Episode 314 - Can Pleasures Really Overcome Pains?
Welcome to Episode 314 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote “On The Nature of Things,” the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
We are closing in on the end of those portions of Tusculan Disputations that are most relevant to Epicurean philosophy today, so we’ll pick up this week after Section 26 of Part 5.
As we close in on Cicero’s final arguments on virtue, we will focus on the very different view of virtue held by Epicurus. Two passages that reveal this difference are:
Quote
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.41—42 (Usener 67, 69)
[Epicurus On The End] ‘For my part I cannot conceive of anything as the good if I remove the pleasures perceived by means of taste and sex and listening to music, and the pleasant motions felt by the eyes through beautiful sights, or any other pleasures which some sensation generates in a man as a whole. Certainly it is impossible to say that mental delight is the only good. For a delighted mind, as I understand it, consists in the expectation of all the things I just mentioned - to be of a nature able to acquire them without pain… ’ A little later he adds: ‘I have often asked men who were called wise what they could retain as the content of goods if they removed those things, unless they wanted to pour out empty words. I could learn nothing from them; and if they want to babble on about virtues and wisdoms, they will be speaking of nothing except the way in which those pleasures I mentioned are produced.’ (Long & Sedley - Hellenistic Philosophers)
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XII. The truth of the position that pleasure is the ultimate good will most readily appear from the following illustration. Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity. Let such a man moreover have no dread of any supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection, and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement.
Suppose on the other hand a person crushed beneath the heaviest load of mental and of bodily anguish to which humanity is liable. Grant him no hope of ultimate relief in view also give him no pleasure either present or in prospect. Can one describe or imagine a more pitiable state? If then a life full of pain is the thing most to be avoided, it follows that to live in pain is the highest evil; and this position implies that a life of pleasure is the ultimate good. In fact the mind possesses nothing in itself upon which it can rest as final. Every fear, every sorrow can be traced back to pain; there is no other thing besides pain which is of its own nature capable of causing either anxiety or distress.
Pleasure and pain moreover supply the motives of desire and of avoidance, and the springs of conduct generally. This being so, it clearly follows that actions are right and praiseworthy only as being a means to the attainment of a life of pleasure. But that which is not itself a means to anything else, but to which all else is a means, is what the Greeks term the Telos, the highest, ultimate or final Good. It must therefore be admitted that the Chief Good is to live agreeably.
Transcript (unedited)
Section titled “Transcript (unedited)”Cassius (00:10):
Welcome to episode 314 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucious who wrote on the Nature of Things, the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the epicurean text and we discuss how epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of epicurus@epicureanfriends.com where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes. Today, we’re going to be dealing mostly with section 26 of part five of Tuscan Disputations. But to place this in context with where we were last week, we’re in a section that highlights the different perspectives on virtue that distinguished the Cian platonic stoic position versus that of Epicurus. Last week we talked mostly about the heap issue and the question of how Cicero and these other Greek philosophers are placing such emphasis on the mind and the intellect because they see the mind as being a part of the divine and being so much more important than the body.
(01:29):
And to unite those two issues, they see the mind as able through logic or piety or geometry, mathematics, propositional logic to identify either an essence or an ideal form or something that a God is telling us that determines what a thing is. They refuse to rely on the senses anticipations and feelings that Epicurus relies on. They say those are deceptive and incapable of reaching the truth. And that for example, while we may never be sure through our eyes and touching and smelling, that the thing in front of us is a horse, we know that there is an ideal horse or an essence of a horse that exists somewhere else, and that’s where truth lies according to these other anti epicurean positions. Now today as we go into 26, we’re going to move on from the heap problem to another recurring hypothetical that the ancients are regularly using.
(02:34):
This time we’ll be discussing whether anyone can be considered to be happy while they’re under torture, while they’re on the rack. And that’s a reminder that what we’re struggling through here is how to deal with what does good mean, what does virtue mean, what does happiness mean? And as we look at the dispute between Cicero and Epicurus, we have to keep that background in mind. And of course, part of what we did last week as well was to contrast the way that Quata described the best life from an epicurean perspective versus the way that Cicero is describing the best life through this platonic perspective. And it’s in Cicero’s itemization of his view of the wise man and the best life that we are elaborating on these elements that Joshua will talk about now from section 25.
