Episode 322 - Epicurean Moral Outrage Against Socrates

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Welcome to Episode 322 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote “On The Nature of Things,” the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
   
This week we start are continuing our series reviewing Cicero’s “Academic Questions” from an Epicurean perspective. We are focusing first on what is referred to as Book One, which provides an overview of the issues that split Plato’s Academy and gives us an overview of the philosophical issues being dealt with at the time of Epicurus. This week will will continue in Section 2 and our focus will include a statement by Varro in praise of Socrates, and possible Epicurean responses to it.

We’ll also look at Socrates’ “Second Sailing” and the major topics contained in the Mark Riley Article “The Epicurean Criticism of Socrates”

https://www.epicureanfriends.com/thread/4954-episode-322-epicurean-moral-outrage-against-socrates/

In this episode we will continue discussion of the Epicurean criticism of Socrates, this time focusing on Socrates’ character and manner of teaching.

Riley - The Epicurean Criticism of Socrates

New Topics:

1. Why do people fall for this stuff?
2. The need for moral outrage against the positions of Socrates and Cicero that the senses are unreliable .
3. Torquatus’ explanation of pleasure as the ultimate goal, which shows how many types of pleasure he is including

Three general lines of attack on Socrates

1. The original accusation of Meletus and the public feeling which lead to the accusation. The basis of this charge seems to be that Socrates, anti-democratic himself, was responsible for the education and thus the excesses of Critias and Alcibiades.
2. The biographical tradition beginning with Aristoxenus’ Life of Socrates.4 “Seething with hatred and malignity,” he collected or invented a mass of derogatory information: Socrates was extremely lustful but did no harm because he confined himself to married women and prostitutes (fr. 54a and b); he was quick to anger (fr. 56), and so on.
3. The polemic of the Epicureans, on which I wish to concentrate. The Epicureans are often said to be characterized by abusive and defamatory language, as Plutarch puts it. … Epicurus (D.L. 10.7-8): “Plato’s school he called the ‘toadies of Dionysius;’ their master himself the ‘golden’ Plato.” … Their opposition was based on a fundamental difference of opinion concerning the role of the philosopher and his behavior towards his students.

The Specific Epicurean Critique

To the Epicureans the philosopher possessed wisdom which could bring salvation from irrational fears and desires if the disciple could only be convinced of the truth of his master’s teachings-note Lucretius’ pleas to Memmius in De Rerum Natura (1.50 ff.; 5.8 ff.).7 The contrast between this view and Socrates’ detachment, his efforts to make his hearers think for themselves, could not be more clear. This contrast seems to have been recognized by the Epicureans themselves, who proceeded to criticize Socrates for his errors, not primarily of doctrine, but of character and method. That their opposition was to the character and methods of Socrates in particular, not to the doctrines which he shared with Plato and the Academy (in the philosophic tradition), is shown by the moderation and brevity of Colotes’ attack on Plato in his work On the Point that Conformity to the Doctrines of the Other Philosophers Actually Makes it Impossible to Live, quoted passim by Plutarch in Adversus Colotem, and by the paucity of hostile references to Plato in Epicurus and by their generality: “flatterer of Dionysius” comes from the general anti-Platonic tradition; “golden” seems vague enough to cover any reference to haughtiness of manner or style.

In his work mentioned above Colotes criticizes a number of philosophers for expounding doctrines which violate good common sense. He asks why Socrates puts food into his mouth instead of into his ear, and why he eats food instead of grass (Adv. Col. 1108b), concluding with the accusations that Socrates’ words were charlatans or imposters (aXarbvas … X6yovs) because what he said in the dialogues was one thing, but what he did was quite different (1117d).

The doctrine attacked here is Plato’s, briefly criticized in the section of the essay immediately preceding (1115c-1116e). Colotes had said, “But Plato says that it is idle to regard horses as being horses and men men” (1115c). Plutarch’s defence makes it clear that Colotes is criticizing Plato for considering the visible world around us, the world of 64a, as unreal, and for postulating a world of the vorTr6v, i.e., of the Forms, as real (1115d ff.). Hence what appears as a horse may or may not actually be one; the sense of impression has nothing to do with “reality.” Such an opinion is of course the very opposite of the Epicurean position; compare ad Hdt. 38: “It is necessary to test everything in the light of our sense impressions (Kara& ras alo-oaSs).”

Considering how fundamental this disagreement is, we might have expected a more extensive or lively criticism from Colotes. Instead the jeers and the ridicule at the practical effects of Plato’s opinion are directed at Socrates, whose words prompted Colotes’ attack. Socrates states that the true philosopher tries to get away from the body and turn to the soul, regards the senses as inaccurate and indistinct, and sees the soul as deceived by the body in any investigation of truth. In short Socrates declares that the philosopher must use the light of the mind to attain a knowledge of true being (Phaedo 66a)-precisely Plato’s doctrine attacked by Colotes. Since Socrates does not admit the reality of the world around us, he should logically not distinguish between grass and food, between high and low water, and so on.

Now the logical consequences of this refusal to attribute reality to the perceptible world around us should be the same as the consequences of refusing to take a position at all on what is reality. The latter position is CEroxi, suspension of judgement, and is attributed to the Sceptics, chiefly to Pyrrho of Elis. That Sceptics were expected in some circles to live up to their profession is shown by Diogenes Laertius (9.62) on Pyrrho: “He led a life consistent with this doctrine (i.e., agnosticism and suspension of judgement), going out of his way for nothing, taking no precautions, but facing all risks as they came, whether carts, precipices, dogs, or what not, and generally leaving nothing to the arbitrament of the senses.” This testimony from Antigonus of Carystus, roughly a contemporary of Colotes (both third century B.C.), indicates that Colotes could have felt justified in criticizing Socrates for not following the practical conse- quences of his doctrine. Socrates’ words are imposters; he himself is an imposter, because he lives as if the world around us were real; he follows the clues offered by sight, whereas to be consistent he should ignore this illusion and follow what is really real, whatever the consequences. Thus the basic fault of Socrates is not wrong belief but the inconsistency between his belief and his practice.

