Episode 031 - Continuation of Episode 30 And Discussion of the Polyaenus Example
Date: 08/10/20
Link: https://www.epicureanfriends.com/thread/1644-episode-thirty-one-continuation-of-episode-thirty-polyaenus/
Summary
Section titled “Summary”Episode 031 is a two-person episode with Cassius and Martin only — Elaine and Charles are absent. Rather than reading new text, they extend the previous week’s discussion by reviewing forum responses from EpicureanFriends.com members Don and Godfrey, who weighed in on the debate over whether a person needs an explicit Epicurean philosophy to live happily. Don argues that the “fictitious scientist” scenario misses the point: the goal is not moment-to-moment pleasure but a sustained, pleasurable life capable of navigating hardship, tragedy, anxiety, and failure. He cites Principal Doctrine 10 — if the pleasures of the profligate actually dispelled their fears, there would be no quarrel with them — and quotes from the Letter to Menoeceus on the distinction between Epicurean pleasure and mere sensory indulgence. Godfrey sides with Martin and Elaine: Epicurus did not invent the canon but observed and articulated a natural process; as long as nothing interferes with that process, no explicit philosophy is required — but when wrong thinking, fear, and religion interfere, correct philosophy is the medicine needed to return.
Cassius connects this to Ayn Rand’s essay “Philosophy: Who Needs It?” — which he reads and largely rejects, but finds persuasive specifically on the point that everyone has an implicit philosophy, whether acknowledged or not. Those who do not examine their thinking absorb their framework from parents, churches, media, and social osmosis. Martin agrees emphatically, noting that making his own implicit philosophy explicit has given him far greater confidence and has largely resolved the residual tendency toward skeptical doubt he had before. He illustrates with an anecdote: a humanities scholar who analyzed an essay by a scientist critical of the humanities revealed, in detail, the implicit philosophical commitments the scientist was using without knowing it. Martin also describes how becoming explicit about Epicureanism corrected a misconception he had held about minimalism. Elaine is cited by both Cassius and Martin as the rare example of someone so naturally aligned with Epicurean rationality that the philosophy was effectively in operation before she ever encountered it explicitly — though both acknowledge her circumstances are unusual.
The episode closes with deeper discussion of the Polyaenus example. Cassius reads the key passage from Cicero’s De Finibus: “It is also unworthy of a natural philosopher to deny the infinite divisibility of matter — an error that Epicurus would have avoided if he had been willing to let his friend Polyaenus teach him geometry, instead of making Polyaenus himself unlearn it.” Martin argues this is polemical: Cicero is partisan, devoted to infinite divisibility, and the phrase “unlearn geometry” is an emotionally charged description of what was probably a simple change of position on one technical question. Polyaenus most likely moved from an obsession with geometry to a more balanced engagement with it after joining Epicurus — he did not abandon science but lost his exclusive fixation. Martin also notes that Plato and Cicero both treated geometry as revealing absolute truth about the world, a view modern mathematics has refuted: mathematics is a useful modeling tool, not a mirror of ultimate reality. Cicero’s polemic against Epicurus on this point reflects his own Platonic commitments rather than a fair representation of what Polyaenus actually did.
Transcript
Section titled “Transcript”Cassius: Welcome to Episode 31 of the Lucretius Today Podcast. Unfortunately we don’t have Elaine or Charles with us today — it’s going to be Martin and me. And so rather than read a new section, we thought the thing to do would be to extend the discussion from last week, because there have been additional comments added at the EpicureanFriends.com forum about what was said last week, and that would provide a basis for us to continue the discussion.
So let me first point out that post number three in the thread, by Don on Friday, responded directly to what we said last week about the Polyaenus example and the life of someone such as a scientist who is enjoying his life from the pursuit of science and doesn’t necessarily — in the viewpoint of some — need a wider philosophy if he is in fact experiencing pleasure through the pursuit of science. Even that description of the issue is open to challenge. But with that as the description of what was said last week, here is what Don said in response.
