Episode 279 - TD10 - On "Dying Before One's Time"
Date: 05/01/25
Link: https://www.epicureanfriends.com/thread/4439-episode-279-td10-on-dying-before-one-s-time/
Summary
Section titled “Summary”This episode continues Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations Book One, covering Sections 38–42. Cassius briefly recaps the previous episode — the symmetry argument and the examples of Pompey and Priam — before moving into new territory. In Section 38, Cicero argues that a wise man acts for his country and posterity even knowing death is final, extends the sleep–death analogy (invoking the myth of Endymion put to sleep by Diana on Mount Latmus), and quotes Aristotle on the day-fly in the Hypanis River to underscore how short life is against eternity. Section 39 asks what “dying before one’s time” even means: nature lends life without a fixed repayment date, and a part of life is still preferable to none at all. Joshua adds context about Cicero’s personal losses — his daughter Tullia (died 45 BC, age 34) and her infant sons — noting this was not an abstract question for Cicero. In Section 40 Cicero turns back toward Platonic idealism, praising Theramenes who drank hemlock calmly under the Thirty Tyrants; Section 41 quotes Socrates’ speech before his judges, arguing that death is either a dreamless sleep (a gain) or passage to a better world where he will meet Homer, Hesiod, Musaeus, Palamedes, Ajax, and Agamemnon. Cassius notes that most of the speech is sharply anti-Epicurean, though he admires Socrates’ final words — “which condition is better, only the immortal gods know” — as a gesture toward epistemic humility. Both speakers agree Cicero has reached the philosophical climax of Book One and will rely on historical exempla for the remainder.
Transcript
Section titled “Transcript”Cassius: Welcome to episode 279 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius who wrote On the Nature of Things, the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes. This week we’re continuing in our series covering Part One at this point of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations from an Epicurean viewpoint. We are continuing to discuss the implications of death and whether death should be considered to be an evil, a good, or something else. We are beginning today in section 38 of Part One, following up on Cicero’s argument where he brought up the fact that sometimes one might think it would be better to die sooner rather than later. Using the examples of men like Pompey or Priam of Troy, who if they had died a year or two before they did would not have experienced tremendous pain and problems that came from the destruction of their lives and families and friends at the end of their lives. Cicero made the point almost exactly the same way that Lucretius does — that we can look at death in the same way as we look at the time before we were born. We were not conscious of anything at that time, nor did we have any concerns. The same will be the case after we die, and whether we’re talking about a centaur which never had any existence or King Agamemnon of Greece who most certainly did, the state of death is equally non-existent for both. So as we get started today, we’re on section 38 and we’ll have Joshua stand in for Cicero and read the next argument in section 38.
Joshua: “Why then should Camillus be affected with the thoughts of these things happening 350 years after his time? And why should I be uneasy if I were to expect that some nation might possess itself of this city 10,000 years hence? Because so great is our regard for our country as not to be measured by our own feeling but by its own actual safety. Death then, which threatens us daily from a thousand accidents and which by reason of the shortness of life can never be far off, does not deter a wise man from making such provisions for his country and his family as he hopes may last forever, and from regarding posterity — of which he can never have any real perception — as belonging to himself. Wherefore, a man may act for eternity even though he be persuaded that his soul is mortal, not indeed from a desire for glory, which he will be insensible of, but from a principle of virtue, which glory will inevitably attend, though that is not his object.
The process indeed of nature is this: that just in the same manner as our birth was the beginning of things with us, so death will be the end; and as we were no ways concerned with anything before we were born, so neither shall we be after we are dead. And in this state of things, where can the evil be? Since death has no connection with either the living or the dead: the one have no existence at all, the other are not yet affected by it. They who make the least of death consider it as having a great resemblance to sleep, as if anyone would choose to live 90 years on condition that at the expiration of 60 he should sleep out the remainder. The very swine would not accept of life on those terms, much less I.