Colotes’ second criticism of Socrates, that he flaunts the boast that he does not even know himself (Adv. Col. 1118c, referring to Phaedrus 230a), adds to the characterization of Socrates. Again he is charged with ignoring the obvious; for the Epicurean, man can be defined by pointing to a man and saying “man is this kind of shape here combined with animation” (Sextus Empiricus Math. 7.267; fr. 310 Usener). Socrates can see men all around, yet he insists he does not know what he is. More important is the attack implied in the word “flaunting;” not only is Socrates in error, but he boasts of his error and ignorance. This pride in his ignorance is a personal quality which puts Socrates outside the company of truly wise men, according to Epicurus, who states “the wise man will dogmatize, not suspend judgement”-ooy,tarLelv re KaL OVK a7opraWEv (D.L. 10.121; fr. 562 Usener). Boasting of one’s ignorance is also the mark of a traditional Greek villain, the dissembler (elpwv). An eiron’s acts are also rejected by the Epicurean, as I shall now show.

Philodemus appends to his discussion a letter of Ariston of Keos which is likewise a guide to relieving the fault of arrogance: Philodemus adds that arrogance can arise from other causes, including philosophy itself, as in the cases of Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Empedocles, and Socrates (10.15-25). The subsequent discussion shows in what way each of these is arrogant.

The fourth philosopher, Socrates, belongs among the eirones, the hypocrites who claim to be less than they are. This fault of character is treated at length, and practically the whole text has survived (De vit. 21.37-23.37).15 The eiron does not say what he thinks: “He praises what he criticizes elsewhere” (22.3). “He commonly belittles and criticizes himself and those like him” (22.4-5); for example, if anyone praises him and asks him to speak, he replies, “What do I know except that I know nothing” or “What reputation do I have?” (22.17-23). He overflows with praise for others: “Blessed is so-and-so because of his character, or his wealth, or his luck” (22.25-27). He adds complimentary adjectives to proper names: “Handsome Phaedrus, wise Lysias” (22.27-32). If he contributes anything wise, he attributes it to others, just as Socrates attributes his knowledge of economics to Aspasia and Ischomachus (22.32-35). He depreciates himself: “You are right in looking down on me, ignorant as I am; I look down on myself,” or “Would that I were young and not so old, so that I might take lessons from you” (23.12-16). Further examples follow, then Philodemus adds: “What need to say more? The person who compiled the Socratic dialogues (has supplied us with enough examples)” (23.35-37).16 This last comment is by Philo- demus himself abridging Ariston’s list of examples; for similar statements indicating abridgment compare: “That is enough to say on this topic” (16.27-28), and “What need to say any more about such ranters and ravers” (20.26-27).

Philodemus was correct in taking the eiron’s statements as typical of Socrates. Many of the statements can be paralleled in the dialogues: “I know that I know nothing” (22.2) is attributed to Socrates in Plato’s Apology 21d and in Diogenes Laertius 2.32. The list of flattering epithets, xpo7r6v, r EXvv , yaeXi, yevvaZov, &avpeTov (22.30-32) can be found as follows: TOP XPffarTov OcoE6pOP (Phaedrus 266e), cbs 6vs el (Gorg. 491e), wc yevval IIlXe (Gorg. 473d), avspelos yap E (Gorg. 494d).17 In Xenophon’s Oecono- micus Socrates does attribute his knowledge of economics to Aspasia (Oec. 3.14-15) and to Ischomachus (Oec. 7.2 if.). For the self-depreciation typical of the eiron see Socrates’ last speech in the Euthyphro (16a) for one example of many. There can be no doubt that Socrates is regarded as the archeypal eiron, depreciating himself, claiming to know nothing, flattering others.

Philodemus also considers the eiron to be “a type of imposter” (&XacW’v; De vit. 21.37-38) because he conceals what he thinks. ‘AXacbv and elpov are also combined in Aristophanes, where both become flattering descrip- tions of the sophist. In The Clouds Strepsiades is so hard-pressed by expenses that he is willing to do anything to appear bold, quick-witted, and so on; he recites twenty-one characteristics of the sophist who can make wrong seem right (Nub. 445-451). To become such a sophist, he is willing to hand himself over to Socrates, who presumably already has these twenty-one virtues. Among these terms are edpwv, dissembler, and aXabPv, imposter, cheat. Neither word is defined in the text, but clearly the true sophist can be both an eiron and alazon.

The fact that an eiron can be a type of alazon makes possible Colotes’ complaint that Socrates puts out adXa6vas Xbyovs (Adv. Col. 1117d). His words say one thing, while he does another-the perfect description of the eiron, agreeing entirely with Philodemus: “He praises what he criti- cizes elsewhere” (De vit. 22.1-3). The words elpov and aXa’cJv can appar- ently be used interchangeably in a charge of hypocrisy.

With this knowledge of how Philodemus characterizes the eiron, we can see that Plutarch’s defense of Socrates is not a defense at all to the Epicurean (Adv. Col. 1117d-e). Plutarch assumes that Socrates’ claim that he knows nothing and is always searching for the truth proves his sincerity and consistency, since the dialogues portray him always questioning and investigating. His claim also proves his right to be called a philosopher, since philosophers do in fact go around searching for truth-in contrast to Epicurus, who receives sacred offerings just like a god (Adv. Col. 1117e; fr. 130 Usener). For the Epicurean this claim, openly flaunted, is proof of his insincerity, his eironeia, because this sort of statement is just what an eiron would say (De vit. 22.20-22). As for Socrates’ right to be called a philosopher, we shall see below why his disclaimer of knowledge disqualifies him from the title of philosopher.18

The best preserved section, coll. 4-6, reviews Xen. Oec. 2.1 ff., in which Socrates declares that he is richer than Critobulus despite the fact that his property is five minas while Critobulus’ is one hundred times as much. Philodemus attacks Socrates’ judgement: “How can one with five minas be rich and one with five hundred be poor? How can five be enough for one, but not for the other? Should we call one ‘poor,’ the other ‘rich,’ because of their way of life?” (4.26-34). According to Philodemus, the reason Socrates can make such a statement is that he is accustomed to “name things, here the obviously poor man, according to his opinion, not according to a pattern built on common perceptions.20 Socrates always holds to what is not factual and commonsensical (irpaytarTKobv), as in this case, believing that five minas are enough for the necessities of life and for the natural desires of men, and in believing that prosperity in life is useless, and in not wanting more, since he has set his limit at five minas, contrary to all good sense” (5.1-14). It is important to note in this passage that Socrates is being criticized for wrong doctrine and for an incorrect epistemology, i.e., proceeding from a priori assumptions instead of sticking to facts. None of his personal qualities aggravates the error.

