawn from experience, not a state that any man must enter.
One more column belongs here: the Cyrenaics, the other ancient school of pleasure. Cicero treats them as more consistent than Epicurus because they took pleasure only in its ordinary sense of agreeable motion (II.18, II.39-41). Diogenes Laertius records the difference: the Cyrenaic chief good “is not that pleasure as a state, which consists in the absence of all pain, and is a sort of undisturbedness, which is what Epicurus admits as such” (Diogenes Laertius II.87, tr. Yonge). The comparison with the Cyrenaics shows that Epicurus’ doctrine of pleasure was not a confused version of Aristippus, as Cicero suggests, but a considered correction of him.
5. Does The Good Admit Of More And Less?
Section titled “5. Does The Good Admit Of More And Less?”Diogenes Laertius records that the Epicureans held “one wise man is not wiser than another” (X.121), and that they recognized “two ideas of happiness, complete happiness, such as belongs to a god, which admits of no increase, and the happiness which is concerned with the addition and subtraction of pleasures” (X.122). These sentences are answers to a question that runs through all of On Ends: whether the highest good can be increased, whether a longer life is a happier one, and whether one wise man can be happier than another. Epicurus’ direction is that the good has a limit. Below the limit there is more and less; at the limit nothing can be added. The article One Wise Man Is Not Wiser Than Another treats this issue in full, and this section gives Cicero’s part of the record.
The Platonists
Section titled “The Platonists”Plato’s test in the Philebus was that the good must have a limit and not belong to the class that “admits of more and less” (27e-28a). Antiochus’ school, however, would not follow the test to its end. Piso closes Book V with this position: “I … do not hesitate to declare that every Wise Man is always happy, but yet that it is possible for one to be happier than another” (On Ends V.95). He distinguishes the happy life from the “supremely happy” life, and Cicero replies: “what can be more unsatisfactory than to say that a man is happy but not happy enough? Any addition to what is enough makes too much; now no one has too much happiness; therefore no one can be happier than happy” (V.81).
The Aristotelians
Section titled “The Aristotelians”Because the Aristotelians count health, wealth and fortune among goods, more of them makes a man happier. Piso asks whether Quintus Metellus, who saw four sons rise to high office and died full of honors, was not happier than Regulus, “who died a captive in the hands of the enemy, from starvation and want of sleep,” supposing both to have been wise (V.82). Cicero, arguing for the older schools against Cato, adds that time adds something: “if a man who has lived ten years enjoyably were given an additional month of equally enjoyable life, the addition to his enjoyment, being of some value, would be a good thing, but yet the refusal of the addition does not forthwith annihilate his happiness” (IV.30). Theophrastus went furthest, and held “that misfortune, sorrow and bodily anguish were incompatible with happiness” (V.77).
The Stoics
Section titled “The Stoics”The Stoics held that the good is all or nothing. “Goodness is absolute, and is not a question of degree” (III.34). Time adds nothing to it: “the Stoics do not deem happiness to be any more attractive or desirable if it be lasting than if it be brief” (III.46). And from this Cato draws the rule that decides the question of the wise man:
So it is consistent with the principles already stated that those who deem the End of Goods, that which we term the extreme or ultimate Good, to be capable of degree, are on their own theory also bound to hold that one man can be wiser than another, and similarly that one can commit a more sinful or more righteous action than another; which it is not open to us to say, who do not think that the End of Goods can vary in degree.
Cicero, On Ends III.48 (tr. Rackham)
Asked whether Metellus was happier than Regulus, the Stoics answer that he was not (V.83).
The Skeptics
Section titled “The Skeptics”Cicero the Academic grants the Stoics their consistency: “I only wish they said that there were degrees of happiness! then you would see a collapse! … their system is a marvellously consistent whole” (V.83). Against Epicurus, he argues that if pleasure is the good, more pleasure over more time must be better: “if one thinks that happiness is produced by pleasure, how can he consistently deny that pleasure is increased by duration? If it is not, pain is not either” (II.88).
Epicurus’ Answer
Section titled “Epicurus’ Answer”Torquatus quotes Epicurus: “no greater pleasure could be derived from a life of infinite duration than is actually afforded by this existence which we know to be finite” (I.63), which is Principal Doctrine 19: “Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure” (PD 19).
Cicero’s objection assumes that pleasure is a quantity that grows without end, so that more time must bring more of it. That is Philebus’ view, not Epicurus’. For Epicurus pleasure has a limit, the removal of all pain, and a life that has reached that limit in its experiences is complete; more time adds variety but not a greater good. Epicurus therefore stands with the Stoics against the Aristotelians in saying the good, at its limit, cannot be increased, and with the Aristotelians against the Stoics in saying that below the limit there is more and less. Cicero’s own comparison makes the point for him. Mocking Epicurus, he writes: “Take away his everlasting life, and Jove is no happier than Epicurus; each of them enjoys the Chief Good, that is to say, pleasure” (II.88). Epicurus would accept the sentence as written. It is what he meant when he said a man may “rival even Zeus in happiness” (Vatican Saying 33).
That is also why Epicurus could agree with the Stoic sentence that one wise man is not wiser than another without accepting the Stoic grounds for it. The Stoic reached it because virtue is all or nothing. Epicurus reached it because the goal the wise man pursues has a limit, the same for every man, though the lives of wise men still hold more and less pleasure, at different times and in different ways.
6. Virtue: The Goal Itself, Or The Means To It?
Section titled “6. Virtue: The Goal Itself, Or The Means To It?”Diogenes Laertius asks of every school whether virtue is enough for happiness and whether it is chosen for its own sake. For the Stoics and the Platonists this was the central issue of ethics, and Cicero, following Chrysippus, calls it “a duel in which the combatants are, not myself and Torquatus, but Virtue and Pleasure” (On Ends II.44). Epicurus’ direction is that the virtues are chosen for the pleasant life they produce, as medicine is chosen for health, and that for this very reason they cannot be separated from a pleasant life.
The Platonists
Section titled “The Platonists”Cicero, arguing in the Platonic tradition against Torquatus, defines moral worth as that “which is of such a nature that, though devoid of all utility, it can justly be commended in and for itself, apart from any profit or reward” (II.45). He appeals to Plato’s image of wisdom: “The sense of sight, says Plato, is the keenest sense we possess, yet our eyes cannot behold Wisdom; could we see her, what passionate love would she awaken!” (II.52). And he insists that “duty is its own reward” (II.72).
The Aristotelians
Section titled “The Aristotelians”Piso gives the Peripatetic view that virtue is “the perfection of reason” (V.38) and the highest of goods, though not the only one: “The things we reckon as bodily goods do, it is true, form a factor in supreme happiness, but yet happiness is possible without them. For those supplementary goods are so small and slight that in the full radiance of the virtues they are as invisible as the stars in sunlight” (V.71). He holds that “all the virtues, and the Moral Worth which springs from them and inheres in them, are intrinsically desirable” (V.64).
The Stoics
Section titled “The Stoics”For the Stoics virtue is not merely the highest good but the only one. Cato: “The essential principle not merely of the system of philosophy I am discussing but also of our life and fortunes is, that we should believe Moral Worth to be the only good” (III.26). He finds it self-evident: “nothing is less open to doubt than that what is morally good is to be desired for its own sake, and similarly what is morally bad is to be avoided for its own sake” (III.39). Cicero records Cleanthes’ picture of what an Epicurean world would look like: Pleasure “decked as a queen, and gorgeously apparelled, seated on a throne; at her side should stand the Virtues as her handmaids,” saying “As for us Virtues, we were born to be your slaves; that is our one and only business” (II.69).
The Skeptics
Section titled “The Skeptics”Pyrrho and Aristo pushed the Stoic view to its limit: if only virtue matters, nothing else makes any difference. Cato himself rejects them for it: “it is of the essence of virtue to exercise choice among the things in accordance with nature; so that philosophers who make all things absolutely equal, rendering them indistinguishable either as better or worse, and leaving no room for selection among them, have abolished virtue itself” (III.13). Cicero ranks Pyrrho as the most mistaken of all, “because his conception of virtue leaves nothing as an object of desire whatever” (IV.43). In Book IV Cicero turns a related argument against Cato. Virtue that chooses must have something to choose for: “Considerations of conduct or duty do not supply the impulse to desire the things that are in accordance with nature; it is these things which excite desire and give motives for conduct” (IV.48).
