Episode 322 - The Epicurean Criticism of Socrates For His Treatment Of Those Seeking Answers

In this episode we will continue discussion of the Epicurean criticism of Socrates, this time focusing on Socrates’ character and manner of teaching.

Riley - The Epicurean Criticism of Socrates

Three general lines of attack on Socrates are recorded f

1. The original accusation of Meletus and the public feeling which lead to the accusation. The basis of this charge seems to be that Socrates, anti-democratic himself, was responsible for the education and thus the excesses of Critias and Alcibiades.
2. The biographical tradition beginning with Aristoxenus’ Life of Socrates.4 “Seething with hatred and malignity,” he collected or invented a mass of derogatory information: Socrates was extremely lustful but did no harm because he confined himself to married women and prostitutes (fr. 54a and b); he was quick to anger (fr. 56), and so on.
3. The polemic of the Epicureans, on which I wish to concentrate. The Epicureans are often said to be characterized by abusive and defamatory language, as Plutarch puts it. … Epicurus (D.L. 10.7-8): “Plato’s school he called the ‘toadies of Dionysius;’ their master himself the ‘golden’ Plato.” … Their opposition was based on a fundamental difference of opinion concerning the role of the philosopher and his behavior towards his students.

The Specific Epicurean Critique

To the Epicureans the philosopher possessed wisdom which could bring salvation from irrational fears and desires if the disciple could only be convinced of the truth of his master’s teachings-note Lucretius’ pleas to Memmius in De Rerum Natura (1.50 ff.; 5.8 ff.).7 The contrast between this view and Socrates’ detachment, his efforts to make his hearers think for themselves, could not be more clear. This contrast seems to have been recognized by the Epicureans themselves, who proceeded to criticize Socrates for his errors, not primarily of doctrine, but of character and method. That their opposition was to the character and methods of Socrates in particular, not to the doctrines which he shared with Plato and the Academy (in the philosophic tradition), is shown by the moderation and brevity of Colotes’ attack on Plato in his work On the Point that Conformity to the Doctrines of the Other Philosophers Actually Makes it Impossible to Live, quoted passim by Plutarch in Adversus Colotem, and by the paucity of hostile references to Plato in Epicurus and by their generality: “flatterer of Dionysius” comes from the general anti-Platonic tradition; “golden” seems vague enough to cover any reference to haughtiness of manner or style.

First

In his work mentioned above Colotes criticizes a number of philosophers for expounding doctrines which violate good common sense. He asks why Socrates puts food into his mouth instead of into his ear, and why he eats food instead of grass (Adv. Col. 1108b), concluding with the accusations that Socrates’ words were charlatans or imposters (aXarbvas … X6yovs) because what he said in the dialogues was one thing, but what he did was quite different (1117d).

The doctrine attacked here is Plato’s, briefly criticized in the section of the essay immediately preceding (1115c-1116e). Colotes had said, “But Plato says that it is idle to regard horses as being horses and men men” (1115c). Plutarch’s defence makes it clear that Colotes is criticizing Plato for considering the visible world around us, the world of 64a, as unreal, and for postulating a world of the vorTr6v, i.e., of the Forms, as real (1115d ff.). Hence what appears as a horse may or may not actually be one; the sense of impression has nothing to do with “reality.” Such an opinion is of course the very opposite of the Epicurean position; compare ad Hdt. 38: “It is necessary to test everything in the light of our sense impressions (Kara& ras alo-oaSs).”

Considering how fundamental this disagreement is, we might have expected a more extensive or lively criticism from Colotes. Instead the jeers and the ridicule at the practical effects of Plato’s opinion are directed at Socrates, whose words prompted Colotes’ attack. Socrates states that the true philosopher tries to get away from the body and turn to the soul, regards the senses as inaccurate and indistinct, and sees the soul as deceived by the body in any investigation of truth. In short Socrates declares that the philosopher must use the light of the mind to attain a knowledge of true being (Phaedo 66a)-precisely Plato’s doctrine attacked by Colotes. Since Socrates does not admit the reality of the world around us, he should logically not distinguish between grass and food, between high and low water, and so on.