Epicurus’ only surviving comment on Socrates is a criticism of his eironeia (Cicero Brutus 292; fr. 231 Usener). Cicero considers Socrates’ eironeia to befacetam et elegantem and he does not agree with Epicurus, who criticized it. Again personal qualities, not philosophical doctrines, are the target.23

In short the Epicurean considers Socrates to have the undesirable traits of an eiron: he flatters others, conceals what he really thinks, does not practice what he preaches (this latter trait subsumed under the category &XauWv). What motives does the eiron have for acting this way? To determine first the motives of the eiron, and second, why this behavior is inappropriate to the role of philosopher, we must disentangle the various senses of the word edpoevda.2 Eironeia is not always bad; Cicero considered it witty and urbane; Aristotle in his definition of eironeia (Eth. Nic. 1127a23-b34) does not seem to be offended by the self-depreciators, who “are not too noticeable and obviously strike one as cultivated,“25 in contrast to the boasters who are crude. His mention of Socrates as the model eiron cannot be taken as a criticism of Socrates.26 Rather different are the eirones of Theophrastus Char. 1, Demosthenes Phil. 1.7.37, and of Aristophanes. These persons are not self-depreciators for the sake of urbanity and wit; instead they are persons who are reluctant to get involved in affairs; they wish to keep to their own business. Theophrastus’ eiron will “never confess to anything he is doing, but will always say that he is thinking about it,” or “hearing, he will affect not to have heard; seeing, not to have seen” (Jebb’s translation). Demosthenes describes the reluctance of the Athenians to act against Philip as eironeia: T’rv Yerf Tepav pa6bvrra Kai elpwvetav (Phil. 1.7.37). The self-depreciation that has come to be associated with eironeia can be used as an excuse for not joining in affairs. Indeed Philodemus’ eiron seems to have this motive: “He says the least, puts difficulties in his own way” (De vit. 23.9-11) or “He cannot understand what is said clearly” (23.16-22). Similar statements are at 22.22-23, 23.28-32.

The fundamental attitudes of the Epicureans toward philosophy and toward the role of the philosopher vis-a-vis his confraternity are out- lined in Philodemus’ IlepL irappralas (ed. A. Olivieri [Leipzig 1914]).28 The philosopher is in charge of a group of students who are “in preparation” (KaraaKeva6o6ervoL). He heals them of mental disease and error just as a doctor heals bodily disease (fr. 39). The philosopher is regarded by his students as their only savior (acrwTpa l6vov) or as a hero under whose guidance they will be safe (40.8-10). To promote the treatment the sage should “without any equivocation show to the person in his charge his mistakes and he should point out his shortcomings” (40.1-5). He can be blunt if necessary, taking the risk that this is the correct course for students who will not otherwise listen (10.3-7). In short the philosopher’s job is to help those under his guidance in any way possible. Philode- mus adds: “It follows by necessity that acting/thinking secretively (Xaapatoirpa,yev) is the most unfriendly of acts; the one who does not bring everything out into the open will be hiding these from the most excellent of friends” (41.1-10), the most excellent of friends being the philosopher. De Witt summarizes the intent of the confraternity thus: “All aimed to habituate themselves to receive admonition kindly and to administer it frankly and gently. All were to be animated by good will, and everyone was urged to become an apostle, never ceasing to proclaim the doctrines of true philosophy.”29

Philodemus’ concern for his students recalls that of his master, Epicurus, for his will (D.L. 10.16-22) and Diogenes Laertius’ comments (10.9) are witness to his concern and love for his fellow-philosophers. As a result of this concern he wished to leave behind his teachings in an easy-to-remember, summarized form, as he states in ad Hdt. 35-36, where he also makes it clear that the principal teachings should be memorized (EtZ fvlrioviLEtv [ad Hdt. 35.11]) to provide a firm basis for thought and action.30 For Philodemus, the use of rapprqala, “frankness,” is a manifestation of concern and true friendship, for not only does the philosopher help his students by pointing out their errors and shortcomings, but he can also be helped by frankness directed toward him: the sages “will inflict biting words on each other in a most kindly and healing manner, and they will recognize the kindness shown in giving this help” (Ilepi Wapp. col. 8a9-b5). The philosophers must be open to each other and willing to exchange truths without restraint. Such friendship and the mutual exchange of help deriving from it seem to have been the essence of Epicurean con- fraternities, along with a corresponding rejection of outside influence which could be disruptive.31 If anyone in the group has wisdom or can help his fellows, he must speak out frankly; withholding wisdom or advice would be the end of true philosophic friendship: KOLvd raT rv TV lXv. Epicurus’ maxim, “Of all things which wisdom provides to make life happy, much the greatest is the possession of friendship” (Sent. 27, Bailey’s translation) shows the value he placed on friendship, and his The eiron, Socrates, does not receive help or advice from others; no one in the dialogues is his equal. He does not give help or advice in frank openness, rather his statements are tongue-in-cheek, sly. Neither in his receiving nor in his giving help does Socrates practice rappvala, which for Philodemus seems to be the most important quality of the sage in his society. We may conjecture that the importance of irapprlala for the Epicureans lay in their desire to avoid alienating their students by refusing to be open and direct and to encourage the search for truth by letting everyone have his say. Their students were also their friends, and openness between friends was always considered a virtue. (See Plutarch’s Quomodo adulator 59b ff., likewise concerning rapprala.) The slyness which they thought characterized Socrates would put a distance between philosopher and student, a distance inimical to Epicurean friendship. For a specific example of Socrates’ eironeia and a comparable modern reaction to it, consider the Euthyphro, in which Socrates pretends to need help from Euthyphro in understanding what piety is (= self-depreciation; Euthyphro 5a-b; 7a) and in which he refuses any overt comment on Euthyphro’s outrageous prosecution of his father (= withdrawal, lack of concern). Both actions violate Epicurean feeling; the first is equivalent to flattery, the antithesis of the frankness advocated in Philodemus’ IHlep rapprfalas, frankness through which moral and philosophical education is best carried out; the second is an abdication of duty on the part of the philosopher, who has a responsibility to help his students, or in fact anyone he meets. (IIpl rapp-raias contains directions on how to use frankness to noblemen, older persons, women, and so on; it is not limited to students in the formal sense.) The Epicureans would echo the objec- tions raised by an imaginary opponent in an essay by Gregory Vlastos: “I don’t believe you (Socrates) really care for that man’s soul, for if you did, how could you have let him go with his head still stuffed with his superstitions?“32 The sage is neglecting his duty, indulging in his own vice.