Epicurus’ Answer
Section titled “Epicurus’ Answer”Torquatus treats each virtue in turn as a means to the pleasant life. Of wisdom: “We esteem the art of medicine not for its interest as a science but for its conduciveness to health; the art of navigation is commended for its practical and not its scientific value … So also Wisdom, which must be considered as the art of living, if it effected no result would not be desired; but as it is, it is desired, because it is the artificer that procures and produces pleasure” (I.42-43). Temperance is “desirable not because it renounces pleasures, but because it procures greater pleasures” (I.48). Courage is sought “in order to live without anxiety and fear and so far as possible to be free from pain of mind and body” (I.49). Justice is desirable “because it is so highly productive of gratification” (I.53). Diogenes Laertius gives the same doctrine: “He says that virtue is preferred for the sake of pleasure, and not for its own sake, just as the doctor’s art is employed for the sake of health. … Epicurus says also that virtue alone is inseparable from pleasure” (X.138).
From this Epicurus draws a conclusion that Cicero found hard to accept from a philosopher of pleasure: “Epicurus, the man whom you denounce as a voluptuary, cries aloud that no one can live pleasantly without living wisely, honourably and justly, and no one wisely, honourably and justly without living pleasantly” (I.57). This is Principal Doctrine 5. Cicero’s reply is that Epicurus cannot mean it consistently (II.49-51), and he reports Epicurus’ own challenge to the other schools: Epicurus says that those who make morality the standard while allowing pleasure no part in it are “uttering sounds devoid of sense,” and that “he has no notion or perception whatever of any meaning that this term Morality can have attached to it” (II.48).
The two columns now show their real difference. For Cicero and Cato, virtue is a thing to be admired for itself, and asking what it is for is already a kind of corruption. For Epicurus, asking what a thing is for is how we know whether it is worth having. A virtue that produced nothing but misery would not be a virtue. Cicero himself, attacking Cato in Book IV, came close to this: he argued that virtue needs something outside itself to aim at, and that only the things nature makes desirable can supply “motives for conduct.” Epicurus says what those things come to: the pleasant life, and the absence of pain.
Cicero’s strongest piece of evidence turns out to support Epicurus. He admits that Epicureans live good lives: “the fact that Epicurus himself was a good man and that many Epicureans both have been and today are loyal to their friends, consistent and high-principled throughout their lives, ruling their conduct by duty and not by pleasure,—all this does but enforce the value of moral goodness and diminish that of pleasure. The fact is that some persons’ lives and behaviour refute the principles they profess” (II.81). In the Tusculan Disputations he goes further: “the Epicureans, those best of men, for there is no order of men more innocent” (Tusculan Disputations III, chapter 21). Cicero can only explain this by supposing that the Epicureans do not live by their own principles. The simpler explanation is that they did. A school that teaches that injustice, cowardice and intemperance destroy the pleasant life will produce honest, steady and moderate men, and Cicero’s own testimony shows that it did.
7. Body, Mind, And External Goods: What Counts Toward The Good Life?
Section titled “7. Body, Mind, And External Goods: What Counts Toward The Good Life?”The schools divided over what belongs to the good life besides virtue: health, freedom from pain, wealth, friends, country. Diogenes Laertius asks whether bodily and external goods are goods at all, and Cicero spends most of Book IV on the Stoic answer. Epicurus’ direction is to treat a man as a whole, body and mind together, and to count whatever produces pleasure or removes pain, in body or in mind, as part of the good life, while holding that the mind’s pleasures and pains, which reach to past and future, outweigh the body’s.
The Platonists
Section titled “The Platonists”Plato’s tradition treated the body as a burden on the mind. Cicero states the Platonic view in the Tusculan Disputations: “Now to separate the soul from the body, is to learn to die, and nothing else whatever. Wherefore take my advice; and let us meditate on this, and separate ourselves as far as possible from the body, that is to say, let us accustom ourselves to die. This will be enjoying a life like that of heaven even while we remain on earth … for this present life is really death” (Tusculan Disputations I, chapter 31).
The Aristotelians
Section titled “The Aristotelians”The Aristotelians counted three classes of goods: “the greatest being those of the mind, the next best those of the body, the third are external goods, as the Peripatetics call them, and the old Academics differ very little from them” (Tusculan Disputations V, chapter 30). Piso argues that because we love ourselves, we love every part of ourselves: “since we love ourselves, and desire all our attributes both of mind and body to be perfect, our mind and body are themselves dear to us for their own sakes” (On Ends V.37). In Book IV Cicero presses this against the Stoics with an argument Epicurus could have written. Even a creature that was pure mind, he says, “would ask for health and freedom from pain” (IV.27); and in fact “even the mind is not an empty, impalpable something (a conception to me unintelligible), but in some sort corporeal, and therefore even the mind is not satisfied with virtue alone, but desires freedom from pain” (IV.36).
The Stoics
Section titled “The Stoics”The Stoics denied that health, wealth and freedom from pain are goods. They called them “preferred”: “this which we entitle preferred or superior is neither good nor evil; and accordingly we define it as being indifferent but possessed of a moderate value” (III.53). The wise man will choose them, but they add nothing to his happiness: “We hold that the multiplication even of those goods that in our view are truly so called does not render life happier or more desirable or of higher value; even less therefore is happiness affected by the accumulation of bodily advantages” (III.43). Their illustration is the knucklebone thrown to land upright: landing upright is “preferred,” but it is “in no sense” part of the end (III.54).
The Skeptics
Section titled “The Skeptics”Carneades held that the quarrel between Stoics and Peripatetics over bodily goods was a quarrel over words. Cato reports that Carneades “never ceased to contend that on the whole so-called ‘problem of good and evil,’ there was no disagreement as to facts between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, but only as to terms” (III.41). Pyrrho and Aristo, at the other extreme, “said, for example, that there was absolutely nothing to choose between the most perfect health and the most grievous sickness” (II.43).
Epicurus’ Answer
Section titled “Epicurus’ Answer”Epicurus counted both body and mind, and he did so without either the Platonic contempt for the body or the Stoic pretense that pain is not an evil. Torquatus explains the relation between them: “we aver that mental pleasures and pains arise out of bodily ones … Yet we maintain that this does not preclude mental pleasures and pains from being much more intense than those of the body; since the body can feel only what is present to it at the moment, whereas the mind is also cognizant of the past and of the future” (On Ends I.55). Diogenes Laertius gives the same reasoning: “the flesh is only troubled for the moment, but the soul for past, present, and future. In the same way the pleasures of the soul are greater” (X.137).
The side-by-side comparison is striking here. Cicero’s argument against Cato in Book IV, that the mind is “in some sort corporeal” and so “desires freedom from pain,” is Epicurus’ doctrine. Epicurus taught that the mind is made of atoms like the rest of the body, and that what affects one affects the other. The Stoics, Cicero says, start from human nature and then abandon it, “as if” man had no body, and the Platonists ask us to separate ourselves from the body while still alive. Epicurus never made that separation. The pleasure of a sound body and the pleasure of a mind at ease with its past and confident about its future are one life, felt as one.
On external goods, Epicurus agreed with the Stoics that wealth and fame are not goods in themselves, but for a different reason. They are worth having to the extent that they bring pleasure or prevent pain, and the desire for them beyond that point brings more trouble than it is worth. Section 8 takes this up.
8. Desires And Emotions: Set A Limit, Or Root Them Out?
Section titled “8. Desires And Emotions: Set A Limit, Or Root Them Out?”What should be done with desire, fear, grief and anger? Diogenes Laertius records each school’s view of the passions and of the wise man’s feelings, and Cicero devotes most of the third and fourth books of the Tusculan Disputations to the question. Epicurus’ direction is that feelings are not diseases but guides. Desires are to be sorted by what they bring, and those that nature sets a limit to are to be met, while the empty ones are to be set aside.