Now the logical consequences of this refusal to attribute reality to the perceptible world around us should be the same as the consequences of refusing to take a position at all on what is reality. The latter position is CEroxi, suspension of judgement, and is attributed to the Sceptics, chiefly to Pyrrho of Elis. That Sceptics were expected in some circles to live up to their profession is shown by Diogenes Laertius (9.62) on Pyrrho: “He led a life consistent with this doctrine (i.e., agnosticism and suspension of judgement), going out of his way for nothing, taking no precautions, but facing all risks as they came, whether carts, precipices, dogs, or what not, and generally leaving nothing to the arbitrament of the senses.” This testimony from Antigonus of Carystus, roughly a contemporary of Colotes (both third century B.C.), indicates that Colotes could have felt justified in criticizing Socrates for not following the practical conse- quences of his doctrine. Socrates’ words are imposters; he himself is an imposter, because he lives as if the world around us were real; he follows the clues offered by sight, whereas to be consistent he should ignore this illusion and follow what is really real, whatever the consequences. Thus the basic fault of Socrates is not wrong belief but the inconsistency between his belief and his practice.

Second

Colotes’ second criticism of Socrates, that he flaunts the boast that he does not even know himself (Adv. Col. 1118c, referring to Phaedrus 230a), adds to the characterization of Socrates. Again he is charged with ignoring the obvious; for the Epicurean, man can be defined by pointing to a man and saying “man is this kind of shape here combined with animation” (Sextus Empiricus Math. 7.267; fr. 310 Usener). Socrates can see men all around, yet he insists he does not know what he is. More important is the attack implied in the word “flaunting;” not only is Socrates in error, but he boasts of his error and ignorance. This pride in his ignorance is a personal quality which puts Socrates outside the company of truly wise men, according to Epicurus, who states “the wise man will dogmatize, not suspend judgement”-ooy,tarLelv re KaL OVK a7opraWEv (D.L. 10.121; fr. 562 Usener). Boasting of one’s ignorance is also the mark of a traditional Greek villain, the dissembler (elpwv). An eiron’s acts are also rejected by the Epicurean, as I shall now show.

Philodemus appends to his discussion a letter of Ariston of Keos which is likewise a guide to relieving the fault of arrogance: Philodemus adds that arrogance can arise from other causes, including philosophy itself, as in the cases of Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Empedocles, and Socrates (10.15-25). The subsequent discussion shows in what way each of these is arrogant.

The fourth philosopher, Socrates, belongs among the eirones, the hypocrites who claim to be less than they are. This fault of character is treated at length, and practically the whole text has survived (De vit. 21.37-23.37).15 The eiron does not say what he thinks: “He praises what he criticizes elsewhere” (22.3). “He commonly belittles and criticizes himself and those like him” (22.4-5); for example, if anyone praises him and asks him to speak, he replies, “What do I know except that I know nothing” or “What reputation do I have?” (22.17-23). He overflows with praise for others: “Blessed is so-and-so because of his character, or his wealth, or his luck” (22.25-27). He adds complimentary adjectives to proper names: “Handsome Phaedrus, wise Lysias” (22.27-32). If he contributes anything wise, he attributes it to others, just as Socrates attributes his knowledge of economics to Aspasia and Ischomachus (22.32-35). He depreciates himself: “You are right in looking down on me, ignorant as I am; I look down on myself,” or “Would that I were young and not so old, so that I might take lessons from you” (23.12-16). Further examples follow, then Philodemus adds: “What need to say more? The person who compiled the Socratic dialogues (has supplied us with enough examples)” (23.35-37).16 This last comment is by Philo- demus himself abridging Ariston’s list of examples; for similar statements indicating abridgment compare: “That is enough to say on this topic” (16.27-28), and “What need to say any more about such ranters and ravers” (20.26-27).

Philodemus was correct in taking the eiron’s statements as typical of Socrates. Many of the statements can be paralleled in the dialogues: “I know that I know nothing” (22.2) is attributed to Socrates in Plato’s Apology 21d and in Diogenes Laertius 2.32. The list of flattering epithets, xpo7r6v, r EXvv , yaeXi, yevvaZov, &avpeTov (22.30-32) can be found as follows: TOP XPffarTov OcoE6pOP (Phaedrus 266e), cbs 6vs el (Gorg. 491e), wc yevval IIlXe (Gorg. 473d), avspelos yap E (Gorg. 494d).17 In Xenophon’s Oecono- micus Socrates does attribute his knowledge of economics to Aspasia (Oec. 3.14-15) and to Ischomachus (Oec. 7.2 if.). For the self-depreciation typical of the eiron see Socrates’ last speech in the Euthyphro (16a) for one example of many. There can be no doubt that Socrates is regarded as the archeypal eiron, depreciating himself, claiming to know nothing, flattering others.

Philodemus also considers the eiron to be “a type of imposter” (&XacW’v; De vit. 21.37-38) because he conceals what he thinks. ‘AXacbv and elpov are also combined in Aristophanes, where both become flattering descrip- tions of the sophist. In The Clouds Strepsiades is so hard-pressed by expenses that he is willing to do anything to appear bold, quick-witted, and so on; he recites twenty-one characteristics of the sophist who can make wrong seem right (Nub. 445-451). To become such a sophist, he is willing to hand himself over to Socrates, who presumably already has these twenty-one virtues. Among these terms are edpwv, dissembler, and aXabPv, imposter, cheat. Neither word is defined in the text, but clearly the true sophist can be both an eiron and alazon.

