Against The Platonists From An Epicurean Perspective
Why Plato Matters to Epicureans
Section titled “Why Plato Matters to Epicureans”Of all the philosophers Epicurus argued against, Plato did the most to build the world that Epicurus set out to overturn, and Plato’s arguments against pleasure are still the ones most often turned against Epicurus. An Epicurean who wants to understand what Epicurus was fighting, and why so many of the charges against him miss the mark, needs to know Plato.
Plato (about 428–347 BC) was an Athenian and a follower of Socrates. After Socrates was put to death in 399 BC, Plato wrote the dialogues in which Socrates is the chief speaker, and in about 387 BC he founded a school in a grove outside Athens, the Academy. Aristotle studied there for twenty years. How far Plato’s Socrates is the real Socrates, and what the other witness, Xenophon, adds, is taken up below in the historical record.
Epicurus (341–270 BC) was born six years after Plato’s death. When he came to Athens at eighteen, Plato’s pupil Xenocrates was head of the Academy (DL X.1), and one ancient report says that Epicurus had earlier been “a disciple of Pamphilus the Platonist in Samos” (DL X.14). Epicurus therefore knew Platonism from the inside, and much of his own philosophy can be read as a rejection of it.
Plato matters to Epicureans for three main reasons.
First, Plato built the world that Epicurus rejected. In Plato’s dialogues the things we see and touch are only shadows of a higher reality, the eternal Forms, which can be known only by the mind. The senses deceive us. The soul is immortal, existed before birth and will be judged after death. The world was made by a divine craftsman who “desired that all things should be good and nothing bad,” and the stars are gods. Pleasure is not the good. “Those who pursue philosophy aright study nothing but dying and being dead.” This is the world that Epicurus denied.
Second, Plato’s world outlived Epicurus’s. The Platonic tradition passed into the Stoics, who took over Plato’s creator god, into the later Platonists, and through them into Christianity. Saint Augustine wrote that of all the philosophers the Platonists came nearest to the Christian faith (City of God VIII). For most of the Middle Ages Plato’s Timaeus, with its account of the creation of the world, was the only dialogue of Plato widely read in the Latin West. Much of what Epicureans today must argue against reaches us in Plato’s words.
Third, many of the later arguments against Epicurus come from Plato’s arguments against pleasure. The charge that pleasure is the good of “a leaky jar,” that the absence of pain is only a “neutral state,” that a life of pleasure is a life fit for cattle, that virtue cannot be “an exchange of pleasures for pleasures,” all come from Plato. Many of them were aimed at other men, such as Callicles in the Gorgias, who held views quite different from Epicurus’s. But they have been used against Epicurus ever since, and Epicureans need to know where they come from and why they miss the mark.
The rest of this introduction follows the three divisions of Epicurean philosophy: the Canon, or how we know the truth; Physics, or the nature of things; and Ethics, or how to live. Each section states Plato’s position in his own words, with links to the passages in the dialogues on this site, and then sets out the Epicurean response. The dialogues themselves follow, each with an Epicurean guide of its own and a linked outline:
- Apology: Socrates’ defense at his trial, his “divine sign,” and death as sleep or migration.
- Meno: can virtue be taught? Learning as recollection of what the immortal soul knew before birth.
- Phaedo: the death of Socrates and the arguments for the immortality of the soul.
- Gorgias: Socrates against Callicles on whether pleasure is the good.
- Republic: justice, the ideal state, the Forms and the Cave, the comparison of pleasures, and the myth of Er.
- Theaetetus: the refutation of the claim that knowledge is perception.
- Timaeus: the creation of the world by the divine craftsman.
- Philebus: pleasure and wisdom compared.
- Laws Book X: the case against the materialists, and the laws against impiety.
Plato and Epicurus: The Historical Record
Section titled “Plato and Epicurus: The Historical Record”Socrates, Plato and Xenophon
Section titled “Socrates, Plato and Xenophon”As far as we know, Socrates (469–399 BC) wrote no philosophical works. The only writings Plato credits to him are poems composed in prison at the end of his life, “the metrical versions of Aesop’s fables and the hymn to Apollo” (Phaedo 60d), and none of these survive. He spent his life in the streets of Athens questioning his fellow citizens about virtue, and in 399 BC he was tried and put to death on charges of impiety and corrupting the young. What we know of him comes mainly from two of his followers. Plato (about 428–347 BC) made him the chief speaker in most of his dialogues. Xenophon (about 430–354 BC), a soldier and historian, wrote down his own memories of Socrates’ conversations in the Memorabilia, in part to defend Socrates against the charge of impiety. Plato’s Socrates often speaks for Plato’s own theories, so Xenophon’s account is an important second witness.
On one point Xenophon matters a great deal to Epicureans. In Memorabilia I.4 and IV.3 Socrates argues that the parts of the body and the order of the world were designed by gods for the good of man. David Sedley, in Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity (2007), writes that the best evidence for Socrates’ “radical stance on the creation issue” is “to be found, not in Plato, but in the less fashionable and, for most tastes, less exciting pages of Xenophon’s Memorabilia” (p. 78). “Xenophon’s Socrates is a fundamentally anti-scientific creationist” (p. 78). Sedley finds in Xenophon “a historical depiction of Socrates’ ideas on divine creation which not only is inherently credible, but also represents exactly the reorientation from creationist science to creationist piety that we might expect of him” (p. 82). Socrates “became the first to argue for the creationist option against the rival materialist hypothesis. Thus it was that the Argument from Design entered the scene” (p. 83). Sedley adds that because Plato’s dialogues “have eclipsed all our other sources on Socrates,” “the vital material in Xenophon has been insufficiently appreciated” (p. 86). The creationism of Plato’s Timaeus therefore did not begin with Plato. It goes back to Socrates himself (see The Creation of the World below).