The Platonists
Section titled “The Platonists”Cicero reports Plato’s division of the soul: “his master, Plato, imagined a three-fold soul; a dominant portion of which, that is to say, reason, he had lodged in the head, as in a tower; and the other two parts, namely, anger and desire, he made subservient to this one” (Tusculan Disputations I, chapter 10). On this view desire is the lowest part of a man, to be ruled by reason, and Cicero, arguing in the Platonic tradition against Torquatus, says that the man who makes pleasure the chief good “judges the question not with the rational and deliberative part of his mind, but with its lowest part, the faculty of desire” (On Ends II.115).
The Aristotelians
Section titled “The Aristotelians”The Peripatetics held that the passions are natural and useful when moderate. Diogenes Laertius reports Aristotle’s view that “the wise man was not destitute of passions, but endowed with moderate passions” (Diogenes Laertius V.31, tr. Yonge). Cicero reports that “the Peripatetics say that these perturbations … are not only natural, but were given to men by nature for a good purpose,” and that “they call [anger] the whetstone of courage” (Tusculan Disputations IV, chapter 19).
The Stoics
Section titled “The Stoics”The Stoics held that every passion is a false opinion and that the wise man is free of them all. Cato lists the four classes, “sorrow, fear, lust, and … delight,” and concludes: “these emotions, I say, are not excited by any influence of nature; they are all of them mere fancies and frivolous opinions. Therefore the Wise Man will always be free from them” (On Ends III.35). They are sins even when nothing comes of them: “the passions of fear, grief and lust are sins, even when no extraneous result ensues” (III.32).
The Skeptics
Section titled “The Skeptics”Cicero as an Academic stands aside from the dispute in principle. He says the Peripatetics “are answered by the Stoics; they have my leave to fight it out; who think myself no otherwise concerned than to inquire for what may seem to be most probable” (Tusculan Disputations IV, chapter 21). In practice, on this issue, he sides with the Stoics. He speaks of the perturbations “which we insist upon it should be extirpated” (IV, chapter 19), and in On Ends he applies the same view to Epicurus: “for my own part I cannot cordially approve, I merely tolerate, a philosopher who talks of setting bounds to the desires. Is it possible for desire to be kept within bounds? It ought to be destroyed, uprooted altogether” (On Ends II.27).
Epicurus’ Answer
Section titled “Epicurus’ Answer”Torquatus sets out the classification of desires:
Nothing could be more instructive, more helpful to right living, than Epicurus’s doctrine as to the different classes of the desires. One kind he classified as both natural and necessary, a second as natural without being necessary, and a third as neither natural nor necessary; the principle of classification being that the necessary desires are gratified with little trouble or expense; the natural desires also require but little, since nature’s own riches, which suffice to content her, are both easily procured and limited in amount; but for the imaginary desires no bound or limit can be discovered.
Cicero, On Ends I.45 (tr. Rackham)
Even Cicero, in the Tusculan Disputations, grants that Epicurus “has divided his kinds of desires, not very acutely perhaps, but yet usefully” (Tusculan Disputations V, chapter 33). In On Ends he says he approves “the substance of this classification” and objects only to its form (On Ends II.27).
The real difference lies in Cicero’s demand that desire be “destroyed, uprooted altogether.” Epicurus held that desire is how a living creature moves toward what it needs, and that to root it out would be to root out life itself. The Stoics called fear, grief and delight “frivolous opinions.” Epicurus called pleasure and pain the feelings by which we judge every choice (Diogenes Laertius X.129). His aim was not a wise man without feelings but a wise man who reads his feelings correctly. The Epicurean summary says the wise man “will be more deeply moved by feelings, but this will not prove an obstacle to wisdom” (X.117), and on the rack “he will cry out and lament” (X.118). No Stoic could have written those sentences.
What Epicurus asked was that desires be measured by what they bring. Desires that nature limits, for food, warmth, safety and friendship, are easily met. Desires that rest on empty opinion, for limitless wealth, fame or power, have “no bound or limit,” and so they can never be satisfied. Cicero quotes Principal Doctrine 10 in his own translation and treats it as scandalous: “If the things in which sensualists find pleasure could deliver them from the fear of the gods and of death and pain, and could teach them to set bounds to their desires, we should have no reason to blame them” (II.21). The doctrine says the opposite of what Cicero hears in it. The sensualist’s pleasures cannot do these things, and that is the reason to blame him.
For grief, Epicurus taught a method Cicero describes in the Tusculan Disputations: “he makes the alleviation of grief depend on two things, a ceasing to think on evil, and a turning to the contemplation of pleasure. For he thinks that the mind may possibly be under the power of reason, and follow her directions” (Tusculan Disputations III, chapter 15). The mind is not helpless before its feelings. It can turn its attention, and pleasure, remembered and expected, is there to turn to.
9. Justice, Society, And The Universe As A City
Section titled “9. Justice, Society, And The Universe As A City”Diogenes Laertius records the Epicurean view that justice is a compact, and the Stoic view that it exists by nature. Cicero gives the full Stoic and Platonic case and his own attack on Epicurus’ account. Epicurus’ direction is that justice is not a thing in itself but an agreement among men not to harm or be harmed, kept because the just life is the pleasant and secure one.
The Platonists
Section titled “The Platonists”Cicero, in the Platonic tradition, makes justice part of what reason itself teaches. Reason “has inspired man with a relish for his kind … She reminds him that, as Plato puts it in his letter to Archytas, man was not born for self alone, but for country and for kindred, claims that leave but a small part of him for himself” (On Ends II.45). Justice that is kept only for advantage is not justice at all: “It is obvious that, if fair-dealing, honesty and justice have not their source in nature, and if all these things are only valuable for their utility, no good man can anywhere be found” (II.59).
The Aristotelians
Section titled “The Aristotelians”Piso traces justice to a natural social bond that begins in the family and spreads outward: “first by blood relationships, then by connections through marriage, later by friendships, afterwards by the bonds of neighbourhood, then to fellow-citizens and political allies and friends, and lastly by embracing the whole of the human race. This sentiment, assigning each his own and maintaining with generosity and equity that human solidarity and alliance of which I speak, is termed Justice” (V.65). He adds that “human nature is so constituted at birth as to possess an innate element of civic and national feeling” (V.66).
The Stoics
Section titled “The Stoics”The Stoics rested justice on their theology. Cato: “they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own” (III.64). That city did not include animals: Chrysippus taught “that all other things were created for the sake of men and gods, but that these exist for their own mutual fellowship and society, so that men can make use of beasts for their own purposes without injustice” (III.67). And they held that justice valued for its usefulness would not last: “if it were so, the same claims of utility would be able to undermine and overthrow them. In fact the very existence of both justice and friendship will be impossible if they are not desired for their own sake” (III.71).
The Skeptics
Section titled “The Skeptics”Carneades was famous for arguing against justice as readily as for it. Cicero borrows one of his cases to press Torquatus: “Suppose, says Carneades, you should know that there is a viper lurking somewhere, and that some one, by whose death you stand to profit, is about to sit down on it unawares; then you will do a wicked deed if you do not warn him not to sit down. But still your wickedness would go unpunished, for who could possibly prove that you knew?” (II.59). Cicero’s own charge follows: an Epicurean is just only from fear of being found out, and so “your school undoubtedly preaches the pretence of justice instead of the real and genuine thing” (II.71).
Epicurus’ Answer
Section titled “Epicurus’ Answer”Torquatus answers that injustice does not pay, and not only because of the courts:
And just as Rashness, Licence and Cowardice ever torment the mind, ever awaken trouble and discord, so Unrighteousness, when firmly rooted in the heart, causes restlessness by the mere fact of its presence; and if once it has found expression in some deed of wickedness, however secret the act, yet it can never feel assured that it will always remain undetected. … there really is no motive for transgressing: since the desires that spring from nature are easily gratified without doing any man wrong, while those that are imaginary ought to be resisted, for they set their affections upon nothing that is really wanted; while there is more loss inherent in Injustice itself than there is profit in the gains it brings.
Cicero, On Ends I.50-52 (tr. Rackham)
Principal Doctrines 31 and 33 give the doctrine in Epicurus’ words: “The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage, to restrain men from harming one another, and save them from being harmed” (PD 31), and “Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time, it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed” (PD 33).
Set beside the other columns, Epicurus’ account has two advantages. First, it needs no universe governed by divine will. The Stoic city of gods and men, and Chrysippus’ world “created for the sake of men and gods,” rest on a theology Epicurus rejected (section 13). Second, it explains why justice differs from place to place and age to age while still answering to something real: the shared advantage of not harming and not being harmed.