The fact that an eiron can be a type of alazon makes possible Colotes’ complaint that Socrates puts out adXa6vas Xbyovs (Adv. Col. 1117d). His words say one thing, while he does another-the perfect description of the eiron, agreeing entirely with Philodemus: “He praises what he criti- cizes elsewhere” (De vit. 22.1-3). The words elpov and aXa’cJv can appar- ently be used interchangeably in a charge of hypocrisy.

With this knowledge of how Philodemus characterizes the eiron, we can see that Plutarch’s defense of Socrates is not a defense at all to the Epicurean (Adv. Col. 1117d-e). Plutarch assumes that Socrates’ claim that he knows nothing and is always searching for the truth proves his sincerity and consistency, since the dialogues portray him always questioning and investigating. His claim also proves his right to be called a philosopher, since philosophers do in fact go around searching for truth-in contrast to Epicurus, who receives sacred offerings just like a god (Adv. Col. 1117e; fr. 130 Usener). For the Epicurean this claim, openly flaunted, is proof of his insincerity, his eironeia, because this sort of statement is just what an eiron would say (De vit. 22.20-22). As for Socrates’ right to be called a philosopher, we shall see below why his disclaimer of knowledge disqualifies him from the title of philosopher.18

The best preserved section, coll. 4-6, reviews Xen. Oec. 2.1 ff., in which Socrates declares that he is richer than Critobulus despite the fact that his property is five minas while Critobulus’ is one hundred times as much. Philodemus attacks Socrates’ judgement: “How can one with five minas be rich and one with five hundred be poor? How can five be enough for one, but not for the other? Should we call one ‘poor,’ the other ‘rich,’ because of their way of life?” (4.26-34). According to Philodemus, the reason Socrates can make such a statement is that he is accustomed to “name things, here the obviously poor man, according to his opinion, not according to a pattern built on common perceptions.20 Socrates always holds to what is not factual and commonsensical (irpaytarTKobv), as in this case, believing that five minas are enough for the necessities of life and for the natural desires of men, and in believing that prosperity in life is useless, and in not wanting more, since he has set his limit at five minas, contrary to all good sense” (5.1-14). It is important to note in this passage that Socrates is being criticized for wrong doctrine and for an incorrect epistemology, i.e., proceeding from a priori assumptions instead of sticking to facts. None of his personal qualities aggravates the error.

Epicurus’ only surviving comment on Socrates is a criticism of his eironeia (Cicero Brutus 292; fr. 231 Usener). Cicero considers Socrates’ eironeia to befacetam et elegantem and he does not agree with Epicurus, who criticized it. Again personal qualities, not philosophical doctrines, are the target.23

In short the Epicurean considers Socrates to have the undesirable traits of an eiron: he flatters others, conceals what he really thinks, does not practice what he preaches (this latter trait subsumed under the category &XauWv). What motives does the eiron have for acting this way? To determine first the motives of the eiron, and second, why this behavior is inappropriate to the role of philosopher, we must disentangle the various senses of the word edpoevda.2 Eironeia is not always bad; Cicero considered it witty and urbane; Aristotle in his definition of eironeia (Eth. Nic. 1127a23-b34) does not seem to be offended by the self-depreciators, who “are not too noticeable and obviously strike one as cultivated,“25 in contrast to the boasters who are crude. His mention of Socrates as the model eiron cannot be taken as a criticism of Socrates.26 Rather different are the eirones of Theophrastus Char. 1, Demosthenes Phil. 1.7.37, and of Aristophanes. These persons are not self-depreciators for the sake of urbanity and wit; instead they are persons who are reluctant to get involved in affairs; they wish to keep to their own business. Theophrastus’ eiron will “never confess to anything he is doing, but will always say that he is thinking about it,” or “hearing, he will affect not to have heard; seeing, not to have seen” (Jebb’s translation). Demosthenes describes the reluctance of the Athenians to act against Philip as eironeia: T’rv Yerf Tepav pa6bvrra Kai elpwvetav (Phil. 1.7.37). The self-depreciation that has come to be associated with eironeia can be used as an excuse for not joining in affairs. Indeed Philodemus’ eiron seems to have this motive: “He says the least, puts difficulties in his own way” (De vit. 23.9-11) or “He cannot understand what is said clearly” (23.16-22). Similar statements are at 22.22-23, 23.28-32.