And Endymion indeed, if you listen to fables, slept once on a time on Mount Latmus in Caria for such a length of time that I imagine he is not as yet awake. Do you think that he is concerned that the Moon is in difficulties, though it was by her that he was thrown into that sleep in order that she might kiss him while sleeping? For what should he be concerned for, when there is not even any sensation? You look on sleep as an image of death, and you take that on you daily. Have you then any doubt that there is no sensation in death, when you see there is none in sleep, which is its near resemblance?”
Cassius: Thank you, Joshua, for reading section 38 there. I think we’re still largely in a section that is either totally or largely consistent with Epicurean philosophy, since Cicero is still at the point of arguing that death is not an evil. And I think we’re seeing here that there’s a lot of consistency between Cicero’s position and Epicurus’s position. There are several interesting aspects of this paragraph, such as how even if you think you’re not going to exist, that is not a deterrence for the wise man from making provision for his country and his family that he hopes might last forever, and from regarding posterity — of which he has never had any real perception — as belonging to himself. Now that’s almost a direct reflection of something Diogenes of Oenoanda said, I think, when he’s talking about strangers or future generations. And of course in Epicurus’s case we have Epicurus writing a will for what would take place after he was gone. So I see no inconsistency there with an Epicurean position.
Joshua: So we should remember that where we are in the text is: Cicero has taken the view for his own part that there is an afterlife and that death is not an evil because the afterlife is going to be better. And then we’ve moved into this other long section in which he’s taking the view that even if these other thinkers are right and death is the dissolution of mind and body and there is no afterlife, that death is still not an evil. And he’s going into many of the same arguments that Epicurus himself makes: “when death is, you are not; and when you are, death has not come. There’s no sensation in death.” And he extends that even to sleep here, Cicero does.
Cassius: Yeah. And before we move further, the last part of that — where he says that a man may act for eternity even though he’d be persuaded his soul is mortal, not indeed from a desire of glory which he will be insensible of, but from a principle of virtue which glory will inevitably attend, though that is not his object — there are a couple of things we could say about that. I don’t know that glory is a consideration that is totally prohibited in Epicurean philosophy. It’s certainly not a goal that you’re looking for, but just as Cicero is saying here, there are certain actions in life which glory will inevitably attend. And if someone were trying to argue that that applied to Epicurus, I think they could look to Lucretius at the beginning of several of his books, where Lucretius is describing Epicurus’s achievements as essentially — I would say — glorious achievements that are worthy of emulation because of how beneficial and tremendously important to the rest of humanity they were.
So you’ve got this issue here again about Epicurus not setting virtue as a goal, but at the same time he is saying that virtue is inseparable from living a life of happiness. And to say that virtue is admirable is not an un-Epicurean thought. I would not think certainly that the Stoics carry that to an extreme which is not justified and say that that is the goal of life, but just as virtue is necessary for a happy life in Epicurean terms, I don’t think Epicurus would say there’s anything wrong with noting that those who act virtuously are well regarded by not only current but future generations.
Joshua: I think you’re certainly right about that, Cassius. We’re not turning into Sunday school here, but I’m going to quote once again from the King James version of the Bible — I think we did that last week as well. Matthew chapter six, verses 25 through 34: “Therefore I say unto you, take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat or what ye shall drink, nor yet for your body what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat and the body more than raiment? Behold the fowls of the air, for they sow not, neither do they reap nor gather into barns, yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much better than they? Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit unto his stature? And why take ye thought for raiment? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin, and yet I say unto you that even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these.”
And then we skip down to verse 32, and I think this is interesting. He says in verse 31: “Therefore take no thought, saying what shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewithal shall we be clothed, for after all these things do the Gentiles seek. For your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of these things. But seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you. Take therefore no thought for the morrow, for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.”