He said: “This was a lively one” — referring to the episode. And then: “I feel compelled to weigh in on the life of your fictitious scientist. I don’t think one can just say that the pursuit of science bringing the scientist pleasure is the end of it. I seem to hear you saying that pleasure is the goal, the scientist experiences pleasure, and that’s it. That’s not the only aspect of the scientist’s life we need to worry about. I agree that if the pursuit of science brings them pleasure, that’s fine. But it cannot be the whole story and negate the need for the possession of a philosophy of life. I would ask: what is the totality of their life? How are they living it? Are they just? Are they making decisions to bring sustained pleasure to their whole life? The moment-by-moment experience of pleasure while researching or contemplating their scientific pursuit is not the goal. It is living a sustained, pleasurable life. That’s why Epicurus stressed that sometimes we should experience pain for the sake of later pleasure, and why we should abstain from some pleasures for more pleasure later. It’s not necessarily 24/7, 365, immersion in pleasurable feelings all the time, for your average human, Epicurean or not. The importance of a framework or philosophy of life is how you deal with life when it isn’t providing pleasure. How do you return to that? How do you react when someone close to you dies? How do you experience hardship, disease, disappointment, and so on? If experiencing individual pleasures is the only goal, and we come to this naturally — as I understand some of you were saying in this episode — of what use is Epicurus and his philosophy? If experiencing pleasure is the only important aspect of Epicureanism, and we naturally do this anyway, of what use is the philosophy at all? I keep coming back to Principal Doctrine 10: ‘If the pleasures of the profligate dispel their fears and anxieties, we’d have no quarrel with them. But their pleasures don’t dispel their fears.’ But they’re experiencing pleasure, so it’s all okay then? I have to say no to that. I don’t think that’s the goal Epicurus taught. They’re not living a life that can be sustained in pleasure. Now if they were demonstrating they understood how to make prudent decisions to sustain their pleasure — that death is nothing to them, and why — and not simply running after every pleasure all the time, then yeah, go forth and seize the day. I don’t think that’s what the ‘lost’ are doing.” And then likewise in the Letter to Menoeceus, Don quotes the part that says: “So when we say pleasure is the goal, we don’t mean the pleasure of decadent people or the enjoyment of sleep, as is believed by those who are ignorant and don’t understand us, or who are ill-disposed to us, but to be free from bodily pain and mental disturbance.” And then he underlines: “For a pleasant life is produced not by drinking at endless parties and enjoying boys and women and consuming fish and other delicacies of an extravagant table, but by sober reasoning, searching out the cause of everything we accept or reject, and driving out the opinions that cause the greatest trouble in the soul.” So Don concludes: “The scientist’s pleasure or joy in their work is fine as far as it goes — one should not tell them to stop. But pleasure or joy in that one thing is not the entirety of life.”
Okay, Martin. I think that’s a pretty good summary of the issue that we were talking about last week. And then the conversation continued after that with some points by Godfrey, another participant on the forum. Godfrey said this — and he’s referring to you, Martin, when he says this. He said: “Just finished listening — great discussion.” And then: “To me, Martin said it most accurately and concisely: ‘It’s natural.’ Epicurus did not invent the canon. He observed and articulated it. It’s a natural process involving pleasure. As long as nothing is interfering with this process, then no philosophy is necessary. But when wrong thinking, fears, religion, and such interfere with the process, then correct philosophy is the medicine to get back on track. So at least for now I’m with Elaine and Martin.” — I guess that means he’s not with Cassius. “Don’s points are well taken, however, and bring the discussion to the fullness of pleasure. If the scientist has arranged his life to maximize pleasure, then there’s no reason to change. But if his marriage is a shambles, he’s living on the streets, he’s an alcoholic, et cetera, then he probably could use a philosophical intervention. In the latter case, his cup of pleasure is full of muddy water.”
Martin, do you remember at this point what he’s referring to when he referred to you as saying that it’s natural?
Martin: Yes, that is the point. I don’t remember in what context I said it.