Joshua (03:27):
So in section 25, Cicero gives us a description of the good life or the life of the wise man according to his philosophy. And we contrasted that last week with Cicero’s description of the life of happiness according to Torti at the end of 25, he says, now if it be happiness to rejoice in such goods of the mind that is to say in such virtues, and if all wise men enjoy thoroughly these pleasures, it must necessarily be granted that all such are happy
Cassius (04:02):
Even in torture. And upon the rack,
Joshua (04:06):
Do you imagine, I’m speaking of him as laid on roses and violets? Is it allowable even for Epicurus who only puts on the appearance of being a philosopher and who himself assumed that name for himself to say though his matters stand, I commend him for his saying that a wise man might at all times cry out though he be burned, tortured, cut to pieces. How little I regard it shall this be said by one who defines all evil as pain and measures every good by pleasure, who could ridicule whatever we call either honorable or base and could declare of us that we are employed about words and uttering empty sounds and that nothing is to be regarded by us, but as it is perceived to be smooth or rough by the body? What shall such a man as this, as I said, whose understanding is little superior to the beasts, be it liberty to forget himself and not only to despise fortune when the whole of his good and evil is in the power of fortune, but to say that he is happy in the most wracking torture when he had actually declared pain to be not only the greatest evil but the only evil.
(05:24):
Nor did he take any trouble to provide himself with those remedies which might have enabled him to bear pain such as firmness of mind, a shame of doing anything, base exercise and the habit of patience, preceptive courage, and a manly heartiness. But he says that he supports himself on the single recollection of past pleasures, as if anyone when the weather was so hot as that he was scarcely able to bear, it should comfort himself by recollecting that he was once in my country are pum where he was surrounded on every side by cooling streams. For I do not apprehend how past pleasures can allay present evils. But when he says that a wise man is always happy, who would have no right to say so if he were consistent with himself, what may they not do who allow nothing to be desirable, nothing to be looked on as good, but what is honorable? Let then the peripatetics and old academics follow my example and at length leave off muttering to themselves and openly and with a clear voice. Let them be bold to say that a happy life may not be inconsistent with the ago of Polaris’s bull.
Cassius (06:41):
Thanks Joshua and Callini for reading that there is a lot in this paragraph that we need to spend some time talking about. I was intending to focus mostly on the discrepancy here between Cicero Andogenous ERUs about what Epicurus is saying while he is on the rack. And that’s one thing to talk about, but there are several things going on here where Cicero is even criticizing the Peripatetics in the old academics. So first of all, in what Joshua has just read, he quoted Cicero as saying that epicure as held quote, that a wise man might at all times cry out though he be burned, tortured, cut to pieces, how little I regarded unquote. Now that is not what Di Urus says in section one 18 of Di ERUs, Cyril Bailey translates as follows, and even if the wise man be put on the rack, he is happy only the wise man will show gratitude and will constantly speak well of his friends alike in their presence and their absence.
(07:53):
Yet when he is on the rack, then he will cry out and lament. Now I’ve always understood that as meaning that when you’re on the rack you’re going to cry out in pain, which is consistent with what Dogen’s Lurches says. That epic as hell that a wise man will feel more deeply than other men. So he will be in touch with his feelings, he’ll be in touch with his physical pleasure and pain, and when he is in pain, he will cry out from the pain that makes all the sense in the world. But for Cicero to turn around and say that Epicurus when he is tortured will cry out how little I regard it. That’s something very different it seems to me. And it strikes me that this whole paragraph Cicero is getting overwrought. I would think that the truth is as Dogen Denise Leus, who is friendly to epicure is recorded, that what you’re going to cry out when you’re in torture is that you’re in pain. You’re not going to cry out as if you are a super stoic how little I regard this pain. Let’s talk about that before we go further. Joshua, how would you deal with what appears to me to be an inconsistency between these two sources? Is it possible that Epicurus would say how little I regard it? I could see how Cicero could extend the thought that far, but I don’t know that I think that’s a fair statement of Epicurus real position,
Joshua (09:22):
Right? So there’s two claims in one 18. One of them is that the wise man is happy if he is on the rack and the other is that he will or will not, depending on the translation cry out may be one thing to say about Epicurus views as transmitted by a DGen LAIs on this question is that they appear in this collection of sayings or claims that are made about the quote wise man. And we don’t always have sources for these. We assume that DGen LAIs has sources for these, but some of them probably don’t survive and some of them are genuinely difficult to translate for one thing because they’ve been taken out of a larger text. So we’re missing the context and some of them present other problems. For example, on this one we have two different translations. One of them says he will cry out and lament and one of them says, nor will he cry out and lament.