I think what we see here is a contrasting position, because Cicero is saying: I care now about the past and future misfortunes of my country, and even though I didn’t exist before and won’t exist in the future, I am still going to act for the good of my country because it’s virtuous to do so. And I think what we see in very early Christianity is the idea that we don’t need to plan for the future of Rome, we don’t need to plan for the future 10,000 years from now, because that future isn’t going to exist. The end of the world is nigh — repent — and there’s only one thing that really matters, and that is what it says here in verse 33: “Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.” So it’s an interesting cultural difference there. The Greeks did not have necessarily an idea of laboring over what Christians refer to as the end times — of laboring over not just the death of the individual but the death of humanity and the end of all things associated with humanity. And when you frame it in that perspective, it gives you very different motivations and very different things that you’re pursuing. And so I think Epicurus is much closer to Cicero on this point, or should I say Cicero is much closer to Epicurus when he says these things. Epicurus certainly did take thought for tomorrow when he laid out his will.
Cassius: Yes indeed. The whole orientation is very, very different. And of course we need to also say that Epicurus would talk about pleasure in this context — about the pleasure that comes from knowing that these good things will happen to his friends in the future. And he would not say obviously that you’re doing this solely because you wish to be virtuous. You’re taking account of what’s going to happen to your friends and family and your country after you’re gone because it gives you pleasure to take that into account, not that you’re going to be around to experience it. So there’s certainly additional discussion that would need to be added into what Cicero is saying here, but even here with Cicero, he’s a lot closer to the Epicurean position than the Christian view that you just quoted from.
Now we’re going to need to spend some time talking about this sleep issue at the end of section 38, but before we get there, there are a couple of sentences that — now that I look at this — this is almost a direct quote from an Epicurean text. Here when Cicero says this: “The process indeed of nature is this: that just in the same manner as our birth was the beginning of things with us, so death will be the end; and as we were no ways concerned with anything before we were born, so neither shall we be after we are dead; and in this state of things, where can the evil be? Since death has no connection with either the living or the dead: the one have no existence at all, the other are not yet affected by it.” I mean, that is almost a quote that he’s got out of either Lucretius or Epicurus or both. I don’t think there’s much to be added there other than to observe that it’s almost a direct plagiarism of the Epicurean position. But to turn to the final section of 38 about sleep — “those who make the least of death consider it as having a great resemblance to sleep” — okay, so at this point Joshua, let’s go into section 39 and continue the argument.
Joshua: “Away then with those follies, which are little better than old women’s dreams, such as that it is miserable to die before our time. What time do you mean? That of nature? But she has only lent you life as she might lend you money, without fixing any certain time for its repayment. Have you any grounds of complaint then that she recalls it at her pleasure? For you received it on these terms. They that complain thus allow that if a young child dies, the survivors ought to bear his loss with equanimity; that if an infant in the cradle dies, they ought not even to utter a complaint. And yet nature has been more severe with them in demanding back what she gave. They answered by saying that such have not tasted the sweets of life, while the other had begun to conceive hopes of great happiness and indeed had begun to realize them. Men judge better in other things and allow a part to be preferable to none. Why do they not admit the same estimate in life?
Though Callamus does not speak amiss in saying that more tears had flowed from Priam than his sons, yet they are thought happier who die after they have reached old age. It would be hard to say why, for I do not apprehend that anyone, if a longer life were granted to him, would find it happier. There is nothing more agreeable to a man than prudence, which old age most certainly bestows on a man, though it may strip him of everything else. But what age is long, or what is there at all long to a man? Does not old age, though unregarded, still attend on childhood’s pastimes as the cares of men? But because there is nothing beyond old age, we call that long. All these things are said to be long or short according to the proportion of time they were given us.
For Aristotle saith there is a certain kind of insect near the river Hypanis, which runs from a certain part of Europe into the Pontus — the Black Sea — whose life consists but of one day. Those that die at the eighth hour die in full age; those who die when the sun sets are very old, especially when the days are at the longest. Compare our longest life with eternity and we shall be found almost as short-lived as those little animals.”