Transcript (Unedited)

Cassius:

Welcome to Episode 322 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote on the Nature of Things, the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in this study of Epicurus at Epicureanfriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we’re following up on our discussion from last week, which focused on Cicero’s Varro going into the history of the Academy and explaining the role of Socrates in allegorically “bringing philosophy down from the heavens,” and the implications of that direction, along with the direction previously set by Pythagoras in causing Greek philosophy to move away from the focus on natural science, which had been near the heart of it for many generations previously.

Last week I mentioned the Cosmos series by Carl Sagan and episode seven Backbone of the Night in which Carl Sagan goes through this history for us, and I’ll repeat that reference because I highly recommend anyone interested in this at all to take a look at his description. It’s a much more artistic and eloquent and interesting audio video presentation of these issues than we can do here on the podcast. It has a dramatic failing in my point of view that it doesn’t even mention the name of Epicurus, but once you become familiar with the issues that we’re talking about, you will see that what Sagan was endorsing was what led to the philosophy of Epicurus and what Epicurus was doing in developing his theory of knowledge and his rejection of radical skepticism from Socrates. And the rejection of the platonic forms was directly in response to this line of thought, inaugurated by ris, advanced by Socrates and Plato, which led the Greeks away from the study of nature.

The text that we brought out last week was centered in section four of book one of academic questions, and we went through several aspects of what Varo said was the significance of Socrates, that he brought philosophy down from the heavens, that he thought that the heavenly bodies were either far out of reach of our knowledge, or that even if we became acquainted with their nature, they had no influence on living well. And he therefore changed the emphasis of his philosophy from the study of nature to the assertion that he knew nothing except the fact that he knew nothing and that this made him the wisest of men and caused him to focus on what he thought he could do to live well, even though his decisions were not being based on any opinions about the nature of the universe, that’s the reason that his discourses were entirely devoted to the praise of virtue and to encouraging all men to the study of virtue, as Veoh says, as may be plainly seen in the books of the disciples of Socrates and above all, and those of Plato.

Now what we mentioned last week but did not pursue is one of those books of Plato is the Fido, and the Fido is the book in which Plato relates the discussion that was held on the last day of Socrates’ life as he was waiting for the jailer to come in and administer the hemlock. Socrates discussed at that point with his followers who were present, why he was not concerned about facing death, why he thought that he was going to a better place and why he was actually happy about it, because he was convinced that the body and its sensations were actually an obstacle to the understanding of truth. And that Socrates was convinced due to his theory of recollection and preexistence of the soul, that the soul was itself immortal and that it would survive death and go to a better place allowing him to understand truth that had always been kept from him due to the distortions of the census.

Nearing the end of that discussion, Socrates throws open what he has said to his students and ask if they have any questions about what he has said, and he does receive some significant challenges, which of course, he through Plato bats away with confidence, bordering on arrogance, but which causes Socrates to explain further his position, especially in relation to the charge that, well, the soul may be more durable than the body, but just because the soul may be more durable than the body, that doesn’t mean the soul is going to last forever. That doesn’t mean the soul is immortal. That’s the question brought by one of Socrates as followers and Socrates thinks about the answer to that question and in explaining how he’s going to respond to that question, Socrates launches into what in modern philosophy is often described as Socrates’s second sailing or second voyage.

And the reason it’s summarized in that way is that Socrates goes into a very important discussion of his own past exploration of philosophy. And what Socrates does in explaining his position is he says that he looked into what he could determine about the causes of things, and then he says, then one day I heard a man reading from a book by Angora that it is the mind that arranges and causes all things. I was pleased with this theory of cause, and it seemed to me to be somehow right that the mind should be the cause of all things. And I thought, if this be so, the mind in arranging things arranges everything and establishes each thing as it is best for it to be. And when he had told me that he would go on to explain the cause and necessity of it and would tell me the nature of the best and why it is best for the earth to be as it’s for, I never imagined that when he said that they were ordered by intelligence, he would introduce any other cause for these things than that it is best for them to be as they are.

And then Socrates says, my glorious hope, my friend was quickly snatched away from me. And as I went on with my reading and I saw that the man made no use of intelligence and did not assign any real causes for the ordering of things, but mentioned as causes air and ether and water, Socrates proceeds with the criticism of simply itemizing the mechanics of the way things work. And he says, but it is most absurd to call things of that sort causes. So it seems to me that most people when they give the name of cause are groping in the dark as it were and giving it a name that does not belong to it. Now, I would gladly be the people of anyone who would teach me the nature of such a cause, but since that was denied me and I was not able to discover it myself or learn of it from anyone else, and since I had given up investigating realities, I decided that I must be careful not to suffer the misfortune, which happens to people who look at the sun and watch it during an eclipse, but some of them ruin their eyes unless they look at an image in water or something of the sort.