What Epicurus Said About Plato
Section titled “What Epicurus Said About Plato”Diogenes Laertius records the names that Epicurus gave to the other philosophers. “The followers of Plato he called ‘Flatterers of Dionysus,’ and Plato himself ‘The golden man’.” The first name refers to Plato’s visits to the court of the tyrants of Syracuse, Dionysius I and Dionysius II, where he tried to put his political ideas into practice. The second may mock Plato’s myth of the metals in the Republic, in which the rulers have gold mixed into their souls (415a).
The Epicurean Velleius on the Timaeus
Section titled “The Epicurean Velleius on the Timaeus”In Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods the Epicurean Velleius begins by rejecting “the artisan deity and world-builder of Plato’s Timaeus,” together with “that old hag of a fortune-teller, the Pronoia … of the Stoics.” He asks what tools and helpers Plato’s god could have used, and he presses Plato on a contradiction: “the thinker who represented the world not merely as having had an origin but even as almost made by hand, also declared that it will exist for ever. Can you suppose that a man can have even dipped into natural philosophy if he imagines that anything that has come into being can be eternal?” He asks too “why did these deities suddenly awake into activity as world-builders after countless ages of slumber?” Lucretius asks the same questions in Book V of On the Nature of Things, and David Sedley concludes that in the Epicurean attack on divine creation “[t]he main target of attack is clearly the Timaeus” (Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity, p. 140).
Velleius treats Plato and the Stoics together, and rightly so. The Stoics took over Plato’s creator god and his providence, and the Epicureans answered both with the same arguments. When Epicurus attacked the Timaeus, he was attacking the Stoics as well.
Colotes Against the Platonists
Section titled “Colotes Against the Platonists”Epicurus’s pupil Colotes wrote a book arguing that it is impossible to live according to the teachings of the other philosophers, including Socrates and Plato, and other works attacking Plato’s Lysis and Euthydemus. He also criticized the myth of Er at the end of the Republic, asking why a philosopher who claims to teach the truth should tell a fable. Four centuries later the Platonist Plutarch wrote a whole treatise, Against Colotes, to answer him, and another, That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible. The quarrel between the Garden and the Academy was still alive in the second century AD.
The Academy Turns Skeptic
Section titled “The Academy Turns Skeptic”About fifty years after Plato’s death the Academy itself changed course. Under Arcesilaus and later Carneades it taught that nothing can be known for certain, and it attacked both the Stoics and the Epicurean trust in the senses. This is the Academy of Cicero’s Academic Questions, and its arguments are preserved at length by Sextus Empiricus (see the Sextus Empiricus introduction). Lucretius answers the skeptic in a famous line: “if a man believe that nothing is known, he knows not whether this even can be known, since he admits he knows nothing” (On the Nature of Things IV.469–470, tr. Munro).
The Canon: What Is Real, and How Plato Says We Know It
Section titled “The Canon: What Is Real, and How Plato Says We Know It”For Plato the first question is not how we know, but what is real. “What is that which always is and has no becoming; and what is that which is always becoming and never is? That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state; but that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason, is always in a process of becoming and perishing and never really is” (Timaeus 27d–28a). Truth belongs to the eternal. The world of the senses is only half real, and so the senses cannot be the test of truth. As Sextus Empiricus summed it up, Plato held “that only intelligibles are true,” because “sensibles are always becoming and never being.”
Epicurus began from the opposite answer. What exists and acts in nature is real, and “there is no difference between saying that a thing is ‘true’ and saying that it is ‘subsisting’” (Against the Logicians II.9). Every other difference between the two canons follows from this first one.
The Senses Deceive
Section titled “The Senses Deceive”Plato’s theory of knowledge begins with distrust of the senses. In the Phaedo Socrates asks: “Have the sight and hearing of men any truth in them, or is it true, as the poets are always telling us, that we neither hear nor see any thing accurately?” When the soul “tries to consider anything in company with the body, it is evidently deceived by it.” The soul thinks best “when none of these things troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor any pleasure.” When it uses the senses, “it is dragged by the body to things which never remain the same, and it wanders about and is confused and dizzy like a drunken man.”
The Timaeus draws the same line. “That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state; but that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason, is always in a process of becoming and perishing and never really is.”
Epicurus held the opposite. “Nor is there anything which can refute the sensations.” Reason cannot refute them, “for all reason is dependent upon sensations.” Error comes from the opinions we add, not from the senses themselves.
The Forms
Section titled “The Forms”Plato’s answer to the unreliability of the senses is the theory of Forms: eternal, unchanging realities such as “absolute beauty and good and greatness,” which the mind can know and which are the true causes of things. The highest of them is the Form of the Good, which “may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence.”
In the allegory of the Cave, ordinary men are prisoners “living in a underground den,” chained from childhood so that they “can only see before them.” Behind them a fire burns, and between the fire and the prisoners runs “a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.” Men pass behind the wall “carrying all sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials,” and the prisoners see only the shadows that the fire throws of them. “To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images.” Plato then explains his figure: “the prison-house is the world of sight.” Plato carries this so far that he tells the student of astronomy not to learn from looking at the sky: “whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, seeking to learn some particular of sense, I would deny that he can learn.” In the Timaeus the race of birds is made from “innocent light-minded men, who, although their minds were directed toward heaven, imagined, in their simplicity, that the clearest demonstration of the things above was to be obtained by sight.”