As for Carneades’ viper, the Epicurean answer is the one Torquatus gave: the man who keeps silent must live with what he has done and with the fear that it will come out. Cicero himself grants how an Epicurean would actually behave. Asked what he would do if a dying friend secretly asked him to pass an estate to the friend’s daughter, Cicero tells Torquatus: “You no doubt will hand over the money; perhaps Epicurus himself would have done the same” (II.58). Epicurus’ wise man does not need a city of gods to keep him honest. He knows that “the just man is most free from trouble; the unjust most full of trouble” (PD 17).
10. Friendship
Section titled “10. Friendship”Every school praised friendship, and Diogenes Laertius records each school’s view of it. The question was whether a friend is loved for his own sake or for what he brings. Cicero puts this question to the Epicureans more sharply than to anyone else, because he thought their answer to it was impossible. Epicurus’ direction is that friendship is the greatest means to a happy life that wisdom provides, and that this is exactly why the wise man loves his friends as himself.
The Platonists And The Aristotelians
Section titled “The Platonists And The Aristotelians”Piso places friends among the things “desirable for their own sakes,” but outside the end itself: “external goods, that is, goods that belong neither to the mind nor to the body, such as friends, parents, children, relatives and one’s country itself, while intrinsically precious to us, yet are not included in the same class as the former” (V.68). Cicero gives the definition of love from which, he says, the Latin word for friendship comes: “What is the meaning of ‘to love’ … except to wish some one to receive the greatest possible benefits even though one gleans no advantage therefrom oneself?” (II.78).
The Stoics
Section titled “The Stoics”The Stoics “recommend the cultivation of friendship, classing it among ‘things beneficial,’” and, as with justice, reject utility as its ground: “the very existence of both justice and friendship will be impossible if they are not desired for their own sake” (III.70-71).
The Skeptics
Section titled “The Skeptics”Cicero argues that a friendship founded on advantage will end with the advantage: “If expediency creates the feeling it will also destroy it” (II.78). He asks whether a calculating Epicurean would value a friend above the granaries of Puteoli (II.84), and he notes that some later Epicureans had softened the doctrine: “You quoted another and a more humane dictum of the more modern Epicureans, which so far as I know was never uttered by the master himself. This was to the effect that, although at the outset we desire a man’s friendship for utilitarian reasons, yet when intimacy has grown up we love our friend for his own sake” (II.82).
Epicurus’ Answer
Section titled “Epicurus’ Answer”Torquatus begins with Epicurus’ own words and his own life:
Now Epicurus’s pronouncement about friendship is that of all the means to happiness that wisdom has devised, none is greater, none more fruitful, none more delightful than this. Nor did he only commend this doctrine by his eloquence, but far more by the example of his life and conduct. … Yet Epicurus in a single house and that a small one maintained a whole company of friends, united by the closest sympathy and affection; and this still goes on in the Epicurean school.
Cicero, On Ends I.65 (tr. Rackham)
This is Principal Doctrine 27: “Of all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life, far the greatest is the possession of friendship” (PD 27). Torquatus then gives three Epicurean accounts of how friendship and pleasure are joined. On the first, friendship is the surest preserver of pleasure, and “it is not possible to secure uninterrupted gratification in life without friendship, nor yet to preserve friendship itself unless we love our friends as much as ourselves. … For we rejoice in our friends’ joy as much as in our own, and are equally pained by their sorrows” (I.67). On the second, friendship begins in advantage and grows into affection. On the third, “wise men have made a sort of compact to love their friends no less than themselves” (I.70). He also quotes Principal Doctrine 28: “The same creed that has given us courage to overcome all fear of everlasting or long-enduring evil hereafter, has discerned that friendship is our strongest safeguard in this present term of life” (I.69).
Cicero’s dilemma, that a friend must be loved either for his own sake or for advantage, assumes that the two exclude each other. Epicurus held that they do not. The pleasure of friendship is not a payment received from the friend. It is the joy taken in the friend’s own joy, which is why the Epicurean “will feel exactly the same towards his friend as he does towards himself” (I.68). A man who loved his friend only as a tool would lose that pleasure, so the Epicurean reason for friendship is also the reason for loving the friend fully. The Epicurean summary in Diogenes Laertius says that the wise man “will face fortune and never desert a friend” (X.120) and that “on occasion he will even die for a friend” (X.121).
Here again Cicero’s testimony is the strongest evidence. He does not deny that Epicurus “had many friends” (II.80). He reports that Atticus’ Epicurean friends kept Epicurus’ likeness “on their drinking-cups and rings” (V.3). And he quotes Epicurus’ last letter, written in great pain, asking Hermarchus “to protect the children of Metrodorus” (II.96). Cicero calls this “loyalty to friendship and affection” and says it is “inconsistent and incompatible with his teachings” (II.99). The Epicurean reading is simpler. A man who held friendship to be the greatest of the means to a happy life spent his last day caring for his friends’ children.
11. Pain, The Rack, And Whether The Wise Man Is Always Happy
Section titled “11. Pain, The Rack, And Whether The Wise Man Is Always Happy”Diogenes Laertius records the Epicurean saying that “even if the wise man be put on the rack, he is happy” (X.118). Nearly every school except the most cautious Aristotelians claimed that the wise man is always happy, and each was challenged to show how its doctrine allowed it. The rack was the standard test case. Epicurus’ direction is that the wise man is happy because in his life pleasure predominates over pain, even when the pain is severe, and not because pain is no evil or because he feels none.
The Platonists
Section titled “The Platonists”Cicero reports that the heads of Plato’s Academy held that a happy life “may attend virtue even to the moment of execution; nay, may descend with her into Phalaris’s bull, according to Aristotle, Xenocrates, Speusippus, Polemon” (Tusculan Disputations V, chapter 31). Piso tells a story of Polemo racked with gout and visited by the Epicurean Charmides: “‘Stay, I beg of you, friend Charmides,’ cried Polemo; ‘no pain from here has got to there’ (pointing to his feet and his breast). Yet Polemo would have preferred not to feel pain” (On Ends V.94).
The Aristotelians
Section titled “The Aristotelians”The Peripatetics called pain an evil but taught that it must be borne bravely: “the Peripatetics say that pain is an evil, but on the duty of bearing the annoyance it causes with fortitude their teaching is the same as that of the Stoics” (V.94). Theophrastus was more candid and held “that misfortune, sorrow and bodily anguish were incompatible with happiness” (V.77). Cicero tells Piso that he agrees with Theophrastus, “if misfortunes, as you say, are evils” (V.86).
The Stoics
Section titled “The Stoics”The Stoics secured the wise man’s happiness by denying that pain is an evil at all. Cato: “can anything be more certain than that on the theory of the school that counts pain as an evil, the Wise Man cannot be happy when he is being tortured on the rack? Whereas the system that considers pain no evil clearly proves that the Wise Man retains his happiness amidst the worst torments” (III.42). Courage itself, they argued, depends on this: “it is impossible for there ever to exist a man of steadfast, firm and lofty mind, such a one as we call a brave man, unless it be established that pain is not an evil” (III.29).
The Skeptics
Section titled “The Skeptics”Cicero answers the Stoics with ridicule: “Here are people all agog to learn why pain is no evil; and the Stoics tell them that though pain is irksome, annoying, hateful, unnatural and hard to bear, it is not an evil, because it involves no dishonesty, wickedness or malice … He who hears this may or may not want to laugh, but he will not go away any stronger to endure pain than he came” (IV.52). He reports that the Stoic Dionysius of Heraclea left his school over a disease of the eyes, “as though Zeno had ever taught him that to feel pain was not painful!” (V.94).
Against Epicurus he argues the other way. If pain is the chief evil, then a wise man in pain cannot be happy, and no man can be sure of his health even until evening. He quotes Metrodorus’ description of happiness, “sound health, and an assurance of its continuance,” and asks: “Can anyone have an assurance of what his health will be, I don’t say a year hence, but this evening?” (II.92). He dismisses Epicurus’ teaching on pain, “Short if it’s strong, light if it’s long,” as “a tag for copybooks” (II.95), and he mocks Epicurus’ claim about the rack: “he is fond of ranting like this now and then, and indeed tells us that when the Wise Man is suffering torments of pain, he will say ‘How pleasant this is! how little I mind!’” (V.80).