I thought of that danger and I was afraid my soul would be blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with any of my senses. So I thought I must have recourse to conceptions and examine in them the truth of realities. And of course, Socrates goes much further than I’m going to quote here today in the opening of this episode. But the bottom line is that it is very, very clear that Socrates pointed away from the study of natural science to the study of logos, to the study of ideas in themselves. And that’s what Plato develops in many of his dialogues into a discussion of what we call today, the platonic forms. It’s the basic idea that you are going to find truth in the study of logical constructions as opposed to finding truth through the senses and the observation of the universe. This is where if you have any lingering concerns that this could actually be the situation that such a divergence of opinion could actually be taking place. Go back to the Cosmos episode and let Carl Sagan walk you through as he goes over to Greece, goes to the island of Samos, talks about the Pythagorean solids and how all of this unwound to lead Greek philosophy away from the study of science. Now, before we turn to the second part of the epicurean criticism of Socrates, let’s see what Joshua would add to our discussion so far.

Joshua:

Cassius, as I hear you go through all of this and think back on everything that we’ve encountered as we’ve gone through all the works of Cicero that we’ve gone through, as we’ve branched out from there to explore what were the sources of his ideas, and we see how plainly ludicrous some of these claims are. And the question that I have and I realize is not one that is easy to answer or easy to answer in a way that we feel good about. The question I have is this, why do people fall for this stuff? What he’s saying is abandon your senses. They’re lying to you. The environment that you’re surrounded in is in such constant flux that it’s impossible for you to grasp hold of any real knowledge. And the only hope left to you to really learn anything, to know anything is to transcend this world with its lies and its illusions and to ascend into a world of perfect clarity and truth.

Why do people fall for these ideas? And I’m sure you’ve got your own ideas for that. One I wanted to bring up today is because it connects with something we talk about a lot, and that is virtue ethics. It’s the idea that what are you willing to sacrifice in order to prop up objective morality or absolute morality? What are you willing to sacrifice in order to prop up the notion that virtue is the telos? What are you willing to give away in order to be able to keep hold of those things that make you feel good about yourself, even if they’re not true? Because as we’ve gone through so many works by Cicero on this podcast, we’ve encountered point after point in which Cicero is putting on a great show of being deeply offended by something that Epicurus has said because he’s talking about pleasure and saying that pleasure is the good pleasure is the end to which we direct ourselves.

And that if you dismiss certain kinds of pleasures just because other people think that they are base or lowly, you throw everything into confusion because you’ve lost the very idea of the meaning of the word pleasure. And so many times as we’ve gone through these works, RO has put on a great show of being flabbergasted by what he’s hearing from Epicurus. And when you take a close look at this transmission from Socrates through Plato and down to Cicero, you see the claims that are being made there and you see that the claims do not stand up even to the most superficial level of scrutiny, but that people like Cicero put their faith in them because it makes them feel good about themselves and about the choices they make. It makes them feel like Marcus Reiss returning to imprisonment and Carthage to torture and death, that that was not just a great plan, but it was the only honorable thing left for him to do in this life was to submit to torture and death.

And that any system, any system of thought or system of philosophy that didn’t hold out that promise, the promise that great sacrifice or great courage would not be rewarded with the name of the good or the name of the telos. Any system that does not put virtue or morality or piety in that top spot is a system that someone like Cicero is going to reject. And it doesn’t matter what else is in that system of thought. It doesn’t matter that Epicurus is so much better able than Socrates to point to things in nature and use them as evidence and support of his conclusions. And it doesn’t matter to someone like Cicero that we think that we can rely on this evidence because we can come back to it again and again and we can show it to our friends and see what they think of it, and that by a series of observations over time and the accumulation of sensory evidence that we can strengthen our opinion and our confidence in these matters and they are willing to throw all of that away if only to clinging onto the life raft of virtue and virtue ethics and morality.

And I frequently find this kind of infuriating. It’s one of the many reasons I love Joseph Conrad, a paragraph from his author’s introduction to the shadow line, one of his novels. He says in that introduction, all my moral and intellectual being is penetrated by an invincible conviction that whatever falls under the dominion of our senses must be in nature. And however exceptional cannot differ in its essence from all the other effects of the visible and tangible world of which we are a self-conscious part. The world of the living contains enough marvels and mysteries as it is marvels and mysteries acting upon our emotions and intelligence in ways so inexplicable that it would almost justify the conception of life as an enchanted state. No, he says, I am too firm in my consciousness of the marvelous to be ever fascinated by the mere supernatural witch. Take it any way you like it’s but a manufactured article, the Fabrication of minds insensitive to the intimate delicacies of our relation to the dead, into the living in their countless multitudes, a desecration of our tenders memories, an outrage on our dignity.

And the reason Cassius, that I return again and again to this passage from Joseph Conrad is he is summoning not just natural philosophy to support his opinion. He is summoning an equal and opposite moral outrage at the Platos and the Socrates and the Ciceros of the world at people who would try to convince us that our senses are totally unreliable. People who would try to convince us that there is a sphere of existence and activity above or beyond nature, people who would try to convince us that the small things in this life like the pleasure, the relationships that we form with other people, that these things are not enough against this potential for either punishment or reward in another life. And as I say, the moral outrage that he’s able to summon here in defense of his own position, I think you kind of need that.

I think that as we approach these ideas from Socrates, you kind of need the ability to say, look, this is a matter of everything I love against everything I hate in the love category is pleasure and is exploration and the study of the world that we live in and making those connections between disparate phenomena in that world and using all of that to come to a better understanding and a higher synthesis of knowledge. And in the hate category is obscurantism and the absurdities of the charlatans who are trying to sell you something that you cannot have confidence in. And what they’re trying to sell you is the idea that you really cannot have confidence in anything. You can’t have confidence in your senses. You cannot have confidence that what you are experiencing in nature is any relationship with any kind of fact or truth independent of your existence.