(10:16):
So we do have those problems with the Greek side of this particular text, and there’s a discrepancy also in Cicero’s presentation of Epicurus view on the experience of torture. He says here that Epicurus says that there is no time when the wise man even undergoing torture cannot cry out. I counted all as nothing. But we’ve encountered Cicero elsewhere saying that Epicurus actually goes to absurd extremes on this point and claims that one being burned alive in the brazen bowl of Polaris couldn’t cry out how sweet this is. So we’re kind of dealing with discrepancies on both sides here.
Cassius (10:59):
Yeah, definitely this is one of those situations where there are varying texts and of course there are a number of statements in Epicurean philosophy that do stand out in a similar way such as death is nothing to us or the sun is the size it appears to be, or when you’re about to die, saying the Vatican saying to the effect that you’re going to spit on life and those who vainly clinging to it and go ahead and leave life and say you’ve lived. Well, there clearly is within Epicurean philosophy, a willingness to make very bold statements like this. So I suppose it’s possible and even likely that in discussing a hypothetical, a bold statement, you can continue to be happy even when you’re in pain. Like that would be something that Epicurus could have said. Just as he says that when he was about to die, even under tremendous pain from kidney disease, it’s one of the happiest days of his life.
(11:56):
The willingness to boldly state that you can overcome difficulty is a sentiment that an epicurean could easily express. However, I don’t think in this case that it’s likely that Cicero has it right here. It’s much more consistent with Epicurean philosophy to say that you are going to be understanding, following, acknowledging the senses of pain and pleasure and not trying to suppress them. So with Dogen, these alerts is translated as saying you’re going to give vent to groans and feelings of pain and so forth. I think that’s likely to be the better way to understand Epicurus at the same time. Cicero is right that Epicurus is firmly saying that even when you’re under torture, there is a way to look at happiness and affirm to yourself that you are a happy man even while under torture, even while suffering kidney disease. Cicero finds this to be so revolting to him because it’s such a different perspective on how to live.
(13:03):
Cicero applauds the boldness of Epicurus in saying that we have the ability to overcome pain while at the same time he repudiates Epicurus view that pain and pleasure are the only measures of the right and wrong way to live. Cicero wants all of us to be willing to fight as soldiers and undergo all sorts of pain and difficulty in order to achieve his goals for the state or for religion, but he wants you to do that for the reason that you are pursuing virtue or pursuing piety, and he doesn’t want you to decide what you’re going to do and what you’re not going to do based on pain and pleasure. So Cicero is really in a conundrum here about how to evaluate Epicurus because he likes the result, but he hates the reasoning to get to it. It’s in this context that Cicero joins this analysis to his repudiation of where Cicero says that Epicurus is ridiculing the stoics. He talks about Epicurus quote, who could ridicule whatever we call honorable or base and could declare of us that we were employed about words and uttering merely empty sounds. Sister detest that kind of reasoning. He sees virtue as everything in life and what he considers to be evil as everything wrong in life. He wants you to evaluate everything from that polar opposite of good versus evil, not from the polar opposite of pain versus pleasure. And he says that a man who thinks like Epicurus does is little superior to the beasts.
Joshua (14:39):
Let me just read from section two, paragraph seven of cul and disputations because this is where we get his other claim about what Epicurus says about the brazen bull of ris. He says, but Epicurus indeed says such things that it should seem that his design was only to make people laugh for he affirmed somewhere that if a wise man were to be burned or put to the torture, you expect perhaps that he’s going to say he would bear it, he would support himself under it with resolution, he would not yield to it, and that by Hercules would be very commendable and worthy of that very Hercules whom I have just invoked. But even this will not satisfy Epicurus that robust and hardy man. No, his wise man, even if he were in Polaris’s Bull would say how sweet it is, how little do I regard it?