The Cave has a large defect, and it lies in the puppeteers. What the prisoners see is not nature at all. It is a show staged behind their backs: the figures are made things, the shadows are cast by men hidden behind a screen, and the prisoners are chained so that they cannot turn and look. Plato does not say why the carriers carry their figures, but his picture works only if the world of the senses is like a puppet show, arranged by others and shown to men who cannot check it. Nature is not like that. Nature has no design, no aims for men and no wish to deceive them. It holds no opinions, and so it cannot hand us false ones. Epicurus said the same of the senses themselves: “all sensation is irrational and does not admit of memory; for it is not set in motion by itself, nor when it is set in motion by something else, can it add to it or take from it.” Falsehood comes in only with what we add: “falsehood and error always lie in the addition of opinion.” Nature gives us no puppet show and no house of mirrors.
Even an opponent of Epicurus chose a better image. In Cicero’s Academica, Lucullus, speaking for Antiochus against the Academic skeptics, says: “Even the Cimmerians, to whom some god, or nature, or the foulness of the country that they inhabited, had denied the light of the sun, had still some fires which they were permitted to avail themselves of as if they were light” (II.61). The Cimmerians may lack the light they would like, but the light they have is real, and no one stands behind them using it to fool them. Plato’s Cave has no such innocence.
For Epicurus there is no world of Forms behind the world we see, and no one is working the shadows. Because nature has no intent to mislead us, we can trust the senses, and by trusting them and using them to pursue pleasure, we can reach happiness through pleasure. Our general ideas, the “preconcepts,” are formed from repeated sensations, and they are tested against the senses, not the other way round. The real causes of things are bodies and their motions, which we know by reasoning from what we see.
Learning Is Recollection
Section titled “Learning Is Recollection”How can the mind know the Forms if it does not learn them through the senses? Plato’s answer is that the soul knew them before birth. “Seeing then that the soul is immortal and has been born many times, and has beheld all things both in this world and in the nether realms, she has acquired knowledge of all and everything,” so that “research and learning are wholly recollection.” In the Meno Socrates questions a slave boy about geometry and claims that the boy, “without anyone having taught him,” recovers the knowledge “out of himself.” In the Phaedo the same argument is used to prove that the soul existed before birth (72e–77a).
Epicurus held that “all thoughts have their origin in sensations by means of coincidence and analogy and similarity and combination, reasoning too contributing something” (DL X.32). The slave boy learns from a figure drawn before his eyes.
Knowledge Is Not Perception
Section titled “Knowledge Is Not Perception”The Theaetetus is Plato’s most careful argument against the senses as the standard of truth. Theaetetus proposes that “knowledge is nothing else than perception.” Socrates ties this at once to Protagoras’s saying that man is “the measure of all things” and to the doctrine “that all things are in motion, like streams.” Then he argues that the soul perceives through the senses as through instruments, and grasps being and truth by itself: “knowledge is not in the sensations, but in the process of reasoning about them.” Therefore “perception and knowledge could never be the same.”
The strategy is worth noticing. Plato does not argue against the senses as Epicurus understood them. He joins trust in the senses to Protagoras’s relativism and Heraclitus’s flux, and refutes the combination. Epicurus held neither of these doctrines. He held that every sensation truly reports what strikes the sense organ, that error lies in added opinion, and that the atoms themselves do not change. Later critics of Epicurus often repeated Plato’s move, treating any trust in the senses as if it were Protagoras’s “man is the measure.”
Summary: Two Different Canons
Section titled “Summary: Two Different Canons”- Plato: only the eternal is truly real, and the world of the senses is “always becoming and never is.” The senses deceive, like shadows of puppets thrown on the wall of a cave, and true knowledge is of the eternal Forms, grasped by the mind alone, which recollects what the soul knew before birth.
- Epicurus: what exists and acts in nature is real, and what reports it as it is, is true. Nature has no design and no intent to deceive, and a sensation adds nothing of its own, so the senses are the first standard of truth. General ideas are built from sensations, error lies in added opinion, and the feelings of pleasure and pain are the standard of good and evil.
Physics: The Divine Craftsman Against the Atoms
Section titled “Physics: The Divine Craftsman Against the Atoms”Socrates Turns Away from Nature
Section titled “Socrates Turns Away from Nature”In the Apology Socrates denies that he investigates “the things beneath the earth and in the heavens.” In the Phaedo he tells how he lost his early enthusiasm for “the kind of wisdom which they call investigation of nature.” He was hopeful when he heard that Anaxagoras made mind the cause of all things, but disappointed when Anaxagoras “made no use of intelligence, and did not assign any real causes for the ordering of things, but mentioned as causes air and ether and water.” To explain why Socrates is sitting in prison by his “bones and sinews” is to miss the real cause, which is his choice of what is best.
This passage marks a turning point in Greek thought. From here on, Plato and his successors demanded that nature be explained by purpose, by what is “best,” and treated explanations in terms of bodies and their motions as superficial. Epicurus, following Democritus, returned to the explanation of nature by bodies, and insisted that it is the only explanation that gives us true understanding which can give us confidence and free us from fear. “A man cannot dispel his fear about the most important matters if he does not know what is the nature of the universe, but suspects the truth of some mythical story” (Principal Doctrine 12).