Cassius: Thank you, Joshua. Now the opening section talks about the idea that it is miserable to die before our time. And he says: what time do you mean? That of nature? Nature’s only lent you life as if she had lent you money, and she never fixed any certain time for its repayment. That’s straightforward enough and I don’t have too much problem reconciling that with Epicurus. It may be exactly Epicurus’s position and what Lucretius says in his discussion of death. But then there’s an interesting section here about comparing what we should think about a young child who dies versus an old man who dies. And Cicero is alleging that some people say that we should bear the loss of a baby with equanimity — as if an infant in the cradle dies, they ought not even utter a complaint — but that in regard to an older person who dies, we have more grounds for concern because the older person has begun to conceive hopes of great happiness and indeed had begun to realize them. Now just the comparison of what we think of an infant who dies versus a man who dies at the prime of life — this relates back to the question we deal with often. How long should we seek to live? Do we think that once someone gets going and becomes a young adult and they start forming these dreams and ambitions for the future, is the death of such a person in the prime of life in some way worse than the death of an infant in the cradle?
Joshua: We’re going to have some trouble understanding where Cicero is coming from here because it’s estimated — or so I see on the internet — that approximately 25 to 30% of children in ancient Rome did not survive past the age of 10. Obviously we are living in a very, very different world, but for most of human history this has been the way things have been — a huge proportion of everyone dying younger, but particularly children not reaching adulthood or dying in childbirth. And we are not coming at it from that view of things, so it’s going to be more difficult to get a handle on that. But also in these societies, because children were much more likely to die, everyone had more children. That’s another thing that colors this question. But you’re right — the question he’s asking is this: if a young child dies, a good Roman is supposed to bear the loss with equanimity. If an infant dies in the cradle, they ought not even to utter a complaint. And yet when a person reaches a certain age — whether that’s adolescence or early adulthood — and then they die, then it seems like this is a person who had passed that danger of dying young and now has their whole life ahead of them. They’ve already started to make friends and they’ve already been in school and they’re planning out their future, and it feels like a great loss when this happens. And Cicero I think is trying to get people to think more clearly in all of these cases, saying that life is on loan from nature and when nature recalls it, we should bear it with equanimity in all cases. That’s probably more than I would ask of people — certainly if you lose a child, probably no matter what age that child is, it’s going to be difficult.
And I don’t expect a mother or a father to bear that loss with equanimity. But he’s trying to make the point here against this backdrop of: what do we mean when we say “long”? If a child has lived 14 years before dying, that’s short — but it’s only short in comparison to the life of a 90-year-old, which we consider to be long. In reality, these are both very short on timescales considering the whole of humanity. So I think Cicero is just asking us to think more clearly about this — that no matter what stage of life death comes, we should bear it with equanimity in ourselves, and we should regard the loss of people close to us, our friends, even our children, with equanimity as well, because the fact that they existed at all was that they were on loan from nature, and nature has recalled them, and there’s nothing we can do to gainsay that.
Cassius: Yes, Cicero was trying to point out the inconsistencies in people’s opinions. The pain that we feel on the loss of a child versus the loss of an adult is one thing. Also, Cicero is asking us to think about the justice of nature, because he’s saying that nature is dealing more severely with the infant in the cradle, because that infant is not going to get much life experience at all — any pleasure from life at all — because it’s so short. Nature in that case is dealing more severely with the infant than nature deals with the person who’s lived to the prime of life. And yet that’s not really the way most people look at it, because they get all upset when someone in the prime of life dies. And sometimes, as you were saying Joshua, they take the death of an infant as something that is just relatively more ordinary and not something to be so concerned about.
They’re going to be concerned about both to a certain extent, but he’s saying that men don’t properly appreciate that life is a gift that could be taken back at any time. And I think this is where he leads into the sentence that I want to emphasize, where he says: “men judge better in other things and they allow a part to be preferable to none. Why do they not admit the same estimate in life?” And to me, embedded in that sentence is basically the same sentiment that we talk about fairly regularly about not letting the perfect be the enemy of the good. In other words, just because you can’t have the whole, is it not better to have a part of the whole rather than none? Because there are people in this world who will say: if I can’t have everything, I don’t want anything at all.