Cassius: Yeah. I guess I’m reading the rest of that paragraph — and so he carries on referring to the fact that Epicurus didn’t invent anything new, he was just observing what was there. And the next sentence says “it’s a natural process involving pleasure.” I think I’m interpreting this now as I read it. And of course the next sentence says “as long as nothing is interfering with this process, then no philosophy is necessary.” I guess maybe that is the heart of the issue: the perspective of whether there is a natural state that should be our first concern, and that that first concern is simply pursuing pleasure — and the perspective that as long as we’re successful in pursuing pleasure, then no philosophy beyond that is necessary. Do you think that’s what he’s saying? And if he is, what do you think you mean by that?
Martin: Well, the thing is — and I understand Godfrey’s phrase the way you describe it now — I do not fully agree with him. The thing is, if we do not have a philosophy or explicitly think we don’t have a philosophy, we implicitly have a philosophy. I see this, for example, with my wife. She says she’s absolutely not interested in philosophy. But people nevertheless have an actual philosophy. It may often be very inconsistent and contradictory, but people who know philosophy can figure that out. I’ve seen this in an article by — I’m not sure whether it’s a philosopher or another person in the humanities — who analyzed an essay from a scientist that was critical of the humanities subjects. And then this humanities scholar really analyzed what philosophy the scientist was using in the background without being conscious of it. And that is the advantage of doing philosophy explicitly: that we get conscious about this, that we see where the weak points are, and can refine it, and also correct misclassifications. One example in my case: because I wasn’t clear about this, I didn’t know how to answer when a close friend asked me whether I’m an idealist or a materialist. And I remember I had the misconception that Epicurus promoted minimalism, and that I was pursuing minimalism. But explicitly discussing this issue turned out: no, Epicurus does not push for minimalism, and I also do not apply minimalism. I just use elements of minimalism, but that doesn’t make me a minimalist.
Cassius: I am going to be agreeing with everything you just said in several different ways. But before I go into that, what do you think — if Elaine were here, remembering what she said last week — do you think she would take the same position you just took? Or if you try to put yourself in Elaine’s shoes, is that her perspective as well?
Martin: I guess so. When she stumbled across Epicurus, she saw that it was the philosophy she had been following all along. So she found out that her implicit philosophy has a fairly exact correspondence in an existing explicit philosophy. And then of course it’s just natural that you want to learn more and figure out the details.
Cassius: Okay. Before we go any further, I want to say this and put all sorts of caveats around it. I’ve in my life attempted to read many different viewpoints, many of which I currently reject, including the one I’m about to cite. But on the topic you raised, Martin — about everybody having an implicit philosophy whether they acknowledge it or not — there was an essay by Ayn Rand called “Philosophy: Who Needs It?” that expanded on the point you just made in a way I’ve never forgotten. Although I reject so much of the rest of what I read in Ayn Rand, her point about that is, I think, exactly what you just said: everybody has a programmed-in orientation towards life and method of thinking, whether they’re conscious of it or not. And if they’re not conscious of it, what that means simply is that they’ve picked it up subconsciously — by osmosis, if you want to use a term like that. They’ve picked it up from other people: from their parents, from their friends, from their churches, from the media, from whatever source. And they’ve not examined it. They’re basically driving along like a herd, because they haven’t consciously examined, in many cases, how they think themselves. The orientation of wanting to examine your own thoughts and make sure that you’re thinking in a way that you consciously agree with — I think that seems to be very good, and maybe that’s really the point of what we are talking about here. If somebody wanted to take the extreme other position, they might say: “Well, if those people without a specific philosophy are happy, then no one should have a problem with it, and therefore philosophy is not necessary.” What do you think about that?
Martin: This does not follow from prudence. It’s a principle of prudence that we want to make good decisions toward pleasure, and this is not assured if we just go along with the herd — what’s now called being a sheep. And another thing: once the implicit philosophy has become explicit, I pursued it with a lot more confidence. Before, there was a lot more doubt: could be like this, could be like that. So there was an implicit tendency toward skepticism. And that is now gone. I’m a lot more confident that, even though this philosophy is not an absolute philosophy — we can’t be sure it’s absolutely right in some ultimate sense — for a practical approach to life, it’s just the best one to choose.