The Creation of the World
Section titled “The Creation of the World”The Timaeus gives Plato’s account of how the world came to be. “Everything that becomes or is created must of necessity be created by some cause,” and the creator looked to an eternal pattern, since “the world is the fairest of creations and he is the best of causes.” Why did he make it? “He was good, and the good can never have any jealousy of anything,” and “finding the whole visible sphere not at rest, but moving in an irregular and disorderly fashion, out of disorder he brought order.” The world is a single living creature with a soul, the stars are gods, and the creator hands the making of mortal creatures to the lesser gods (41).
Plato does not prove the starting points of this account. He states them and treats doubt as impiety: “If the world be indeed fair and the artificer good, it is manifest that he must have looked to that which is eternal; but if what cannot be said without blasphemy is true, then to the created pattern.” Sedley notes that these premises are “baldly stated at the outset (29a2–6), and nowhere treated as in need of defense—it would, after all, be a sacrilege to think otherwise” (p. 109). Plato admits that an account of the visible world can only be probable, and he tells his hearers that “we ought to accept the tale which is probable and enquire no further.” For the traditional gods he asks for no proof at all: “How can we doubt the word of the children of the gods? Although they give no probable or certain proofs, still, as they declare that they are speaking of what took place in their own family, we must conform to custom and believe them.”
Some modern readers treat the creation story as a myth that Plato did not mean literally. Sedley argues that Plato meant a real beginning in time: “In Plato’s case, the divine origin of the world is, by contrast, doctrinally of absolute philosophical centrality” (p. 103). Aristotle, the Epicureans and the Stoics “all seem to have concurred in favoring the literal reading of the Platonic creation” (p. 107). The questions of Velleius about tools, helpers and timing were aimed at the text as Plato wrote it.
Plato was not the first to argue this way. In Xenophon’s Memorabilia Socrates asks a friend who mocks sacrifice and divination to look at the human body: the eyes, the eyelids that close “as with folding doors,” the eyebrows set so “that no drop of sweat fall from the head and injure them.” “I ask you, when you see all these things constructed with such show of foresight can you doubt whether they are products of chance or intelligence?” The friend agrees that they “would seem to be the handiwork of some wise artificer, full of love for all things living” (I.4.6–7). The Timaeus builds a whole cosmology on the same idea, and the Stoics carried it forward.
Lucretius answers this argument directly. He warns against “the mistake of supposing that the bright lights of the eyes were made in order that we might see.” Such explanations “put effect for cause through wrongheaded reasoning; since nothing was born in the body that we might use it, but that which is born begets itself a use: thus seeing did not exist before the eyes were born.” He also turns the Timaeus’s eternal pattern against it. Where could gods have found “a pattern for begetting things in general as well as the preconception of what men are,” and how could they know what atoms can do, “unless nature herself gave the model for making things?”
Epicurus rejected each step. The universe is infinite and uncreated, made of atoms and void, and “there are infinite worlds both like and unlike this world of ours.” No god made them, because a blessed and immortal being “knows no trouble itself, nor causes trouble to any other” (Principal Doctrine 1). Lucretius calls the belief that gods made the world for men “all sheer folly,” and points to its defects: “the nature of the world has by no means been made for us by divine power: so great are the defects with which it stands encumbered.”
Against the Materialists: Laws Book X
Section titled “Against the Materialists: Laws Book X”In his last work Plato attacked the materialist view of the world directly. Its source, he says, is a doctrine held by men of science to the effect that: “all things which are coming into existence, or have or will come into existence, do so partly by nature, partly by art, and partly owing to chance.” The elements “all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art,” and by their chance combinations “they have brought into being the whole Heaven and all that is in the Heaven, and all animals, too, and plants … not owing to reason, nor to any god or art.” These men say also that gods exist “by art and not by nature,” by human convention, and that justice is a convention too.
Plato wrote this before Epicurus was born, but it is a fair description of the view Epicurus would defend. Plato’s answer is that soul, not body, comes first: the soul is “one of the first existences, and prior to all bodies,” defined as “the motion able to move itself.” Since soul is the cause of all motion, the heavens are moved by souls, and these souls are gods. Epicurus answered that the atoms move eternally by their own weight, and that the soul is a compound of fine atoms which comes to be and passes away with the body.
Gods Care for Men, and Unbelief Is a Crime
Section titled “Gods Care for Men, and Unbelief Is a Crime”Book X of the Laws begins from the claim that “No one who believes, as the laws prescribe, in the existence of the gods has ever yet done an impious deed voluntarily, or uttered a lawless word,” and it names three kinds of impiety: to believe that gods do not exist, to believe “that the gods exist, but have no care for men,” or to believe “that they are easy to win over when bribed by offerings and prayers.” The second is the Epicurean position. Plato argues against it that a god who neglected small things would be like an idle man, “a man most like to sting-less drones.”
Then Plato makes unbelief a crime. Anyone who meets with impiety must report it “by informing the magistrates.” There will be a prison “named the reformatory,” where unbelievers will be held and admonished, and if a man “be convicted again on a like charge, he shall be punished by death” (909a).
Plato also wanted the stories of gods controlled by the state. In the Republic the guardians must be taught that God causes only good things: “God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many assert, but he is the cause of a few things only … of the evils the causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him.” Poets such as Homer, who say that Zeus hands out both good and evil to men, must be silenced. The rulers will tell the citizens a “royal lie” that God mixed gold, silver, brass and iron in their souls. For Plato, religion is both true and useful, and its usefulness justifies lies and punishments.
Epicurus taught that gods are blessed and immortal and that they neither govern the world nor punish men. “The impious man is not he who popularly denies the gods of the many, but he who attaches to the gods the beliefs of the many” (DL X.123). The Epicurean attack on religious fear is in part an attack on the use of gods as an instrument of rule.