(15:35):
What sweet is it not sufficient if it is not disagreeable? But those very men who deny pain to be an evil are not in the habit of saying that it is agreeable to anyone to be tormented. They rather say that it is cruel or hard to bear, afflicting unnatural, but still not an evil. While this man Epicurus who says that it is the only evil and the very worst of all evils yet thinks that a wise man would pronounce it sweet, I do not require of you to speak of pain in the same words which Epicurus uses a man as you know, devoted to pleasure. He may make no difference if he pleases between Polaris’s bull and his own bed, but I cannot allow the wise man to be so indifferent about pain. If he bears it with courage, it is sufficient that he should rejoice in it. I do not expect for pain is beyond all question sharp, bitter against nature, hard to submit to and hard to bear. And I won’t read any further there from paragraph seven of section two, but that gives us a more complete picture of Cicero’s own understanding of what Epicurus had to say.
Cassius (16:51):
This is a really interesting discrepancy and I’m not sure we’ve talked about it before and I’m not sure I’ve really read much about this in the commentators either, but I think it really does say something that needs to be thought about. Cicero comes to conclusions that we disagree with, but usually the facts that he is stating are relatively well documentable. He prides himself in translating Epicurus directly for having epic’s books in front of him. So it’s hard to say that everything Cicero is saying is without foundation. I would say it’s more likely that this is another example of him interpreting what Epicurus is saying in an extreme manner for purposes of setting him up for ridicule so that there probably is something that we need to understand here and accept about what Epicurus is saying and yet have it make sense with all of epicure and philosophy.
(17:50):
I don’t think that Epicurus would say that the pain of being tortured is sweet in the sense of it being a pleasure. Epicurus is certainly able to distinguish between pleasure and pain, but in terms of happiness, and of course Dewitt talks about this in his book as well, that Cicero is being unfair to Epicurus in this regard. There are different types of pleasure, different types of sweetness, even just like Lucretius talks about in book two, it’s sweet to realize that you are not yourself afflicted by pains and disasters that other people might be suffering from. When Epicurus is considering himself in kidney disease and realizing that he is happy even though he is suffering from the kidney disease, he’s not saying that the kidney disease itself is sweet, but he’s saying that the overall condition of being happy, which he evaluates himself as is sweet.
(18:50):
Happiness is a form of pleasure even in the presence of pain. Again, you can do more than one thing at once. You can walk and chew gum at the same time. You are not consumed at every moment in life by a single thing. Principle doctrine number nine about how pleasures would not differ from each other if they could consume the entire person and the entire experience, but they don’t consume the entire experience. You do have different things going on in your life at the same time. And so I would say the way forward in trying to analyze that is going to be to segment out the different things that we’re talking about and realize that the pain of kidney disease is definitely pain, but at the same time you are happy because you can offset against the pain, the pleasures of friendship, the pleasures of memory, these other pleasures that are also available to you.
(19:46):
You are not limited to experiencing one single thing at a time. A single experience is either pain or pleasure, but your total experience of being a conscious human being takes into account many different things at the same time. And in fact, even the way Cicero expresses it here in section 26, he’s saying how little I regard it, is the quote from Cicero. He’s not saying, oh yes, being tortured being cut to pieces is sweet, it’s pleasurable. No, he’s not saying it’s pleasurable. He’s saying he is able to disregard the pain and he’s able to disregard the pain because he’s able to regard other aspects of his experience which are pleasurable. And this case the body is being tortured on the rack through bodily pain. But as long as he has his consciousness about him, he’s able to access his mental experiences and realize that even though at this moment he’s in terrible physical pain, the physical pain is not all there is to his being. He’s able to mentally appreciate what he’s got, what he’s had in the past and what he can hope for in the future if he’s able to escape from the torture.
Joshua (21:02):
You mentioned that Norman Dewitt in his book Epicurus and his philosophy talks about Cicero in this claim. This is what Norman DeWit says. He says elsewhere, Cicero pretends to cite the opinion of Epicurus misrepresenting him shamelessly and using his name as an excuse for parading a tedious collection of his own translations from Greek tragedy. On the topic of pain, what Epicurus is on record is saying, is this even under torture? The wise man is happy and that comes from Dogen. His leadership, which we’ve already read do it continues to say this. He says, Cicero chose to imagine him in the brazen bull of the tyrant Solaris in which the victims were roasted alive. And as saying how pleasant, how little this torture means to me, this is a shabby invention and shameless quibbling, it ignores the difference between suaves pleasant and happy. So this has been on our radar for some time because of DeWitt’s book, but I didn’t expect to find the same discrepancy up here within Cicero’s own work at Tuske Disputation that he says one thing in section two and completely different thing in section five. So that is interesting to notice. But going back to paragraph 26 and section five, we have after his reference to the wise man being burned, tortured and cut to pieces, we have a reference here by Cicero to a particular aspect of Aism among the epicureans, and that was this view that whether something was pleasant or painful to the senses was relative to the shape of the atom itself, that a smooth atom would be more pleasant than a rough or sharp atom. So he mentions that here in the text.