Cassius: Again, I totally agree. You’re saying that you’re much more confident — and I think we could probably also say that you’re being much more successful in the application of it, because you’ve consciously begun to acknowledge some of the subtleties and seen potential errors in understanding or application that you could then course-correct, and become more successful in the way you pursue it. So again, this would be another aspect of Epicurean philosophy — I don’t think any Epicurean would argue that philosophy for its own sake is the goal. It’s just a practical matter. It’s not a theoretical issue. Philosophy doesn’t have special status for its own sake. What we’re talking about is the practical way of life that successfully brings pleasure. Because if you’re not using prudence — if you’re not using some degree of reflection and, again, course correction — then it’s just extremely unlikely that you’re going to be successful in achieving pleasure over a longer term.
And now I’ll say something I always catch myself on: I don’t think “long-term pleasure” is quite a correct definition of the goal either. The extent of time that the pleasure lasts is a factor, but I think Epicurus explicitly says in his Letter to Menoeceus that it’s not the primary factor and not the only factor. So even if your goal is simply to get to the top of Mount Everest and stay there for five minutes — because you think that experience of pleasure would be worth it to you — you still have to be prudent in the way you pursue it, or you’re not going to make it. You’ll freeze on the way up.
And regarding philosophy, the same thing applies to the scientist we discussed. If science is from a professional perspective what the person wants to do as the main purpose of their life, the same logic applies. Epicurus himself is an example: for him, doing the philosophy was the way to get maximum pleasure.
Martin: And I think he specifically went even further and talked about how his study and exploration into natural phenomena and physics was really what gave him pleasure as well. So it wasn’t just that he enjoyed the logic of the debate — he really enjoyed the study of natural phenomena. And I think that’s what he recommended among the things he recommended to people to best understand life: to study nature, basically — which is a scientific approach. But for this we need to put into perspective that in ancient times there was no real distinction between subjects. Someone doing one thing was expected to do everything — to be essentially universal. There may have been exceptions, but anyone doing something in that direction was expected to be somewhat of a generalist. The last person said to have been at that level was perhaps Goethe, and after that things became so specialized that essentially one human no longer has the capacity to be up to date on everything. The number of specialists has dramatically increased. Three hundred years ago it was still possible to know every scholar of note, and it’s not today.
Cassius: I think it would be interesting to continue with Godfrey’s comment about “it’s natural” — I asked in response to that about how frequently that was going to be successful, in a general way consistent with what we’ve just been discussing. And then Don responded further to Godfrey. I think that’s probably worth reading here as well. In response to what Godfrey said about the natural perspective, Don said: “I think he raised good points, Godfrey, but I would posit that one’s life doesn’t have to be in shambles to need a philosophy of life to come back to. I’ll freely admit that most people’s default is simply to deal with life’s situations at random as they arise. But how do we make sense of life’s ups and downs? How do we deal with tragedy? How do we orient ourselves to have sustained pleasure? Do we experience pain and frustration and see no bigger reason for it? I do think that as infants, animals including humans seek to have their basic desires fulfilled — to achieve pleasure — look at the face of a sleeping infant with a full belly. But rapidly, humans are acculturated: we learn to rationalize, to sublimate, to hide behind facades. ‘Smiles, everyone, smiles,’ as Mr. Roarke used to say on Fantasy Island. I think the answer to Cassius’s question on how often there’s no interference is: rarely — if I understand his question.”
And I responded back to that: yes, he did understand the question, and that’s my perspective too — that it’s rare you’re going to be successfully pursuing pleasure without interference from the outside, or from bad ideas, or from bad views of religion.
Martin: I think the only person I would trust to still do that is Elaine. I know I don’t know of any other person who is really so ingrained in living that way. Before, I was a lot more doubtful and unclear about a lot of things, and that gives uncertainty in decision-making. I think Elaine is maybe the only person who is so ingrained that she would be the one rare case.