Here Plato makes the charge that runs through the whole of this book: that men will not be good unless they believe in a higher and truer world than this one, a world of Forms and of gods who watch them and will judge them, and that the belief must be kept alive, by a “royal lie” if necessary and by law if not. Diogenes of Oinoanda answered Plato by name. The fear of gods restrains no one whom the laws do not already restrain, and the wise are just because they reason correctly about pain and death. “On account of what kind of gods, then, will human beings be righteous? For they are not righteous on account of the real ones or on account of Plato’s and Socrates’ Judges in Hades.” (Fr. 20).
The Immortal Soul and the Afterlife
Section titled “The Immortal Soul and the Afterlife”Most of the Phaedo is an argument that the soul is immortal: it comes from the dead and returns to them, it knew the Forms before birth, it resembles the divine and unchanging, and it brings life and so cannot admit death. “The soul is like the divine and the body like the mortal.” The Republic adds a proof that “the soul of man is immortal and imperishable.”
Three of the dialogues end with a myth of judgment after death:
- The Gorgias. After death each soul is stripped of its body and judged naked by the judges of the dead, so that no wealth or rank can hide what it has done. The curable are punished and improved, and the incurable are punished forever as a warning to others. Socrates offers the story “as the truth.”
- The Phaedo. Socrates describes the true earth, of which we see only the hollows, and the rivers of the underworld. The dead are judged and sent each to his place. The incurably wicked are hurled into Tartarus and never come out, and those who have purified themselves by philosophy live on without bodies. A man “ought to repeat such things to himself as if they were magic charms.”
- The Republic. Er, a soldier killed in battle, “returned to life” on his funeral pyre twelve days later and told what he had seen. The souls of the dead are judged and spend a thousand years being rewarded in heaven or punished beneath the earth, tenfold for every wrong. Then they choose their next lives by lot, drink from the river of forgetfulness, and are born again. The Republic ends with the advice to follow justice “considering that the soul is immortal.”
In Plato, the promise and threat of the afterlife are used to support the moral life.
The Timaeus builds this judgment into the order of nature. Men “who were cowards or led unrighteous lives may with reason be supposed to have changed into the nature of women in the second generation,” those who “had no philosophy in any of their thoughts” become beasts, and the most ignorant become “the race of fishes and oysters.” Sedley sums up the point: “Plato’s world is not anthropocentric but, as we might rather say, psychocentric” (p. 126). On Sedley’s reading the whole order of nature is designed for the training and punishment of souls, whose highest reward is to escape the body altogether.
Lucretius answered the Phaedo in the third book of On the Nature of Things, with dozens of proofs that “the nature of the mind and soul is bodily” and mortal, concluding: “Death therefore to us is nothing, concerns us not a jot, since the nature of the mind is proved to be mortal.”
Necessity, Destiny and the Choice of Lives
Section titled “Necessity, Destiny and the Choice of Lives”Plato did not teach the rigid fate of the Stoics, and he did not deny that men choose. But he placed the decisive choice outside this life, and he set the life we live beneath the throne of Necessity.
In the myth of Er, the souls about to be born again come before Lachesis, “the daughter of Necessity,” and each chooses the life it will lead: “the life which he chooses shall be his destiny. Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours her he will have more or less of her; the responsibility is with the chooser—God is justified.” Once the choice is made, Clotho ratifies “the destiny of each,” Atropos spins the threads and makes them “irreversible,” and the souls pass “beneath the throne of Necessity.” Then they drink from the river of forgetfulness. The man who lives the life remembers nothing of having chosen it.
The Laws sets every life within a providence that governs each part of the world for the sake of the whole. The young man who doubts that gods care for men is to be told that “all things are ordered systematically by Him who cares for the World—all with a view to the preservation and excellence of the Whole,” and that his own part, “tiny though it be,” was “not generated for thy sake, but thou for its sake.” God leaves the shaping of each man’s character to his own will, but then, like a draughts-player, moves each soul “according to the law and order of destiny” to the place it deserves, toward heaven or down to Hades.
And where Plato speaks of praise and blame in this life, he takes them away. Of the man who gives way to pleasure, the Timaeus says that “he is regarded not as one diseased, but as one who is voluntarily bad, which is a mistake … For no man is voluntarily bad; but the bad become bad by reason of an ill disposition of the body and bad education, things which are hateful to every man and happen to him against his will.”
Epicurus held the reverse on each point. There is no choice before birth and no river of forgetfulness, because there is no soul before birth. No providence orders the world, and no man exists “for the sake of the Whole.” The choices a man makes in this life are his own, and they are rightly praised and blamed: “that which is in our control is subject to no master, and to it are naturally attached praise and blame” (DL X.133). Plato’s soul is free only in a myth, and only once. The Epicurean is free here, every day, in the choices by which he wins pleasure and avoids pain.
Ethics: The Good Against Pleasure
Section titled “Ethics: The Good Against Pleasure”Virtue and the Examined Life
Section titled “Virtue and the Examined Life”Socrates told his judges that “to talk every day about virtue and the other things about which you hear me talking and examining myself and others is the greatest good to man, and that the unexamined life is not worth living.” In the Meno he concludes that virtue “is imparted to us by a divine dispensation without understanding in those who receive it.” In the Theaetetus the goal of life is “to become like God, so far as this is possible,” and to become like God “is to become righteous and holy and wise.” In each case virtue is either the end itself or a step toward the divine.
For Epicurus virtue is the means to the pleasant life. “It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and justly,” and it is for the sake of that pleasant life that the virtues are chosen.