And that really the only way to achieve any level of confidence is to leave everyone else behind in the cave and ascend up into the world of pure being. And it takes, I think, a kind of moral outrage, moral indignity of the kind that we see here in Joseph Conrad to meet those allegations. While at the same time being aware that there are people who are never going to come around because of what Tortez calls the glamor of a name. He says, those who place the chief good in virtue alone are beguiled by the glamor of a name and do not understand the true demands of nature. If they will consent to listen to Epicurus, they will be delivered from the grossest error your school. He says, dilates on the transcendent beauty of the virtues, but were they not productive of pleasure? Who would deem them either praiseworthy or desirable?

We esteem the art of medicine not for its interest as a science, but for its conduciveness to health. The art of navigation is commended for its practical and not its scientific value because it conveys the rules for sailing a ship with success. So also wisdom which must be considered as the art of living if it affected no result would not be desired, but as it is, it is desired because it is the artifice or that procures and produces pleasure. Interesting to note in this passage from Torti in Cicero on ends, what it says there about natural philosophy, we esteem the art of medicine not for its interest as a science, but for its conduciveness to health. It’s because these things are useful to us, largely that we’re interested in studying them, but the greatest use of all from Epicurus point of view is that this is how we rid ourselves of the fears and terrors that people have cultivated in us since we were children.

We have to study nature in order to get to know the causes of things. And in what you quoted there, Cassius Socrates is trying to look for the causes of things as well. What he hears, the idea that all causes proceed from the mind and he becomes totally in love with that idea and he’s ready to completely cast aside nature as being of any utility or any interest in the conversation. So there’s a lot of threads to keep in hand as we go through this. But at that point, which is that some people who are so beguiled by the glamor of the name of virtue, they’re not going to be willing to abandon this system, the system of Socrates and Plato if it means also abandoning the virtue ethics that makes them feel good about what they do and about the lives they’ve built for themselves. And if it makes them think for a moment that pleasure is a more worthwhile pursuit than virtue, they’re not going to be willing to abandon the system of Socrates and Plato.

Cassius:

Yeah, Joshua, let’s pursue this line of thought. We may even spend the whole episode talking about this so extremely important because I think you’re exactly correct in focusing on the importance of taking a position and certain things being good and certain things being bad. Now, you’ve talked about the reasons why people clinging to virtue ethics regardless of the implications of how it means that you’re going to walk away from the senses and walk away from the study of nature. Now, in Carl Sagan’s episode seven of Cosmos, he focuses on the reason being that this kind of attitude can come from wanting to justify your position within society. He points out that the Greece of this time period was largely a slave society and that were great inequities in society, and that finding things to be ordered by divine will justifies these inequities and lends divine sanction to things that are clearly controversial in nature.

That’s going on with Cicero as well in his own attempts to justify what he saw as the virtues that had made Rome great and to respond to criticisms that he saw being raised from the epicurean point of view. So clearly the desire to justify your own personal preferences is a significant part of motivation behind something like this. But rather than going so far in the direction of diagnosing a psychology, it seems to me we’re probably going to be more productive if we focus on how this comes about. And it’s that part that you spent a lot of time focusing on as well in discussing this issue of whether the universe is knowable or not. That’s the thread that Carl Sagan traces when he goes from S to Anex mander to Theodore, to impedes to Democrat, to an ris that despite disagreements among them, they were largely committed to the idea that it is possible through the study of nature to come to some conclusions about the way the universe really operates.

We can sometimes tend to overlook that today, but that divide exists even among those people who are not overtly trying to justify their own positions. We’ve all run into people who for whatever reason have come to the conclusion that attempting to find any kind of truth whatsoever is doomed to failure, that it is simply impossible to know anything that the world, especially today with the bombardment of different information technologies that we have, that the world is just totally unknowable because there’s so much conflict, so much difference of opinion. In fact, that’s an argument that Cicero uses to justify his own skepticism by pointing out that everybody has a different opinion about these things and if everybody has a different opinion, how can anybody hope to ever come to a conclusion about anything? And on that score, that’s what Vero was referring to in section four when he said that the successors of Socrates, the successors of Plato, whether it was the Peripatetics through Aristotle or the direct followers through Crucis, that both of those schools began to arrange a certain definite system of teaching, which abandoned the Socratic plan of doubting on every subject and of discussing everything without ever venturing on the assertion of a positive opinion, and that as a result there arose what Socrates would have been very far from a approving of himself.

What Socrates would’ve rejected that of a methodical arrangement of positions on a variety of subjects. The direction that Socrates had been going in was that nothing can be decided positively at all that all you can do is ask questions. And that’s the mentality that I was describing a few minutes ago. Sometimes it’s not motivated necessarily by what I would call maliciousness or intent to deceive. Sometimes it’s just pure frustration and exasperation and failure after failure of being able to come to a conclusion in your own mind about anything. And I believe it’s that as much as anything else that is that the essence of what Epicurean philosophy was all about. Plato himself was pulling back from not taking positive positions by going off into this discussion of ideal forms and saying that we may not be able to get to positive positions through the census, but at least we can come to some certainty through these ideal forms.

Aristotle went in a different direction and did provide some credence to the census and came up with this idea that there are essences within things that will allow us to make conclusions about certain things. The stoics went in the direction of following their ideas about pure logic and divine fire and used that as a basis for taking the position that their virtue ethics was correct. But all of them, as Barrow is pointing out here, are essentially deviating from socrates’s radical skepticism because they were taking certain positive positions about things. And so when Epicurus comes along, he also is going to reject the idea that we should doubt everything and never take a position. But Epicurus is going to find the answer to the problem of knowledge in the sense in the feelings of pleasure and pain. And in the anticipations, Epicurus is going to totally reject this idea of recollection and past lives that Socrates and Plato had suggested.

Epicurus is going to totally reject the prime move or argument from Aristotle. Epicurus is going to totally reject the intelligent design model, the divine fire model that the stoics were suggesting. And Epicurus is going to say that knowledge of the universe is possible, but it is through the study of natural science. And when you pursue that, you can come to important conclusions about the nature of your life. You can come to the conclusion that you have, but one life to live. You can come to the conclusion that you’re not going to spend an eternity in hell or heaven depending on your actions, but that you are like all other animals in nature providing guidance through pleasure and pain as to how to live. You come to the conclusion that a expansive understanding of pleasure as being actions consistent with nature are the right way to pursue your life, but you’re not going to be able to understand what that means unless you first take a position about basic aspects of the universe.

