Episode 022 - Lucretius Book Two - Epicurean Philosophy As The Only Way To Defeat Fear of Death And Other Errors As To The Goal of Life
Date: 06/12/20
Link: https://www.epicureanfriends.com/thread/1594-episode-twenty-two-book-two-epicurean-philosophy-as-the-only-way-to-defeat-fear/
Summary
Section titled “Summary”Episode 022 opens Book Two with its celebrated prologue, which Martin reads in Daniel Brown’s translation. The three opening images — watching a storm at sea from shore, watching a battle from safety, and looking down from “the serene, lofty heights of true philosophy” at mankind wandering in error — generate a discussion about the most common misreading of the passage. Lucretius explicitly denies that the pleasure lies in others’ suffering (“not that the pleasure is so sweet that others suffer”), and the group clarifies that the image is instead about the positive pleasure of being free from avoidable dangers and mistaken goals. The daily spectacle of people laboring nights and days for wealth, fame, and power — rather than battlefield carnage — is where most listeners will recognize themselves.
The passage on reclining friends on soft grass by a river generates extended discussion about what Lucretius is and is not claiming. The group agrees he is not endorsing primitivism or minimalism: the reclining friends have food, shelter, and a river, and Epicurus’s famous deathbed contentment cannot substitute for decades of actual material want. “Riches are not necessary for pleasure” is not the same as “riches are never pleasurable” — Cassius argues they can bring some pleasure without being a guarantee of it, and that treating them as sufficient for happiness is the real error. Elaine invokes Principal Doctrine 9 (“if every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted and influenced the whole organism, pleasures would never differ from one another”) to explain why pleasures are not interchangeable: missing your friend cannot be fixed by chocolate, or money, or luxury, because each specific desire has its own specific satisfaction.
The episode’s sharpest debate concerns the key translation of the passage on fear of death and religion. Daniel Brown renders it “all this stuff is want of sense and all our life is groping in the dark.” Bailey and Munro both use “reason alone” has the power to defeat these fears, which Cassius argues is anachronistically Aristotelian and inconsistent with Epicurean canonics, where reason alone is not a criterion of truth. Martin Ferguson Smith instead uses “philosophy alone,” which Elaine reads aloud. Stallings, to the panel’s surprise, also uses “reason alone.” The Latin rationis does support “reason,” but Cassius argues the translators have read the word through an Aristotelian lens, and that “reason” here must mean the Epicurean approach — proper philosophy tied to the senses as the ultimate validation — not abstract dialectical logic. The recurring children-in-the-dark passage underscores the point: the answer is “the light of nature and the rules of reason” understood as integrated Epicurean philosophy, not syllogistic proof.
Transcript
Section titled “Transcript”Cassius: Welcome to Episode 22 of Lucretius Today. I’m your host, Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we’ll walk you through the six books of Lucretius’ poem and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers and everyone here is a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book Epicurus and His Philosophy by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt. Before we start, here are our three ground rules. First, our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it, which may or may not be the same as what you hear about Epicurus at other places today. Second, we aren’t talking about Lucretius with the goal of promoting any modern political perspective — Epicurus must be understood on his own, and not in terms of competitive schools which may seem similar to Epicurus but are fundamentally different and incompatible, such as Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, or Marxism. Third, the essential base of Epicurean philosophy is a fundamental view of the nature of the universe. When you read the words of Lucretius, you’ll find that Epicurus did not teach the pursuit of virtue, or luxury, or simple living, as ends in themselves, but rather he taught the pursuit of pleasure. From this perspective, it is feeling which is the guide of life and not supernatural gods, idealism, or virtue ethics. And as important as anything else, Epicurus taught that there’s no life after death and that any happiness we’ll ever have must come in this life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion. Now for today in this Episode 22, we begin Book Two with a discussion of how a proper philosophy — that of Epicurus — is the only answer to the fear of death and to the other mistakes that plague human existence. Now let’s join today’s discussion with Martin reading the opening of Book Two.