Cassius: I don’t know if my laughing came through over the recording or not, but I totally agree. Elaine is an example of someone who has pursued rationality and science her whole life — she’s a successful physician, and she understands, I think, so much of what Epicurus was saying just instinctively and naturally, without having had to be prepared for it. She certainly embodies it correctly. And so for somebody like that, it can become so ingrained that — given your position in life and your circumstances — you may successfully just practice your job, practice your interests and hobbies, and the things that bring you joy. For whatever reason in your circumstances, you don’t encounter as much controversy or obstacle as other people do.
I’m sure if Elaine were here she would say that she’s had all sorts of obstacles and continues to have them just like everybody else. But I agree, Martin, that Elaine’s perspective — like everybody’s perspective; that should go without saying in everything we’re talking about — none of us are disembodied brains. We all have individual personalities, contexts, likes and dislikes, abilities and disabilities, problems that factor into the picture and explain how successful we’re going to be in the pursuit of pleasure, and how much time we have to devote to fighting outside negative influences versus how much time we can simply devote to experiencing pleasure in our normal activities.
We could probably go on with that for a long time. So many people have such difficult obstacles that they constantly confront — whether it’s physical, mental, financial, political, and all sorts of different kinds — so many different obstacles to doing the things they’d like to do and experiencing the pleasure they would like to experience. And some people, through no fault of their own, have to devote tremendous amounts of time to trying to overcome those obstacles. And to me it’s obvious that the best way to overcome obstacles is using prudence and a philosophy and attacking things rationally so as to achieve pleasure, which is the goal. The goal is not to be rational for the sake of being rational; the goal is to use rationality in order to overcome your obstacles and achieve pleasure. So it’s just going to vary widely how much time somebody has to devote to philosophy, and I think that probably explains the difference in perspective that we heard last week.
And then I see another post from Don on the same subject. He went back to Godfrey and asked: “When you say ‘the default and the general rule is the natural state,’ Don said in response — ‘Is the natural state the experience of pleasure, the seeking of pleasure, or something else? I’m not being critical, I just want to make sure I understand what you’re referring to. Same with Martin, when he says it’s natural — is it the experience or the pursuit of pleasure that is the natural state to which we need to return?’”
Martin, do you know what he’s saying there?
Martin: Yes, that is the thing. I think after this discussion I need to go back and listen to what I said in context, so I know exactly what I meant. And then I will later write a written note on it.
Cassius: I see Godfrey responded to that comment from Don by saying: “The natural state that I’m referring to is the smooth and integrated functioning of the sensations, prolepsis, and feelings — so it would be the experience of pleasure functioning in a way as to be a proper guide for the pursuit of pleasure.” And then Don said: “Got it, that helps. Well stated, Godfrey.”
I wish they were here to help clarify exactly what we’re talking about there. I think I’m beginning to gather where we’re going. But there clearly is a perspective issue that has to be clarified.
Martin, did you have any more thoughts about the Polyaenus example? I’m still thinking that the historical record — which Don has been very helpful in clarifying in this thread — is probably very closely on point to what we’re talking about. There doesn’t appear to be much in the ancient texts about the Polyaenus story with the exception of what Don cited. Polyaenus is not mentioned a lot in the ancient sources. The dictionary entry above doesn’t include Philodemus, but Diogenes Laertius does mention him by name. One of the few specific ancient references is in Cicero’s De Finibus, which has this passage: “It is also unworthy of a natural philosopher to deny the infinite divisibility of matter — an error that assuredly Epicurus would have avoided if he had been willing to let his friend Polyaenus teach him geometry, instead of making Polyaenus himself unlearn it.” So with references like that, the traditional commentary has come down to us that Polyaenus somehow was a great mathematician or geometrician to start with, and then when he became an Epicurean he just threw it aside and did not pay attention to it anymore. That’s the traditional story. And then there’s a passage in Frances Wright’s A Few Days in Athens where she takes a different perspective on that and says that’s most likely a totally incorrect reading. But that’s the point where I’d ask you, Martin — do you have any additional thoughts on what the Polyaenus story should represent for us?