Cassius (22:56):
That is very interesting to me because I continue to question to what extent there is an overlap between Epicurus and the sacs on this point because they are famous for equating pleasure with smooth motion and there is a reference in Lucious as you commented on to smooth or rough atoms. But here the actual phrasing by Cicero is somewhere in between there in saying that nothing is to be regarded by us, but as it is perceived to be smooth or rough by the body. So at least there Cicero is blending the two together and implying that Epicurus also considered smooth motion to be synonymous with pleasure. And also Joshua, we need to pay attention I think to a little further down where Cicero says, nor did he take any trouble to provide himself with those remedies which might’ve enabled him to bear pain such as firmness of mind or shame of doing anything, base exercise, patience, courage and manly heartiness.
(24:00):
So there he’s listening the virtues and saying that Epicurus doesn’t care about these virtues and that instead he supports himself on the single point of pleasure. Here he’s focusing on the single recollection of past pleasure, but I think this is a noteworthy example of him saying that just like Epicurus is saying that Cicero’s view of virtue is empty because it has no meaning. He’s also saying that Cicero’s view of virtue is worthless. It’s also interesting to see how he combines his attack on Epicurus saying that Cicero’s own view of virtue is empty by also saying that Epicure says that Cicero’s views of virtue are worthless. He says that nor does epicure has take any trouble to provide himself with those remedies which might’ve enabled him to bear pain such as firmness of mind, shame, exercise, patience, courage and manly hardiness, and that instead Epicurus supports himself only on pleasures.
(25:04):
So this paragraph is strongly contrasting the different perspectives with Cicero just absolutely rejecting Epicurus understanding of what virtue is and the use that virtue has. It’s the same question over and over. Is virtue an end in itself or is virtue useful because it produces pleasure and the difference between the two positions could not be any more stark. In addition to what we’ve discussed so far, Cicero is also attacking Epicurus by saying that Epicurus hell, that on a cold day you can feel warmer by thinking about warm things or the reverse that on a warm day you can be cooler by thinking about cool things that of course is ridiculous and not what Epicurus is position really is. But we need to discuss that.
Joshua (25:56):
Yeah, that sticks in my mind because of a passage from Shakespeare’s Richard II who writes, who can hold a fire in his hand by thinking on the frosty caucuses or cloy the hungry edge of appetite by bear, imagination of a feast or wallow naked in December’s snow by thinking on fantastic summer’s heat. Oh no, the apprehension of the good gives, but the greater feeling to the worse. In other words, the apprehension of the good does not diminish the experience of what is bad. It actually increases the experience of what is bad. If you’re burning and you’re thinking about ice and snow, it’s going to make you feel worse than if you hadn’t thought those things. That’s the claim being made here in Shakespeare’s play. And Cicero is claiming here that Epicurus came to a different perspective on this, that you could sta one thing against another and alleviate the pain of the moment.
Cassius (26:52):
He says, for I do not apprehend how past pleasures can allay present evils. That’s the Yang translation. That’s exactly the position that Ciro is taking here, and how do you deal with that argument? Certainly there’s an aspect to it that’s true, that the contrast between something you remember is good versus your current problems does put your present problem in sharper relief. But I would ask the question, what else are you going to do? What are you going to appeal to? Why do you undergo any pain at any moment anyway? Is it because of virtue? Is it because of imaginary idea of reward in heaven or that God wants you to be pious? Is that what you’re going to rely on to overcome the pains and troubles of life? Or are you going to work to overcome the pains and troubles of life because of the pleasures of life?