Epicurus’ Answer
Section titled “Epicurus’ Answer”Torquatus states the Epicurean claim exactly, and it is not the claim Cicero mocks:
For Epicurus thus represents the Wise Man as always happy: his desires are kept within bounds; death he disregards; he has a true conception, untainted by fear, of the Divine nature; if it be expedient to depart from life, he does not hesitate to do so. Thus equipped he enjoys perpetual pleasure, for there is no moment when the pleasures he experiences do not outbalance the pains; since he remembers the past with delight, grasps the present with a full realization of its pleasantness, and does not rely upon the future; he looks forward to it, but finds his true enjoyment in the present. … Moreover, any pains that the Wise Man may encounter are never so severe but that he has more cause for gladness than for sorrow.
Cicero, On Ends I.62 (tr. Rackham)
The wise man’s happiness is the predominance of pleasure over pain, not the absence of pain. Principal Doctrine 4 says the same: “chronic illnesses permit a predominance of pleasure over pain in the flesh” (PD 4). Even Piso, arguing against Epicurus, reports the doctrine correctly: “the very people who measure all things by pleasure and pain, do not they cry aloud that the Wise Man always has more of what he likes than of what he dislikes?” (V.93). And the Epicurean summary in Diogenes Laertius, right after saying the wise man is happy on the rack, adds: “Yet when he is on the rack, then he will cry out and lament” (X.118). Epicurus did not say that pain is pleasant or that the wise man feels none. He said that the pleasures of a mind that remembers its past, enjoys its present and does not fear its future can outweigh even severe bodily pain.
That is the point at which the columns separate. The Stoic made the wise man happy on the rack by calling pain no evil, and Cicero, who agreed with the Stoics on much else, could not keep a straight face. The Peripatetic admitted pain is an evil and was left, like Theophrastus, unable to say the wise man is always happy. Epicurus called pain an evil, as every man feels it to be, and still held that the wise man is happy, because happiness for him is a matter of which feeling predominates. Of the three, only Epicurus’ answer matches both what men feel and what the schools wanted to claim.
Cicero’s own record provides the proof. He translates Epicurus’ last letter: “Epicurus to Hermarchus, greeting. I write these words … on the happiest, and the last, day of my life. I am suffering from diseases of the bladder and intestines, which are of the utmost possible severity. … Yet all my sufferings … are counterbalanced by the joy which I derive from remembering my theories and discoveries” (II.96). And he responds: “When I read this I rank the death-scene of Epicurus on a level with those of Epaminondas and of Leonidas” (II.97). Cicero goes on to argue that the letter contradicts Epicurus’ doctrine. It does not. It is the doctrine of Torquatus’ I.62 carried out on the last day of Epicurus’ life: severe pain, outweighed by the joy of memory and friendship.
As for fortune, Cicero’s charge is that if happiness depends on pleasure, “happiness becomes the slave of fortune” (II.89). Torquatus quotes the Epicurean answer: “the Wise Man is but little interfered with by fortune: the great concerns of life, the things that matter, are controlled by his own wisdom and reason” (I.63). What nature requires is easy to get, a point Cicero himself calls “excellently said” (II.90). The wise man cannot be certain of his health this evening, but he can be confident that what he needs is within reach, that severe pain does not last, and that his memories and his friends will not be taken from him by any illness.
12. Death, Time, And Memory
Section titled “12. Death, Time, And Memory”Every school had to say whether death is an evil and what the wise man should think about it. Diogenes Laertius gives Epicurus’ answer in the Letter to Menoeceus and Principal Doctrine 2. Cicero preserves the rival answers and his own objections. Epicurus’ direction is that death is nothing to us, because where death is we are not; that the length of life does not decide its happiness; and that memory is a real power by which past pleasures stay with us.
The Platonists
Section titled “The Platonists”Plato taught that the soul survives the body. Cicero reports that he “not only was of the same opinion with Pythagoras concerning the immortality of the soul, but that he also brought reasons in support of it” (Tusculan Disputations I, chapter 17). From this followed the Platonic view of philosophy as a practice of dying: “to separate the soul from the body, is to learn to die … This will be enjoying a life like that of heaven even while we remain on earth … for this present life is really death” (I, chapter 31).
The Aristotelians
Section titled “The Aristotelians”Piso argues from the fear of death that nature loves life: “the fact that practically everybody has this feeling is conclusive proof that nature shrinks from destruction” (On Ends V.31). He grants that this fear can be excessive, but treats a moderate degree of it as natural, and asks: “Who does not suppose that the Wise Man himself, even when he has resolved that he must die, will yet be affected at parting from his friends and quitting the very light of day?” (V.32).
The Stoics
Section titled “The Stoics”The Stoics held that happiness does not depend on length of life, and that the decision to live or die is made by weighing things according to nature, not happiness: “When a man’s circumstances contain a preponderance of things in accordance with nature, it is appropriate for him to remain alive; when he possesses or sees in prospect a majority of the contrary things, it is appropriate for him to depart from life. This makes it plain that it is on occasion appropriate for the Wise Man to quit life although he is happy, and also of the Foolish Man to remain in life although he is miserable” (III.60). Nor does the wise man wait for the end to be called happy: Solon’s warning to Croesus was “unwisely given” (III.76).
The Skeptics
Section titled “The Skeptics”In the first book of the Tusculan Disputations Cicero argues that death cannot be an evil on any of the rival theories of the soul, while saying that which theory is true “some god must determine” (Tusculan Disputations I, chapter 11). Against Epicurus he raises two objections. First, Epicurus’ will, which provided for a yearly celebration of his birthday and a monthly gathering of his students, seems to him inconsistent with the doctrine that “death does not affect us at all” (On Ends II.100-103). Second, he doubts that we can choose what we remember, citing Themistocles: “I remember … even things I do not wish to remember, but I cannot forget things I wish to forget” (II.104).
Epicurus’ Answer
Section titled “Epicurus’ Answer”Cicero himself translates the doctrine: “death does not affect us at all; for a thing that has experienced dissolution must be devoid of sensation; and that which is devoid of sensation cannot affect us in any degree whatsoever” (II.100). Torquatus gives the reason a brave man can face it: “It makes light of death, for the dead are only as they were before they were born” (I.49). Epicurus’ own words in the Letter to Menoeceus complete the argument: “death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist” (Diogenes Laertius X.125).
Set beside the Platonic column, the difference is complete. Plato asks us to rehearse death and to call this life a kind of death. Epicurus asks us to see that death is nothing to us, so that this life, the only one we have, can be lived fully. Set beside the Stoic column, the difference is in the reason. The Stoic weighs “things in accordance with nature” against their contraries and may leave life “although he is happy.” Torquatus also says the wise man may leave life when it can no longer be borne, “when the play has ceased to please us” (I.49), but the Epicurean measure is the life itself, whether pleasure in it can still predominate, and the Epicurean summary adds that the wise man, even “if he is deprived of his eyesight, … will not end his whole life” (Diogenes Laertius X.119).
Memory is the Epicurean answer to time. “Fools are tormented by the remembrance of former evils; to wise men memory is a pleasure—by it they renew the goods of the past” (On Ends I.57). Cicero’s Themistocles shows only that memory is not perfectly obedient. Epicurus’ point was that we can choose where to turn our attention, and that the pleasures of the past, once lived, cannot be taken away. Epicurus’ last day is again the example: the joy “of remembering” outweighed the pain.
As for the will, the birthday celebration and the monthly gatherings were for the living. They kept a community of friends together and kept the memory of Epicurus and Metrodorus among them, which is exactly what the will says: “to keep alive the memory of himself and of Metrodorus” (II.101). Nothing in that requires that the dead feel anything. Cicero’s further complaint, that no day can truly be anyone’s birthday because “the identical day that has once occurred” cannot recur (II.102), is a joke, and Cicero tells it as one.
13. Gods, Providence, And The Making Of The World
Section titled “13. Gods, Providence, And The Making Of The World”Diogenes Laertius records each school’s view of divine nature, and in Epicurus’ case gives the opening of the Letter to Menoeceus and Principal Doctrine 1. Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods sets the Epicurean Velleius against the Stoic Balbus and the Academic Cotta, and On Ends shows how deeply Stoic ethics depended on Stoic theology. Epicurus’ direction is that a blessed and immortal nature is untroubled and gives trouble to no one, that the world was made by nature without a maker, and that fear of divine anger and of punishment after death rests on false opinion.