And I think Cicero is making a good point here that a part of life is better than none at all. And if you can’t live to a hundred years old, or can’t live forever — and especially can’t live forever — I think that’s ultimately the issue. People think that because they’re not going to live forever, they’re being cheated out of something, they’re being deprived, and they take a childish attitude and say: if I can’t live forever, I don’t really care to live at all. And that’s not the way we judge most things in life, because we think it is preferable to have a part of what we wish to have rather than none. And Cicero says: why don’t they admit the same thing in regard to life — that it is better to live as long as you can and not worry about the fact that you’re not living forever?
Joshua: I think those are good points, Cassius. We have not reviewed what was going on at the time Cicero was writing these Tusculan Disputations. I do want to point out that for Cicero, this is not an academic question. The idea of children dying young — because Cicero’s grandson died in 49 BC, his daughter who was 34 years old died in 45 BC, one month after giving birth to her second son, who died soon after she died in 45 BC. So within the space of four years, he has lost his daughter and her two infant sons. And Cicero’s daughter Tullia died at 34 years old at his villa in Tusculum — where he’s having these conversations — a year or two after she has died. So he has just been through hell on this point, and we should take that into consideration before we regard him as cruel or something for saying that we should bear the death of a child with equanimity. He’s just been through it with his daughter and two grandsons, and then he himself died in 43 BC, two years after his daughter. So in those two years is when this book is being written that we’re reading right now.
Cassius: Very good points. Cicero is not only aware of his own losses of his own family, but he’s also aware of the perilous times that he’s living in and that he himself could meet his end at any point — just as he eventually did. And then Cicero closes section 39, as you previously said Joshua, by talking about what Aristotle has said in regard to the insect who only lives one day, and he uses that as an illustration to hammer home what I think is again very familiar to us, at least in echo from Lucretius, where his last sentence of this section is: “Compare our longest life with eternity and we shall be found almost as short-lived as those little animals.” I think that’s a point that clearly is emphasized in Epicurus and especially through Lucretius. Now next we’re going to turn to section 40 and we’re going to get back into an area where I think we’re going to see much more difference between Cicero and Epicurus. We’ve probably had the utmost of our Epicurean-type argument and now he’s going to turn back and start going in the Platonic direction again. So Joshua, if you could read section 40 for us.
Joshua: Yeah, that’s right — we’ve had the utmost of Cicero being sympathetic to Epicurus, while even making a reference to swine and their reflections about living, which may have been a veiled jab at Epicurus. Anyway, in section 40 he says this: “Let us then despise all these follies — for what softer name can I give to such levity? — and let us lay the foundation of our happiness in the strength and greatness of our minds, in a contempt and disregard of all earthly things, and in the practice of every virtue. For at present we are enervated by the softness of our imaginations, so that should we leave this world before the promises of our fortune-tellers are made good to us, we should think ourselves deprived of some great advantages and seem disappointed and forlorn. But if through life we are in continual suspense, still expecting, still desiring, and are in continual pain and torture — good gods, how pleasant must that journey be which ends in security and ease?
How pleased am I with Theramenes! How exalted his soul does he appear! For although we never read of him without tears, yet that illustrious man is not to be lamented in his death, who, when he had been imprisoned by the command of the Thirty Tyrants, drank off at one draft as if he had been thirsty the poisoned cup, and threw the remainder out of it with such force that it sounded as it fell. And then on hearing the sound of the drops, he said with a smile: ‘I drink this to the most excellent Critias’ — who had been his most bitter enemy — for it is customary among the Greeks at their banquets to name the person to whom they intend to deliver the cup. This celebrated man was pleasant to the last, even when he had received the poison into his bowels, and truly foretold the death of that man whom he named when he drank the poison, and that death soon followed. Who that thinks death an evil could approve of the evenness of temper in this great man at that instant of dying?
Socrates came a few years after to the same prison and the same cup, by as great iniquity on the part of his judges as the tyrants displayed when they executed Theramenes. What a speech is that which Plato makes him deliver before his judges, after they had condemned him to death!”