Everybody uses the word happiness, but everybody seems to have a different conception of what happiness is. How can you even communicate or think or come to any conclusions about anything unless you first have some clarity about what you’re talking about? That’s where the discussion about frankness and epicurean philosophy comes in because clarity of position, being willing to take a position about something is what Epicurus is really focusing on. He’s rejecting Socratic skepticism and saying that there is a basis for positive conclusions and that these positive conclusions will lead you along the path of living your life in the best way possible. On those points, as we’ve discussed it so far, I do think clearly Carl Sagan is right that the desire to perpetuate a political system is at the root of many people who are willing to just latch on to a system of virtue ethics without any deeper thought about its foundations at all.

But there’s also a group of people who through no malicious intent, fail to understand how to arrive at confidence and knowledge. So we’ve now talked extensively about the Socratic rejection of the study of natural science and the importance of that and all of the disaster that it has led to in western civilization and western philosophy. But that’s not all of the epicurean criticism of Socrates because what is also well known is exemplified by an article written by a man named Mark Riley under the title The Epicurean Criticism of Socrates. And he approaches the problem not as one entirely focused on natural science, but as on issues of character and the relationship of a teacher to his students. Riley notes that there were essentially three lines of attack on Socrates in the ancient world, one of them being the leading men of Athens who considered his views to be anti-democratic, which we can certainly see through Plato’s Republic in the ideal society that Socrates discusses there.

There was also a biographical attack on Socrates associated with a man named Eric Stocks inus, that Socrates was seething with hatred and malignity and that he was extremely lustful and did no harm because he confined himself to married women and prostitutes, and he was quick to anger. And there are a number of other personal attacks. But then the third of the attacks on Socrates is that of the Epicureans, which Riley describes as being based on a fundamental difference of opinion concerning the role of the philosopher and his behavior towards his students. Much of what we know about this is because of what was preserved in plu tars responses to Colotti, and it derives from the fact that Epicureans considered the philosopher who was professing wisdom to be someone who could bring salvation from the problems of life. And that when you consider Socrates as example that a philosopher is not a doctor assisting in the eradication mental disease, but is in fact someone who is detached and who’s simply asking questions and never giving any answers, that this is a dramatic contrast and approach.

An epic curium is going to assist other people by clearly telling them information that is going to be of benefit to them. The epicurean is not going to simply lead people around in circles asking questions without ever telling them what the answer is. And Riley says that the epicurean opposition was to the character and methods of Socrates. Cootes is recorded to have asked why Socrates puts food into his mouth instead of into his ear and why he eats food instead of grass. And that Socrates’ words were that of a charlatan or an imposter because he said one thing in the statements that are preserved in the dialogues, but what he did in his own real life was different than what he advocated. Socrates says that it is I to regard horses as being horses and men. Men what appears to be a horse may or may not actually be a horse.

The sense of impression has nothing to do with reality, and that of course is the very opposite of the epicurean position. Colius points out that the Socrates does not admit the reality of the world around us. He should logically not distinguish between grass versus any other kind of food. And of course, at this point in the discussion, it occurs to me to remember that we have not recently been talking about Book four of Lucious, but in that section where Lucretius is talking about the person who asserts that nothing can be known is admitting that he knows nothing. And that section which continues on into how the senses or the ultimate test of knowledge that’s all directly aimed at these arguments of Socrates and Plato about the nature of knowledge. We are not going to spend the time to go through the Fido in detail, but in that book and in others, Socrates states that the true philosopher tries to get away from the body and turn to the soul.

And the true philosopher regards the senses is inaccurate and indistinct and sees the soul as deceived by the body in any investigation of truth. This is around IDO 66 A. So that’s the criticism in terms of Socrates being inconsistent between his assertions and the actual practice of his life. If Kieran also criticized Socrates for asserting that he does not even know himself, this comes in the fibrous around Section two 30, Socrates can see men all around him, and yet he insists that he does not know what he himself is. He takes pride in this ignorance, and that’s a personal quality that puts Socrates outside the company of truly wise men. Boasting of one’s ignorance is the mark of a traditional Greek villain, a disassembler whose actions are rejected by Epicurus. These criticisms are also preserved in Phil Edemas who calls Socrates a hypocrite who claims to be less than he really is.

It’s a character trait that Phil Edemas goes into relatively at length that such a person does not say what he thinks, but in fact praises what he criticizes elsewhere, he belittles himself and those like him, for example, if anyone praises him and asks him to speak, a person like Socrates will reply, what do I know except that I know nothing? Or What reputation do I have? So Phil is criticizing this as being a type of imposter who conceals what he thinks. That’s the opposite of being clear and frank in discussing of what you think to be true, Lu tar tries to defend Socrates and saying that he’s simply being sincere, that he really doesn’t know anything at all. But if that’s the case, it simply means that Socrates is not a philosopher from the Epicurean point of view, and that takes him out of the arena of those who should be listened to.

And so Riley reports that Philas says that the philosopher from the epicurean point of view is in charge of a group of students who are in preparation, and the philosopher is going to heal them of mental diseases and error just as a doctor heals bodily disease to promote this kind of treatment. The wise philosopher should quote without any equivocation show to the person in his charge his mistakes. That’s this frankness we’re talking about, but not to do it out of any concern of arrogance or showing that you’re smarter than the other person, but is to help those who are under his guidance in any way possible. And from this point of view, Phil Dima says it follows by necessity that acting or thinking secretively is the most unfriendly of Acts. The one who does not bring everything out into the open will be hiding these from his friends.