Martin: “Pleasure is when a tempest drives the waves in the wide sea to view the sad distress of others from the land — not that the pleasure is so sweet that others suffer, but the joy is this: to look upon the ills from which yourself are free. It likewise gives delight to view the bloody conflicts of a war in battle ranged all over the plains without a share of danger to yourself. But nothing is more sweet than to attain the serene, so lofty heights of true philosophy, well fortified by learning of the wise, and then look down on others, and behold mankind wandering and roving every way to find a path to happiness, their strife for wit, contest for nobility, labor nights and days with anxious care for heaps of wealth, and to be ministers of state. O wretched are the minds of men, how blind their hearts, in what dark roads they grope their way, in what distress is this life spent, short as it is! Don’t you see nature requires no more than the body free from pain? We may enjoy the mind easy and cheerful, removed from care and fear. And then we find a little will suffice the nature of our bodies and take off every pain — nay, will afford much pleasure — and nature wishes for nothing more desirable than this. What, no golden images of boys holding false blazing torches in their hands to light the midnight revels of the great adorn thy house? What, their rooms shine not with silver, nor are overlaid with gold, nor do their arch-gilded roofs rebound with the strong notes of music? Yet refined men sweetly indulge their bodies as they lie together on the soft and tender grass hard by a river’s side, under the boughs of some high tree, without a heap of wealth. Chiefly when the spring smiles and the season of the year sprinkles the verdant herbs with flowery pride. Nor will a burning fever sooner leave the body when you are tossed in clothes embroidered on beds of blushing purple, than when you lie in coarse blankets. Since riches then afford no comfort to our bodies, nor nobleness, nor the glory of ambition, display in you are to think they do the mind no good. If when you behold your furious legions embattled over the plains waging mock war, or when you view your navy stand eager to engage, or bear away over the white sea, if struck with sights like these your fearful superstitions and the dread of death forsake your mind and leave your breasts serene and free from care — to wear something. And if these things are vain and all grimace, and the truth is that the fears of men nor failing cares fly from the sound of alarms or cruel darts, but boldly move among the kings and mighty of the earth, nor do they homage pay to shining gold, nor the gay splendor of a purple robe — do you doubt but all this stuff is want of sense, and all our life is groping in the dark? For as boys tremble and fear everything in the dark night, so we, in open day, fear things as vain and little to be feared as those that children quake at in the dark and fancy making towards them. This terror of the mind, this darkness then, not the sun’s beams, nor the bright rays of day can scatter, but the light of nature and the roots of reason.”
Cassius: Thank you, Martin. It’s a very interesting section — very frequently discussed, and a lot in here. We can start at the very top, and I know that frequently people talk about, “Well, this is terrible — Epicurus is taking pleasure in the pain of other people. He is saying that it’s sweet to watch other people going through all sorts of distress, and how terrible that is.” Yet that’s not what I think he’s saying at all.
Martin: I mean, this is more an image of — of course there is a real pleasure of not being in danger — but it’s basically more simply what the situation is. If you understood the philosophy rightly, then you look at those around you who don’t understand it and who do these senseless things. So it’s more like he’s using it as a symbol.
Cassius: Well, so yeah. And how I look at this is — it could also be literally true, Martin, but you have to, just like we always say, take it in the context of the whole. If you pick just this section out, it actually I don’t think would be real helpful to your pleasure in my opinion. But if you remember all of the stuff about friendship and caring about the people that you love, then it’s clear he’s not talking about you watching people you love be in a horrible battle and done violence to. I get the read that this would be wars over things that you don’t feel are necessary to your happiness.
Elaine: You couldn’t have any friends in that war — that’s what I’ve got to say. These days, if you have friends that are being affected by things, it’s probably not going to be natural to you to feel aloof from it or to feel pleasure, because empathy would prevent that.
Martin: Yes. But again, coming back to what it symbolizes — because seeing these extreme situations like war and such things, that’s rather rare. But we see every day people following nonsensical goals by their actions.
Charles: Yeah. I was going to say, I think Lucretius was talking more about some sort of a daily toil rather than an actual war. Because he talks about mankind wandering and roving every day, striving for wit, contending for nobility, especially laboring nights and days with anxious cares. Yeah. At least that’s how I see it.
Cassius: Even for that, if there are people that you have empathy for, it’s possible that your pain would outweigh your pleasure, and that therefore you would try to spread the philosophy. But it probably depends on the individual and the specifics of the situation, what you feel.
Elaine: I don’t think we should see this as prescriptive. He’s being descriptive. He’s not saying don’t care about people. If you care about it, you care about it — that’s your feeling. So I don’t think we are telling people to try to alter their natural responses. And I think if you take this section out of context, it appears extremely smug.
Cassius: Yeah. And that’s why the context is super important. Where I get this feeling, just descriptively, is watching people who are just completely resistant to useful information — the Stoics and the Platonists who are just dead set, “No, we’re not going to listen to feelings, we’re going to stick with our abstract stuff.” People who have current opinions that are shooting themselves in the foot. You can’t talk them into it. You’re watching them wander around. At a certain point, for me, I think: well, okay, do what you’re going to do. Sad. Glad I’m not you.