(27:53):
Cicero is placing a very negative outlook on this, but if you drill down into what’s really at stake, Epicurus is exactly correct. You are not going to offset troubles with fantasies about courage and honor and piety. An intelligent person is going to think about reality and say that I know I’m going through pain. Now I know I may have to go through more pain, but the reason I’m going through this pain is because of the pleasures of life. I am not fantasizing about a heaven that does not exist. I am in touch with reality and I like reality. I like the world I live in. I want to continue to live in this world as long as I possibly can. And in contrast to those who say that those who love this life will lose it, I’m willing to say I love this life and I will stay with it because of the pleasures it brings, and I’m not going to all the trouble of staying alive for some fantasy that does not exist.
(28:55):
I’m going to the trouble to stay alive because of the pleasures that can be experienced in life. Jess, let’s begin to wrap up our discussion for today. But the very last part I want to highlight as well, where Cicero says, let then the peripatetics and the old academics follow my example and leave off muttering to themselves and let them openly and with a clear voice be bold to say that a happy life is not inconsistent with the agony of Polaris’s bull. So C was even criticizing his own allies in the old academy and those who follow Aristotle who know that there’s a problem here with the pain that is caused by being under torture. And yet Cicero here in his stoic incarnation is saying that those guys, even Plato, even Socrates, even Aristotle are not bold enough for me. They need to be like a stoic and say boldly that even when I am in agony and polaris’s bull, I am happy. And they should not have any reluctance to say that is what Cicero is saying, because he’s buying into this extreme version that virtue is all that matters.
Joshua (30:12):
Yeah, the stoics are conspicuously absent from this last sentence, but we see in the first sentence of paragraph 27 that the reason for that is because he’s been relying on stoicism to get him this far. He says, but to dismiss the subtleties of the stoics, which I’m sensible, I have employed more than was necessary, let us admit three kinds of goods. And then he launches into that whole other thing.
Cassius (30:35):
Even as he says it, he knows that they are subtleties and that he knows that he’s saying that he’s employed it more than was necessary, and yet that’s exactly what he’s just done in criticizing the old academy and the peripatetics. And so we’ll wait until next week to go further into 27, but that’s the transition here at the end is that Cicero’s beginning to back off some of the extreme language that he’s employed here in 26, and yet in employing that language in 26, I think he’s given us some very, very interesting information about Epicurus that forces us to confront the differences in these perspectives. So Joshua, any thoughts as we begin to close for today?
Joshua (31:20):
Yeah, I didn’t do this last week and I couldn’t figure out where to put it in here this morning, but section 25, which is the one we covered last week, ends with the sentence I read at the beginning of today’s episode where he says, now if it be a happiness to rejoice in such goods of the mind, that is to say in such virtues, and if all wise men enjoy thoroughly these pleasures, it must necessarily be granted that all such are happy. And the use of the language there enjoying thoroughly these pleasures made me somewhat curious. So I did go to the Latin to see what words he’s using there for pleasure and for enjoyment, and those words are God perent or per. And so the word that’s translated as pleasure here is gau or gaudy, and that would more typically be translated as joy.
(32:14):
Cicero, I’m certain would make a distinction between the gau that he cites and the volta of lucious, this kind of in cicero’s mind, this very bodily and sensual pleasure. And then this other word perro seems to be connected with the word fructose and our modern use of the word fruit, but it’s something you enjoy the use of or enjoy the partaking in. So in neither case, is he using the same kind of language that Lucretius uses when he’s talking about pleasure and what the life of pleasure and the life of happiness means for him. So that’s kind of beside the point of what we’ve been talking about, but I did want to cover it because his use of the word pleasure there is kind of striking if you don’t have the context.
Cassius (33:01):
Yeah. Joshua, I thought you did a very good job last week of pointing out that what Cicero was endorsing was the pleasures of the mind or mathematics or science, such as when he’s praising our committees as opposed to the pleasures of the body who he’s disparaging by equating them with the pleasures of the tyrant. Okay, well, we’ll bring today’s episode to a conclusion at that point and come back next week. We’re continuing as we close out, tus and disputations here, I think to make some very important points that while Cicero is characterizing all of this in terms of whether virtue is sufficient for the happy life by bringing all this to a head, we’re seeing how differently Cicero and his friends evaluate virtue than does Epicurus, and we’re bringing out how important it’s to understand therefore what virtue really is and how to pursue it, and the reasons for which we pursue it. We’ll come back and discuss more of that next week. In the meantime, we invite everyone to drop by the Epicurean French Forum and let us know if you have any questions or comments about our discussions on Epicurean philosophy. Thanks for your time today. We’ll be back again soon. See you then. Bye.