The Platonists
Section titled “The Platonists”Plato’s Timaeus describes a craftsman who made the world by looking to an eternal pattern (Timaeus 27d-28a). Velleius attacks it at the start of his speech: he will not expound “the artisan deity and world-builder of Plato’s Timaeus,” and he asks “What power of mental vision enabled your master Plato to descry the vast and elaborate architectural process” (Nature of the Gods I.18-19). He adds that Plato “represented the world not merely as having had an origin but even as almost made by hand, also declared that it will exist for ever. Can you suppose that a man can have even dipped into natural philosophy if he imagines that anything that has come into being can be eternal?” (I.20).
The Aristotelians
Section titled “The Aristotelians”Cicero says the Stoics took their physics largely from the Peripatetics, “maintaining the existence of the gods and the creation of the world out of the four elements,” and that Zeno “agreed that the universe as a whole and its chief parts are governed by a divine mind and substance” (On Ends IV.12). Piso, speaking of the growth of plants, leaves the question open: “whether it be, as very learned men have thought, that this capacity has been engendered in them by some higher and diviner power, or whether it is the result of chance” (V.33).
The Stoics
Section titled “The Stoics”Stoic ethics rested on providence. Cato: “they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members” (III.64), and “Nor again can anyone judge truly of things good and evil, save by a knowledge of the whole plan of nature and also of the life of the gods” (III.73). Velleius calls their providence “that old hag of a fortune-teller, the Pronoia (which we may render ‘Providence’) of the Stoics” (Nature of the Gods I.18), and he links it directly to Plato’s creator: “as for your Stoic Providence, Lucilius, if it is the same thing as Plato’s creator, I repeat my previous questions, what were its agents and instruments, and how was the entire undertaking planned out and carried through?” (I.20). The Platonists and the Stoics formed one camp on this question. Both held that the world was designed by a divine mind, and Epicurus answered both together.
The Skeptics
Section titled “The Skeptics”Cotta, the Academic, replies to Velleius by questioning whether Epicurus’ gods leave any room for religion: “what reason have you for maintaining that men owe worship to the gods, if the gods not only pay no respect to men, but care for nothing and do nothing at all?” (Nature of the Gods I.115). He charges that Epicurus “destroyed the very foundations of religion” (I.115), and asks how there can be “any excellence in a being so engrossed in the delights of his own pleasure that he always has been, is, and will continue to be entirely idle and inactive” (I.116).
Epicurus’ Answer
Section titled “Epicurus’ Answer”Velleius gives the Epicurean answer in several steps. First, men everywhere hold a preconception of gods as blessed and immortal: “nature, which bestowed upon us an idea of the gods themselves, also engraved on our minds the belief that they are eternal and blessed. If this is so, the famous maxim of Epicurus truthfully enunciates that ‘that which is blessed and eternal can neither know trouble itself nor cause trouble to another, and accordingly cannot feel either anger or favour, since all such things belong only to the weak’” (Nature of the Gods I.45). That is Principal Doctrine 1. Second, the world needs no maker: “he who taught us all the rest has also taught us that the world was made by nature, without needing an artificer to construct it, and that the act of creation, which according to you cannot be performed without divine skill, is so easy, that nature will create, is creating and has created worlds without number” (I.53). Third, the designer the other schools offer would be a master to be feared: they “have saddled us with an eternal master, whom day and night we are to fear; for who would not fear a prying busybody of a god, who foresees and thinks of and notices all things, and deems that everything is his concern?” (I.54). And so: “Epicurus has set us free from superstitious terrors and delivered us out of captivity, so that we have no fear of beings who, we know, create no trouble for themselves and seek to cause none to others, while we worship with pious reverence the transcendent majesty of nature” (I.56).
The order of this reasoning matters. Velleius does not say that Epicurus chose a world without a maker in order to be free from fear. He says the world was made by nature, as the study of nature shows, and that freedom from the fear of a “prying busybody” follows from knowing it. The confidence comes from the truth, not the other way around.
Cotta’s objection, that gods who do nothing deserve no worship, assumes that the only reason to honor a divine nature is to get something from it. Epicurus held the reverse. A man honors what is excellent because it is excellent, and the life of a being who “takes delight in his own wisdom and virtue, and knows with absolute certainty that he will always enjoy pleasures at once consummate and everlasting” (I.51) is the model of the best life. That such a being does not toil at running the world is not idleness in any blameworthy sense. It is freedom from the labor that the Stoic and Platonic designer would have to carry forever. Cicero himself grants the Epicurean conclusion in On Ends, in mockery: “Take away his everlasting life, and Jove is no happier than Epicurus” (On Ends II.88).
14. Fate, Chance, And Free Choice
Section titled “14. Fate, Chance, And Free Choice”Diogenes Laertius records Epicurus’ rejection of “the destiny of the natural philosophers” and his view of chance (X.133-134). Cicero’s On Fate gives the debate between Epicurus and the Stoic Chrysippus in detail. Epicurus’ direction is that some things happen by necessity, some by chance, and some are in our own control, and that the evidence of our own will is not to be denied for the sake of a theory.
The Platonists And The Aristotelians
Section titled “The Platonists And The Aristotelians”Cicero’s surviving text of On Fate says little of Plato, and it places Aristotle on a side many readers would not expect: “the two opinions held by the old philosophers, on the one hand the opinion of those who deemed that everything takes place by fate in the sense that this fate exercises the force of necessity — the opinion to which Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles and Aristotle adhered — and on the other hand the opinion of those who held that the movements of the mind are voluntary and not at all controlled by fate” (On Fate 39).
The Stoics
Section titled “The Stoics”Chrysippus held that all events happen by fate, while trying to keep some room for human responsibility. Cicero says that “he inclines to adhere to those who hold that the mind is released from all necessity of motion; but in employing formulae peculiar to himself he slips into such difficulties that against his will he lends support to the necessity of fate” (On Fate 39). The Stoic fate was the same as their providence, the plan of the divine mind running through all things.
The Skeptics
Section titled “The Skeptics”Cicero attacks the swerve directly. In On Ends he calls it “a piece of childish fancy” and “an arbitrary fiction; for Epicurus says the atoms swerve without a cause” (On Ends I.19). In On Fate he asks: “what causes the swerve? … This is wishful thinking, not investigation” (On Fate 46-47). The Academic Carneades took a different line: “Carneades showed greater insight: his doctrine was that the school of Epicurus could have maintained its cause without this fictitious swerve. For it would have been better for the dogma of the possibility of some voluntary movement of the mind to be maintained than for them to introduce the swerve” (On Fate 23).
Epicurus’ Answer
Section titled “Epicurus’ Answer”Epicurus’ starting point is the evidence of the will itself. Lucretius states it:
Once again, if every motion is always linked on, and the new always arises from the old in order determined, nor by swerving do the first-beginnings make a certain start of movement to break through the decrees of fate, so that cause may not follow cause from infinite time; whence comes this free will for living things all over the earth, whence, I ask, is it wrested from fate, this will whereby we move forward, where pleasure leads each one of us, and swerve likewise in our motions neither at determined times nor in a determined direction of place, but just where our mind has carried us?
Lucretius, On the Nature of Things II.251-260 (tr. Bailey)
Epicurus did not reason from a wish for freedom to a theory that would allow it. He reasoned from what every man observes, that living creatures move “where pleasure leads each one of us,” to the conclusion that the atoms cannot all be locked in an unbroken chain of necessity. The Letter to Menoeceus gives the threefold division: some events “happen by necessity, and some by chance, and some are within our control; for while necessity cannot be called to account, he sees that chance is inconstant, but that which is in our control is subject to no master, and to it are naturally attached praise and blame” (Diogenes Laertius X.133). Chrysippus had to bend his own terms until, in Cicero’s words, he slipped “against his will” into necessity. Carneades, the Skeptic, agreed with Epicurus that the will is free, and differed only on how to state it. Of all the columns on this issue, Epicurus’ is the one that begins from the evidence and does not explain it away.