Martin: Yeah. The other thing is that these daily things we observe people do — just by themselves, they’re not really that painful. They’re not really a problem if it were for the right goal. Then it would be just —
Cassius: If it’s for the goal of pleasure —
Martin: Yes, exactly. Then it would be fine. There would be no need to pity them that they put in some pain now, because they will reap the bigger pleasure later. But it’s just that they aim for something vain — which is not really toward pleasure. So that is, for them, the bad thing.
Cassius: And that is exactly what the next little section is about. Before we go on to the next section, let me add something and maybe ask a question. First I wanted to just emphasize that even in this text it says specifically “not that the pleasure is so sweet that others suffer.” So he’s emphasizing that the purpose of making this observation is not to take pleasure in the unhappiness or bad things that happen to other people. Now — this is what I wanted to raise before we move further. Is there an element here where he is introducing, using imagery, the issue of absence of pain? Now we go into a lot of discussion about the meaning of absence of pain, but clearly Epicurus is saying that there is pleasure involved in either ridding ourselves of an existing pain or avoiding some pain that we would otherwise come into contact with. To what extent is this an introduction to the very deep Epicurean doctrine about how pleasure is not just something that you experience actively and intensely at a particular moment, but also an underlying feeling that exists just by being alive? The question is: to what extent is this an allusion to the Epicurean doctrine that there are more types of pleasure than just immediate sensory stimulation — that in fact ridding ourselves of pain, or existing with the knowledge that we are avoiding certain types of pain, is itself pleasurable?
Elaine: Oh yeah, yeah, yes, I agree with that. And I mean there are many types of pain and many types of pleasure. For pain, there’s obviously physical pain, but there are different kinds of mental pain — there’s pain of regret, there’s pain of having had an opportunity to help a friend and not taking it. There’s that pain that we want to avoid, and then there’s physical pain that we’d like to avoid. And the reason that these vain pleasures — “vain” meaning futile — is that you can never get enough of something like nobility. It’s an abstract concept and you’re never going to have enough. So it’s impossible to really protect yourself from pain that way. It’s a little smarter and safer for your pain-pleasure situation to skip all that kind of power struggle stuff — not because it’s bad, but because it just doesn’t lead anywhere pleasurable.
Cassius: Yeah. Most of the things that we’re going to discuss today in this section do relate to the issue of why it’s not necessary to surround yourself with riches or luxury or other immediately highly stimulating bodily pleasures. As we go through these other examples we’ll develop that in detail, but maybe to some extent this opening is also intended to relate to that topic — that thinking about your life and realizing that you are avoiding pitfalls that others fall into is itself an example of something pleasurable that you do in your mind, that doesn’t require a lot of glory or riches or luxury.
Cassius: Yeah, and then this section here: “Yet refined men sweetly indulge their bodies as they lie together on the soft and tender grass.” Okay — so a couple of things in there. This is a contrast to the conflict between humans — it’s friendship, company, relaxing together by the river, not being alone. We have each other, and that’s the best source of wealth that you can have, because you can protect each other. But then I also want to say — not every situation of poverty involves soft and tender grass by the river under the boughs of a tree. Don’t take it too far — we’re not saying, “Oh, it’s fine, you shouldn’t feel you’re needing anything,” if you’re in a country that’s war-torn and you’re out in a hundred-degree heat with no shelter and your river’s dried up. That’s a problem, right? That would be a mistake. So we know that there are a certain amount of material resources that if you don’t have, it’s going to be very hard to say that you can get pleasure. Would anybody disagree with that?
Elaine: I completely agree with that.
Cassius: I’m listening to see if Martin or Charles has any objection.
Martin: Yeah, I’m thinking about it, but there’s not really — I mean, clearly these passages can be read, if you take them out of context, as this guy preaching minimalism. He is saying you should return to nature, you should get rid of all your technology, you should go to the side of the stream and live with a loin cloth. You can read these sentences to lead in that direction. But that would be to ignore the rest of the philosophy. Because as Elaine said, you cannot sustain yourself in reality in that kind of scenario — you give up your tools, your hunting weapons, your crops, and the work you need to sustain yourself, and you’ll be starving in short order.
Elaine: Yeah, immediately — real quickly, like, you’re not going to make it through extreme heat conditions or extreme cold conditions. And of course we have to remember Epicurus on his deathbed — you have these wonderful pleasurable memories to get you through situations of extreme pain. But if we’re talking about decades, that’s not going to cut it.