That’s an aspect of this that needs to be considered in just the general concept of friendship. If you are someone’s friend, you are trying to help them. You’re trying to give them information that you believe to be true because it will help them. You’re not lording over these other people by emphasizing through irony and hiding the ball that they should have to reason things out entirely by themselves when you have the ability to help them get out of their dilemma more quickly. As we’ve been discussing already, some are not able at all despite all the effort they put into philosophy and the search for knowledge to come to the information that they need to live better lives. And the epicurean is going to be like Lucretius who talks about those who are wandering with hearts and darkness. You’re going to want to help those people, bring them the information that they need and not just keep them spinning around in circles by asking questions and professing that there are no answers.

So lemme bring what I’m saying there to a conclusion by wrapping it up into this, that even though Epicurus disagreed with Aristotle in certain aspects of his conclusions, even though Epicurus disagreed with the stoics in many aspects of their conclusions, Epicurus was at least in agreement with Aristotle and the stoics that it is important to say what you mean and mean what you say. If you believe something to be true, it’s important to put it out there and assist those who need that information and not just act like no conclusions are possible. That in fact is the worst possible approach to those who are really seeking a better way of life, relief from anxiety relief, from disease relief, from false fears about going to hell or being punished by Gods. Yes, the epicureans rejected the Socratic platonic abandonment of the study of natural science, but at an even deeper level and really for the same reason the Epicureans were rejecting the Socratic and Pythagorean tendency and direction towards mysticism, which allows you to take the position that Joshuas has brought up earlier, that it is acceptable to just jump straight to virtue ethics without ever explaining a basis and a foundation and an argument in support of why that virtue ethic is correct.

We’ve talked numbers of times about Lucians Hermo timus dialogue, and that is the point that Ellucian raises there. It is essential at the very beginning of an analysis to make sure that you understand and agree with the premises of the argument once you accept premises that are false. Once you accept arguments that there is a true reality outside of this one, once you first start down the road laid by false premises, logical consistency pulls you out like a undertow into the ocean, it becomes impossible through logic to escape the errors of your first fundamental error. And when you start out with a presumption that no knowledge is possible and that we can in fact legitimately go straight to virtue ethics, you are already lost at that point. You have denied yourself the ability to return to reality just as epicure says in his principle doctrines, once you abandoned the sense you have abandoned and lost your ability to determine the difference between truth and falsity.

Joshua:

Well, about the disconnect between the advice given and the behavior we see in the philosopher, there is an excellent story relating to DIY the cynic, and I’m reading from a website philosophy now, a magazine of ideas. And the author writes about Apus, who’s the main focus of this article. AIP is loved to puncture people’s pretensions. One day he was at the baths with DGen, the cynic whom Cicero described as notorious for the most frantic excesses of moroseness and self-denial and quote, this was the man whom Alexander the Great visited and invited him, ask of me what you want. And from Diese, he received the Curt reply stand out of my light AIP has left the baths first and took Diage Denise’s old cloak leaving behind his own expensive purple one. A purple robe was regarded as elegant by Athenian society. When diodes discovered what had happened, he went running naked after Aus demanding his old cloak back.

Aus chided him for being so concerned about his reputation that he would rather go cold than be seen wearing purple. And I hope everyone sees the point of this, which is that Diese is so wrapped up in his own self-image As I live in a wine jar or I live in a giant tub in the streets, I live like a dog in a kennel and my cloak, my warm, tattered, disgusting old cloak is part of this image. And if people see me walking around interior and purple, they’re going to think that I suddenly think that I’m royalty and that he’s more concerned about how he comes across to the very people that he himself is often chiding for their own self involvement. I mean, Diese is walking through the streets with a lamp, and when asked about it, he says he’s looking for a true Athenian or a real man.

He’s looking for someone who isn’t wrapped up in their delusions. And yet we see here in this little anecdote that he’s really no different from the people he’s criticizing. In fact, he’s worse. In fact, he is more ridiculous and more absurd in protecting his reputation as a dog than these other people are in building their own lives as humans. So as I said, I think that’s a great story. It really captures something in some of what was circulating in Greece in Epicurus, his lifetime with these people putting on a great show. But really, when you pull the veil back, you just see how silly what they’re trying to do really is. I mean, if you read Book six of Plato’s Republic, his goal is not to point out that the interlocutor doesn’t know. His goal is to reach the conclusion that we live in a world of constant change, a world of becoming, and that what we need to do, this is not like an option.

This is the purpose of philosophy. This is a reason that we hear in down with a critical thinking faculty in the first place. What we have to do is learn to transcend the world of mere becoming and rise up into the world of pure and perfect being where things don’t change. We’re this Ian physics of constant flocks where that is no longer the ruling principle. And in order to do this, we have to use geometry to get there. And once we’ve gotten there, we have to come back down and we have to use what we’ve learned to instruct the people around us and to take leadership roles in this imagined republic because the person who has left the cave and come back into it sees 10,000 times better than the person who’s never left the cave. So it’s very much not let’s all gather around and question our own perceived knowledge. It’s we’re working towards this set of conclusions. And the whole purpose of this exercise is to reach those conclusions specifically. Why else would Plato put over the door of the academy? Let none ignorant of geometry enter here. This is the whole point you’re here.

Cassius:

So what we’ve discussed today has been understanding why Socrates was so controversial among the ancient Epicureans. We’re going to continue to discuss these issues in coming weeks because it is so embedded into the fabric of current ideas about Socrates and Plato and philosophy that the Socratic method is a good thing, that we are simply using it as a technique of making people think so that they will understand things better. But in the end, this all originated because as Carl Sagan said, Plato Socrates, they had agendas of their own. And the ultimate purpose of abandoning natural science, of arguing that truth comes through dialectic rather than through the study of nature, is to undermine confidence in the sense so that you will not attempt to study nature yourself and come to your own conclusions. You will end up relying on the arguments of the plaintiffs, the socratics, and those who say that the individual has no ability to learn these things for themselves, that it is this other worldliness of forms, ideas, or religion, which is where the ultimate truth resides and not in this world. We’ll continue to discuss these issues in coming weeks. Thanks for your time today. Be sure to drop by our form and let us know if you have any comments or questions on these discussions. We’ll be back again soon. See you then. Bye.