15. The Study Of Nature And The Love Of Knowledge
Section titled “15. The Study Of Nature And The Love Of Knowledge”Every school had a physics and a view of what learning is for. Diogenes Laertius records that Epicurus came to philosophy as a boy because “the teachers of literature … were not able to explain to him the passage about Chaos in Hesiod” (X.2). Cicero records the rival schools’ praise of knowledge for its own sake and his own scorn for Epicurus’ physics. Epicurus’ direction is that the study of nature comes first because we cannot live well without knowing the truth about the world, and that knowing the truth is itself among the greatest pleasures of life.
The Platonists
Section titled “The Platonists”Plato’s tradition placed true knowledge beyond the senses (section 2) and pictured the highest life as one of study. Piso: “The old philosophers picture what the life of the Wise will be in the Islands of the Blest, and imagine them released from all anxiety, needing none of the necessary equipment or accessories of life, and with nothing else to do but to spend their whole time upon study and research in the science of nature” (On Ends V.53).
The Aristotelians
Section titled “The Aristotelians”The Peripatetics were the great collectors of natural knowledge. Piso: “Aristotle gave a complete account of the birth, nutrition and structure of all living creatures, Theophrastus of the natural history of plants” (V.10). They ranked the life of study highest of all: “Among the alternative ideals of conduct they gave the highest place to the life of retirement, devoted to contemplation and to study. This was pronounced to be most worthy of the Wise Man, as most nearly resembling the life of the gods” (V.11). Piso insists that knowledge is loved for its own sake and not for pleasure: “those who in this connexion allege that the studies I have mentioned are pursued for the sake of mental pleasure fail to see that they are proved to be desirable for their own sake by the very fact that the mind feels delight in them when no bait of advantage is held out” (V.50).
The Stoics
Section titled “The Stoics”The Stoics made natural philosophy a virtue, because “he who is to live in accordance with nature must base his principles upon the system and government of the entire world” (III.72-73). For them the study of nature leads to the divine plan and to the maxim “follow God” (III.73).
The Skeptics
Section titled “The Skeptics”Cicero dismisses Epicurus’ physics as borrowed and spoiled: “Here, in the first place, he is entirely second-hand. His doctrines are those of Democritus, with a very few modifications. And as for the latter, where he attempts to improve upon his original, in my opinion he only succeeds in making things worse” (I.17). He mocks the swerve and Epicurus’ view of the size of the sun (I.19-21), and he describes Epicurus as “deficient in that liberal culture which confers on its possessor the title of an educated man” (I.26). In Book IV he says the purpose of natural philosophy goes beyond “the two objects, recognized by Epicurus, of banishing superstition and the fear of death” (IV.11).
Epicurus’ Answer
Section titled “Epicurus’ Answer”Torquatus calls Epicurus “the great explorer of the truth, the master-builder of human happiness” (I.32), and both titles matter. Epicurus came to philosophy over a question about the origin of the world, not over a wish to be comforted. Torquatus explains why the study of nature is “all-important”: it teaches the meaning of terms; “a thorough knowledge of the facts of nature relieves us of the burden of superstition, frees us from fear of death, and shields us against the disturbing effects of ignorance”; it shows “what nature’s real requirements are”; and it gives the Canon by which truth is tested, so that we “stand fast in our belief, unshaken by the eloquence of any man” (I.63-64). Freedom from fear is one of the results of knowing the truth, not the reason the physics was devised. Cicero’s phrase “the two objects, recognized by Epicurus” reverses the order, as if Epicurus had built a physics to fit the conclusions he wanted. Epicurus wanted the truth, and the confidence followed from it. Torquatus even offers to “prove to you both your swerve of the atoms and size of the sun, and also that very many errors of Democritus were criticized and corrected by Epicurus” (I.28).
Epicurus’ own words in the Letter to Herodotus show what kind of life this was: “I who urge upon others the constant occupation in the investigation of nature, and find my own peace chiefly in a life so occupied” (Diogenes Laertius X.37). And Piso, arguing against the philosophers of pleasure, testifies to the same fact: “So potent is the spell of these pursuits, that even those who profess to follow other Ends of Goods, defined by utility or pleasure, may yet be seen to spend their whole lives in investigating and unfolding the processes of nature” (On Ends V.57).
Piso’s argument against pleasure here answers itself. He says knowledge is desirable for its own sake “by the very fact that the mind feels delight in them.” That delight is what Epicurus called pleasure. The Epicurean does not love knowledge less than the Peripatetic. He gives the true reason why every man who has tasted it loves it. As for education, Torquatus answers Cicero’s charge directly: Epicurus “refused to consider any education worth the name that did not help to school us in happiness” (I.71). He did not reject learning. He rejected learning that leads nowhere, and he held that the study of how the world actually works, and how to live in it, is worth more than a lifetime spent on the subjects “that we ought to be ashamed not to have learnt in boyhood” (I.72).
16. Is Pleasure A Life Of Idleness?
Section titled “16. Is Pleasure A Life Of Idleness?”Cicero’s most persistent charge is that a philosophy of pleasure makes men small: that it cannot account for heroism, public service, or the drive to achieve, and that it reduces man to an animal at a trough. The other schools offered action, glory and the service of the state as proof that men aim at something higher than pleasure. Epicurus’ direction is that pleasure includes every experience men find desirable, from the quiet to the exuberant, and that the joy of achievement, discovery and friendship is pleasure too.
The Platonists
Section titled “The Platonists”Cicero, in the Platonic tradition, quotes Plato’s letter to Archytas: “man was not born for self alone, but for country and for kindred, claims that leave but a small part of him for himself” (On Ends II.45).
The Aristotelians
Section titled “The Aristotelians”Cicero cites Aristotle against the Cyrenaics: “just as the horse is designed by nature for running, the ox for ploughing, and the dog for hunting, so man, as Aristotle observes, is born for two purposes, thought and action: he is as it were a mortal God” (II.40). Piso argues from children’s restlessness that “we are designed by nature for activity” (V.58), and adds: “Hence the abler and more accomplished a man is, the less he would care to be alive at all if debarred from taking part in affairs, although allowed to consume an unlimited supply of pleasures” (V.56).
The Stoics
Section titled “The Stoics”Cato says that the wise man “should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her” (III.68), and that “no one would care to pass his life alone in a desert, even though supplied with pleasures in unbounded profusion” (III.65).
The Skeptics
Section titled “The Skeptics”Cicero closes Book II with his strongest images. He imagines Xerxes leading his vast armies into Greece and saying he came “to procure some honey from Hymettus,” and applies it to Epicurus’ wise man: “to say that this man’s aim is pleasure is to say that all his high endeavour is for the sake of a little honey” (II.112). “No, Torquatus, believe me, we are born for loftier and more splendid purposes” (II.113). He asks whether Torquatus would rather pass his whole life in unbroken pleasure, “or to be a benefactor of the entire human race, and to bring succour and safety to the distressed, even at the cost of enduring the agonies of a Hercules” (II.118). And he challenges Torquatus to announce in the Senate that pleasure guides all his conduct (II.74).
Epicurus’ Answer
Section titled “Epicurus’ Answer”Cicero’s picture of the life of pleasure is a man “drenched and stimulated with every sort of delight,” passing “days and nights in the enjoyment of the keenest pleasure, without a moment’s intermission” (II.114). He admits in the next breath that this is the Cyrenaic picture, not the Epicurean one: “The Cyrenaics, it is true, do not repudiate it; on this point your friends are more decent” (II.115). Epicurus’ pleasure is not a trough. It is every experience a man finds desirable: the quiet ones, a meal with friends, a book, a garden, a conversation that runs late, and the exuberant ones, climbing a mountain, sailing a rough sea, winning a hard contest, founding a school, building a business, exploring what no one has seen before. Cicero’s heroes found their deeds desirable. That is why they did them.
Cicero’s own language shows it. Of Regulus, who returned to Carthage to keep his word and died under torture, Cicero says that his end was “a pitiable end, as it seems to us who hear of it, but full of pleasure for him who endured it” (II.65). Piso asks: “What devotee of pleasure, though consumed by most glowing passions, can be supposed to feel such transports of rapture in winning the objects of his keenest desires, as were felt by the elder Africanus upon the defeat of Hannibal, or by the younger at the overthrow of Carthage?” (V.70). Both men measure the greatness of these deeds in pleasure and rapture. They are describing the same thing Epicurus described, and calling it by another name.