Cassius: We’re not telling people you don’t need anything to live on. Because that’s kind of what mindfulness is trying to tell people — it’s like, it’s all in your mind. It’s a very —
Elaine: Ascetic.
Cassius: Ascetic. Yes, yes, yes. And it is — I mean, we have physical bodies and our bodies have needs. I wouldn’t take this passage as meaning to deny that. Because these people he’s talking about, on the soft and tender grass by the river under the tree, they are not lying out on asphalt in the sun with nowhere to go and no food. He didn’t give that situation. So don’t go there. Where he’s saying it’s not necessary to have luxury in order to experience pleasure, that is not a statement that it is not necessary to have food, water, air, and the basics of life in order to enjoy pleasure.
Elaine: And nor is this a statement that luxury is not ever a pleasure, right?
Cassius: Yeah, that’s — I initially saw that as an endorsement, but no, it’s saying that it’s not necessary for pleasure, but it’s not a complete hindrance. Or — not a hindrance at all. In these passages, is he saying that those are hindrances? I don’t think he’s saying that they hinder you. He’s just saying they’re not necessary. In excess they can be a counter to pleasure, but other than that they’re not. It’s the process — like in the first paragraph, laboring for nights and days.
Elaine: What this makes me think of is — it would be disingenuous to say that it feels just as bad to be sick in a situation of otherwise severe physical discomfort. If I’ve got the flu, I don’t want to be lying out on the ground — I want to be in a bed. So let’s not take that too far.
Cassius: I would say — if you think about it — there are some things in life that are painful that are going to get you no matter what. I think this is what he’s saying. No matter how much riches you have, if someone you love dies, it’s not going to help you to have a fancy bed. It’s still going to hurt.
Elaine: Yeah. There are experiences humans go through that are painful no matter what, and especially if you have unfounded superstitions and anxieties, money’s not going to help you from those.
Cassius: You know, that point, Elaine — I think it comes even stronger in the next passage, when he goes further and says: “since riches afford no comfort to our bodies, nor nobleness, nor the glory of ambition.” You know, that is easy to read stronger than I think Epicurus would have said it. In the sense that riches do afford some comfort — there’s not much doubt about that. They are not a guarantee of anything, but certainly in many cases on their own they can be desirable, they bring some pleasure, let’s put it that way. And so maybe what’s the best way to say that — they’re not a necessary condition, and they’re not a sufficient condition, but they certainly at times can bring a certain amount of pleasure. So maybe what we have to talk about is what is the amount of pleasure he’s looking at here. Is he saying that they certainly aren’t a guarantee of complete pleasure? And maybe the point I’m making here is that this whole section has to be read with a lot of focus to integrate it with the rest of the philosophy. Riches do afford some pleasure at some times to some people — there’s no doubt about that. So when it says “since riches then afford no comfort to our bodies,” there’s either a translation issue or a phrasing issue in Lucretius that bears scrutiny.
Charles: Yeah, the Bailey translation seems to agree with that though.
Cassius: Well, I think also you’ve got to keep in mind that people are looking for confirmation of that reading in this passage as well.
Elaine: The confirmation bias.
Cassius: Yes. And there’s a section a little bit further down that I really want to talk about confirmation bias on, but we’re not there yet. So I’m going to postpone that. But I think this section has to be read to make the point that riches and luxuries may bring some pleasure but they are no guarantee of the type of pleasure that is sustainable — that you really want. Something like that, right? They’re not going to get you true friends. If riches get you friends and that’s the reason they’re your friends — that’s not friends. That’s not reliable, because you need somebody who’s going to be your friend in all circumstances. So the best things — the most important pleasures — are what riches can’t get you. But they’re also — we could almost go into a discussion here of how pleasures are ranked or measured, because to some extent that’s what we’re talking about. Riches are not pleasure themselves — maybe that’s another way of saying it. There’s nothing about a golden ceiling or fine blankets that is in itself pleasurable.
Elaine: Well, if they give you tactile pleasure — what do you mean? A gold ceiling — I could see it. But a comfy blanket — it’s pretty clear that being in a nice textured blanket feels good.
Cassius: Well, it’s more so that owning those things rather than how you actually interact with them with your senses. Well, gold — let me be the devil’s advocate — gold might not always bring pleasure or look pretty to you if you’re surrounded by gold all the time. If you’re dying of thirst and all you have around you is gold —
Elaine: King Midas.
Charles: I do think gold is very tacky though.
Cassius: So help me with this — maybe I can still rescue that direction by saying: is it possible that what he’s saying here is just that no matter what luxury you wish to name, it is not pleasurable in itself?