Martin: Yeah. The one thing: to me, my best guess is that Cicero is being polemical here in this reference — so he’s exaggerating it. The thing is, it could be that before joining Epicurus, Polyaenus was obsessed with geometry, and then if you reach a certain level in something and gain some fame or recognition — and then you discover that there are other things in life to pursue as well, which apparently happened when he joined Epicurus — it looks like he is no more the obsessive geometrician. But I think he was still a geometrician. He just would no longer dedicate all his time to it. So he lost his obsession with it, but he still kept his passion for it. I guess he just put it into a more balanced life, as was discussed in this thread as well.
And one more thing — maybe a minor thing to mention, but I’ve seen this elsewhere as well: people think that the scientist would completely enjoy every step he’s doing in his research as pleasure, and this is not the case. Because any real existing scientist, in almost all cases, does just minute incremental steps, and this can be extremely frustrating at times. Of course the overall pleasure of doing science is there, but in the end it could be that the total experience of pleasure in life is such that I do not really want to be a professional scientist, because then I’m doing too many unpleasant things — too much pain, so to say — in really doing this at a professional level.
Cassius: I think what you just said is essentially the understanding that Frances Wright takes in A Few Days in Athens — that he did not just all of a sudden stop pursuing geometry or mathematics, but he saw that there are also other important things in life other than simply mathematics and geometry.
Martin: Perhaps to add: that Cicero himself was essentially a Neoplatonist, and that means to him it appears just logical that matter is infinitely divisible — he takes this as an absolute truth, which by now is pretty much refuted by science. And that means he does not really see the point in questioning it. Once you make this point — that geometry reveals absolute truth about the actual world — you see almost geometry as being a mirror of absolute reality. But that thinking was not there at the time in the form it is now. Everybody in some sense was thinking: whatever we look at, this is the absolute truth. We’ve gone away from that. We now understand that whatever we say about this world, we’re essentially creating a model of it. And there is then the difference between the model and what is in some sense really out there behind what we model. That is something that nowadays is much more clear, which was not so at that time. Plato was really thinking that geometry tells absolute truth about the world. Today’s mathematicians think differently. Some of them may actually be Platonists in the sense that they think there is some ideal form that mathematics exemplifies, but they no longer claim that just based on mathematics you then have absolute truth about the world. Mathematics in practical aspects is a useful tool, but there is no fundamental reason why it has to be the case that the universe can be fairly accurately described mathematically.
Cassius: Once again I agree with what you said. And during what you said I know you made the point that maybe it was the worst problem in the ancient world, but possibly it is still a position taken by some mathematicians — that they allow themselves to get so caught up in the model that they begin to see almost mystical implications to it, whether they admit it or not. I do think that’s the message that gets conveyed a lot of times.
And it’s fascinating, and you used the word I want to emphasize: you thought Cicero was being polemical — argumentative, partisan — in the way he’s presenting this. And I think that’s exactly what he’s doing. This is a great example of it, and something we always have to be on the lookout for that he’s doing. Obviously Cicero is devoted to the position that matter is infinitely divisible, and that is Cicero’s side. He’s arguing it. So maybe Epicurus did convince Polyaenus that infinite divisibility was wrong, and maybe Polyaenus did switch sides on the issue — but for Cicero to describe Polyaenus as “unlearning geometry” is a polemical, emotional, argumentative way of presenting it, instead of just saying simply that Polyaenus used to hold one position and after talking to Epicurus he adopted Epicurus’s position.
I guess there’s not enough historical record to really know what Polyaenus himself said about infinite divisibility or much else in particular, but that appears to be what’s going on. The idea that Epicurus would suggest that somebody who is a scientist should dramatically depart from that orientation is just ridiculous, because all of Epicurean philosophy in essence is a scientific approach to life — of identifying what the goal should be and then pursuing it in an intelligent way.
This has been a great discussion today, Martin. Thank you for being with me today. Next week we’ll hopefully be back at full strength with both Elaine and Charles. In the meantime, thanks for listening.