Not an Exchange of Pleasures
Section titled “Not an Exchange of Pleasures”In the Phaedo Socrates admits that ordinary men are temperate in order to obtain greater pleasures, and rejects this as false virtue: “this is not the right way to purchase virtue, by exchanging pleasures for pleasures, and pains for pains, and fear for fear, and greater for less, as if they were coins.” The only true coin is wisdom, and virtue based on the weighing of pleasures is “a painted imitation of virtue.”
This is exactly what Epicurus taught: “by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters.” The wise man gives up some pleasures to avoid greater pains, and accepts some pains to obtain greater pleasures. For Plato this is a counterfeit. For Epicurus it is prudence, “the beginning and the greatest good.”
Callicles Is Not Epicurus
Section titled “Callicles Is Not Epicurus”The Gorgias contains the most famous of Plato’s arguments against pleasure. Socrates’ opponent Callicles holds that “he who would live rightly should let his desires be as strong as possible and not chasten them,” and that “luxury and licentiousness and liberty, if they have the support of force, are virtue and happiness.” Socrates compares such a soul to “a leaky jar,” and asks whether a man “who has an itch and wants to scratch, and may scratch in all freedom, can pass his life happily in continual scratching.” Callicles is driven to admit that some pleasures are better and some worse, and Socrates concludes that “it is for the sake of what is good that we should do everything, including what is pleasant, not the good for the sake of the pleasant.”
These arguments have been used against Epicurus for two thousand years. But Callicles’ view is not Epicurus’s. Epicurus taught that unlimited desires lead to pain, that “the wealth demanded by nature is both limited and easily procured; that demanded by idle imaginings stretches on to infinity” (Principal Doctrine 15), and that justice is a compact among men, not a convention for the weak to be overthrown by the strong. Epicurus agreed that some pleasures should be avoided. His reason was not that they fall short of a higher good, but that they bring more pain than pleasure: “Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen” (DL X.129).
Callicles is also driven to admit that some pleasures are better than others, and Socrates takes this as proof that something other than pleasure must decide between them. Epicurus agreed that pleasures are not all the same. Some are greater and some less, some last and some pass quickly, and some bring pains in their train. But he held that they are ranked by one standard only: which of them, all things considered, makes life most pleasant. “Since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time” (DL X.129). “No pleasure is a bad thing in itself: but the means which produce some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures” (PD 8).
Epicurus’s image is the man at a banquet: “just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant” (DL X.126). The guest does not need a standard higher than taste to choose among the dishes. He chooses by which is most pleasant. When Socrates asks which pleasures are “better,” the Epicurean answer is the ones that bring more pleasure and less pain over the whole of life, and that question is settled by the feelings and by reasoning about them, not by a Good that stands above pleasure.
Pleasure and Wisdom: The Philebus
Section titled “Pleasure and Wisdom: The Philebus”The Philebus is Plato’s fullest treatment of pleasure. Socrates asks whether a life of pleasure without any wisdom, memory or knowledge would be worth living, and Protarchus, who began by saying “Having pleasure I should have all things,” is brought to agree that it would not. The dialogue ends with a ranking of goods in which “pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor yet the second,” but comes after measure, proportion, mind and knowledge.
Epicurus never proposed a life of pleasure without wisdom or memory. For him memory and expectation are among the chief sources of pleasure, and prudence is the greatest good because it secures the pleasant life. Plato’s opponent in the Philebus is again a straw man.
The Philebus also contains Plato’s chief argument that pleasure cannot be the good. Socrates and Protarchus agree that the good must be “the most perfect … of all things” and “sufficient,” lacking nothing. Socrates then asks whether pleasure has a limit, and Philebus answers that pleasure belongs “to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity and degree.” Since what is unlimited can always be increased, it is never complete, and so, Socrates concludes, “the infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of good.”
Epicurus denied the premise. Pleasure has a limit, and the limit is reached when all pain is gone. “The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body nor of mind, nor of both at once” (PD 3). Beyond that point pleasure “is not increased … but is only varied” (PD 18). A life with no pain in it cannot be made more pleasant, only pleasant in different ways. It is pleasure through and through, undiluted by any pain, and in that sense complete. This is a logical test of purity, and it answers Plato’s demand for completeness on Plato’s own terms.
The point must not be misunderstood. “Pleasure” does not exist apart from particular pleasures, any more than “color” exists apart from particular colors. When Epicurus says that all pain has been removed, he does not mean that nothing is left. He means that the particular pleasures by which we know what pleasure is, the pleasures of food and drink, of friendship and conversation, of adventure and achievement, of the senses and of the mind, the pleasures Epicurus praised again and again and that we know by feeling them, fill the whole of our experience with no pain mixed in.
The “Neutral State” and the Absence of Pain
Section titled “The “Neutral State” and the Absence of Pain”One of Plato’s arguments goes to the heart of Epicurean ethics. In Republic IX Socrates argues that between pleasure and pain there is “a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain,” a kind of rest. Sick men say that nothing is pleasanter than health, and men in pain that nothing is pleasanter than relief. But “how, then, can we be right in supposing that the absence of pain is pleasure, or that the absence of pleasure is pain?” Those who think so “err in contrasting pain with the absence of pain, which is like contrasting black with grey instead of white.” The same argument appears in the Philebus, where Socrates speaks of men who “think that they have pleasure when they are free from pain,” and in the Timaeus, which explains pleasure as the sudden replenishment of a body that has been emptied (64–65).