Epicurus did advise against a career in politics: the wise man will not “take part in public life” (Diogenes Laertius X.119). That is advice about where the struggle for office leads, not a call to idleness. Epicurus himself founded a school, wrote some three hundred rolls of books (Diogenes Laertius X.26), kept up friendships across the Greek world, and taught a philosophy whose influence, Cicero admits, “has spread not only over Greece and Italy but throughout all barbarian lands as well” (On Ends II.49). Piso himself testified that Epicureans “spend their whole lives in investigating and unfolding the processes of nature” (V.57). The Epicurean summary says the wise man “will gather together a school” and “on occasion he will even die for a friend” (X.121). That is not the life of a man waiting for honey.
17. Names And Things: Who Changed The Words?
Section titled “17. Names And Things: Who Changed The Words?”The last issue runs under all the others. Cicero repeatedly asks whether a dispute between schools is over facts or only over words. He charges the Stoics with inventing new words for old ideas, and he charges Epicurus with using an old word, pleasure, in a sense of his own. Epicurus’ direction is that words must be used in the sense their first examples give them, and that a real difference in doctrine must be stated in plain words that show it.
The Platonists And The Aristotelians
Section titled “The Platonists And The Aristotelians”Piso accuses the Stoics of theft: “The Stoics have conveyed from us not some one or other item, but our entire system of philosophy. It is a regular practice of thieves to alter the marks upon stolen goods; and the Stoics, in order to pass off our opinions as their own, have changed the names, which are the marks of things” (On Ends V.74). “Just as in the senate there is always some one who demands an interpreter, so we must use an interpreter when we give audience to your school” (V.89).
The Stoics
Section titled “The Stoics”Cicero says of the Stoic founder that “Zeno their founder was rather an inventor of new terms than a discoverer of new ideas” (III.5). Cato admits the novelty and defends it: “at one time even the terms employed in Greek for its novel conceptions seemed unendurable, when they were novel, though now daily use has made them familiar” (III.15). He denies that the dispute is verbal: “nothing seems to me more manifest than that there is more of a real than a verbal difference of opinion between those philosophers on these points” (III.41).
The Skeptics
Section titled “The Skeptics”Carneades held the opposite: between the Stoics and the Peripatetics “there was no disagreement as to facts … but only as to terms” (III.41). Cicero takes the same line in Book IV: “In all this though his language was peculiar, his meaning was the same as that of everybody else” (IV.57). He asks Zeno to show “that I shall be readier to despise money if I believe it to be a ‘thing preferred’ than if I believe it to be a good” (IV.72). And he turns the same charge on Epicurus, saying that the Epicureans “do not deny that we understand what pleasure is, but what he means by it; which proves not that we do not understand the real meaning of the word, but that Epicurus is speaking an idiom of his own and ignoring our accepted terminology” (II.15).
Epicurus’ Answer
Section titled “Epicurus’ Answer”The comparison here is instructive. Cicero, Piso and Carneades agree that the long war between the Stoics and the Peripatetics was largely a war of words. The two schools held, in substance, the same view: that virtue is the highest good and that health and fortune are worth something but far less. Zeno renamed health a “preferred” thing and Aristotle called it a small good, and in practice they valued it the same. That is a striking admission. It means that of the great schools Cicero sets out, only one held a substantially different doctrine of the good. Cicero states it himself: when all the other systems are set aside, “there remains a duel in which the combatants are, not myself and Torquatus, but Virtue and Pleasure” (II.44).
Epicurus’ own use of words was the opposite of Zeno’s. He did not invent a new word for pleasure. He used the ordinary word for the ordinary feeling and refused to divide it. His rule was that “the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there should be no need of explanation” (Diogenes Laertius X.38). Every person knows pleasure from examples, and every person knows that relief from pain, the end of hunger, the rest after a long climb, is pleasant. Epicurus’ only innovation was to insist that all these examples belong under one word, because there is no third kind of feeling for them to belong to. Cicero calls this an idiom of his own. It is better described as taking the ordinary word seriously. Cicero imagines Epicurus’ replies when pressed: “‘I don’t trouble about the name,’” and, asked why not-feeling-pleasure is not then the greatest pain, “‘Because the opposite of pain is not pleasure but absence of pain’” (On Ends II.28). The dispute is not over a name. It is over whether the feelings themselves come in two kinds or three, and on that question Epicurus pointed to experience.
What The Rosetta Stone Shows
Section titled “What The Rosetta Stone Shows”Read side by side, Cicero’s dialogues show four things about Epicurus that his own surviving writings, read alone, can leave unclear.
First, the questions. Epicurus’ sayings are answers to the standard questions the schools were expected to answer: what the end is, how we know, where nature points first, whether the good can be increased, whether virtue is chosen for itself, what the wise man will feel on the rack, whether death is an evil, whether gods govern the world. Diogenes Laertius lists the answers. Cicero shows the questions, and once the question is known, a short sentence like “one wise man is not wiser than another” or “there is no neutral state between pleasure and pain” takes on its full meaning.
Second, the shape of the debate. Cicero’s own witnesses, Carneades, Piso and Cicero himself, testify that the Stoics and the Platonic and Aristotelian schools disagreed largely in words. They shared one premise: that the standard of the good stands above or outside feeling, in reason, in moral worth, in Forms, or in a divine plan, and that pleasure is at best a minor good to be ruled from above. Epicurus is the only one in Cicero’s cast who placed the standard within experience itself, in the senses, the anticipations and the feelings. That is why Cicero could say the whole debate came down to “a duel in which the combatants are … Virtue and Pleasure.”
Third, the reasons. On nearly every issue, the other schools’ answers rest on something Epicurus refused to grant: a choice of starting point made “for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow,” a definition the senses cannot test, a divine city no one has seen, a good that cannot be increased because it is defined to be all or nothing. Epicurus’ answers rest on what any man can check: the infant at the breast, the felt difference between pain and its relief, the predominance of pleasure on a hard day, the will that moves “where pleasure leads.”
Fourth, Cicero’s admissions. An opponent’s concessions are the most valuable testimony a court can hear, and Cicero makes many. He grants that the Epicurean ethics makes clear “what things they are to do or not to do” (IV.46). He argues, against the Stoics, that the mind is “in some sort corporeal” and “desires freedom from pain” (IV.36). He reports, through Piso, that Epicureans hold “the Wise Man always has more of what he likes than of what he dislikes” (V.93). He calls Epicurus “a good man, and a kind and humane man” (II.80), ranks his death with those of Epaminondas and Leonidas (II.97), and calls his followers “those best of men, for there is no order of men more innocent” (Tusculan Disputations III, chapter 21). He describes the death of Regulus as “full of pleasure for him who endured it” (II.65). Again and again, Cicero treats these admissions as a sign that Epicureans are better than their doctrine. The simpler reading is that the doctrine is better than Cicero allowed.
Diogenes Laertius gives us Epicurus’ conclusions. Cicero gives us the debate those conclusions answered. Read together, they show a philosopher who took his stand in the world we see and feel, against schools that looked for the good somewhere above it.
Sources Of Further Information
Section titled “Sources Of Further Information”- H. Rackham, tr., Cicero: De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum (Loeb Classical Library, 1914): On Ends on this site, with an outline of all five books.
- H. Rackham, tr., Cicero: De Natura Deorum; Academica (Loeb Classical Library, 1933): On the Nature of the Gods.
- C. D. Yonge, tr., Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations and Academic Questions: Tusculan Disputations and Academic Questions.
- H. Rackham, tr., Cicero: De Fato (Loeb Classical Library, 1942): On Fate.
- Julia Annas, ed., and Raphael Woolf, tr., Cicero: On Moral Ends (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy; Cambridge University Press, 2001): a modern translation of On Ends with an introduction to the schools.
- Julia Annas and Gábor Betegh, eds., Cicero’s De Finibus: Philosophical Approaches (Cambridge University Press, 2016): essays on each book of On Ends.
- Ákos Brunner, Cicero’s Presentation of Stoic Ethics in De Finibus Book III (doctoral dissertation, Central European University, 2011), PDF.