Cassius: Joshua, thanks for reading section 40 for us. I don’t know that the story of Theramenes is so important to us, but clearly Socrates’s experience is very important to us and Cicero is going to go on relatively at length about that final dialogue. So let’s continue into section 41.
Joshua: Okay, let me make one point about one line here in section 40 because I think it’s great. He says: “for at present we are enervated by the softness of our imaginations, so that should we leave this world before the promises of our fortune-tellers are made good to us, we should think ourselves deprived of some great advantages and seem disappointed and forlorn.” I don’t know what Cicero’s opinion on fortune-telling is — in the ancient world I suspect for a number of reasons that he may have been skeptical of it — but I think that’s a great line: that people who are waiting for the promises of their fortune-tellers to come true, and who die meanwhile, have no business complaining about that. I think that’s a great point. It echoes some of what Lucian says in that letter that we often cite on Alexander the Oracle-Monger, on the same point about trusting oracles.
Cassius: Okay, let’s go further into section 41.
Joshua: Yeah, so Cicero had ended the last section by saying “what a speech is that which Plato makes Socrates deliver before his judges, after they had condemned him to death.” Section 41 — this is the text of part of that speech: “I am not without hopes, O judges, that it is a favorable circumstance for me that I am condemned to die, for one of these two things must necessarily happen: either the death will deprive me entirely of my senses, or else that by dying I shall go from hence into some other place. Wherefore, if all sense is utterly extinguished, and if death is like that sleep which sometimes is so undisturbed as to be even without the visions of dreams — in that case, O ye gods, what gain is it to die? Or what length of days can be imagined which would be preferable to such a night? And if the constant course of future time is to resemble that night, who is happier than I am?
But if on the other hand what is said to be true — namely that death is but a removal to those regions where the souls of the departed dwell — then that state must be more happy still, to have escaped from those who called themselves judges, and to appear before such as are truly so: Minos, Aeacus, and Rhadamanthus; and to meet with those who have lived with justice and probity. Can this change of abode appear otherwise than great to you?” — he’s addressing his judges right now; this is what’s funny about this, he’s saying it’d be great to finally go and meet some real judges — “What bounds can you set to the value of conversing with Orpheus and Musaeus and Homer and Hesiod? I would even, were it possible, willingly die often in order to prove the certainty of what I speak of. What delight must it be to meet with Palamedes and Ajax and others who have been betrayed by the iniquity of their judges! Then also should I experience the wisdom of even that king of kings who led his vast troops to Troy, and the prudence of Ulysses and Sisyphus. Nor should I then be condemned for prosecuting my inquiries on such subjects in the same way in which I have done here on earth.
And even you, my judges — you, I mean, who have voted for my acquittal — do not you fear death. For nothing bad can befall a good man whether he be alive or dead, nor are his concerns ever overlooked by the gods. Nor in my case either has this befallen me by chance, and I have nothing to charge those men with who accused or condemned me, but the fact that they believed that they were doing me harm in this manner,” says Cicero. “Socrates proceeded: there is no part of his speech which I admire more than his last words. ‘But it is time,’ says he, ‘for me now to go hence, that I may die, and for you that you may continue to live. Which condition of the two is the best, the immortal gods know, but I do not believe that any mortal man does.’” — end quote from Socrates in Plato there. And that is the end of section 41, and then we’ll get back into Cicero speaking.