Elaine: Cassius, that’s true of everything. Because if you’ve had plenty of water to drink and somebody keeps telling you to drink more, it’s not going to be a pleasure. So there’s no inherent — I can’t think of an object that would not sometimes be painful.
Cassius: Well, that may sound like an extremely basic point, but is it possible that that’s the point here?
Elaine: Well, but it’s not limited to riches. If you have too much food it’s not pleasurable either.
Charles: You know, but this is getting into really tricky territory actually, because then we start talking about limitations. And I know everyone here has their own opinion on that, but there is only so much that having all your surroundings be gilded or so much food on your table can actually deliver in pleasure.
Cassius: Well, Charles, that’s the point — but isn’t that what most common ordinary people who are not trained in philosophy actually think will bring them pleasure? They think that they need gold and riches and music and all sorts of stimulation like that to bring pleasure. And maybe his entire point here is: you need to rethink that. You don’t need that. That stimulation through luxury is not necessary. You can get stimulation through your friends and through simpler things. And you just need to keep in mind that by focusing on luxury for the sake of luxury, you’re missing the goal — because the goal is pleasure. Because immediately after this, Lucretius follows: “since riches then afford no comfort to our bodies, nor nobleness, nor the glory of ambition.” Elaine, what are you thinking?
Elaine: I just think it’s important not to overstate any of this. There’s maybe just a problem with poetic hyperbole, which is traditional — I mean, it was a thing in the poets of his time. So I take a lot of this as hyperbole.
Cassius: Well, offsetting that — people seem to think that it’s pretty clear that he was going by Epicurus’s own book On Nature as he composed this. Now maybe it’s a flight of poetic fancy away from what was in Epicurus’s book, but I guess I’m looking for a way to reconcile his actual words and make it consistent with what we think is a common-sense understanding of the philosophy. And for that, maybe the best person would be Martin. Martin, he’s still there?
Martin: Yeah, yeah, but I’m still thinking.
Cassius: Of — I hate to ever have a section of Lucretius that we are not able to at least come up with a reasonable defense and integration of with everything else.
Elaine: Well, I don’t think it’s ever happened to this extent though.
Cassius: Well, it’s the intensity. I think we’re seeing how it is consistent. Elaine’s explanations have been good. But it’s not good form — even though you don’t ever want your text to be taken out of context, you still don’t want to plant some passage in the middle of your text that seems inconsistent. There’s a reason why it’s in the poem. There’s got to be some qualification we’re missing that ties it all together.
Cassius: Well, I don’t know that we haven’t tied it together fairly well already. But I’m just looking for different ways of stating how it does tie together as part of our commentary, because clearly these kind of passages are often used as an example of “the important thing about Epicurus is to live as simply as possible — and here is your example: live on the streamside with your friends out on the grass, that is the ultimate way of life.” Is that what this is saying?
Elaine: I don’t think it is. He’s making points here that are integrated into the bigger philosophy.
Cassius: And maybe we’ve covered it enough. But this is what we’re doing here, by talking about everything. Yeah — “luxury is not necessary.” That’s a statement, one way of summarizing it, that is probably accurate as far as it goes. I’m just not sure it goes as far as —
Elaine: Right. I mean, so by definition if it’s a luxury it’s not necessary, yeah. I mean, that’s a circular kind of thing. If you can get all the pleasure that you want without the thing, then sure, it’s a luxury — you don’t need it.
Cassius: So I think a lot of people call things luxuries that may not really be luxuries — they may be necessary. And the thing that I see most often is people saying that man-made things are luxuries, or drawing the line at a certain item — maybe even by cost. But how much something costs isn’t necessarily the determinant. Like, if you have an infection and it’s painful and the only cure is something that costs a thousand dollars, it’s not a luxury because it costs a thousand dollars. You need it. And it’s also not determined by its rarity.
Elaine: Right, right.
Cassius: So I think part of the problem is in the way that modern people use the word luxury. If we really stick to what it means — that it’s something you don’t need for pleasure — then fine. And then we would say that variety is pleasurable too. And if you had to have variety, then your luxury wouldn’t be a luxury — it’d be a necessity.
Martin: Right. I think that is the problem with having this wide definition of what is necessary — or natural. So I might prefer a narrower one, and then I find this issue more easily resolved. So in times when I’m short of money because I’ve lost my job and I still have to pay the mortgage, in that case I will cut down to what I really need — the necessities — and not have those luxuries which I would normally take as a way to the variety of pleasure.
Elaine: Yes. It’s fluid — you can’t define objects or conditions once and for all as “this is luxury, this is necessary.” It’s a fluid thing.