Epicurus answered this argument directly. “Epicurus consequently maintained that there ‘is no such thing as a neutral state of feeling’ intermediate between pleasure and pain,” for the state “characterized as it is by entire absence of pain, is itself, he held, a pleasure, and, what is more, a pleasure of the highest order.” A living being that is conscious at all feels either pleasure or pain. “The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful” (Principal Doctrine 3).
This exchange matters for how Epicurus is read today. Plato’s claim that the absence of pain is only a gray, neutral condition is the source of the long tradition of treating Epicurean pleasure as a mere absence, a passive calm, and of asking whether Epicurus “really” meant pleasure at all. Epicurus’s point was the reverse. When all pain is removed, what remains is not gray but the full experience of being alive, which is pleasure.
Justice: Nature or Compact
Section titled “Justice: Nature or Compact”In the Republic Glaucon states the view that men “think that they had better agree among themselves to have neither” doing nor suffering injustice, “hence there arise laws and mutual covenants.” He illustrates it with the ring of Gyges, which makes its wearer invisible. The rest of the Republic is meant to refute this view and show that justice is the health of the soul and is good in itself.
Glaucon’s account is close to Epicurus’s: “Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another … it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed” (Principal Doctrine 33). Epicurus answered the ring of Gyges as well: the unjust man can never be sure of escaping detection, and so can never live free of fear (Principal Doctrines 34–35).
Philosopher-Kings and the Private Life
Section titled “Philosopher-Kings and the Private Life”Plato’s answer to the problems of politics is that “until philosophers are kings … cities will never have rest from their evils.” He tried twice to put this into practice at the court of Syracuse, which is why Epicurus called his followers “Flatterers of Dionysus.” Epicurus took the opposite view: the wise man “will not take part in public life,” except when necessary, and he seeks security among friends rather than power over a city.
Plato’s Socrates offers two views of death. In the Apology, “either it is virtually nothingness, so that the dead has no consciousness of anything, or it is, as people say, a change and migration of the soul from this to another place.” In the Phaedo, the philosopher’s whole life is a preparation for death: “the true philosophers practice dying, and death is less terrible to them than to any other men.”
Epicurus took the first view of the Apology and made it the whole truth: “death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation.” And he rejected the Phaedo’s view of philosophy as a practice for dying. The right understanding of death “makes the mortality of life enjoyable,” and philosophy is a preparation for living.
Where Plato Helps the Epicurean Case
Section titled “Where Plato Helps the Epicurean Case”Plato is a hostile witness, but in several places he supplies material that Epicureans can use.
- Death as a dreamless sleep. Socrates’ first alternative in the Apology, that death may be “like a sleep in which the sleeper does not even dream,” is very close to Epicurus’s own view, and Socrates calls it “a wonderful gain.”
- Justice as a compact. Glaucon’s speech in Republic II is the earliest full statement of the view of justice that Epicurus adopted, and it is stated with great force (358e–360d).
- The materialists before Epicurus. Laws X is one of the best surviving reports of the natural philosophy of the generation before Epicurus, and of its claim that gods and justice are human conventions (888e–890a).
- The contest of pleasure. Even Plato could not let the question of pleasure go. In Republic IX he calculates that the just king lives “729 times more pleasantly” than the tyrant. In the Philebus he admits “true pleasures,” such as “those which are given by beauty of colour and form, and most of those which arise from smells,” that have no pain mixed with them. And in the Protagoras, not on this site, Socrates himself argues that the art of living is an art of measuring pleasures and pains.
- Praise of sight. In the Timaeus, Plato’s distrust of the senses gives way for a moment: “had we never seen the stars, and the sun, and the heaven, none of the words which we have spoken about the universe would ever have been uttered,” and from sight “we have derived philosophy.”
None of this makes Plato an ally. Each concession serves Plato’s order: the Forms in place of atoms, the craftsman in place of nature, the immortal soul in place of the mortal one, and virtue, wisdom and the divine in place of pleasure.
Plato’s Long Shadow
Section titled “Plato’s Long Shadow”The Academy, the Stoics and the Later Platonists
Section titled “The Academy, the Stoics and the Later Platonists”Plato’s school lasted, with changes, until the sixth century AD. The Stoics took over his creator god and his providence, and the later Platonists, from Plutarch in the first century AD to Plotinus in the third, turned his dialogues into a religious philosophy of the soul’s ascent to the divine. Plutarch wrote three works against the Epicureans. Throughout antiquity the Platonists and the Stoics, for all their differences, stood together against Epicurus on the questions of providence, the soul and pleasure.
Christianity
Section titled “Christianity”The Christian writers found in Plato much that they could use: a creator god, an immortal soul judged after death, a world of eternal truths above the senses, and contempt for the pleasures of the body. Augustine’s high regard for the Platonists set the pattern for the Latin West. Through Augustine, and later through the revival of Plato in Renaissance Florence, where Marsilio Ficino translated all the dialogues into Latin, Plato became the pagan philosopher most at home in Christian thought, while Epicurus remained the type of the unbeliever.
The Modern World
Section titled “The Modern World”In the twentieth century the philosopher Alfred North Whitehead wrote that the European philosophical tradition “consists of a series of footnotes to Plato” (Process and Reality, 1929). The habits of thought that Plato established are still with us: the belief that the senses deceive and that truth lies in abstractions beyond them; the belief that the mind or soul is something other than the body; the belief that pleasure is at best a by-product of a higher good; and the belief that the absence of pain is a neutral state. Epicureans who meet these ideas today should know that they are not neutral observations about the world but positions that Plato argued for, and that Epicurus answered.