Cassius: Okay, well, Cicero has certainly given us in this paragraph a collection of positions, most of which I would say are pretty much the opposite of the Epicurean position, even down to the very end where he concludes. And Cicero says this is the best part where he says “which of the two conditions is better? Only the immortal gods know, but I don’t believe that any mortal man does.” So it’s almost as if Cicero wants to say that the best part of Socrates’s speech to the judges is that he’s proclaiming that he’s a skeptic, and here on these most important questions of life nobody knows the answer. Well, that’s the way he ends the section. But most of the speech to the judges is an argument that being dead is actually going to a better place where you’re going to associate with all these great men of the past and be able to talk to them, including Orpheus and Homer and Hesiod, and that “I would love to die often in order to prove the certainty of what I speak of — what a delight it must be” — to experience the wisdom of even King Agamemnon and many other great men of the past. He says: don’t worry if you voted for my acquittal; don’t feel sorry for me because I’m going to this better place. And don’t you who are concerned about me leaving think that there’s any possibility that a bad thing can happen to a good man, whether he be alive or dead, and nor are his concerns overlooked by the gods. The Christians would have loved that section. “Nor in any case has anything befallen me by chance” — the Calvinist and the determinist would love that section. “And I have nothing to charge those men who condemned me, but that they believe that they were doing me harm” — which is of course impossible for someone who takes the position the Stoics do, that you are totally in control of whether something does harm to you or not, that through your mind, through contemplation, through the things of the next world, you have separated yourself from the problems of physical reality.
So as we’ve been saying, we’re back in full anti-Epicurean mode here in section 41. Okay, Joshua. So that takes us through Socrates’s speech and up to section 42 of Part One. In the interest of time, I think what we’ll do is come back next week and pull out a couple of the really philosophical points that he’s hitting in the remainder of the sections, and then we’ll conclude Part One next week rather than continuing on reading every section in detail. It reminds me of what we came across in De Finibus, and the debate that Torquatus and Cicero were having there about Torquatus saying that the Stoics place too much emphasis on just going incessantly on about the glorious men of the past and their deeds and so forth. There is certainly a place for that and there is some very interesting information in these final ten or so sections of Part One, but it seems like Cicero has really got to the climax of his philosophical argument, and from here on he’s doing the standard Stoic thing of appealing to the glory of these people and trying to get very eloquent about the courage and strength that they showed in the face of death and so forth. And we certainly wish to be courageous and strong in the face of death as Epicureans, but going through each of Cicero’s personal histories is probably not the best use of our time on the podcast. So we’ll come back next week and focus then on the philosophical aspects of what Cicero says in these final sections of Part One. So Joshua, any closing thoughts for today?
Joshua: I’m looking ahead to section 46, and I notice that Cicero kind of makes the same point we’re making. He says: “I might have given you a sufficient answer, as it seems to me on this point — whether death is an evil — in a few words, as you have allowed the dead are not exposed to any positive evil. But I have spoken at greater length on the subject for this reason: because this is our greatest consolation in the losing and bewailing of our friends.” He’s saying: this is why I’m belaboring the point here, this is why I’m talking about all of these illustrious men and women of the Greek and Roman past — because we deal with death, we lose people that are close to us, people we love. And so this is why we have to talk about that. And I think that Epicurus would certainly agree with that aspect of it. We do have to talk about death and we have to keep it fresh in our mind so that when those times come, we can bear them philosophically, we can bear them as we’ve been instructed to bear them by Epicurus. So I think we keep saying it, but here in the Tusculan Disputations, Cicero’s doing really good work, and I think it’s very good that we’re going through this. There is a limit to how deep we want to go, but it’s certainly good to be doing it.
Cassius: And you’re exactly right, Joshua, that Lucretius says basically the same thing in his arguments about death. He is telling us to compare ourselves to Epicurus or to Scipio or to other great men and realize that if those men in their greatness had to face death, why should we complain that we have to face death too? So there’s clearly a lot of benefit that comes when you are facing death specifically to do what Cicero is doing here — think about these men who have also faced death and gone this path already, and realize that you’re not unique, you’re not special, and you’re going to be following the same path that even the greatest men and women who ever existed have followed. But with that for today, let’s come to a close. We’ll come back next week, proceed to the end, and then after that we’ll take up the next of the big questions of life that Cicero is going to get his student to ask him about. In the meantime, we invite you to drop by the forum and let us know if you have any questions or comments about this or our other episodes. Thanks for your time today. We’ll be back again soon. See you then. Bye.