Charles: So yeah. And it’s personal. And it’s a lot like the whole argument of categorizing different pleasures and desires, especially with the whole natural-and-necessary and natural-and-unnecessary framework. Most people can agree on the very bare minimums — water, shelter — but when you start getting into the others, that’s when a lot of contention happens.
Cassius: Yeah. That’s another way of asking the same question: necessary for what? Natural for what? What is the goal? What are we — necessary for pleasure. Well, pleasure as what type of feeling? I come back to the word “feeling.” It’s not a particular type of pleasure — it’s not cotton candy, it’s not cake, it’s not pie, it’s not any one particular experience of pleasure. It is the feeling in general.
Cassius: Well, okay. Now I don’t want people to think that they’re interchangeable, because we have that thing — that Elaine helped me so much with — about if the pleasures were distributed evenly and so on, that they would be interchangeable — meaning that they’re not interchangeable. That’s one of the Principal Doctrines, yeah — Principal Doctrine 9. Okay, that’s what it is: “If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Is that the one you were talking about?
Elaine: Yes, yes. When I first read that I misunderstood it, and Elaine helped me a lot with that because she found some other translations, and what it meant is: if they were like that — well, they’re not like that. They are not interchangeable. And so the specific pleasure that you need to have — the feeling — is personal. It’s individual. It’s going to fluctuate. It’s fluid. And they’re not interchangeable. So if you are missing your friend, chocolate ain’t going to fix it.
Elaine: Because there’s a desire to socialize with your friend.
Cassius: Yes. Or for example, if you want to go off in the direction of looking for the greatest good of the greatest number — the greatest good of the greatest number might be bread or water. But water or bread, statistically speaking, spread over ten thousand people, is not going to make them happy, because they don’t all need water or bread at that particular moment. That’s a tangent we don’t probably need to go off into. But I think that’s the root of the analysis: the feeling of pleasure is going to be personal and individual and contextual. And there’s not any one particular gold — meaning, showering everybody in the world with money is not going to guarantee their happiness. No, it’s not. Now it may generate some pleasures here and there. But some people don’t need money. Some people are lying in their hospital bed about to die in pain. They need medicine or something. Money is not going to help them.
Elaine: Yeah, I’m going to argue, Cassius, that most people need money.
Cassius: Sure. Yeah, maybe it’s not the best analogy. There are lines of thought that take that way too far. Maybe something a bit more superficial — like fluffy pillows or an invitation to a fancy dinner. Yeah, I’m being extreme by using money because money is just the ultimate example of wealth — something you can change into anything, and so you can potentially buy anything. Some people will say: but money can’t buy love, you know.
Elaine: There you go. I was just about to say that, Cassius — you beat me to it.
Cassius: So probably everybody needs money, or almost everybody, but it won’t get you everything that you need. And that may be the point of all this. That may be the point. Because Lucretius knows that gold ceilings are nice to look at. Lucretius knows that soft blankets are nice to touch. He knows those things. He doesn’t put that knowledge aside in writing what he’s written. There’s got to be a way to interpret it that makes sense.
Cassius: Yeah. Okay. Was the entire section read? I can’t remember right now.
Martin: Yes. Yeah.
Cassius: Okay. All right. I asked Martin a few minutes ago what he had to say and then we cut him off. Martin, did you want to add more right now?
Martin: No, no.
Cassius: Okay. The next paragraph I’m looking at talks about “wherefore since riches are of no profit.” He’s making the point here that no matter how powerful and rich you are, those things are not going to drive away the fear of death. That may be basically the same point we’ve been discussing. But anybody want to elaborate on that? Very important point about how the scruples of religion don’t run from your mind, or the dread of death doesn’t run from your mind, just because you’ve got riches and maybe even a good army. Kings are just as subject to fear of religion and death. What does anybody else say?
Charles: We can really tie this together with some of the Principal Doctrines that really stress the importance of protection. Here, I’ll read it: “There is no profit in securing protection in relation to men if things above and things beneath the earth and indeed all in the boundless universe remain matters of suspicion.”
Cassius: Right. Yep, I think that’s directly on point, Charles. Elaine, anything on that one? Because there’s something in this next paragraph I really want to talk about before we run out of time today.
Elaine: No, I think it’s been said well.