The Dialogues
Section titled “The Dialogues”Plato’s works are dialogues, nearly all with Socrates as the main speaker. Since the edition of Henri Estienne (Stephanus) in 1578, every passage has been cited by Stephanus page and section letter, so that Republic 514a means page 514, section a. Every Stephanus reference on the dialogue pages of this site is a link target.
| Dialogue | Subject | On this site |
|---|---|---|
| Apology | Socrates’ defense at his trial | Fowler (1914) |
| Meno | Can virtue be taught? Learning as recollection | Lamb (1924) |
| Phaedo | The death of Socrates; the immortality of the soul | Fowler (1914) |
| Gorgias | Rhetoric, power, and whether pleasure is the good | Lamb (1925) |
| Republic | Justice, the ideal state, the Forms, pleasure, the afterlife | Jowett (1888) |
| Theaetetus | What is knowledge? Against “knowledge is perception” | Fowler (1921) |
| Timaeus | The creation of the world | Jowett |
| Philebus | Pleasure and wisdom | Jowett |
| Laws Book X | The materialists, gods, and the law of impiety | Bury (1926) |
Several other dialogues touch Epicurean concerns. The Protagoras contains Socrates’ argument for an art of measuring pleasures and pains. The Symposium and Phaedrus give Plato’s account of love as the soul’s ascent toward the eternal. The Crito tells why Socrates refused to escape from prison. The Sophist discusses being and not-being. All of them can be read in the Loeb translations at the Scaife reader of the Perseus Digital Library.
The Most Important Passages for Epicureans
Section titled “The Most Important Passages for Epicureans”The Canon: How We Know
Section titled “The Canon: How We Know”- The senses deceive; the soul thinks best alone: Phaedo 65b–66a and 79c.
- Learning is recollection: Meno 81c–86b; Phaedo 72e–77a.
- Knowledge and true opinion: Meno 97d–98b.
- Being and becoming: Timaeus 27–28.
- The Form of the Good, the Line and the Cave: Republic 507a–518b.
- Astronomy without the senses: Republic 529b; men who trusted their eyes become birds: Timaeus 91d.
- The “likely story” and traditional gods: Timaeus 29 and 40.
- “Knowledge is perception” and its refutation: Theaetetus 151e–160e and 184b–186e.
Nature, Gods and the Soul
Section titled “Nature, Gods and the Soul”- Socrates and the study of nature: Apology 19b and 26d.
- Socrates’ turn from natural science; Anaxagoras; the Forms as causes: Phaedo 96a–100e.
- Socrates’ argument from design (Xenophon): Memorabilia I.4.2–7.
- The creation of the world: Timaeus 28–30; the lesser gods: 41; souls reborn as women, beasts and fish: 90e–92c.
- God the cause of good only, and the censorship of the poets: Republic 377b–392c.
- The royal lie: Republic 414b–415d.
- The materialists: Laws 888e–890a.
- Soul older than body: Laws 891e–896e.
- Gods care for men: Laws 899d–905d; each man made for the sake of the Whole, and moved “according to the law and order of destiny”: 903b–904e.
- The law of impiety: Laws 907d–910d.
- The immortality of the soul: Phaedo 69e–107b; Republic 608c–611a.
- Myths of the afterlife: Gorgias 523a; Phaedo 107c; Republic 614b.
- The choice of lives before birth, the Fates and the throne of Necessity: Republic 617d–621a.
- “No man is voluntarily bad”: Timaeus 86.
Ethics
Section titled “Ethics”- “The unexamined life is not worth living”: Apology 38a.
- Death as sleep or migration: Apology 40c–41c.
- Philosophy as practice for dying: Phaedo 64a–67e.
- Virtue not an exchange of pleasures: Phaedo 68d–69c.
- Virtue a gift of gods: Meno 99e–100b.
- Callicles, the leaky jar and the itch: Gorgias 491e–494e.
- Pleasant and good not the same: Gorgias 495a–500a.
- Justice as a compact, and the ring of Gyges: Republic 358e–360d.
- Philosopher-kings: Republic 473c.
- The neutral state and the comparison of pleasures: Republic 583b–588a.
- “To become like God”: Theaetetus 176a–b.
- A life of pleasure without wisdom: Philebus 21; the absence of pain: 44; pure pleasures: 51; the ranking of goods: 66.
- Pleasure as replenishment: Timaeus 64–65.
About These Translations
Section titled “About These Translations”- Apology and Phaedo: Harold North Fowler, Loeb Classical Library, Plato Vol. I (1914).
- Meno: W. R. M. Lamb, Loeb Classical Library, Plato Vol. II (1924).
- Gorgias: W. R. M. Lamb, Loeb Classical Library, Plato Vol. V (1925).
- Theaetetus: Harold North Fowler, Loeb Classical Library, Plato Vol. VII (1921).
- Laws Book X: R. G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library, Plato Vols. X–XI (1926).
- Republic: Benjamin Jowett, third edition (Oxford, 1888).
- Timaeus and Philebus: Benjamin Jowett.
- Xenophon, Memorabilia: H. G. Dakyns, The Works of Xenophon, Vol. III, Part 1 (London: Macmillan, 1897). Scan. Text from Project Gutenberg.
The Loeb texts are the digital editions of the Perseus Digital Library at Tufts University, made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike license, and each Stephanus reference links to the passage in the Scaife reader, where the Greek can be read alongside. The Republic follows the Project Gutenberg transcription of Jowett’s third edition, with its Stephanus references, and links each page to the scanned volume at the Internet Archive.