The fundamental attitudes of the Epicureans toward philosophy and toward the role of the philosopher vis-a-vis his confraternity are out- lined in Philodemus’ IlepL irappralas (ed. A. Olivieri [Leipzig 1914]).28 The philosopher is in charge of a group of students who are “in preparation” (KaraaKeva6o6ervoL). He heals them of mental disease and error just as a doctor heals bodily disease (fr. 39). The philosopher is regarded by his students as their only savior (acrwTpa l6vov) or as a hero under whose guidance they will be safe (40.8-10). To promote the treatment the sage should “without any equivocation show to the person in his charge his mistakes and he should point out his shortcomings” (40.1-5). He can be blunt if necessary, taking the risk that this is the correct course for students who will not otherwise listen (10.3-7). In short the philosopher’s job is to help those under his guidance in any way possible. Philode- mus adds: “It follows by necessity that acting/thinking secretively (Xaapatoirpa,yev) is the most unfriendly of acts; the one who does not bring everything out into the open will be hiding these from the most excellent of friends” (41.1-10), the most excellent of friends being the philosopher. De Witt summarizes the intent of the confraternity thus: “All aimed to habituate themselves to receive admonition kindly and to administer it frankly and gently. All were to be animated by good will, and everyone was urged to become an apostle, never ceasing to proclaim the doctrines of true philosophy.”29

Philodemus’ concern for his students recalls that of his master, Epicurus, for his will (D.L. 10.16-22) and Diogenes Laertius’ comments (10.9) are witness to his concern and love for his fellow-philosophers. As a result of this concern he wished to leave behind his teachings in an easy-to-remember, summarized form, as he states in ad Hdt. 35-36, where he also makes it clear that the principal teachings should be memorized (EtZ fvlrioviLEtv [ad Hdt. 35.11]) to provide a firm basis for thought and action.30 For Philodemus, the use of rapprqala, “frankness,” is a manifestation of concern and true friendship, for not only does the philosopher help his students by pointing out their errors and shortcomings, but he can also be helped by frankness directed toward him: the sages “will inflict biting words on each other in a most kindly and healing manner, and they will recognize the kindness shown in giving this help” (Ilepi Wapp. col. 8a9-b5). The philosophers must be open to each other and willing to exchange truths without restraint. Such friendship and the mutual exchange of help deriving from it seem to have been the essence of Epicurean con- fraternities, along with a corresponding rejection of outside influence which could be disruptive.31 If anyone in the group has wisdom or can help his fellows, he must speak out frankly; withholding wisdom or advice would be the end of true philosophic friendship: KOLvd raT rv TV lXv. Epicurus’ maxim, “Of all things which wisdom provides to make life happy, much the greatest is the possession of friendship” (Sent. 27, Bailey’s translation) shows the value he placed on friendship, and his The eiron, Socrates, does not receive help or advice from others; no one in the dialogues is his equal. He does not give help or advice in frank openness, rather his statements are tongue-in-cheek, sly. Neither in his receiving nor in his giving help does Socrates practice rappvala, which for Philodemus seems to be the most important quality of the sage in his society. We may conjecture that the importance of irapprlala for the Epicureans lay in their desire to avoid alienating their students by refusing to be open and direct and to encourage the search for truth by letting everyone have his say. Their students were also their friends, and openness between friends was always considered a virtue. (See Plutarch’s Quomodo adulator 59b ff., likewise concerning rapprala.) The slyness which they thought characterized Socrates would put a distance between philosopher and student, a distance inimical to Epicurean friendship. For a specific example of Socrates’ eironeia and a comparable modern reaction to it, consider the Euthyphro, in which Socrates pretends to need help from Euthyphro in understanding what piety is (= self-depreciation; Euthyphro 5a-b; 7a) and in which he refuses any overt comment on Euthyphro’s outrageous prosecution of his father (= withdrawal, lack of concern). Both actions violate Epicurean feeling; the first is equivalent to flattery, the antithesis of the frankness advocated in Philodemus’ IHlep rapprfalas, frankness through which moral and philosophical education is best carried out; the second is an abdication of duty on the part of the philosopher, who has a responsibility to help his students, or in fact anyone he meets. (IIpl rapp-raias contains directions on how to use frankness to noblemen, older persons, women, and so on; it is not limited to students in the formal sense.) The Epicureans would echo the objec- tions raised by an imaginary opponent in an essay by Gregory Vlastos: “I don’t believe you (Socrates) really care for that man’s soul, for if you did, how could you have let him go with his head still stuffed with his superstitions?“32 The sage is neglecting his duty, indulging in his own vice.