Cassius: Okay. I want to ask you guys’ opinion about something that is going to be a difference in my view between the translations. In the next passage, the Daniel Brown edition says — after he talks about no matter how much wealth or power you have, you’re still subject to these fears of death — he then asks the question, and this is the Daniel Brown version: “do you doubt but all this stuff is want of sense, and all our life is groping in the dark?” That phrasing makes good sense to me. But I want to call your attention to the way that Bailey in particular does that, because Bailey asks it this way: “can you doubt that all such power belongs to reason alone, above all when the whole of life is a struggle in the darkness?” It bothers me to see Bailey say all such power to defeat these fears belongs to reason alone. And Munro translates that as: “how can you doubt that this is wholly the prerogative of reason, when the whole of life is a struggle in the dark?” I have a problem with the phrasing that implies that reason alone would be the answer. So can I read the —
Elaine: Sure. Martin Ferguson Smith?
Cassius: Yes.
Elaine: Okay. So: “but if we recognize that these suppositions are absurd and ridiculous, because in reality people’s fears and the cares at their back dread neither the din of arms nor cruel darts, and strut boldly among kings and potentates, respecting neither the glitter of gold nor the brilliant luster of purple raiment, how can you doubt that philosophy alone possesses the power to resist them — all the more so because life is one long struggle in the gloom.”
Elaine: That reminds me of Matthew Arnold.
Cassius: Elaine, if we were to go back to the Latin, I’m thinking that Martin Ferguson Smith uses the word “philosophy” out of concern for maybe what I’m talking about here. Because if we look at the Latin — and I’m not sure we’re going to be able to do that quickly enough today — I’m pretty sure that the word in there is rationis or something like that, which led Munro and Bailey to simply use the word “reason.” And so I’m glad you read Martin Ferguson Smith, because I think the word “philosophy” makes better sense there, although it may not be perfect either. Daniel Brown does not use the word “reason.” Daniel Brown says “want of sense” — more like wisdom, kind of.
Martin: Yes, yeah, yeah.
Cassius: Martin Ferguson Smith is academic — he’s pretty careful about those things. I wish he’d put a footnote to explain his choice of translation. But I don’t know, I think it makes more sense. I don’t have my copy of Stallings with me to look at what she said. Let’s see. I do — hang on — something tells me that she wouldn’t follow the language so closely to say “reason.” Now she did though — she says: “Why doubt that reason alone can quench this terror with its spark, especially since life is one long labor in the dark.” Well, that’s almost surprising for Stallings.
Cassius: I’m looking at the Daniel Brown Latin version and I see quid dubitas — which sounds like “why would you doubt” — and then quin omnis sit haec rationis egestas — so I think the word rationis is right in there, which would explain why you come up with “reason.” But I cannot believe that you would want to be very careful in citing “reason alone.” Is that the same word for reason that he would use at other times? That’s a good question, and I don’t know that I can answer that, Elaine. Like, is it Aristotelian? Let’s see — let me get this one. Is it —
Elaine: Okay, okay. So the translation is: reckoning, account, reason, judgment, consideration, system, manner, method.
Cassius: Yeah, Elaine, that’s my point here — there’s all sorts of words they could use there. But I think a lot of translators are going to be impelled, because they’re steeped in Aristotle and Plato and they worship reason, to put “reason alone” in that sentence when that probably does not fit. That’s one of the places that I’ve seen Daniel Brown’s translation — maybe not being perfect — going off in a different direction that is sometimes better in my view. But given all that we’re talking about in terms of feeling, all that we’re talking about in terms of reason or logic not being in the canon of truth — to say “reason alone is the answer to our fears” would be contradictory to the rest. I mean, that’s what he’s saying so many times. When he talks about how — in fact, it’s the next passage isn’t it? Let me go back to that. Yeah, the ending passage of what we’re talking about today goes back to the thing he repeats over and over about how boys tremble and fear everything in the dark night — so we fear things there’s little to be feared — “the terror of mind and darkness, not the sun’s beams, nor the bright rays of day can scatter, but the light of nature and the roots of reason.” It’s a philosophy. It’s an approach.
Martin: It’s not dialectical logic.
Cassius: Yeah, but it’s proper logic.
Martin: Proper logic, yes.
Cassius: Proper logic — or more generally, proper philosophy — which in Epicurean terms has to be tied to the senses as the ultimate validation, and not to dialectical logic or some other abstraction for their validation.
Elaine: Doesn’t this paragraph appear again in Book Three? The one about children trembling in the dark?
Cassius: Yes, I think it appears several times. Has it not already appeared in Book One as well?
Elaine: I don’t think so. I think it appears several times but not yet in Book One.
Cassius: This is a powerful passage. He’s saying that all of your thoughts of military power and wealth and luxury — it’s ridiculous to suggest those are going to solve the problems of life for you, and your fear of death and your fear of religion and of the gods. It’s ridiculous to think those will be your answer. Your answer has to come from true philosophy.
Martin: Yeah, and I think it makes sense to get rid of fears like this — then reason is the right method to deal with it, as long as your reason is properly reasoning and not just dialectics.
Cassius: Yes. I think we’ve gone on fairly long today. Elaine, anything on this?
Elaine: Yeah, I don’t have anything else. Before that, okay.
Cassius: Okay, all right. Okay, well this has been a good discussion today. Anybody have closing comments as we end today’s session? Charles, I’m sorry — Martin, go ahead. Yeah, let Martin go first, because otherwise Martin, you’re going to say that we did it already.
Martin: Okay. So what I noticed here is that when I just read it, I mean the first paragraphs were easy to understand, but the later ones — when I just read through the passages, I could make some sense of it. But when we go sentence by sentence, I found it really difficult to get through the poetry.
Cassius: How do you mean, Martin?
Martin: Yeah, I mean, when I first read through it, I stumbled at the last paragraphs. I had to compare with another translation, and then I somehow had a feeling I understood what it means. But now during the discussion I again felt a bit confused by the last paragraphs — what he’s actually telling there. I mean, some of what you had said looks agreeable, so I’m again okay if that’s what’s written here, but I still don’t see it written one-to-one in the text.
Cassius: Why not, Martin? Let’s go ahead and try to unwind it. What do you think? Because if you think that, then clearly many people reading it or hearing this are going to think that as well. So — what do you think is the potential confusion?
Martin: Yeah, I think it’s this language. Because sometimes he puts things like — he says the opposite of what he means, so that you understand “this is ridiculous, it doesn’t make sense.” And then I got stuck sometimes — which way does he mean it? And which way does it make sense?
Cassius: So in the end — being the lawyer — state the position that you think is being argued here, in the most understandable terms that you can. What do you think is the best way to summarize what he’s saying in this last passage?
Martin: I mean, the one thing I see from there which makes sense is: that we should not be misled by fears of not achieving certain careers or getting that much money, because we don’t need it for our pleasure.
Cassius: Well, yes. But if you’re looking at the same last paragraph that I’m looking at, I would say it goes further and pushes even harder. Because he’s saying: not only should you not be confused about thinking you need luxury — you need to realize that the thought that you need luxury is ridiculous. It doesn’t solve problems for anybody, including the kings and lords of the world. Those who have all the money — can’t you see, Martin? If Aristotle Onassis, if the most powerful and rich people in the world — those who have the most military power — if even they are in fear of death, if even they cower at the foot of religion, then obviously those things can’t help you. And what you have to go to for an answer to those problems is true philosophy, and not riches and power.
Martin: That’s a very good way of putting it.
Elaine: So here is what I’m going to say — what just came to me. I’m taking it as also applying to the limits of pleasure. So if you are full of pleasure, then that means you have your necessaries — because if you need something for pleasure, then it’s necessary. You’re full of pleasure, and you have your necessaries. Then riches and power and other things cannot add to your pleasure, because your cup is already full. So there’s not some extra “fancy pleasure” out there — that’s illusory, it’s imaginary. You’re not going to have more than the maximum amount of pleasure. You would just wind up having pain, because it’s like eating too much when your stomach is already full. So you don’t have to feel like you’re missing out if you’re already completely having a pleasurable life.
Cassius: I agree. I think that’s a good way of looking at it too.
Cassius: Charles — yeah, I don’t really have anything this episode.
Charles: Well, you’ve had a lot to say already. I guess we’ve been basically — the whole passage has been largely well focused. Everything we’ve said ought to be consistent, basically the same point. I was trying to tie the text back to the original sourcing material, but it’s already been done well.
Cassius: Before we close today, we need to relish the relief — temporarily — from the discussion of the atoms, because next week we’ll be back in the middle of the atoms again. And you know, something I was going to say too is — I would presume that that’s what Lucretius was thinking about when he decided where to break his books and how much to put in one session: that you can only talk about atoms for so long without wanting to talk about something else for a while. So he’s given us a break, gone back to the big picture, and talked about the significance of Epicurus in very poetic and kind of moving ways. And now it’s going to be our job to get back into the discussion of the atoms.
Cassius: Okay, well, anybody have anything else before we close?
Martin: No.
Cassius: Okay. All right. Well, this is a good start to Book Two. Then we’ll do it again next week. Thanks, everybody.
Martin: All right. Thank you.
Charles: Thanks.
Elaine: Bye bye.